1) On the TOC of the Engestrom reading I have linked the paper and figures 6
and 7 in (WORD) doc format. Note there are two files horizontal and
figure6_7 in word format. If there are difficulties let me know. Also
Davydov is available on a 1 page html file.
http://communication.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm
2) I caught Martin message which said,
""I am following this thread with great interest and I particularly
appreciate your reminder that "it *is* possible to be individual and
social at the same time".
My inclination was huh how can one be individual without being social - to
me the very fact that I am an individual speaks to the social, so I have a
hard time here. It seems outright impossible to speak of the individual and
the social as being categories opposed to each other. I agree with Marx who
said there can be no contradiction here.
I agree that subject may be better here or at least take us further. It
seems to me that with Activity being this social-cultural-material process
we as individuals are part of it - inseperable from it.
But, I think the seperate categories of individual - social are real strong
in American political thought. I think Martin's statement would make more
"sense" to most people I associate with - family and teachers -
particularily because its so consistent with an american world view. I know
explaining the opposite or a view closer to Paul's usually gets me blank
stares. My point which I think Diane touched on in an earlier view is one's
acceptance or rejection of arguments has a lot to do with world views we
hold.
I do not think this is without consequence either - if one holds onto a
strong categorical seperation of individual and social one would also
situate agency, transformation, expanding in the individual which of course
YE does not do.
One could bring up the dolphin which to me demonstrates the individual
exists because of the social not the other way around, but I don't think in
the end it matters much. We hold world views with all their political
ramifications and the consequences are high to give them up.
"The individual, when he apprehends himself as such, is social in his
essence. He is social not as a result of external contingencies, but by
virtue of an internal necessity, by virtue of his genesis." Henri Wallon
-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Ryder [mailto:mryder@carbon.cudenver.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 10:44 AM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re: Individual activity?
Victor,
I am following this thread with great interest and I particularly
appreciate your reminder that "it *is* possible to be individual and
social at the same time".
In my job, I often spend many hours alone in my 'Dilbert' cubicle
solving an engineering problem. I typically feel isolated in my
actions until I take notice of the tools, the language, the schema,
and information resources that I employ as I undertake the task.
Whether or not I engage my colleagues in a task, the outcome is
never the product of my labor alone.
Martin R.
On Mon, 9 Apr 2001, Victor Kaptelinin wrote:
> Thank you, Paul, for your prompt and thoughtful reply!
>
> However, there are still some things that make me feel uncomfortable.
>
> Paul wrote:
> > For example, you continue to talk about "human
> >activities" which surreptitiously slips the notion of individual back
into
> >the idea of activity. This confusion is continuous, I think,
>
> There is no confusion whatsoever. The use of "human activity" (either
> individual or collective) was intended just to differentiate it from " the
> actions of the individual antelope or zebra
> >> >or other such animal "
>
>
> until one
> >begins to see that (in this theoretical framework) activity is a property
of
> >a social group. Actions are the behavior of individuals within the
group.
>
> I believe the opposite is true and activities should be considered as
> properties of BOTH individual and collective subjects. That was Leontiev's
> position and there seem to be good reasons to believe individuals have
> their "personal" or "subjective" (cf. Ricardo's recent message) motives,
> which cannot be considered as just goals within supra-individual activity
> systems. Moreover, the life of an individual ("zhiznedejatelnost",
> according to Leontiev) can be considered as a higher-level entity
comparing
> to individual activities.
>
> Therefore, I do not think any attempt to "slip the notion of individual
> back into
> the idea of activity" should be dismissed outright. In my view, both
> Leontiev's and Engestrom's should be taken seriously and perhaps rejecting
> individuals the right to be subjects of activities (not just actions)
needs
> much more thorough argumentation then just pointing out the dangers of
> thinking otherwise.
>
> Ricardo's idea that we need to keep two meanings of "individual" (as
> opposed to "social" and as opposed to "collective") separate seems to be
> very relevant. One of the implications of accepting this idea is that
> activities can be individual and social at the same time.
>
> Doesn't that mean that questions asked by Charles should be addressed once
> again? The answers provided by Paul earlier are based on the logic that
> activities are not individual because they are social. However, since it
> *is* possible to be individual and social at the same time, these answers
> do not seem to be valid any longer...
>
> What do you think?
>
> Best wishes,
> Victor
>
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: Victor Kaptelinin <vklinin@informatik.umu.se>
> >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 4:52 AM
> >Subject: Re: Individual activity?
> >
> >
> >> Paul,
> >>
> >> I am a bit puzzled with your answers to Charles. Could you please help
me
> >> clarify one thing?
> >>
> >> >Given that the subject is transitional, it still begins as an
> >individual,
> >> >so at the time of the first individual changing his/her object, isn't
> >> >there then an individual activity?
> >> >
> >> > Answer 1. No because all activity is social which is what
> >> >distinguishes it >from the actions of the individual antelope or
zebra
> >> >or other such animal that, being a member of a herd/community
(origin
> >> >of Gattungwesen??), does not act through the mediation of tools.
All
> >> >tool use is learned hence all activity, involving tools, is
> >essentially
> >> >social
> >>
> >> It apears you (and Yrjo) claim that human activities are not individual
> >> because they are always social. However, human actions and operations
are
> >> social, too. It surely means they are not individual, either, right?
> >>
> >> Then where does the distinction between collective activities and
> >> individual actions come from? ("We may well speak of the activity of
the
> >> individual, but never of individual activity; only actions are
> >> individual.")
> >>
> >> Thank you!
> >>
> >> Best wishes,
> >> Victor
> >>
> >> PS I have just joined the discussion and have not traced it to the
> >> beginning yet, so if this issue has already been resolved, well, I am
> >> sorry...
> >>
> >>
>
>
>
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue May 01 2001 - 01:01:48 PDT