Victor,
I am following this thread with great interest and I particularly
appreciate your reminder that "it *is* possible to be individual and
social at the same time".
In my job, I often spend many hours alone in my 'Dilbert' cubicle
solving an engineering problem. I typically feel isolated in my
actions until I take notice of the tools, the language, the schema,
and information resources that I employ as I undertake the task.
Whether or not I engage my colleagues in a task, the outcome is
never the product of my labor alone.
Martin R.
On Mon, 9 Apr 2001, Victor Kaptelinin wrote:
> Thank you, Paul, for your prompt and thoughtful reply!
>
> However, there are still some things that make me feel uncomfortable.
>
> Paul wrote:
> > For example, you continue to talk about "human
> >activities" which surreptitiously slips the notion of individual back into
> >the idea of activity. This confusion is continuous, I think,
>
> There is no confusion whatsoever. The use of "human activity" (either
> individual or collective) was intended just to differentiate it from " the
> actions of the individual antelope or zebra
> >> >or other such animal "
>
>
> until one
> >begins to see that (in this theoretical framework) activity is a property of
> >a social group. Actions are the behavior of individuals within the group.
>
> I believe the opposite is true and activities should be considered as
> properties of BOTH individual and collective subjects. That was Leontiev's
> position and there seem to be good reasons to believe individuals have
> their "personal" or "subjective" (cf. Ricardo's recent message) motives,
> which cannot be considered as just goals within supra-individual activity
> systems. Moreover, the life of an individual ("zhiznedejatelnost",
> according to Leontiev) can be considered as a higher-level entity comparing
> to individual activities.
>
> Therefore, I do not think any attempt to "slip the notion of individual
> back into
> the idea of activity" should be dismissed outright. In my view, both
> Leontiev's and Engestrom's should be taken seriously and perhaps rejecting
> individuals the right to be subjects of activities (not just actions) needs
> much more thorough argumentation then just pointing out the dangers of
> thinking otherwise.
>
> Ricardo's idea that we need to keep two meanings of "individual" (as
> opposed to "social" and as opposed to "collective") separate seems to be
> very relevant. One of the implications of accepting this idea is that
> activities can be individual and social at the same time.
>
> Doesn't that mean that questions asked by Charles should be addressed once
> again? The answers provided by Paul earlier are based on the logic that
> activities are not individual because they are social. However, since it
> *is* possible to be individual and social at the same time, these answers
> do not seem to be valid any longer...
>
> What do you think?
>
> Best wishes,
> Victor
>
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: Victor Kaptelinin <vklinin@informatik.umu.se>
> >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 4:52 AM
> >Subject: Re: Individual activity?
> >
> >
> >> Paul,
> >>
> >> I am a bit puzzled with your answers to Charles. Could you please help me
> >> clarify one thing?
> >>
> >> >Given that the subject is transitional, it still begins as an
> >individual,
> >> >so at the time of the first individual changing his/her object, isn't
> >> >there then an individual activity?
> >> >
> >> > Answer 1. No because all activity is social which is what
> >> >distinguishes it >from the actions of the individual antelope or zebra
> >> >or other such animal that, being a member of a herd/community (origin
> >> >of Gattungwesen??), does not act through the mediation of tools. All
> >> >tool use is learned hence all activity, involving tools, is
> >essentially
> >> >social
> >>
> >> It apears you (and Yrjo) claim that human activities are not individual
> >> because they are always social. However, human actions and operations are
> >> social, too. It surely means they are not individual, either, right?
> >>
> >> Then where does the distinction between collective activities and
> >> individual actions come from? ("We may well speak of the activity of the
> >> individual, but never of individual activity; only actions are
> >> individual.")
> >>
> >> Thank you!
> >>
> >> Best wishes,
> >> Victor
> >>
> >> PS I have just joined the discussion and have not traced it to the
> >> beginning yet, so if this issue has already been resolved, well, I am
> >> sorry...
> >>
> >>
>
>
>
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue May 01 2001 - 01:01:48 PDT