excellent! I am glad we finally understood where we both were coming from.
And, yes, I suspected that aviation might be a great example where
ideological, technical, technological, political, and moral (yes, also
moral), that is, sociocultural, are all blended. And stereotypes belong
right in there too! This is why taking the collision in Germany out of this
context made me feel uncomfortable. This was the basis for all the specifics
of my answers (it was by no means a pure emotion, although emotion was also
right there, in the body of my answers, where elese can it be? see above
about blending...). Of course, you can see better exactly HOW the aviation
activities do embody all of this and this is such an important work, I am
glad I had a chance to learn about you and your work through this brief
"collision exchange."
Anna
-----Original Message-----
From: Phillip Capper
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: 7/11/2002 4:54 PM
Subject: RE: RE collision: science and politics
Thankyou Anna,
I agree with everything you say in your latest message. I was focusing
on
the technical in the interests of managability, and in terms of why I
used
the example in the first place.
I think that I signal my wider thoughts at the end of my last message. I
think aviation is a very vivid illustration of the ways in which
politics
and ideology are inescapably entwined with science. There can be few
activity domains where the ostensible desirability of ideology free
technical performance is greater than in commercial aviation. But it
never
is and never can be. International operational standards are themselves
deeply ideological - with the greatest ideological tensions of all
concerning English as the international language. I am a strong advocate
of
the view that until the aviation safety community moves from viewing the
politics and values that are embedded in operational practice as things
to
be eliminated, and shifts to seeing them as integral parts of
operational
systems that need to be embraced in the design of practice, then there
will
continue to be more problems than are necessary such as were encountered
over Germany that night.
One of the interesting things in our consultancy work is how the use of
the
methods of Developmental Work Research creates what I think of as an
ideological 'filter' with potential clients. Our 'market' can only ever
be a
niche one, because the moment we start talking about the principles of
CHAT
90% of corporate managers immediately become uncomfortable with what we
are
saying - exactly because of your point "the CHAT itself, as an
investigative project
was launched as an ideological investigative project and has ideological
components WITHIN its body (not next to it)". When we have been tempted
to
fudge the embedded ideological components of CHAT in order to attract a
client it doesn't work, because it ceases to be a CHAT project.
Phillip Capper,
Centre for Research on Work, Education and Business Ltd. (WEB Research),
Level 13
114 The Terrace
(PO Box 2855)
WELLINGTON
New Zealand
Ph: +64 4 499 8140
Fx: +64 4 499 8395
Mb: +64 021 519 741
-----Original Message-----
From: Stetsenko, Anna [mailto:AStetsenko@gc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Friday, 12 July 2002 12:23 a.m.
To: 'xmca@weber.ucsd.edu '
Subject: RE collision: science and politics
Phillip, wow, you are a pilot yourself! I can imagine how involved, as a
real expert, you feel in analysing this collision. Yet my impression is
that
you underestimate how much politics and ideology might be involved IN
and
AROUND this "wonderful illustration of activity theory" (i would add
tragic)
and how much politics and ideology are relevant to CHAT in general.
My bigger point is simply this. That you appear to think that only the
analysis of 'technical' aspects of this collision (how pilots reacted,
what
practices of tool mediation were involved etc) is relevant to CHAT, is
an
example of seeing tools and practices, and science at large, as
politics-
and value- free more than they might be. This incidentally was exactly
the
topic of discussion at two symposia in Amsterdam (which i took part in).
The
CHAT itself, its history and present perception is 'a wonderful
illustration' of how science is ideology- and value- and politics
driven.
That Vygotsky was first taken out of context of his school (Leont'ev and
others who continued this school) had clearly to do with ideological
factors. That Leont'ev' s works, and activity theory, is only now making
inroads into psychology, and we are now discovering it, is the result of
some previous ideological inhibitions, I believe. And the result of
changes
in the world itself, in politics and ideologies and values (perhaps as
people feel a need to have an instrument to address the crisis in
society
and create change). Moreover, the CHAT itself, as an investigative
project
was launched as an ideological investigative project and has ideological
components WITHIN its body (not next to it) and this remains to be
analysed
and described.
PS. At a more technical level. As I said, the discrepancy in
instructions is
still disputed. I am waiting to hear more about this as investigation
continues. So, the possibility remains that the pilot, having to react
to
two conflicting messages and not having a clear instruction of how to
prioritize them, reacted as he did -- this might have had to do with the
stereotype of Swiss quality (=of commands by controller) just as I
described. This is still a possibility, although I understand and
respect
you placing present pilot discussions on internet over the statements by
aviation authorities. Then it would illustrate that even the most
seemingly
benign and neutral tools, objects and practices embody ideology, values
and
stereotypes, leading to tragic consequences if they are disregarded.
-----Original Message-----
From: Phillip Capper
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: 7/11/2002 12:36 AM
Subject: RE: novelty and stereotypes: re collision
Thankyou Anna,
Now that we have clarified things it is possible to concentrate on the
ways
in which CHAT might better inform aviation safety!!
What the Russian authorities are now saying about their standard
practices
raises some interesting questions.
The pilot of the Tupolev was placed in an intense position of cognitive
dissonance. He KNEW that there was conflicting traffic (because his TCAS
had
been activated), and he had two simultaneous and directly opposed
instructions to process. One can imagine the captain and first officer
looking at each other and communicating horror primarily through facial
expressions. The missing of the first message is not necessarily
significant - there are many things to do on a flight deck, and
sometimes
the radio message comes at precisely the wrong moment in a work
sequence.
It is at the second message that the contradictory instructions occur.
The
tone of voice of the Swiss ATC officer will be of interest when the
voice
recorders are analysed. There are many different ways to say 'descend
to
flight level 33 immediately'. Did he convey 'crisis' in his voice tone?
The
TCAS activation does tell of crisis - but not necessarily fatal crisis.
TCAS
activations are not that uncommon. They are set to give early warning
rather than late. This is, itself, an interesting question in the field
of
tool mediation. If you set a crisis alert tool to go off early in the
development of a crisis, do you thereby devalue its alerting effect?
I speculate that it is at this point of two messages that the
cultural-historical context became critical. An IMMEDIATE decision is
required - almost a reflex. What the Russian pilots are telling us -
regardless of what the
-----Original Message-----
From: Phillip Capper
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: 7/11/2002 12:36 AM
Subject: RE: novelty and stereotypes: re collision
Thankyou Anna,
Now that we have clarified things it is possible to concentrate on the
ways
in which CHAT might better inform aviation safety!!
What the Russian authorities are now saying about their standard
practices
raises some interesting questions.
The pilot of the Tupolev was placed in an intense position of cognitive
dissonance. He KNEW that there was conflicting traffic (because his TCAS
had
been activated), and he had two simultaneous and directly opposed
instructions to process. One can imagine the captain and first officer
looking at each other and communicating horror primarily through facial
expressions. The missing of the first message is not necessarily
significant - there are many things to do on a flight deck, and
sometimes
the radio message comes at precisely the wrong moment in a work
sequence.
It is at the second message that the contradictory instructions occur.
The
tone of voice of the Swiss ATC officer will be of interest when the
voice
recorders are analysed. There are many different ways to say 'descend
to
flight level 33 immediately'. Did he convey 'crisis' in his voice tone?
The
TCAS activation does tell of crisis - but not necessarily fatal crisis.
TCAS
activations are not that uncommon. They are set to give early warning
rather than late. This is, itself, an interesting question in the field
of
tool mediation. If you set a crisis alert tool to go off early in the
development of a crisis, do you thereby devalue its alerting effect?
I speculate that it is at this point of two messages that the
cultural-historical context became critical. An IMMEDIATE decision is
required - almost a reflex. What the Russian pilots are telling us -
regardless of what the Russian authorities say - is that their cultural
assumption is that the level and direction of the aircraft is CONTROLLED
BY
THE ATC CONTROLLER. That is where they default to when confronted by a
dilemma. This is the opposite of most other nationalities. When I was
trained as a pilot I was trained into the assumption that THE PILOT
CONTROLS
THE FLIGHT and that ATC 'instructions' are, in the end, advisory. I have
flown planes into Russian airports, and this is the first time that I
have
known that Russian pilots tend to have this view of ATC.
The classic illustration of this is what happens when an airliner finds
that
it is in an unstable layer of air and the passengers are being bounced.
American pilots immediately start negotiating for a level change with
ATC.
But when western airliners crossing Russia (for example Tokyo to London
flights) try to do the same thing with Russian ATC, conflict often
follows.
Hence western ATC officers tend to regard Russian pilots as very good
and
very biddable, but non Russian pilots flying across Russia are inclined
to
view Russian ATC as excessively overbearing and authoritarian. For many
aviation professionals taking part in the current discussions this is
the
first time they have come to understand why these culturally situated
perceptions exist.
Stepping back from the tragedy itself, what is interesting here is what
a
wonderful illustration of Activity Theory this all is. First there is
the
disturbance of the disaster, then there is the period of reflection
leading
to the visibilisation of some fundamental contradictions. But alongside
this
there are the negatively mediating factors of the media and swirling
political interests that tend to get in the way of the potential for
expansive learning that is being created within the professional
community.
The thing to watch for is whether the procedural changes will emerge
from
the discussions of the professionals, or the political dances of the
countries and organisations.
Just to be extra clear, Anna, there are many similar culturally situated
procedural differences in aviation operations. Most of the research
effort
has been focused on interactions between Asian and western cultures. In
this
case one came out and bit us that nobody had ever really noticed.
Also - none of the foregoing says anything one way or another about the
performance of Swiss ATC. that doesn't mean that I don't think that to
be
important. I do. I think that it is central to the whole affair. But in
posting messages here I am just concentrating on that aspect of the
event
that is especially instructive in a CHAT context.
Phillip Capper,
Centre for Research on Work, Education and Business Ltd. (WEB Research),
Level 13
114 The Terrace
(PO Box 2855)
WELLINGTON
New Zealand
Ph: +64 4 499 8140
Fx: +64 4 499 8395
Mb: +64 021 519 741
-----Original Message-----
From: Stetsenko, Anna [mailto:AStetsenko@gc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Thursday, 11 July 2002 3:27 p.m.
To: 'xmca@weber.ucsd.edu '
Subject: RE: novelty and stereotypes: re collision
and of course, by no means did I mean to understate how important it is
to
look into the pilots' practices and experiences (particular following
accidents) to reveal possible discrepancies (but not just
western-russian
ones, they really cross boundaries and exist even within countries as
you
wrote later, perhaps also on collision warning systems? see, had you
said
it this way right from the beginning -- about discrepancies between and
within countries, and not as between "pilots trained in Russia" versus
"all
others," that would have been much more accurate and my reaction would
have
been somewhat different).
-----Original Message-----
From: Phillip Capper
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: 7/10/2002 10:24 PM
Subject: RE: novelty and stereotypes: re collision
An additional point in response to Anna - not made clear in my first
response.
One of the unconscionable double binds that the Swiss authorities and
western media tried to place on the Russians were that they started off
by
accusing the Russian pilot of causing the collision by NOT OBEYING an
ATC
instruction and then, when it was pointed out that western pilots are
trained to disobey ATC when their TCAS is activated, they then tried to
accuse him of causing the accident by OBEYING ATC.
Phillip Capper,
Centre for Research on Work, Education and Business Ltd. (WEB Research),
Level 13
114 The Terrace
(PO Box 2855)
WELLINGTON
New Zealand
Ph: +64 4 499 8140
Fx: +64 4 499 8395
Mb: +64 021 519 741
-----Original Message-----
From: Stetsenko, Anna [mailto:AStetsenko@gc.cuny.edu]
Sent: Thursday, 11 July 2002 1:25 p.m.
To: 'xmca@weber.ucsd.edu '
Subject: novelty and stereotypes: re collision
Hi Philipp,
exactly because, as you say, "the collision over Germany is generating
very
high levels of activity at present," let me add a piece of activity by
expanding on the context of what happened in and around this collision.
Not
suprisingly, because as we know context is important, this can add a new
light and reveal whether we are dealing with novelty or stereotypes
here.
What happened IN the colision still remains to be determined. What is
pretty
clear however is what happened immediately after it, and this is the
piece
you skipped over completely in your description. Immediately after the
collision, all the media, but especially the Swiss and German,
uncritically
following the reports by Swiss controllers, blamed the Russian pilots
for
the accident based on assertions (and I list just few of them) that: 1.
Russian pilots have been given several warnings about being on a
collision
course well ahead of the accident (first reported as several minutes)
but
did not react because (here several versions were circulting) they did
not
speak English; they were tired; they were not trained properly, and 2.
Russian aircraft did not have on board collision warning systems
(because
Russian aircrafts in general do not have adequate technical equipment).
Accompanying media reports (NTV channel in Germany, for example, believe
me)
at the same time were reporting, as a matter of fact, that "the victims
were
anyway not children, because in Russia children after the age of 14 are
not
considered to be children."
I cannot even comment on the last blatant lie, but will note that the
rest
of this media coverage, and the related statements by Swiss controllers,
had
to be later revealed as exactly that - blantant lies. These were clear
attempts to cover up (the crime or the accident) and this needs to be
named
as such and treated respectively as a separate crime. I do not see yet
this
cover up crime being named for what it is in the media. Added to the
cover
up should also be attempts to hide the facts that the Swiss controller
was
ALONE in violation of all the rules, that he had to lead 5 other
flights,
one of which was landing at exactly the time of the collision, that one
critical piece of the Skyguide equipment was shut down and the only
telephone line was also shut down (as German controllers were making
desparate attempts to warn the Swiss controller on the phone but the
line
was dead).
Now, as the responsibility of Swiss controllers is surfacing, the
discourse
has shifted to statements that "both sides, Swiss and Russian are trying
to
blame each other" and you indirectly reproduced this discourse in your
message too. However, I see a difference between blaming someone for
what
this someone has done (this, I believe, should be called "finding out
who is
responsible") versus blaming someone for what one did not do and lying
about
facts (this I believe is a "cover up"). I have not seen anywhere,
including
Russian media (at least the leading newspapers) any blame being placed
on
Swiss controllers based on lies about their conduct. Do you see the
difference? So, there is no equivalence for both sides. Can you give me
examples on the contrary that Russian tried to blame smth on Swiss
controllers that then turned out to be not true?
Now, as to novelty. Actually, unlike your statement (that follows most
recent media reports) that Russian pilots are trained differently from
pilots from other countries, the standards of training are exactly the
same
as established by Internationa Association of Civil Aviation. Otherwise,
Russian pilots would not be allowed and would not be able to fly on
international routs. Moreover, the international standard instruction
for on
borad systems of collision warning does say that all the decisions must
be
made by pilots only in consultation with the controller.
So, the fact of the matter is that Russian pilots do speak English and
do
follow standard international instructions. The other thing is that when
you
have 44 seconds to react to conflicting warnings, there is no much time
for
consultations.
Further analysis will show if this analysis is correct. However, I would
really like it if you see that your description is skewed in one
direction -
that of thinking that there was something peculiar about Russian pilots
or
their training that might have caused the collision. (and as I said, I
know
that you follow the media but.. critical view of the media is needed).
That
is whay, I tend to see your description as a continuation of a
comfortbale
STEREOTYPE that Russian means inferior and Swiss (=Western) means
superior.
I do not see much novelty emerging in the situation so far, I see
playing
over and over of THE SAME OLD STEREOTYPES. Novelty does not grow on the
soil
of old stereotypes, I would think.
By the way, it could be, it just could be that the same stereotype did
play
into what happened IN the collision too, not just around it. I believe
(this
needs to be checked and will be checked I hope) that the situation
exactly
as it emerged leading to the collision (in its exact timing etc) might
not
have been forseen in the international instructions and repsetive rules
of
conduct for pilots might not have been clearly described. Then, what
perhaps
happened was extremely tragic and, again, tainted by stereotypes. It
could
be that the Russian pilot, having such a short time to react, and under
competing directions, acted based upon the typical stereotype about
Swiss as
equal to "perfect," "very exact" (if you say smth is very exact you say
"like a Swiss watch" in Russian). This is a very common stereotype in
Russia
and it has been reinforced in recent years of self-scrutiny and
self-criticism in Russian society in a trend of seeing all western as
superior.
This then would be a tragic picture of how deadly, literally,
stereotypes
can be. Given than no one on land was hurt only by some miracle (there
could
have been many victims of course in that beautiful part of Germany where
the
planes went down, I' ve seen this part many times), I would really ask
you
to watch a bit more carefully, for your own sake too, the stereotyping
processes that continue to unfold.
Does it make sense to you?
Anna
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Aug 01 2002 - 01:00:11 PDT