[Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov

Wed May 22 04:31:07 PDT 2019

 The people behind these ideas were equally interesting in other areas.  It is a shame that "culture" has reduced cybernetics to the kitsch.
Dear Huw,Cybernetics is within the "Culture" , how can this latter reduce that former to the kitsch?There's talk of scientists trying to delve into matters of finding the way the inanimate turned into the animate. People are curiously taking glance at vehicles running on the roads without drivers in safety. They believe in the successful end. The problems is somewhere else:In one issue of the MCA Journal , there's a very good article titled : "The early history of the scaffolding metaphor:Bernstein, Luria, Vygotsky, and before" by Anna Shvarts & Arthur Bakker. It's very detailed. At one point it reaches the explication of the metaphor getting help from some biologists including the renown one , Nikolai Bernstein. It was a long time I had been in wait to read him , Okhtomsky and Anokhin. Bernstein's "Dexterity" book reveals a lot good things about evolution. Let's see what he has to say in what have drawn our attention:
[In mammals it grows dramatically compared to birds, and especially with reptiles, the relative number of single, target, attacks,
hunting, etc. All these movements are not stereotyped and are not the same from time to time, but are distinguished by large, accurate and fast adaptability. . They are increasingly increasing the ability to instantly create new, unlearned motor combinations, just right for the occasion.] 
Further ahead:
[If it is possible to apply here a comparison from the field of music, then mammals, relatively less and less of their
movements, perform by heart or notes, and improvise more and more. It is quite understandable in connection with what has been said that their ability to acquire motor skills is increasing more and more: they are becoming easier to train. They greatly increase the number and variety of self-service and toilet movements:

In a constant and wide use of the family enters the upbringing of the young. Who has not seen a cat bring a half-tailed mouse to
kittens to teach them? Who did not observe how a lioness or a tigress in a zoo generously, but reasonably distributes to children
"pedagogical" slaps? Both the she-wolf, the beaver, and the macaque teach their offspring the peculiarities of their life craft.
The family produces and a huge amount of soul and shades. of experiences unknown to reptiles: affection, selflessness,
gratitude, obedience, friendship.

The actions forming the transition to real, so-called object and chain actions are becoming very abundant: various games in the
company, showing an example with a pedagogical purpose, equipment with objects, etc. Birds have sounds-signals and sounds-songs in mammals A whole series of expressive and semantic sounds appear — almost words. How diverse and meaningful, for example, are the sounds made on various occasions by an intelligent dog! Seton-Thompson says the same about bears, Prishvin - about beavers, Kipling - about fur seals. Appears and facial expressions, completely absent in birds, and, expressive movement. Each of us observed how changeable and understandable without words are the words "face" in a dog when it is glad, or ashamed, or offended.] 

And the conclusion of the Chapter:
[The outer side of the event, played out in the Cretaceous epoch of the history of the Earth, was that warm-blooded mammals
had eaten all the cold reptiles. The inner side of the same event was incomparably more important and deeper. It consisted in the fact
that the pyramidal motor system ate the extrapyramidal and established itself over its debris. From now on, the mammals have been
dominating over the entire animal world for *2 or 3 "years"* of our conditional historical scale. 

*The last "week" or one and a half* on the
throne of the Earth is seated by a man.  

We conclude this essay with a brief estimate of the historical events closer to us at the same time scale. Continuously developing, the brain of the owner of the Earth all increases and asserts its real domination over the world.
About our time, on our scale, man invented writing and laid the foundation for the historical period of his existence. He suffered a severe migraine of dark medieval stagnation of thought, but healthy beginnings overcame it. 

Experimental study of nature, true positive science began about *5 "minutes" ago*. 
The physiology of the brain and nervous system exists *a second "minute."*
We excuse her for her *still sensitive and large gaps*, her numerous so far ―*white spots* **are more than natural** for such a short period of her existence.] 

And I ask myself how far "self-generating" goes to the "Suis Generis" of Spinoza and Marx versus the "Autopoiesis" here discussed in the name of ...
3D representation of a living cell during theprocess of mitosis, example of anautopoietic system
The term "autopoiesis" (from Greek αὐτo- (auto-), meaning "self", and ποίησις(poiesis), meaning "creation, production") refers to a system capable of reproducing and maintaining itself. The term was introduced in 1972 by Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela to define the self-maintaining chemistry of living cells. Since then the concept has been also applied to the fields of systems theory and sociology.

Regards
Haydi

    On Tuesday, May 21, 2019, 10:01:11 PM GMT+4:30, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:  

 Programming language ontologies are different to ontology in the epistemological sense. They have a different basis, it is just a poor use of wording -- a reduction, as with just about everything. The shared meaning is about the basis of an object. But the object in a conventional digital computing is a defined entity using a formal language rather than a way of construing that entails action and understanding. To make things simpler one can start with the meaning of "information". In standard computing, this pertains to "useful data", but in the cybernetic sense it is a verb, it is a process of informing, of changing the form -- a difference that makes a difference.
There are certainly cybernetic ideas in computing, but they are not coherently applied. The demise of higher profile cybernetics as a research vehicle came about through funding being diverted into narrower forms of research -- such as generations of investment into AI and the dull computing we see everywhere. Cybernetics strikes through the digital/analog world/model problem with one stroke, whereas standard computing is entirely locked into formal models. Nevertheless, with care computing can be a powerful tool within a project conceived on cybernetic principles.
The people behind these ideas were equally interesting in other areas.  It is a shame that "culture" has reduced cybernetics to the kitsch.
Best,Huw

On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 16:13, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:

Mike and Huw,I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...).Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself?-greg
On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

Hi Huw-
I was not at all focused on the originality of the  2 cybernetics idea.  I was focused on howit (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a longtime (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way thatfollowers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguishbetween different realtions of observer to observed, 
The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with thepeople we were working with. 
A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle inthe context of discussions about the kind of work we do.  There seems to be close matching here too.Perhaps relevant?Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). 
The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. 
Mike

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Mike,
I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it.
I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed".
The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate!
Best,Huw

On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

Huw-
I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time:
Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".  ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result.

In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant.  In our practice we have played both roles.  I think of the "hard" system in our workas "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry.
Is this extrapolation reasonable?
mike
PS-- Andy       There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people likeBernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrivedin Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw.  Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. Butthey were also Stalinist ideology.

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi David,
This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with:
"Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics, is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead, Heinz von Foerster and others.[1] Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask, and is closely allied to radical constructivism, which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld.[3]"
Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result.

One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc.  
One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance.
Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design.
One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either.
I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors".
>From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics.
Best,Huw

On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

Huw...
So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive.
So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.)
In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context. 
Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language. 
Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics). 
Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world?   

David KelloggSangmyung University

New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:

Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised.
Huw
On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

Andy, Alfredo--
The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion. 
I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something? 
David KelloggSangmyung University

New Article: Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in understanding narratives byKorean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
Some e-prints available at:https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:

https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/

In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest.

Evald Ilyenkov’s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day.

The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution.

Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov’s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today’s crises.
 -- 
  Andy Blunden
 http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm  

-- 
At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots.  Like a cypress tree living in brackish water.  Anon

-- 

“All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.”    -Goethe

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.Assistant ProfessorDepartment of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball TowerBrigham Young UniversityProvo, UT 84602WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu 
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson

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