Right at the end of section 6, Vygotsky makes a point which underlies a lot
of his argument and should be brought out before we go on. The 'lawfulness
of a clash of ideas and opinions' is determined by 'the development of the
science itself and the nature of the reality it studies at a given level of
knowledge.' (257). Thus there is an unfolding logic to the development of
the science, expressed through 'objective tendencies which are inherent in
the objective tasks brought forward by the development of the science and
which act behind the backs of the various theorists and investigators with
the the force of a steel spring.' Only someone who can approach this 'by
means of the general science' will understand these tendencies.
This seems to reflect a Hegelian view by which the unfolding of the logic
of the categories of the science have an objective existence, which can be
captured by a 'general science' because this includes 'a fundamental
dialectical analysis of the nature of this concept [he takes the
subsconscious as an example] and the features of being that it corresponds
to and reflects.' (Sect. 7, 258)
Such conceptual analysis precedes investigation of particular issues of e.g.
the subconscious. 'A correct statement of a question is no less a matter of
scientific creativity and investigation — and it is much more crucial. The
vast majority of contemporary psychological investigations write out the
last decimal point with great care and precision in answer to a question
that is stated fundamentally incorrectly.'
Vygotsky here reiterates his point from section 5 that conceptualisation
must precede empirical science. Here he uses it to emphasise the need for a
coherent, integrated and systematic set of views as in his conception of
'general science'. In the rest of section 7 he criticises eclectic attempts
to form an overall framework by combination of ideas that are not cut from
one conceptual cloth. Here is where he blasts Luria's attempt to reconcile
Freud and Marx. Use of terms such as 'monism' and 'materialism' in an
undefined way merely serve to blur over distinct ideas. Rather 'in order to
critically regard a foreign system, one must first of all have one's own
psychological system of principles', both as a means for critical assessment
of Freud's ideas and for an understanding of how they can be integrated into
one's own ideas. 'Before we turn the solution of the problem of the
unconscious as a psychological problem, we must first solve it as _the_
problem for psychology.
More to follow soon...
Bruce
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