I think I might have sent this directly to Helena by mistake. Here's our
exchange:
I regret that I haven't had time to read the Leont'ev text, though I've
save it for future reference/reading. In response to Helena's post: I must
wonder how radically we can attribute personality exclusively to social
activity. I speak as someone who knows people with chemical imbalances
whose personalities have changed dramatically through medical interventions
(e.g., Risperdal for psychotic episodes; Paxil and related medications for
high anxiety/depression; etc.). One could argue that these medications are
socially produced and that taking them is part of practical activity, and
that's true. But what of people who don't have access to the medications
and therapy and so have personalities that are shaped by their chemical
makeup? I also think of a couple of young kids I know who are autistic and
who have very limited social interaction. Surely their biochemistry has a
lot to do with their personalities.
Peter
At 11:44 PM 10/31/00 -0500, you wrote:
>This is starting to get interesting. I think Leont'ev is actually trying
>to get to a place where he can describe therapy -- psychology not just as
>the system that studies consciousness, but a way to change or help people.
>
>Here's what I see in Chapter 5 (the first part): The problem of
>personality: what is it? Why do we seem to agree that we can recognize and
>describe "personality"? Here the question of internal/external becomes
>primary. We have explained that we must think of a person in the world as
>engaging with it through activity, shaping it and himself through
>activity. So we will not slip into the fallacy of the current two-factor
>explanation -- heredity vs envornment, arguing which has the greater
>influence. Instead (page 6) we say that the personality of a man is in no
>sense pre-existing in relation to his activity; just as with his
>consciousness, activity gives rise to personality. The personality is
>produced by the social relationship man enters into through activity.
>However, it is possible to have one activity mask another, in the sense
>that the apparent motive for the masking activity is actually the
>displacement of a motive for the masked activity. And so we move to a
>discussion of motives....
>
>OK?
>
>Helena
At 05:18 PM 11/1/00 -0500, you wrote:
>I thought I saw a message from Peter S. on Leont'ev . Was I dreaming? If
>that's the message Nate was responding to below, can someone repost it? I
>can't find it on the website either.
>thanks,
>judy
>
>At 09:56 AM 11/1/00 -0600, you wrote:
> >Peter,
> >
> >Thanks so much I found this really useful. It really summed up for me what I
> >have gotten from the readings and discussion - as well as my understanding
> >of what Leont'ev, Vygotsky, Luria et al were trying to say.
> >
> >Nate
> >
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Peter JONES(SCS) [mailto:P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk]
> >Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2000 4:14 AM
> >To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >Subject: leont'ev: externalization/internalization etc
> >
> >
> >31 october 2000
> >from peter jones, sheffield hallam university
> >Friends
> >this message has been stewing for a few days as i've been really struggling
> >both with the book and with the many ideas thrown up in discussion,
> >including
> >dot's earlier email (and her later clarifications) which provoked a lot of
> >interesting debate, and in particular, some issues which are not so easy to
> >resolve. i wanted to return to the issue of external/internal and
> >externalization/internalization (and i've harped on about this before, so
> >apologies!). the cultural-historical position is usually expressed as
> >follows
> >(and indeed vygotsky put it this way): the direction of development is from
> >social to individual (= external to internal). this way of expressing things
> >cannot be right (i should stress that i don't think vygotsky actually
> >understood it in this way, despite the way that it is expressed). it is
> >wrong
> >because the individual IS THE SOCIAL BEING (marx)!! think about it: if
> >social
> >means 'external' then the process of 'internalizing' the external cannot
> >therefore be social - it cannot be part of the 'social process' and
> >consequently the individual (the person, the personality) is not a social
> >phenomenon! but this is absurd! the process of 'internalization' (however we
> >construe it) is part of the (SOCIAL!) process of becoming of the individual
> >person, the (individual ) social being. it is absolutely wrong, therefore,
> >to
> >counterpose the individual to the social; the internal to the external in
> >this
> >way. there is of course a valid distinction between 'collective' and
> >'individual' activities etc but this is not to do with the former being
> >social
> >and the latter not. the 'inner' states of the individual mind are just as
> >much
> >social phenomena as the stock exchange. i understand the 'social' to mean
> >the
> >concerted, co-action, co-operation etc of particular individuals; it means
> >that
> >in everything the individual person does (or thinks) other people are
> >present,
> >other people are 'addressed' (to use Felix Mikhailov's term -
> >'obrashchenie')
> >whether directly in immediate practical circumstances of active cooperation
> >where, as individuals we must start our personal journey, or indirectly in
> >'inner speech' and private contemplation. as marx put it (i think we've
> >looked
> >at this quote before): 'Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no
> >means
> >ONLY in the form of some DIRECTLY communal activity and directly COMMUNAL
> >enjoyment, although COMMUNAL activity and COMMUNAL enjoyment - ie activity
> >and
> >enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in ACTUAL direct ASSOCIATION
> >with
> >other men - will occur wherever such a DIRECT expression of sociability
> >stems
> >from the true character of the activity's content and is appropriate to the
> >nature of the enjoyment. But also when i am active SCIENTIFICALLY, etc - an
> >activity which i can seldom perform in direct community with others - then
> >my
> >activity is SOCIAL because i perform it as a MAN. Not only is the material
> >of
> >my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in
> >which
> >the thinker is active): my OWN existence IS social activity, and therefore
> >that
> >which i make of myself, i make of myself for society and with the
> >consciousness
> >of myself as a social being.' this is from the early writings (1844) and
> >goes
> >on in similar vein in a way which is directly relevant to the discussion i
> >think.so the development of our physical and mental powers as individuals,
> >of
> >our capacity to act, think, plan, imagine, feel, etc etc is not a movement
> >from
> >'social to individual': it IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL ITSELF - my
> >individual 'progress' is the 'progress' of other people too; the development
> >of
> >the individuals (together, through and with one another) is the development
> >of
> >the community! if an individual solves a problem it is our solution -
> >humanity
> >as a whole has solved it. (conversely an individual's problems are
> >everybody's
> >problems!). leont'ev does not, i don't think, make this equation 'social =
> >external' although sometimes his remarks seem a bit cryptic. but for
> >instance
> >(section 3.2): 'Human psychology is concerned with the ACTIVITY OF CONCRETE
> >INDIVIDUALS that takes place either in conditions of open association, in
> >the
> >midst of people, or eye to eye with the surrounding object world - before
> >the
> >potter's wheel or behind the writing desk'. He goes on in the same section
> >to
> >criticise a view which is 'limited by the concept "socialization" of the
> >psyche
> >of the individual' although this implies that he sees the concept of
> >"socialization" of the psyche as valid within certain liimits. his
> >discussion
> >of 'internal' and 'external' is very nuanced - and in section 3.4 he accepts
> >some kind of interaction or dialectic of internal and external - 'the
> >existence
> >of regularly occurring transitions in the opposite direction also, from
> >internal to external activity' although he general insists on the primacy of
> >internalization as the process of formation of the individual "psyche". but
> >there are problems with this. it seems to me (partly because of the
> >exclusive
> >focus - at least in detailed analysis - on individual activity) that the
> >categories of 'internal' and 'ideal' (theoretical etc) activity are
> >conflated
> >(and perhaps this is the force of yrjo's early comment on the whole book.
> >but
> >the two distinctions do not match up: remember marx on the architect and the
> >bee! the architect does his/her planning on paper on the drawing board -
> >this
> >is completely external! the 'plan' is the thing, the sensuous
> >(super-sensuous,
> >ie ideal) object in front of him/her being altered in advance of the real
> >thing. of course there is activity going on 'inside the head' of the
> >architect
> >too (ie internally) which is of course, part of the planning process; but
> >this
> >'internal' activity in the head is part of any activity! if activity is
> >truly
> >conscious and purposeful (ie it has an object, motive in leont'ev's sense)
> >then
> >how can 'external activity' not be/include (at the same time) 'internal
> >activity' in leont'ev's sense?? so that his distinction between
> >external/internal breaks down. theoretical (or in general ideal) activity is
> >just as 'external' as any other activity, as witness this discussion we're
> >having about the meaning of his book! paul's point about the pre-eminence of
> >production over consumption is a good, one, i think but it does not really
> >make
> >the point that he wants to make. production is purposeful activity - it
> >runs
> >its course (cf marx on the labour process) according to a purpose which
> >(ideally) precedes (and guides) the actual transformation of object into
> >product. so in leont'ev's (inadequate?) terms production is
> >'externalization'
> >of the 'internal'!! yours in some confusion!
> >P
> >PS: why do my messages come out in a weird format? should i be pressing some
> >button??
> >
> >
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