Dear Steve.
I feel a little foolish. I sense that I share your understanding of
things, but seeing it written leads me to what must be a fundamental
blind spot in my own thinking....and since it seems to me to likely be
so basic to CHAT, forgive, in advance, my naivete. But, in what sense
are you referring to language as "physical" or "material"?
These are two terms you seem to use somewhat interchangeably in what
you've written. Again, I don't disagree at all (and sense that I
probably do agree); I just recognize how imprecise my own thinking is
around this. Is language "physical" in the sense of the physiological
processes of speech, the neural pathways of language production and the
physicality of written language? Is that it? Or is it something else? Is
it perhaps the Nietzschean edict that when we say the "stone is hard" we
are forgetting that we really don't know "hard" outside of the stone in
the first place? Are all "ideal" things then also "physical" by some
account?
You yourself mention that since understanding the strength of CHAT as
materialist versus dualist makes this a good discussion to be having.
But if this will become too much of a definiition-chasing digression
don't let me stop the flow of conversation, we can shelve these
questions which might be answered organically over time, or could be
part of a future exchange.
I'm just taken by the "materiality and meaning"/"physical and mental"
parallels you draw. Are "material" (or "materiality") and "physical"
synonyms in a CHAT context? And are "meaning" and "mental" of the same
ilk, or realm, which I guess would be Ideal (?)? Doesn't that, in a way,
reinforce so-called dualist notions? Or are we just damned by an
inherited discourse that needs perpetually to be stitched together,
frankenstein-style, to make materialist sense?
Just wondering, thanks. You drew my attention away from my work deadline
long enough to toss this out (so there might be an element of
procrastination interweaved with my genuine interest in a little more
elaboration of how language is, in particular, "physical" in a
materialist sense).
In Peace,
K.
Steve Gabosch wrote:
> The theoretical section at the beginning of the paper is entitled
> "What Are Artifacts and Tools?" and argues that there is little
> agreement among cultural-historical psychology theorists over the
> relation of "tools" and "artifacts." I disagree. There is plenty of
> agreement over this relationship, especially amongst the principal
> writers cited.
>
> Wartofsky, for example, in a quote the authors provide, says: "Tools
> and language, then, become the basic artifacts by means of which the
> human species differentiates itself from its animal forbears." This is
> a clear statement that tools and language are kinds of artifacts. The
> authors offer no actual evidence that anyone in the CHAT community
> thinks otherwise. To my knowledge, no one does.
>
> The authors also err in their interpretation of Vygotsky's diagram,
> depicted on p 54 of Mind in Society (1978). They call the diagram a
> "triangle", but all Vygotsky is doing in this picture is explaining
> that signs and tools are two different forms of mediated activity. The
> point LSV is making is that in this respect, tools and signs are
> similar and not different. By characterizing this diagram as a
> "triangle", the authors imagine tools and signs are being
> counterposed, and miss out on the actual concept being promoted that
> tools and signs are both forms of mediated activity.
>
> The concept that tools and signs are kinds of artifacts, and are also
> two forms mediated human activity, is to my knowledge ubiquitous among
> the originators and contemporary theorists of CHAT.
>
> The authors misinterpret Mike Cole from pg 117 of Cultural Psychology
> - the same page Mike quoted from in his post. They make it sound like
> Mike was saying it was "easy to assimilate the concept of artifact
> into the category of tool" when in fact Mike was criticizing the
> "artifact-as-object" notion frequently found in anthropology for
> making this error.
>
> These kinds of misinterpretations signal that something is wrong. What
> is going on?
>
> One guess is the authors hold a fundamental position that is in direct
> opposition to the materialist view of CHAT on the nature of artifacts
> - but aren't fully aware of their opposition. Hence, they see
> confusion and differing opinions where general unity among CHAT
> theorists actually exists because they are looking to find
> confirmation of their own opposing thesis - but are not finding it.
> They incorrectly interpret this void as being a lack of agreement
> among CHAT thinkers, when the reality is, it is they that are in fact
> apparently in disagreement.
>
> They reveal their fundamental thesis most clearly in their final
> paragraph on page 125, which captures the essential idea of their
> paper. What is most important to note here is how they distinguish
> "mental artifacts" from "material artifacts." The asterisks are mine
> for emphasis.
>
> "Although this study of artifacts as tools used in three classroom
> events is basically an account of
> trying to grapple with the issues involved, it did demonstrate the
> complexity of any “serious study of
> artifacts” in classrooms, and showed common features in the function
> of material objects. All the artifacts
> carried a meaning, including messages about their use. In each event,
> the participants recognized
> these messages. What varied was mode of response, which depended, in
> the examples cited,
> on the power and knowledge composition of the groups. The
> effectiveness of an artifact on the functioning
> of learners depends on the development of **mental artifacts** of the
> kind identified by
> Wartofsky (1979), mediated in turn by **material artifacts**, and by
> the actions of fellow students."
>
> If one concludes that artifacts come in two essential varieties,
> mental and material, as the authors of this paper do, then one could
> easily have difficulty understanding how Vygotsky, Luria, Wartofsky,
> Engestrom, Cole, and others see eye to eye on the relation of
> artifacts to tools and signs, or have a common concept of how the
> mental and material interact in human activity or in terms of human
> artifacts. Since none of these writers hold to the traditional dualist
> bifurcation of reality into the physical and mental (body vs. mind,
> natural vs. supernatural, material vs. mental, etc.), it would indeed
> be difficult to detect common agreement among them in this regard.
>
> The essential idea that these writers share about artifacts, including
> tools and signs, is that all artifacts have both materiality and
> meaning (ideality). Each individual artifact and class of artifacts
> has a unique and specific form and combination of these two essential
> components of artifactuality. Note, for example, the sentences Mike
> quoted in his post about a table and the word "table." They are both
> artifacts, but the two differ in terms of "the relative prominence of
> their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of coordinations they
> afford."
>
> At the same time, while artifacts are similar in that they are all
> some combination of materiality and meaning, and they are similar in
> that they each have specific natural and cultural properties, there
> are also important differences between major classes of artifacts. For
> example, Vygotsky emphasizes there are important differences between
> tools and signs that must be understood. Wartofsky, applying this kind
> of reasoning, discusses certain fundamental differences between three
> kinds of artifacts (roughly, tools and signs for producing,
> instructions for using tools and signs and engaging in processes, and
> imagined objects and processes). When surveying CHAT-oriented
> theorists, from Vygotsky to Ilyenkov to Cole - and allowing oneself to
> abandon the mechanical materialist and vulgar idealist notion of
> natural objects and human artifacts as inherently being either
> physical or mental - one is struck by the common theme that all human
> artifacts - tools, signs and otherwise - insofar as they interact with
> a mediate human activity - are constructed of both materiality and
> meaning, of both the physical and the mental.
>
> As I see it, this dialectical view of how human consciousness and
> natural physicality are interwoven in all the objects, including both
> tools and signs, that humans psychologically and socially interact
> with, is a great improvement over much older, mechanical notions of a
> dual world divided between material and mental entities. Eric suggests
> the latter outlook provides a better fulcrum for comprehending things
> like classroom artifacts and how students interact with them. I see it
> differently. As I see it, the former outlook, first clearly formulated
> by Marx and elaborated by Vygotsky, and later Ilyenkov, and most
> recently by major writers who identify with CHAT, is a major step
> forward toward creating a scientific understanding of human activity.
> This outlook sees all artifacts, of both the tool and language
> variety, as simultaneously both consciously used physical entities
> *and* embodiments of human consciousness - and not one *or* the other.
> I believe the classroom research described in the paper would be
> enhanced, not inhibited, by this theory of the dual nature of artifacts.
>
> That we find ourselves discussing and debating these issues in MCA and
> on xmca is a good thing. The dual nature of artifacts is one of CHAT's
> most important and far reaching ideas and can only be preserved and
> advanced by struggling to understand its importance, debating its
> merits, and applying it to human life.
>
> - Steve Gabosch
>
>
>
> At 02:00 PM 1/14/2006 -0800, Mike Cole wrote:
>> Hi Eric et al--
>>
>> I actually had difficulty with this article and its literature
>> overview. I
>> especially find it
>> disorienting when people refer to my work and make references to "the
>> role
>> of non-material
>> cultural artifacts". Or, refer to my writing about artifacts and declare
>> them to be of two kinds,
>> material and ideal (the former occurs in this article, the latter is a
>> frequent reading). In this regard,
>> in Chapter 5 of Cultural Psychology to which the authors refer in
>> citing my
>> views, I wrote:
>>
>> According to the view presented here, which bears a close affinity to
>> the
>> ideas of John Dewey and also traces its genealogy back to Hegel and
>> Marx, an
>> artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified
>> over the
>> history of its incorporation in goal directed human action. By virtue
>> of the
>> changes wrought in the process of their creation and use, artifacts
>> are*simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and material
>> *. They are manufactured in the process of goal directed human
>> actions. They
>> are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their
>> participation
>> in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they
>> mediate in the present.
>>
>> Defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply with equal
>> force
>> whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted
>> forms
>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material
>> culture.[1]<#_ftn1>What differentiates the word "table" from an actual
>> table is the relative
>> prominence of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of
>> coordinations they afford. No word exists apart from its material
>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, hand movements,
>> writing,
>> or neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by
>> thinking human beings
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> <#_ftnref1> [1] For a discussion of language as a system of artifacts
>> and the homology between words and what we usually think of as material
>> artifacts, see Rossi-Landi (1983, p. 120ff)
>> ---------------------
>>
>> I could, of course, be totally wrong and I believe the Peter Jones,
>> among
>> others, does not share my views. But a major point of departure for
>> me is
>> the primal fusion of the ideal and material in mediated human action and
>> their differentiation only in bracketed ways for specific purposes.
>>
>> In a similar way, I find it disorienting to have a semiotic triangle
>> referred to as a tertiary artifact citing Wartofsky.
>>
>> Perhaps others can help out here.
>> mike
>>
>> On 1/11/06, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > Great article! Especially good in its overview of the literature that
>> > defines tools and artifacts. The authors tend to side with the
>> separation
>> > of psychological and material artifacts for the purpose of being
>> able to
>> > study how groups conduct a learning exercise. My understanding of why
>> > they
>> > did this was so they could reference how many times the students
>> refered
>> > to
>> > the 'flip chart", the puzzle or the textbook. The authors do not
>> dismiss
>> > spoken language as artifact but rather there intention was to
>> concretely
>> > determine how many references to the artifact were made per session.
>> >
>> > Big question raised by the authors is even though in all three
>> examples
>> > there is movement towards a completed lesson: getting the book read,
>> > completing the puzzle or learning the english language there is no
>> clear
>> > method of knowing to what extent individual student's in each lesson
>> > gained
>> > knowledge or "learned" anything.
>> >
>> > I have always respected Engstrom's approach that the psychological
>> aspect
>> > of an artifact cannot be separated from the material object but I
>> tend to
>> > agree with the authors that this approach does not provide much of a
>> > folcrum for studying how artifacts facilitate the learning process.
>> >
>> > what do you think?
>> >
>> > eric
>> >
>> >
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> At 02:00 PM 1/14/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>> Hi Eric et al--
>>
>> I actually had difficulty with this article and its literature
>> overview. I
>> especially find it
>> disorienting when people refer to my work and make references to "the
>> role
>> of non-material
>> cultural artifacts". Or, refer to my writing about artifacts and declare
>> them to be of two kinds,
>> material and ideal (the former occurs in this article, the latter is a
>> frequent reading). In this regard,
>> in Chapter 5 of Cultural Psychology to which the authors refer in
>> citing my
>> views, I wrote:
>>
>> According to the view presented here, which bears a close affinity to
>> the
>> ideas of John Dewey and also traces its genealogy back to Hegel and
>> Marx, an
>> artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified
>> over the
>> history of its incorporation in goal directed human action. By virtue
>> of the
>> changes wrought in the process of their creation and use, artifacts
>> are*simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and material
>> *. They are manufactured in the process of goal directed human
>> actions. They
>> are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their
>> participation
>> in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they
>> mediate in the present.
>>
>> Defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply with equal
>> force
>> whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted
>> forms
>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material
>> culture.[1]<#_ftn1>What differentiates the word "table" from an actual
>> table is the relative
>> prominence of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of
>> coordinations they afford. No word exists apart from its material
>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, hand movements,
>> writing,
>> or neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by
>> thinking human beings
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> <#_ftnref1> [1] For a discussion of language as a system of artifacts
>> and the homology between words and what we usually think of as material
>> artifacts, see Rossi-Landi (1983, p. 120ff)
>> ---------------------
>>
>> I could, of course, be totally wrong and I believe the Peter Jones,
>> among
>> others, does not share my views. But a major point of departure for
>> me is
>> the primal fusion of the ideal and material in mediated human action and
>> their differentiation only in bracketed ways for specific purposes.
>>
>> In a similar way, I find it disorienting to have a semiotic triangle
>> referred to as a tertiary artifact citing Wartofsky.
>>
>> Perhaps others can help out here.
>> mike
>>
>> On 1/11/06, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > Great article! Especially good in its overview of the literature that
>> > defines tools and artifacts. The authors tend to side with the
>> separation
>> > of psychological and material artifacts for the purpose of being
>> able to
>> > study how groups conduct a learning exercise. My understanding of why
>> > they
>> > did this was so they could reference how many times the students
>> refered
>> > to
>> > the 'flip chart", the puzzle or the textbook. The authors do not
>> dismiss
>> > spoken language as artifact but rather there intention was to
>> concretely
>> > determine how many references to the artifact were made per session.
>> >
>> > Big question raised by the authors is even though in all three
>> examples
>> > there is movement towards a completed lesson: getting the book read,
>> > completing the puzzle or learning the english language there is no
>> clear
>> > method of knowing to what extent individual student's in each lesson
>> > gained
>> > knowledge or "learned" anything.
>> >
>> > I have always respected Engstrom's approach that the psychological
>> aspect
>> > of an artifact cannot be separated from the material object but I
>> tend to
>> > agree with the authors that this approach does not provide much of a
>> > folcrum for studying how artifacts facilitate the learning process.
>> >
>> > what do you think?
>> >
>> > eric
>> >
>> >
>
>
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