Responsibility for our theories
Charles Bazerman (bazerman who-is-at humanitas.ucsb.edu)
Mon, 1 Jan 1996 12:08:32 -0800 (PST)
Jay,
just one aded comment on our discussion about attachment to
theories. Although I agree we ought to be cautious about becoming too
attached to our theories, we can not but help use our theories as tools
to think about our lives and practices, that is if we are serious in our
inquiries. And we ought to be aware that others may use what we say as
tools to reflect on and construct their behaviors. The point is that we
have a kind of moral responsibility for the theories we entertain and
espouse. This is not to suggest we deny any line of inquiry as too
dangerous, but that we do not enter down certain paths too lightly,
without considering a broader picture, and without demanding a high
degree of evidence.
In contemplating theories, which have a double-hermeneutic effect
as Giddens might say in transforming social realities, it is worth
thinking about whether the actually describe the world we daily live in
or a world we might want to live in. It is often not too useful to
advance theories to castigate the worlds we believe others live in but
which we would not reflexively accept as the one we live--both because we
of course can't escape the accounts we make, but also because we and
others may come to believe and accept as reality and the justification
for behaviors worlds we at firts found unrealistic and uninhabitable.
We should face realities, but we also should not
proliferate views that skew future realities.
I think you in your own work are sensitive to this issue, but I
wanted to make sure I made this side of my concern absolutely explicit.
The indeterminacy and constructivist nature of theories should not only
make us treat them lightly concerning their truth; it should also make us
treat them very seriously, in their consequences.
Chuck