Good questions, Kevin, no digression or
foolishness at all in asking these fundamental
questions. They need to be asked over and
over. I think the essential idea of a
"monist-dialectical" view versus a
"dualist-mechanical" view is that all objects in
the sphere of human activity (i.e. artifacts,
including tools and signs) have both a material
*and* an ideal (or meaning) aspect. As Ilyenkov,
Bakhurst, Cole and other emphasize, materiality
in any human-sphere sense must have aspects of
ideality (meaning), *and* any form of meaning
(ideality) must also have a material
"instantiation," to use a formulation from
Mike. It is a grand "and" concept. Outlooks
that slip toward the view that objects are
physical *or* mental offer a more impoverished
view of artifacts and human activity.
This leads to two special case questions to see
if we can discover exceptions to these generalizations:
1) can one have thoughts (mental artifacts) that
have no tangible physical existence
2) can one encounter physical objects that have no meaning
In 1), we can imagine a zebra-striped giraffe
floating outside our window. In the fleeting
moment one imagines such a creature, what might
our body do? Might it, for example, pause for thought?
In 2), if a unearthly object was discovered in a
forest, what might people do? Might this object
become an object of interest and mystery,
precisely because no one knows what it is?
I bring these thought questions up to point out
how difficult it is to invent an object that
exists in the orbit of human affairs that does
not have the dual character of containing both materiality and ideality.
~ Steve
At 09:59 AM 1/15/2006 -0500, Kevin Rocap wrote:
>Dear Steve.
>
>I feel a little foolish. I sense that I share
>your understanding of things, but seeing it
>written leads me to what must be a fundamental
>blind spot in my own thinking....and since it
>seems to me to likely be so basic to CHAT,
>forgive, in advance, my naivete. But, in what
>sense are you referring to language as "physical" or "material"?
>
>These are two terms you seem to use somewhat
>interchangeably in what you've written. Again, I
>don't disagree at all (and sense that I probably
>do agree); I just recognize how imprecise my own
>thinking is around this. Is language "physical"
>in the sense of the physiological processes of
>speech, the neural pathways of language
>production and the physicality of written
>language? Is that it? Or is it something else?
>Is it perhaps the Nietzschean edict that when we
>say the "stone is hard" we are forgetting that
>we really don't know "hard" outside of the stone
>in the first place? Are all "ideal" things then
>also "physical" by some account?
>
>You yourself mention that since understanding
>the strength of CHAT as materialist versus
>dualist makes this a good discussion to be
>having. But if this will become too much of a
>definiition-chasing digression don't let me stop
>the flow of conversation, we can shelve these
>questions which might be answered organically
>over time, or could be part of a future exchange.
>
>I'm just taken by the "materiality and
>meaning"/"physical and mental" parallels you
>draw. Are "material" (or "materiality") and
>"physical" synonyms in a CHAT context? And are
>"meaning" and "mental" of the same ilk, or
>realm, which I guess would be Ideal (?)? Doesn't
>that, in a way, reinforce so-called dualist
>notions? Or are we just damned by an inherited
>discourse that needs perpetually to be stitched
>together, frankenstein-style, to make materialist sense?
>
>Just wondering, thanks. You drew my attention
>away from my work deadline long enough to toss
>this out (so there might be an element of
>procrastination interweaved with my genuine
>interest in a little more elaboration of how
>language is, in particular, "physical" in a materialist sense).
>
>In Peace,
>K.
>
>
>
>Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>The theoretical section at the beginning of the
>>paper is entitled "What Are Artifacts and
>>Tools?" and argues that there is little
>>agreement among cultural-historical psychology
>>theorists over the relation of "tools" and
>>"artifacts." I disagree. There is plenty of
>>agreement over this relationship, especially
>>amongst the principal writers cited.
>>
>>Wartofsky, for example, in a quote the authors
>>provide, says: "Tools and language, then,
>>become the basic artifacts by means of which
>>the human species differentiates itself from
>>its animal forbears." This is a clear statement
>>that tools and language are kinds of artifacts.
>>The authors offer no actual evidence that
>>anyone in the CHAT community thinks otherwise. To my knowledge, no one does.
>>
>>The authors also err in their interpretation of
>>Vygotsky's diagram, depicted on p 54 of Mind in
>>Society (1978). They call the diagram a
>>"triangle", but all Vygotsky is doing in this
>>picture is explaining that signs and tools are
>>two different forms of mediated activity. The
>>point LSV is making is that in this respect,
>>tools and signs are similar and not different.
>>By characterizing this diagram as a "triangle",
>>the authors imagine tools and signs are being
>>counterposed, and miss out on the actual
>>concept being promoted that tools and signs are
>>both forms of mediated activity.
>>
>>The concept that tools and signs are kinds of
>>artifacts, and are also two forms mediated
>>human activity, is to my knowledge ubiquitous
>>among the originators and contemporary theorists of CHAT.
>>
>>The authors misinterpret Mike Cole from pg 117
>>of Cultural Psychology - the same page Mike
>>quoted from in his post. They make it sound
>>like Mike was saying it was "easy to assimilate
>>the concept of artifact into the category of
>>tool" when in fact Mike was criticizing the
>>"artifact-as-object" notion frequently found in
>>anthropology for making this error.
>>
>>These kinds of misinterpretations signal that
>>something is wrong. What is going on?
>>
>>One guess is the authors hold a fundamental
>>position that is in direct opposition to the
>>materialist view of CHAT on the nature of
>>artifacts - but aren't fully aware of their
>>opposition. Hence, they see confusion and
>>differing opinions where general unity among
>>CHAT theorists actually exists because they are
>>looking to find confirmation of their own
>>opposing thesis - but are not finding it. They
>>incorrectly interpret this void as being a lack
>>of agreement among CHAT thinkers, when the
>>reality is, it is they that are in fact apparently in disagreement.
>>
>>They reveal their fundamental thesis most
>>clearly in their final paragraph on page 125,
>>which captures the essential idea of their
>>paper. What is most important to note here is
>>how they distinguish "mental artifacts" from
>>"material artifacts." The asterisks are mine for emphasis.
>>
>>"Although this study of artifacts as tools used
>>in three classroom events is basically an account of
>>trying to grapple with the issues involved, it
>>did demonstrate the complexity of any “serious study of
>>artifacts” in classrooms, and showed common
>>features in the function of material objects. All the artifacts
>>carried a meaning, including messages about
>>their use. In each event, the participants recognized
>>these messages. What varied was mode of
>>response, which depended, in the examples cited,
>>on the power and knowledge composition of the
>>groups. The effectiveness of an artifact on the functioning
>>of learners depends on the development of
>>**mental artifacts** of the kind identified by
>>Wartofsky (1979), mediated in turn by
>>**material artifacts**, and by the actions of fellow students."
>>
>>If one concludes that artifacts come in two
>>essential varieties, mental and material, as
>>the authors of this paper do, then one could
>>easily have difficulty understanding how
>>Vygotsky, Luria, Wartofsky, Engestrom, Cole,
>>and others see eye to eye on the relation of
>>artifacts to tools and signs, or have a common
>>concept of how the mental and material interact
>>in human activity or in terms of human
>>artifacts. Since none of these writers hold to
>>the traditional dualist bifurcation of reality
>>into the physical and mental (body vs. mind,
>>natural vs. supernatural, material vs. mental,
>>etc.), it would indeed be difficult to detect
>>common agreement among them in this regard.
>>
>>The essential idea that these writers share
>>about artifacts, including tools and signs, is
>>that all artifacts have both materiality and
>>meaning (ideality). Each individual artifact
>>and class of artifacts has a unique and
>>specific form and combination of these two
>>essential components of artifactuality. Note,
>>for example, the sentences Mike quoted in his
>>post about a table and the word "table." They
>>are both artifacts, but the two differ in terms
>>of "the relative prominence of their material
>>and ideal aspects and the kinds of coordinations they afford."
>>
>>At the same time, while artifacts are similar
>>in that they are all some combination of
>>materiality and meaning, and they are similar
>>in that they each have specific natural and
>>cultural properties, there are also important
>>differences between major classes of artifacts.
>>For example, Vygotsky emphasizes there are
>>important differences between tools and signs
>>that must be understood. Wartofsky, applying
>>this kind of reasoning, discusses certain
>>fundamental differences between three kinds of
>>artifacts (roughly, tools and signs for
>>producing, instructions for using tools and
>>signs and engaging in processes, and imagined
>>objects and processes). When surveying
>>CHAT-oriented theorists, from Vygotsky to
>>Ilyenkov to Cole - and allowing oneself to
>>abandon the mechanical materialist and vulgar
>>idealist notion of natural objects and human
>>artifacts as inherently being either physical
>>or mental - one is struck by the common theme
>>that all human artifacts - tools, signs and
>>otherwise - insofar as they interact with a
>>mediate human activity - are constructed of
>>both materiality and meaning, of both the physical and the mental.
>>
>>As I see it, this dialectical view of how human
>>consciousness and natural physicality are
>>interwoven in all the objects, including both
>>tools and signs, that humans psychologically
>>and socially interact with, is a great
>>improvement over much older, mechanical notions
>>of a dual world divided between material and
>>mental entities. Eric suggests the latter
>>outlook provides a better fulcrum for
>>comprehending things like classroom artifacts
>>and how students interact with them. I see it
>>differently. As I see it, the former outlook,
>>first clearly formulated by Marx and elaborated
>>by Vygotsky, and later Ilyenkov, and most
>>recently by major writers who identify with
>>CHAT, is a major step forward toward creating a
>>scientific understanding of human activity.
>>This outlook sees all artifacts, of both the
>>tool and language variety, as simultaneously
>>both consciously used physical entities *and*
>>embodiments of human consciousness - and not
>>one *or* the other. I believe the classroom
>>research described in the paper would be
>>enhanced, not inhibited, by this theory of the dual nature of artifacts.
>>
>>That we find ourselves discussing and debating
>>these issues in MCA and on xmca is a good
>>thing. The dual nature of artifacts is one of
>>CHAT's most important and far reaching ideas
>>and can only be preserved and advanced by
>>struggling to understand its importance,
>>debating its merits, and applying it to human life.
>>
>>- Steve Gabosch
>>
>>
>>
>>At 02:00 PM 1/14/2006 -0800, Mike Cole wrote:
>>>Hi Eric et al--
>>>
>>>I actually had difficulty with this article and its literature overview. I
>>>especially find it
>>>disorienting when people refer to my work and make references to "the role
>>>of non-material
>>>cultural artifacts". Or, refer to my writing about artifacts and declare
>>>them to be of two kinds,
>>>material and ideal (the former occurs in this article, the latter is a
>>>frequent reading). In this regard,
>>>in Chapter 5 of Cultural Psychology to which the authors refer in citing my
>>>views, I wrote:
>>>
>>>According to the view presented here, which bears a close affinity to the
>>>ideas of John Dewey and also traces its genealogy back to Hegel and Marx, an
>>>artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified over the
>>>history of its incorporation in goal directed human action. By virtue of the
>>>changes wrought in the process of their creation and use, artifacts
>>>are*simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and material
>>>*. They are manufactured in the process of goal directed human actions. They
>>>are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their participation
>>>in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they
>>>mediate in the present.
>>>
>>>Defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply with equal force
>>>whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted forms
>>>of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material
>>>culture.[1]<#_ftn1>What differentiates the word "table" from an actual
>>>table is the relative
>>>prominence of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of
>>>coordinations they afford. No word exists apart from its material
>>>instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, hand movements, writing,
>>>or neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by
>>>thinking human beings
>>>------------------------------
>>>
>>><#_ftnref1> [1] For a discussion of language as a system of artifacts
>>>and the homology between words and what we usually think of as material
>>>artifacts, see Rossi-Landi (1983, p. 120ff)
>>>---------------------
>>>
>>>I could, of course, be totally wrong and I believe the Peter Jones, among
>>>others, does not share my views. But a major point of departure for me is
>>>the primal fusion of the ideal and material in mediated human action and
>>>their differentiation only in bracketed ways for specific purposes.
>>>
>>>In a similar way, I find it disorienting to have a semiotic triangle
>>>referred to as a tertiary artifact citing Wartofsky.
>>>
>>>Perhaps others can help out here.
>>>mike
>>>
>>>On 1/11/06, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Great article! Especially good in its overview of the literature that
>>> > defines tools and artifacts. The authors tend to side with the separation
>>> > of psychological and material artifacts for the purpose of being able to
>>> > study how groups conduct a learning exercise. My understanding of why
>>> > they
>>> > did this was so they could reference how many times the students refered
>>> > to
>>> > the 'flip chart", the puzzle or the textbook. The authors do not dismiss
>>> > spoken language as artifact but rather there intention was to concretely
>>> > determine how many references to the artifact were made per session.
>>> >
>>> > Big question raised by the authors is even though in all three examples
>>> > there is movement towards a completed lesson: getting the book read,
>>> > completing the puzzle or learning the english language there is no clear
>>> > method of knowing to what extent individual student's in each lesson
>>> > gained
>>> > knowledge or "learned" anything.
>>> >
>>> > I have always respected Engstrom's approach that the psychological aspect
>>> > of an artifact cannot be separated from the material object but I tend to
>>> > agree with the authors that this approach does not provide much of a
>>> > folcrum for studying how artifacts facilitate the learning process.
>>> >
>>> > what do you think?
>>> >
>>> > eric
>>> >
>>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>At 02:00 PM 1/14/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>>>Hi Eric et al--
>>>
>>>I actually had difficulty with this article and its literature overview. I
>>>especially find it
>>>disorienting when people refer to my work and make references to "the role
>>>of non-material
>>>cultural artifacts". Or, refer to my writing about artifacts and declare
>>>them to be of two kinds,
>>>material and ideal (the former occurs in this article, the latter is a
>>>frequent reading). In this regard,
>>>in Chapter 5 of Cultural Psychology to which the authors refer in citing my
>>>views, I wrote:
>>>
>>>According to the view presented here, which bears a close affinity to the
>>>ideas of John Dewey and also traces its genealogy back to Hegel and Marx, an
>>>artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified over the
>>>history of its incorporation in goal directed human action. By virtue of the
>>>changes wrought in the process of their creation and use, artifacts
>>>are*simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and material
>>>*. They are manufactured in the process of goal directed human actions. They
>>>are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their participation
>>>in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they
>>>mediate in the present.
>>>
>>>Defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply with equal force
>>>whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted forms
>>>of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material
>>>culture.[1]<#_ftn1>What differentiates the word "table" from an actual
>>>table is the relative
>>>prominence of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of
>>>coordinations they afford. No word exists apart from its material
>>>instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, hand movements, writing,
>>>or neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by
>>>thinking human beings
>>>------------------------------
>>>
>>><#_ftnref1> [1] For a discussion of language as a system of artifacts
>>>and the homology between words and what we usually think of as material
>>>artifacts, see Rossi-Landi (1983, p. 120ff)
>>>---------------------
>>>
>>>I could, of course, be totally wrong and I believe the Peter Jones, among
>>>others, does not share my views. But a major point of departure for me is
>>>the primal fusion of the ideal and material in mediated human action and
>>>their differentiation only in bracketed ways for specific purposes.
>>>
>>>In a similar way, I find it disorienting to have a semiotic triangle
>>>referred to as a tertiary artifact citing Wartofsky.
>>>
>>>Perhaps others can help out here.
>>>mike
>>>
>>>On 1/11/06, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Great article! Especially good in its overview of the literature that
>>> > defines tools and artifacts. The authors tend to side with the separation
>>> > of psychological and material artifacts for the purpose of being able to
>>> > study how groups conduct a learning exercise. My understanding of why
>>> > they
>>> > did this was so they could reference how many times the students refered
>>> > to
>>> > the 'flip chart", the puzzle or the textbook. The authors do not dismiss
>>> > spoken language as artifact but rather there intention was to concretely
>>> > determine how many references to the artifact were made per session.
>>> >
>>> > Big question raised by the authors is even though in all three examples
>>> > there is movement towards a completed lesson: getting the book read,
>>> > completing the puzzle or learning the english language there is no clear
>>> > method of knowing to what extent individual student's in each lesson
>>> > gained
>>> > knowledge or "learned" anything.
>>> >
>>> > I have always respected Engstrom's approach that the psychological aspect
>>> > of an artifact cannot be separated from the material object but I tend to
>>> > agree with the authors that this approach does not provide much of a
>>> > folcrum for studying how artifacts facilitate the learning process.
>>> >
>>> > what do you think?
>>> >
>>> > eric
>>> >
>>> >
>>
>>
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