>The video [Monkey in the Mirror] makes a fascinating comparison between the
>intellectual abilities and social
>behavior of humans and those of other great apes (Orangutans and
>chimpazees). I usually present the video to illustrate the role of tools
>in the development and evolution of intelligent behavior as well as the
>connection between identity and social interaction.
Jorge, could you say more about how the video illustrates the connection
between identity and social interaction? Jim Gavelek and I have sometimes
pondered the phenomena studied by Gordon Gallup (1977). Monkeys and baboons
failed to recognize their self-image in a mirror while a chimp and orangutan
were both seemingly conscious that "It is me, there." It sounds like this
may be something covered by your film and is interesting in its implications.
For example, if the awareness that one occupies a unique space in time marks
the inception of what we as humans term identity, what is it that
facilitates self-awareness, the awareness of self vis-vis other? Is it
being part of a community? Of course that is necessary, but while ants have
highly sophisticated social structures, I don't think we would attribute
individual identities to them. Does the identity we impute to chimps and
orangutans result from the communicative and intellectual abilities that a
more "human-like" neocortex makes possible? While chimps and orangutans
possess the necessary brains for tool-use, it seems to me that much of
primate communication is phatic, without the rich semiotic resources that
homo sapiens utilize to construct their identities. Although they can be
taught by humans to use symbols to communicate, chimps don't develop this
skill naturally in the wild. So its not a simple function of biology.
Clearly, the social IS necessary (I think here about primate research on the
adverse effects of early social deprivation on monkeys' capacities to
subsequently integrate themselves into the group) but not sufficient. The
advantage of a sociocultural perspective on identity is that it allows one
to consider identity as an emergent phenemenon, something that constituted
by many ontological levels and yet reducible to none. No one level
(biological, cultural, ontogenetic) provides a sufficient account of
anything as enormously complex as a living, active organism (let alone one
that thinks and creates).
One aspect of sociocultural theory that remains problematic for me is how to
frame affect, which has typically been construed from an individual
perspective, and its role in identity formation. For example, might primate
research point toward the importance of including AFFECT as a regulator of
self-other boundaries? In watching primates, it seems to me that many of
their interactions are affectively mediated bids for dominance through
intimidation (creating fear, anxiety), nurturance through grooming
(obtaining security, pleasure), and so on. I think of a couple related
literatures in this regard. Attachment theory (John Bowlby) is an
evolutionary perspective that speaks to the connection between affect and
social relations. Though typically construed as an individual
characteristic, the consequence of endogenous instincts, one's affective
comfort with how s/he is positioned vis-a-vis social others is believed to
be a function of early social contexts. Also, Michael Lewis has done a
great deal of research in the area of "self-conscious affect," affects such
as shame, pride, embarrasment, and guilt (all socially generated) in which
one is made accutely aware of self-in-relation to others. Although he and
others attribute such affects to cognitive self-evalutations regarding how
one measures up to internalized cultural standards, I'm not sure the latter
are necessary. At least as regards shame/pride. Who among us has not
witnessed pride and shame preverbal children?
More to the point of your original question, I do think of sociocultural
perspectives as inherently evolutionary, though not reductionistic in that
sense.
Here are a couple refs that might be relevant...
Tulviste, P. (1991). The cultural-historical development of verbal thinking.
Commack, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers.
Penuel, W. R., & Wertsch, J. V. (1995). Vygotsky and identity formation: A
sociocultural approach. Educational Psychologist, 30(2), 83-92.
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Mark R. Gover (PH: 517.393.0721)
Educational Psychology "Without time, everything would
Michigan State University happen at once. Without space,
govermar who-is-at pilot.msu.edu it would all happen to YOU!"
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