Katrina-- To allign those interested in this discussion it would help if we
were
all "on the same page." Are you referring to the English Language edition of
Fundamentals of Defectology? I am a little uncertain but I think so. p. 60
discusses
Pavolv and the notion of reflex (my eye was caught by the statement that all
psychological
acts are characterized by their future-oriented directedness). p,. 66 is
about blind children
but focuses on social disruption.
If that is correct, we can post some of the text to make it accessible to
those interested. Could you advise me please on what (minimal!) text we
would need to
reproduce?
mike
On 12/2/06, Katarina Rodina <katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no> wrote:
>
> Andy,
> First, my questions were referring to the significance of "modernist" and
> Darwinist/biological approaches to psychology, i.e. CHAT psychology and
> the holistic part of the "psychology of disability" (Vygotsky's concept of
> dysontogenesis).
>
> I fail to see the actuality and relevance of these issues to psychology
> and education in what might be described as a postmodern cultural
> situation (at least in the West). So why is this so important? Why should
> we spend time, energy and intellectual faculties on these issues?
>
> Second, Vygotsky as a clinical psychologist is predominantly
> anti-modernist and anti-behaviorist, possibly even anti-evolutionist. We
> can trace his ontological view on disability back to the period 1924-1934.
> Vygotsky ("Fundamentals of Defectology", 1993:30) was opposed to modernist
> positivist methodology using predominantly quantitative diagnostics as an
> "arithmetical conception of a handicapped condition". In his work
> Defektologia, Vygotsky was clearly opposed to a biological view on
> disability as a static condition. Vygotsky's view on the nature of
> disability as a dialectical process - "social aberration" (1993:66) -
> highlighted in his concept of "complex structures of disability", in the
> understanding of "abnormal ontogenesis" and the concept of disabled
> persons as "ingrown/rooted into culture" is essentially social
> constructionist, possibly even "pre-postmodernist"(Neuman & Holzman
> 1997:25). The question is: in what way was vygotskian social
> constructionist (not constructivist) psychology, especially in regard to
> disability, influenced by Spinoza-Descartes (modernistic epistemologists)?
>
> P.S. May I remind you that I have previously tried to highlight similar
> perspectives:
>
> > I have some difficulties seeing LSV as a Marxist, more than a
> > social-constructionist, inspired by the French sociological school,
> German
> > idealism etc (which was not unusual in the Russian "underground"
> > intellectual culture at the beginning of the 20th century in the fields
> of
> > literature, arts etc). Vygotsky's work (from his "Psychology of Art",
> > 1915, to the very last writings of 1934 in the field of psychopathology
> > and defectology) is constructionist (Gergen 1995; 2001) as well as
> > non-constructivist (see Karpov, 2005). From my point of view, Vygotsky's
> > social constructionist views do not represent the same view on the
> social
> > construction of mind as in the social constructionist theory by Bergman
> &
> > Luckman (1966), which explain human socialisation from an evolutionist
> > perspective. I would rather say that Vygotsky's social constructionism
> is
> > an historical (not evolutionist) situated approach to the understanding
> of
> > human cultural development.
>
> http://www.lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2006_10.dir/0279.html
>
> Yours,
> Katarina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, December 1, 2006 23:58, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > I think that's too big a question for me, Katarina. What is your
> specific
> > issue in relation to the psychology of disability?
> > Andy
> > At 10:50 PM 1/12/2006 +0100, you wrote:
> >
> >>Hi Andy, Sasha and everybody else interested in these issues,
> >>
> >>Could you kindly explain the significance of this developmental
> >>Spinoza-Descartes-Hegel-Marx-Ilyenkov point of view in relation to
> >>Vygotsky's early works and clinical research in the field of special
> >>psychology & education? What ideas were important for Vygotsky`s
> >>theoretical foundation for the psychology of disability?
> >>
> >>Yours,
> >>Katarina
> >>
> >>
> >>On Thu, November 30, 2006 08:57, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >> > Firstly, Sasha I recommended Lektorsky's book purely and simply
> >> because it
> >> > is a book-length treatment of this very complex subject from within
> >> our
> >> > shared tradition. I recognise the kinship of my ideas with both
> >> Lektorsky
> >> > and AN Leontyev but nothing in what I have said was intended as a
> >> > representation of the ideas of these two writers. It is all my own
> >> view. I
> >> > have no bone to pick with Lektorsky, Leontyev or anyone else in this
> >> broad
> >> > tradition of enquiry.
> >> >
> >> > Secondly, we are surely talking at cross purposes. Yes, a "subject"
> is
> >> *by
> >> > definition* self-conscious and yes I do exclude plant life from
> >> > participation in the subject-object relation in the role of subject.
> I
> >> am
> >> > aware of the relation between any organism and "its" object and how
> >> this
> >> > state of being can be seen as part of the biological evolution
> towards
> >> > human life. But I am not giving lessons in Darwinism. I will leave
> >> > speculations about the dialectics of nature for the biologists. (BTW,
> >> I
> >> > have no time for the application of the notion of "emergence" outside
> >> of
> >> > the narrow domain for which it is applicable. I don't know why you
> >> mention
> >> > this.)
> >> >
> >> > Thirdly, not even a human individual is a subject actually, let alone
> >> a
> >> > sea
> >> > cucumber. It is also wrong to describe the working class as a
> subject,
> >> > though for different reasons. If you want to label every form of life
> >> as a
> >> > subject because it is active, then that's fine. The word 'active', in
> >> > English at least, can be used that way, and may be useful for the
> >> study of
> >> > biology. But such a notion contributes absolutely nothing to
> resolving
> >> the
> >> > problem of the place of the individual in modern capitalist society,
> >> the
> >> > design of experiments into learning, understanding the persuasiveness
> >> of
> >> > neo-conservative scaremongering, the reasons for low levels of
> >> literacy
> >> > among immigrant populations, etc., etc., etc..
> >> >
> >> > My interest in a notion of subjectivity is for the purpose and only
> >> for
> >> > the
> >> > purpose of resolving these kinds of questions.
> >> >
> >> > The problem of freedom is in fact posed at two distinct levels: (1)
> at
> >> the
> >> > level of free-will vs Laplacian determinism. This was the problem
> >> which
> >> > bothered Spinoza and still bothers people like John R Searle, for
> >> example,
> >> > who are interested in finding the key to consciousness in neurons and
> >> > electrons; and (2) the problem of humanism vs structuralism, or
> >> > culturalism
> >> > vs constructivism, liberalism vs communitarianism, etc., the problems
> >> > raised by Anna Stetsenko and Stephen Billett about agency and
> >> > individuality, all those questions about whether human beings really
> >> can
> >> > determine their own lives, or on the contrary they are prisoners (not
> >> of
> >> > biological or molecular forces, but) of social structures and
> >> historical
> >> > forces.
> >> >
> >> > Andy
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > At 03:30 AM 30/11/2006 +0300, you wrote:
> >> >>Hi, Andy
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>I'm afraid but I think that just in this issue we have better to base
> >> our
> >> >>analysis on Marx and Il'enkov themselves than on Lektorsky. If you
> are
> >> >>retelling him correctly he doesn't gives us an insight into the
> >> problem
> >> >> of
> >> >>Subject and Object (Predmet) relation but simply shares the old
> >> mistake
> >> >> with
> >> >>A.N.Leont'ev.
> >> >>
> >> >>If subject is "some self-conscious system of activity" it means that
> >> both
> >> >>animals and plants can't be estimated as subjects, surely, if we
> don't
> >> >>ascribe them some form of self-consciousness :-). So it means that
> all
> >> >>living creatures (except the self-conscious humans) are mere objects
> >> >> (here
> >> >>it doesn't mean "predmet" but something passive). This is nothing but
> >> >>ancient Cartesian formula.
> >> >>
> >> >>Let's go ahead. You write: "subject arises out of some definite,
> >> >> objective
> >> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious". I will agree with
> >> >> this
> >> >>statement if you (or Lektorsky) will explain us what makes your
> >> >> "definite,
> >> >>objective system of activity" turn into self-conscious being? The
> >> >>possibility of such a magical transmutation of something mechanical,
> >> >> passive
> >> >>("objective") into self-conscious is looking like the popular among
> >> some
> >> >>psychologists idea of emerging. According to this point of view we
> >> >> explain
> >> >>something if we say that it suddenly emerges, or in old Soviet
> >> >> ideological
> >> >>style if something appears as a result of transition of quantity into
> >> >>quality. You probably know that Vygotsky scoffed at the very idea of
> >> >>emergentism in his "Emotions teaching".
> >> >>
> >> >>The main (Cartesian) mistake of CHAT classics was in their
> >> theoretically
> >> >>fruitful attempts to jump from mechanic S==>R level to the level of
> >> >>consciousness leaving out three necessary stages. It is clear that
> >> such
> >> >>transition is possible only in fair tales where the fairy godmother
> >> gives
> >> >> a
> >> >>soul to the ugly nutcracker.
> >> >>
> >> >>In reality to pass from mechanical to the consciousness level we have
> >> to
> >> >>ascend to the levels of chemism and organism and only here on the
> >> stage
> >> >> of
> >> >>organic life we will meet the real subject-object (predmetnoe)
> >> relation.
> >> >> The
> >> >>birth of subjectness takes place here on the level of abstract life.
> >> But
> >> >> on
> >> >>the first stage (including unicellulars and plants) we have only
> >> >>subjectness, not subjectivness. We have no reasons to search here
> >> >>self-consciousness because on this level we haven't even psyche.
> >> >>
> >> >>Only on the next level when a living subject starts to relate to
> >> itself
> >> >> or
> >> >>the predmet activity of living subject is realizing by means of self
> >> >>directed, reflecsive activity we are coming to the level of psyche
> >> (zoo
> >> >>psyche) or self-sensation (still now not self-consciousness).
> >> >>
> >> >>Thus we can go to the next level the level of consciousness and
> self
> >> >>consciousness only standing on the level of zoo psyche.
> >> >>
> >> >>Only basing on such intermediate evolutionary levels separating the
> >> >>mechanical (Cartesian) S==>R robot and still Cartesian bodiless soul
> >> with
> >> >>free will we can acquire the rational, not magical understanding of
> >> free
> >> >>bodily human being. On the contrary, if we will insist on our
> >> Cartesian
> >> >>attempts we will at best have a chance to repeat after LSV the
> >> >> questionable
> >> >>metaphor of triangle and sign mediation or after ANL the idea of
> >> activity
> >> >>mediating the relation of stimulus and reaction.
> >> >>
> >> >>We entirely agree with Vygotsky's declaration that "the problem of
> >> >> freedom
> >> >>is a central problem of psychology" (it was recently published in
> >> Russian
> >> >>among other materials for Vygotsky's archive). We insist that both
> >> >> Vygotsky
> >> >>and Leont'ev belonged to one and the same theoretic school (you know
> >> some
> >> >> of
> >> >>our colleges are denying this fact) because both they were trying to
> >> >> solve
> >> >>the one and the same problem the problem of freedom. How a human
> can
> >> be
> >> >>free from the mechanical S==>R causation of its body?
> >> >>
> >> >>So if we want not only repeat both true and erroneous words of
> >> Vygotsky
> >> >> and
> >> >>Leont'ev being said long ago, but to do our part for development of
> >> CHAT
> >> >> we
> >> >>have to go further than they in solving the same problem which was in
> >> the
> >> >>focus of their theoretic interest, the problem of freedom. And we can
> >> do
> >> >> it
> >> >>only abandoning the false Cartesian position identifying animals with
> >> >>mechanical (exclusive of subjectness) S==>R causality, doesn't
> >> >> understanding
> >> >>them as a subjects, (not to say about subjectivness) but as a
> soulless
> >> >>mechanical toys. We are stressing that transition from Cartesian
> >> tubes,
> >> >>threads and valves to the modern conception of living body as a
> >> >>biomechanical S==>R robot left us entirely inside Cartesian mechanism
> >> as
> >> >> a
> >> >>specific logic.
> >> >>
> >> >>I realize that all this is hardly acceptable for those investigators
> >> who
> >> >> are
> >> >>trying to develop the semiotic approach appreciating LSV's idea of
> >> sign
> >> >>mediation as his central and the most fruitful idea. It can't be
> >> helped.
> >> >>
> >> >>We have to choose the way: are we going to share Vygotsky's way based
> >> on
> >> >>ideas of sign mediation, or we are going to share Vygotsky's way
> based
> >> on
> >> >>ideas of Spinoza. Vygotsky had too little time to realize that two
> >> these
> >> >>ways led him to the opposite sides, split the very logic of his
> >> >>investigation. I am sure, and I share this position with Il'enkov who
> >> >>fundamentally argued the absolute incompatibility, of semiotic and
> >> >> activity
> >> >>approaches, that the semiotic way leads us to the dead end, while
> >> >> activity
> >> >>approach gives us a chance to build a new dialectical psychology.
> >> >>
> >> >>And we have to realize finally that Vygotsky was not a God, so if we
> >> are
> >> >>investigators, not believers we have to cease the protracted
> >> >> interpretation
> >> >>of his "sacred" texts and start, or better to say continue after
> him
> >> >>investigation of problems he formulated for himself and for all of
> us.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>Sasha
> >> >>
> >> >>-----Original Message-----
> >> >>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> ]
> >> On
> >> >>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >> >>Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 12:22 AM
> >> >>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> >>Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>Big question Michael.
> >> >>
> >> >>See
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/lektorsky/subject-object/index.htm
> >> >> for
> >> >>
> >> >>a book-length answer from Lektorsky.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>Subject and object are always two distinct entities, but the subject
> >> >> (some
> >> >>
> >> >>self-conscious system of activity) arises out of some definite,
> >> objective
> >> >>
> >> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious, and the activity
> >> then
> >> >>
> >> >>constitutes (in AN Leontyev's words) the "intertraffic" between
> >> subject
> >> >> and
> >> >>
> >> >>object. The activity of the subject then is to objectify itself in
> the
> >> >>
> >> >>object, giving its activities material forms deposited in the
> >> objective
> >> >>
> >> >>world around it, vested with meanings by which the subject
> >> >>
> >> >>"institutionalises" itself.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>So in the beginning there is no distinction, because the relevant
> >> system
> >> >> of
> >> >>
> >> >>activity has not yet become self-conscious, and in the end there is
> no
> >> >>
> >> >>distinction because the subject has "naturalised" its activity and
> >> become
> >> >>
> >> >>indistinguishable from the object. These are of course both
> >> tendencies,
> >> >> and
> >> >>
> >> >>not absolute truths, and the whole life of a subject exists between
> >> these
> >> >>
> >> >>two poles.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>Andy
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>At 02:03 PM 28/11/2006 -0500, you wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >Andy and Paul,
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >What is the argument that a dialectical approach, even dialectical
> >> >>
> >> >> >materialism, dissolves the difference between subject and
> object? I
> >> >> guess
> >> >>
> >> >> >we are all influenced by what we have been reading lately, but it
> >> seems
> >> >>
> >> >> >that it is difficult for a dialectic based perspective to escape
> the
> >> >>
> >> >> >idealism trap.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >Thanks,
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >Michael
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >-----Original Message-----
> >> >>
> >> >> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >> >> On
> >> >>
> >> >> >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >> >>
> >> >> >Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 5:09 AM
> >> >>
> >> >> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> >>
> >> >> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD (was= Does
> >> >> VygotskyAccept
> >> >>
> >> >> >the "Assistance Assumption"?)
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >Paul, surely you overstate the matter.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >ZPD is, like all scientific concepts, a theory-laden object. To say
> >> >> that it
> >> >>
> >> >> >exists says that certain more or less well-defined procedures
> >> >> understood
> >> >>
> >> >> >within the Vygotskyan theory, will produce this or that verifiable
> >> >> result.
> >> >>
> >> >> >Otherwise what is the useof the concept and the theory of which it
> >> is a
> >> >>
> >> >> >part? While there are lots of concepts within the Vygotskyan theory
> >> >> which
> >> >>
> >> >> >are new and unique, or have a Marxist genealogy, there are also
> >> plenty
> >> >>
> >> >> >which are shared with all pedagogical theories and common sense. In
> >> >> fact,
> >> >>
> >> >> >all scientific theories must incorporate "common sense" concepts
> >> into
> >> >> their
> >> >>
> >> >> >framework in order to be truly scientific. "Empiricism" denies that
> >> >>
> >> >> >scientific objects are "theory laden" and that there is anything
> >> >>
> >> >> >problematic in the idea of a purely factual test for the existence
> >> of
> >> >> some
> >> >>
> >> >> >object. But to deny Empiricism is not to deny the validity and
> >> >> necessity of
> >> >>
> >> >> >empirical evidence.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >And surely it is wrong to say that in Marxism or Vygotsky "the
> >> subject
> >> >>
> >> >> >object distinction is dissolved". The absolute independence and
> >> >>
> >> >> >separateness of subject and object is certainly denied by Marx and
> >> >>
> >> >> >Vygotsky, but neither claim that "subject" and "object" are invalid
> >> >>
> >> >> >concepts, or concepts between which no distinction can be made. For
> >> >>
> >> >> >example, Marx does not claim that an object (e.g. ZPD) exists
> >> insofar
> >> >> as a
> >> >>
> >> >> >subject (Vygotskyan psychology) incorporates the concept in its
> >> >> activity,
> >> >>
> >> >> >so that empirical refutation of the concept is ruled out in
> >> principle.
> >> >> No
> >> >>
> >> >> >subject exists in absolute separateness from every other subject,
> >> all
> >> >>
> >> >> >subjects exist in a material and therefore infinitely
> >> interconnected,
> >> >>
> >> >> >world. So the identity of subject and object can only be relative,
> >> not
> >> >>
> >> >> >absolute.
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >Andy
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >At 12:26 AM 28/11/2006 -0800, you wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> > > Isnī't the idea of "empirical" evidence for the ZPD something
> >> of
> >> >> an
> >> >>
> >> >> > > oxymoron in itself? Didn{t Vygotsky develop his thinking within
> >> the
> >> >>
> >> >> > > framework of dialetical materialism, something that many north
> >> >> americans
> >> >>
> >> >> > > and others seem all too ready to forget? Isn't the concept of a
> >> ZPD
> >> >> a
> >> >>
> >> >> > > dialectical model in itself, which is to say, a model in which
> >> the
> >> >>
> >> >> > > subject object distinction is dissolved, a dissolution which
> >> defies
> >> >> the
> >> >>
> >> >> > > concept of empirical?
> >> >>
> >> >> > > Paul Dillon
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> >> 9435,
> >> >> AIM
> >> >>
> >> >> >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >_______________________________________________
> >> >>
> >> >> >xmca mailing list
> >> >>
> >> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> >>
> >> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >>
> >> >> >_______________________________________________
> >> >>
> >> >> >xmca mailing list
> >> >>
> >> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> >>
> >> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> 9435,
> >> >> AIM
> >> >>
> >> >>identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>_______________________________________________
> >> >>
> >> >>xmca mailing list
> >> >>
> >> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> >>
> >> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >>
> >> >>_______________________________________________
> >> >>xmca mailing list
> >> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >
> >> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> >> AIM
> >> > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >> >
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > xmca mailing list
> >> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>--
> >>Katarina A. Rodina
> >>MSc in Speech-Language Therapy,
> >>PhD-Research Fellow,
> >>Department of Special Needs Education
> >>University of Oslo
> >>P.O.Box 1140 Blindern
> >>NO-0318 OSLO,Norway
> >>Phone: +47 22 85 81 38
> >>Fax: +47 22 85 80 21
> >>E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no
> >>
> >>Head of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation,
> >>Herzen State Pedagogical University
> >>St.Petersburg, Russia
> >>E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru
> >>tlf: +47 41 108 408
> >>http://www.herzen.spb.ru
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>_______________________________________________
> >>xmca mailing list
> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> AIM
> > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
> --
> Katarina A. Rodina
> MSc in Speech-Language Therapy,
> PhD-Research Fellow,
> Department of Special Needs Education
> University of Oslo
> P.O.Box 1140 Blindern
> NO-0318 OSLO,Norway
> Phone: +47 22 85 81 38
> Fax: +47 22 85 80 21
> E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no
>
> Head of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation,
> Herzen State Pedagogical University
> St.Petersburg, Russia
> E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru
> tlf: +47 41 108 408
> http://www.herzen.spb.ru
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Jan 03 2007 - 07:06:17 PST