[Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)

[mike cole]

Thanks, Martin, for all the time and trouble putting together those
clarifying passages. As is often the case, the texts
take several readings for me to appreciate. I experienced this phenomenon
all the time during 5thD sessions
where kids shared computer screens and negotiated turns;  the kids had a
difficult time explaining how they
had done something.  The kids in this case were often 10-12 which could be
observed in their arguments
about strategies. I hadn't thought about it that way. thanks. (Many
untrained undergrads, on the other hand,
got really into the activities, but retained a phenomenal ability to
describe the interpersonal dynamics of the
interactions). I had not thought of them as failing to introspect.

I fully endorse fully the idea that

Of course, one might find it objectionable that LSV might suggest that
non-literate peoples might be unaware of their own thinking. But I agree
with Andy, in such cultures there may well be systematic instruction in
systems of concepts — legal, religious… — that would have the same effect
as LSV says that school instruction does in the west.

I posted the Hutchins article (thanks Andy) because it raises exactly this
issue with some relevant data .
The work of Megan Bang, Doug Medin and colleagues highlights the
possibility of "real concepts" developing along that are actively
discouraged by schooling.

  Mike
As you know,,  Piaget came around to something like a "cultural context"
interpretation of cultural differences in formal operations, suggesting
that they would
occur in areas of dense expertise.  All reasons why we need a
bio/social-cultural/historical,interdisciplinary of human development.  :-))

On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 5:17 PM Martin Packer <mpacker@cantab.net> wrote:

> Hi Mike,
>
> Well you and I may differ on this. My interpretation is that in the
> passage that Anthony gave us, LSV is talking about the growing
> consciousness *of their own thinking* on the part of school-age children.
> (In Thought & Language he shifts a bit on whether this happens in middle
> childhood or adolescence, but that needn't concern us.) That is to say, he
> is writing about what he calls “introspection."
>
> As evidence for this interpretation let me cite a couple of other passages
> (these are from the excellent Kellogg translation) where I think the point
> is made more clearly:
>
> 100 "I make a knot. I do it consciously. I cannot, however, tell you
> exactly how I did it. My conscious act is unconscious, because my attention
> is focused on the act of the tying, but not on how I do it. Consciousness
> is always some piece of reality. The object of my consciousness is tying
> the knot, a knot, and what was happening to it but not those actions that
> I make when tying, not how I do it. But the object of consciousness can be
> just that - then it will be awareness. Awareness is an act
> of consciousness, the object of which is itself the very same activity of
> consciousness”
>
>
> 102 "Even Piaget's research showed that introspection does not begin to
> develop in any significant degree until school age. Further investigations
> have shown that the development of introspection in the school age contains
> something similar to what occurs in the development of the external
> perception and observation in the transition from infancy to
> early childhood. As is well known, the most important change in external
> perception of this period [i.e. infancy to early childhood] is that a child
> from a wordless and, consequently, meaningless perception, to a semantic,
> verbal and objective perception. The same can be said of introspection on
> the threshold of school age. The child is moving from mute introspection to
> speech and words. He develops an internal semantic perception of his own
> mental processes…. I realize that I can recall, i.e. I do recall the
> subjectivity of my own consciousness."
>
>
> 104 "By their very nature, spontaneous concepts include the fact that they
> are unconscious. Children know how they operate spontaneously but are not
> aware of them. This is what we saw in the children's concept of "because."
> Obviously, by themselves, spontaneous concepts need to be
> unconscious, because consideration is always directed to their
> objects, rather than to the act of thought which is grasping it.”
>
>
> 106  "only in a system [of concepts] can the concept become the object of
> awareness and only in a system can the child acquire volitional control [of
> concepts]."
>
>
> In his Lectures on Child Psychology LSV is very clear, in my view, that at
> each stage the child has consciousness of different aspects of the world
> and of their own psychological processes. For example:
>
> "In an infant, there is no intellectual perception: he perceives a room
> but does not separately perceive chairs, a table, etc.; he will perceive
> everything as an undivided whole in contrast to the adult, who sees figures
> against a background. How does a child perceive his own movements in
> early childhood? He is happy, unhappy, but does not know that he is happy,
> just as an infant when he is hungry does not know that he is hungry. There
> is a great difference between feeling hunger and knowing that I am hungry.
> In early childhood, the child does not know his own experiences….
> Precisely as a three-year-old child discovers his relation to other people,
> a seven-year-old discovers the fact of his own experiences.” (p. 291)
>
>
> Of course, one might find it objectionable that LSV might suggest that
> non-literate peoples might be unaware of their own thinking. But I agree
> with Andy, in such cultures there may well be systematic instruction in
> systems of concepts — legal, religious… — that would have the same effect
> as LSV says that school instruction does in the west.
>
> Stay safe,
>
> Martin
>
>
>
>
> On Aug 15, 2020, at 6:06 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> I was not being ironic, David
> If scientific concepts are required for conscious awareness (as specified
> in the quotation I was asked to respond to) and people who
> have not been to school do not acquire Piagetian concepts related to
> formal operations (for example) or other measure of "thinking in
> scientific concepts) if seems to follow that they have not achieved
> conscious awareness.
>
> LSV writes about non-literate, indigenous, peoples that they are capable
> of complexes, but not true concepts (I think the use of the term.
> "scientific" is not helpful here). Luria interprets his data on
> self-consciousness that are a part of the same monograph as his work on
> syllogisms,
> classification, etc among Uzbekis who had experienced various degrees of
> involvement in modern (e.g. Russian) forms of life as evidence for
> what might be termed "lack of conscious awareness I am not sure."
>
> mike
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 3:31 PM David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>
>> Maybe I missed an ironic intention, Michael, but on August 11 Anthony
>> asked about the meaning of a couple of paragraphs from *Thinking and
>> Speech*.
>>
>>
>>
>> *Here is the passage in question*, from *Thinking and Speech*, Ch. 6,
>> pp. 190-1:
>>
>> "To perceive something in a different way means to acquire new potentials
>> for acting with respect to it. At the chess board, to see differently is to
>> play differently. By generalizing the process of activity itself, I acquire
>> the potential for new relationships with it. To speak crudely, it is as if
>> this process has been isolated from the general activity of consciousness.
>> I am conscious of the fact that I remember. I make my own remembering the
>> object of consciousness. An isolation arises here. In a certain sense, any
>> generalization or abstraction isolates its object. This is why conscious
>> awareness – understood as generalization – leads directly to mastery.
>>
>>
>>
>> *Thus, the foundation of conscious awareness is the generalization or
>> abstraction of the mental processes, which leads to their mastery*.
>> Instruction has a decisive role in this process. Scientific concepts have a
>> unique relationship to the object. This relationship is mediated through
>> other concepts that themselves have an internal hierarchical system of
>> interrelationships. It is apparently in this domain of the scientific
>> concept that conscious awareness of concepts or the generalization and
>> mastery of concepts emerges for the first time. And once a new structure of
>> generalization has arisen in one sphere of thought, it can – like any
>> structure – be transferred without training to all remaining domains of
>> concepts and thought. Thus, *conscious awareness enters through the gate
>> opened up by the scientific concept*."
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike’s reply, in total was:
>>
>>
>>
>> I understand that to mean that humans who have not achieved
>> scientific/real concepts do not have conscious awareness.
>>
>>
>>
>> What am I missing?
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> *On Behalf Of *Martin Packer
>> *Sent:* Saturday, August 15, 2020 4:36 PM
>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a
>> Participation Question)
>>
>>
>>
>> David,
>>
>>
>>
>> Are you saying that either Mike Cole or Lev Vygotsky, or both, are
>> claiming that 5-year old children (for example) lack conscious awareness of
>> the world they live in?
>>
>>
>>
>> Puzzled...
>>
>>
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Aug 14, 2020, at 9:16 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Andy,
>>
>>
>>
>> That “any ‘actual’ concept is the intersection or merging of both the
>> scientific and spontaneous path,” speaks to their complementarity,
>> making them akin to Type 1 and Type 2 processing I referred to in my post.
>>
>>
>> But they’re also hierarchically related, since according to Mike’s
>> interpretation of a Vygotsky’s passage cited by Anthony a few days ago, “humans
>> who have not achieved scientific/real concepts do not have conscious
>> awareness.”
>>
>>
>>
>> I do not question Vygotsky’s genius. What I do question is the coherence
>> of the interpretive frames that have evolved from his work. As Michael
>> observed in a recent post, “like the writer he wanted to be he [Vygotsky]
>> used phrases and ideas less as truths and more to move his narrative
>> forward.” What I always wonder in eavesdropping on XMCA is whether the
>> issues we discuss are resolvable, or is the theoretical backdrop to our
>> conversation so heterogeneous as to make the possibility of resolution
>> illusory.
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>  *On Behalf Of *Andy Blunden
>> *Sent:* Friday, August 14, 2020 10:32 AM
>> *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a
>> Participation Question)
>>
>>
>>
>> No David, as I said, the term "scientific concept" as it is understood
>> nowadays, tends to mislead. The distinction for Vygotsky is entirely, as
>> you say, *developmental*, and it is not a categorisation either (as in
>> putting things into boxes), and nothing to do with "sophistication."
>> "Scientific concept" refers to the path of development that begins with an
>> abstract (decontextualised) concept acquired through instruction in some
>> more or less formal institution. "Spontaneous concept" refers to the path
>> of development which begins with everyday experience, closely connected
>> with immediate sensori-motor interaction and perception, i.e., it begins
>> from the concrete, whereas the "scientific" is beginning from the abstract.
>>
>>
>> Any "actual" concept is the intersection or merging of both the
>> scientific and spontaneous path. For example (1) everyday life is full of
>> ideas which have their source in institutions, but have made their way out
>> of the institutional context into everyday life. On the other hand, for
>> example (2) any scientific concept worth its salt has made its way out of
>> the classroom and become connected with practice, like the book-learning of
>> the medical graduate who's spent 6 months in A&E.
>>
>> I admit, this is not clear from Vygotsky's prose. But here's the thing:
>> when you're reading a great thinker and what they're saying seems silly,
>> trying reading it more generously, because there's probably a reason this
>> writer has gained the reputation of being a great thinker.
>>
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> Hegel for Social Movements
>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fnam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com*2F*3Furl*3Dhttps*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fbrill.com*2Fview*2Ftitle*2F54574__*3B!!Mih3wA!XxSEPVIR0yRJgFaNSBm_i4WM3CddjlgSG_ngNcugdSCaXGC-tM-WRY9GIob6WVqti5Nn5Q*24*26data*3D02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7Ca67ad4b8e1054ad0908108d840677d4e*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637330160531086326*26sdata*3DklbbGOD961jWAJJ2y9AC4ITYXCnaDGFBvC0IbUJKVVs*3D*26reserved*3D0__*3BJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJQ!!Mih3wA!Xj5wWxgfwuTDZiCehf_tnNDlXD6gP8BpwnjrYGS24qDQcMEd3gC6xhsU3N_JiNLOorai4A*24&data=02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7C4c9f97baa48249eab87b08d841637595*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637331242718851133&sdata=W*2FK*2BTbTCBGe1eDIjlq4*2BhdhmoNfNxW11ayTlKsOia*2FA*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUqKioqKioqKioqKioqJSUqKioqKioqKiUlKiUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUl!!Mih3wA!WoFSvqRItZRFG-Wb6AmS0wx0inVUDXaV3gD2ZV6rpV81b-0KImklvCD1pGLY8v7_UV-zxA$>
>> Home Page
>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fnam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com*2F*3Furl*3Dhttps*3A*2F*2Furldefense.com*2Fv3*2F__https*3A*2F*2Fwww.ethicalpolitics.org*2Fablunden*2Findex.htm__*3B!!Mih3wA!XxSEPVIR0yRJgFaNSBm_i4WM3CddjlgSG_ngNcugdSCaXGC-tM-WRY9GIob6WVoUDL1M-A*24*26data*3D02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7Ca67ad4b8e1054ad0908108d840677d4e*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637330160531096322*26sdata*3DUFQ8UqQhHon5sIjNEsW88BFc3G*2FEZq0s1nUehQfL3W4*3D*26reserved*3D0__*3BJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJQ!!Mih3wA!Xj5wWxgfwuTDZiCehf_tnNDlXD6gP8BpwnjrYGS24qDQcMEd3gC6xhsU3N_JiNLEfO6ohg*24&data=02*7C01*7Cdkirsh*40lsu.edu*7C4c9f97baa48249eab87b08d841637595*7C2d4dad3f50ae47d983a09ae2b1f466f8*7C0*7C0*7C637331242718861146&sdata=hQHaTHs78nCNPgn9gG2NkTNb*2BHrhTO8uhtoAzo5bpdE*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUqKioqKioqKioqKiolJSoqKioqKioqJSUqKiUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUl!!Mih3wA!WoFSvqRItZRFG-Wb6AmS0wx0inVUDXaV3gD2ZV6rpV81b-0KImklvCD1pGLY8v77et7hHw$>
>>
>> On 15/08/2020 1:14 am, David H Kirshner wrote:
>>
>> Thanks for your accessible example, Michael.
>>
>>
>>
>> Vygotsky’s scientific / spontaneous distinction between types of concepts
>> has always struck me as such an unfortunate solution to the problem of
>> differential sophistication in modes of reasoning. I’m sure this problem
>> must have deep roots in classical and contemporary philosophy, even as it
>> is reflected in cognitive psychology’s Dual Process Theory that at its
>> “theoretical core amounts to a dichotomous view of two types of processes…:
>> type 1—intuitive, fast, automatic, nonconscious, effortless,
>> contextualized, error-prone, and type 2—reflective, slow, deliberate,
>> cogitative, effortful, decontextualized, normatively correct” (Varga &
>> Hamburger, 2014). What externalizing this distinction as different kinds of
>> cognitive products (this or that kind of concept) seems to do is
>> distract/detract from the sociogenetic character of development. Surely, a
>> sociogenetic approach seeks to interpret these different forms of reasoning
>> as differential discursive practices, embedded in different cultural
>> contexts (Scribner, Cole, etc.). But talking about different kinds of
>> concepts seems like the wrong departure point for that journey.
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> *On Behalf Of *Glassman, Michael
>> *Sent:* Friday, August 14, 2020 7:03 AM
>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a
>> Participation Question)
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Andy, Henry, Anna Lisa,
>>
>>
>>
>> Let me start by saying that this is completely restricted to the way
>> conscious awareness is used in Thinking and Speech. If it is use
>> differently in other places this perspective may be wrong. To my mind (with
>> the proviso that my mind if often wrong) Vygotsky is using the idea of
>> conscious awareness for a specific purpose. To differentiate the role of
>> spontaneous concepts with non-spontaneous concepts. Spontaneous concepts
>> are based initially in affective memory and they give energy and motivation
>> to many of our activities. However we are not consciously aware of them. To
>> go back to chess, I am at the pool and my friend comes up to me and says
>> “Chess?” I say yes. I have no conscious awareness of the concept of chess
>> in my life, why I say yes so easily why it may be a way to make a social
>> connection between me and my friend. It is residue of my affective memory
>> (I don’t know how much Vygotsky was using Ribot when making this argument).
>> We are playing chess and I remember that my brother showed me the
>> non-spontaneous/scientific concept of the bishop’s gambit. As this point in
>> my life I have to think about it and whether I want to use it. I must
>> summon the intellectual functions of memory and attention as I think about
>> the use of the bishop’s gambit. This then is conscious awareness of the
>> scientific concept. I used the bishop’s gambit and win the game and I
>> applaud myself. I got home and tell my brother, the bishop’s gambit was
>> great, thanks. I am mediating the scientific concept of the bishop’s gambit
>> with my everyday concept of playing chess. Voila, development!!!!
>>
>>
>>
>> I don’t know if Vygotsky uses conscious awareness differently elsewhere.
>>
>>
>>
>> Michael
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>  *On Behalf Of *Andy Blunden
>> *Sent:* Thursday, August 13, 2020 11:51 PM
>> *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a
>> Participation Question)
>>
>>
>>
>> Henry, my aim was just to introduce Annalisa and whoever to the
>> scientific way that the terms "conscious awareness" and "consciousness" are
>> used in CHAT. I say "scientific" in the sense that in CHAT we have a system
>> of concepts and associated word meanings which have, if you like,
>> conventional meanings. There is nothing wrong with "automatic and
>> controlled processing" and "ballistic processing" but so far as I am aware
>> these terms were not in Vygotsky's vocabulary. I could be wrong of course
>> and I am sure I will be rapidly corrected if this is the case.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
>
> I[image: Angelus Novus]
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angelus_Novus__;!!Mih3wA!XaZ0ldsk3LvHtURqQPa9pqhSzqJcTkfT9WpcH9iXCnnFdDWAkGk2rg5ikc9GFgnQRyK9kw$>The
> Angel's View of History
>
> It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism,
> spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity cease to be
> antinomies, and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of
> the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means,
> only through the practical energy of humans. (Marx, 1844).
> Cultural Praxis Website: https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!VmZ0krlh0QfyuhwMsJyE-aiBoCi1ndjRzTpyPNrX8Gy6teUon9ROInGdGaVcwUBrBPYaqg$ 
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!XaZ0ldsk3LvHtURqQPa9pqhSzqJcTkfT9WpcH9iXCnnFdDWAkGk2rg5ikc9GFglySosYvA$>
> Re-generating CHAT Website: re-generatingchat.com
> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://re-generatingchat.com__;!!Mih3wA!XaZ0ldsk3LvHtURqQPa9pqhSzqJcTkfT9WpcH9iXCnnFdDWAkGk2rg5ikc9GFgkzDUEbGA$>
> Archival resources website: lchc.ucsd.edu.
> Narrative history of LCHC:  lchcautobio.ucsd.edu.
>
>
>
>
>

-- 

I[image: Angelus Novus] <https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angelus_Novus__;!!Mih3wA!VmZ0krlh0QfyuhwMsJyE-aiBoCi1ndjRzTpyPNrX8Gy6teUon9ROInGdGaVcwUDHx_O9PQ$ >The
Angel's View of History

It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism,
spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity cease to be
antinomies, and thus cease to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of
the theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means,
only through the practical energy of humans. (Marx, 1844).
Cultural Praxis Website: https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://culturalpraxis.net__;!!Mih3wA!VmZ0krlh0QfyuhwMsJyE-aiBoCi1ndjRzTpyPNrX8Gy6teUon9ROInGdGaVcwUBrBPYaqg$ 
Re-generating CHAT Website: re-generatingchat.com
Archival resources website: lchc.ucsd.edu.
Narrative history of LCHC:  lchcautobio.ucsd.edu.
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