[Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov

Tue May 21 10:28:11 PDT 2019

Programming language ontologies are different to ontology in the
epistemological sense. They have a different basis, it is just a poor use
of wording -- a reduction, as with just about everything. The shared
meaning is about the basis of an object. But the object in a conventional
digital computing is a defined entity using a formal language rather than a
way of construing that entails action and understanding. To make things
simpler one can start with the meaning of "information". In standard
computing, this pertains to "useful data", but in the cybernetic sense it
is a verb, it is a process of informing, of changing the form -- a
difference that makes a difference.

There are certainly cybernetic ideas in computing, but they are not
coherently applied. The demise of higher profile cybernetics as a research
vehicle came about through funding being diverted into narrower forms of
research -- such as generations of investment into AI and the dull
computing we see everywhere. Cybernetics strikes through the digital/analog
world/model problem with one stroke, whereas standard computing is entirely
locked into formal models. Nevertheless, with care computing can be a
powerful tool within a project conceived on cybernetic principles.

The people behind these ideas were equally interesting in other areas.  It
is a shame that "culture" has reduced cybernetics to the kitsch.

Best,
Huw

On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 16:13, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Mike and Huw,
> I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a
> second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went
> ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming
> languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making
> possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and
> the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming
> language such that different programming languages make different kinds of
> objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...).
> Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment
> that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself?
> -greg
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
>> Hi Huw-
>>
>> I was not at all focused on the originality of the  2 cybernetics idea.
>> I was focused on how
>> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in
>> philosophy for a long
>> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may
>> also mark the way that
>> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that
>> ethnographers distinguish
>> between different realtions of observer to observed,
>>
>> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our
>> relationship with the
>> people we were working with.
>>
>> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant
>> distinction from Aristotle in
>> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do.  There seems to
>> be close matching here too.
>> Perhaps relevant?
>> *Theoria* is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by
>> extension, "contemplation." It actually derives from the word *theoros*,
>> which is said to come from *thea* (sight, or view, as in a vista --
>> something viewed) plus *orao* (to see). In other words *theoros* combines
>> the seeing with the seen. So a *theoros* is a spectator or a witness to
>> what is there to be seen. A *theoros* can also be someone who goes to
>> consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (*theos*)
>> speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle
>> which the *theoros* must figure out for himself or herself. Even the
>> epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the
>> voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which
>> the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the
>> oracular statements, were viewed as *theorytis*, (spoken by a god).
>>
>> The idea of the *theoros* is interesting in that it involves the
>> spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted,
>> drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to
>> viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic
>> production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through
>> inspiration, the breathing of the god into the *phrenoi *(the lungs --
>> for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness)
>> of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for
>> others. The danger then becomes for the *theoros* to report his or her
>> *theoria* to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to
>> ultimate truth -- *theorytis*, given by a god. Politically in early
>> Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural *theoroi* to
>> mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to
>> "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and
>> vice-versa.
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Mike,
>>>
>>> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but
>>> rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a
>>> change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was
>>> included within it.
>>>
>>> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard
>>> system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that
>>> system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of
>>> your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles.
>>> They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the
>>> structure of the "observed".
>>>
>>> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate!
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Huw-
>>>>
>>>> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of
>>>> cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of
>>>> an idea that has been batted around for some time:
>>>>
>>>> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems"
>>>> whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".  ... Peter
>>>> Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational
>>>> projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which
>>>> requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) ,
>>>> and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result.
>>>>
>>>> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing
>>>> between a participant observer and an observant participant.  In our
>>>> practice we have played both roles.  I think of the "hard" system in our
>>>> work
>>>> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of
>>>> psychosocioanthropological inquiry.
>>>>
>>>> Is this extrapolation reasonable?
>>>>
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> PS-- Andy
>>>>      There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the
>>>> USSR. It affected people like
>>>> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was
>>>> still in force when I arrived
>>>> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw.  Hard to feel the thaw
>>>> in October, 1962!
>>>> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than
>>>> Stalinist ideology. But
>>>> they were also Stalinist ideology.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi David,
>>>>>
>>>>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia
>>>>> entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with:
>>>>>
>>>>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of
>>>>> cybernetics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics>, is the
>>>>> recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between
>>>>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mead>, Heinz von Foerster
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_von_Foerster> and others.[1]
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-RG_01-1> Von
>>>>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas
>>>>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2]
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-2> It
>>>>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon
>>>>> Pask <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Pask>, and is closely
>>>>> allied to radical constructivism
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_constructivism>, which was
>>>>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_von_Glasersfeld>.[3]
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-3>"
>>>>>
>>>>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer
>>>>> is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily
>>>>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to
>>>>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co.
>>>>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects,
>>>>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are
>>>>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard"
>>>>> system that may be produced as a result.
>>>>>
>>>>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being
>>>>> concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction
>>>>> to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically
>>>>> and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order
>>>>> cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are
>>>>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the
>>>>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend
>>>>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place
>>>>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their
>>>>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture
>>>>> and design.
>>>>>
>>>>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels,
>>>>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his
>>>>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels.
>>>>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive
>>>>> changes either.
>>>>>
>>>>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset
>>>>> by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout
>>>>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to
>>>>> "typological errors".
>>>>>
>>>>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a
>>>>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of
>>>>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Huw
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Huw...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble
>>>>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to
>>>>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this
>>>>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it
>>>>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time
>>>>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just
>>>>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just
>>>>>> over-sensitive.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite
>>>>>> of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are
>>>>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite
>>>>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a
>>>>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters.
>>>>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they
>>>>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero
>>>>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are
>>>>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is
>>>>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then
>>>>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order
>>>>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when
>>>>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that
>>>>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as
>>>>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses
>>>>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize
>>>>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a
>>>>>> well-defined context but in a context of context.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning
>>>>>> Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH
>>>>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This
>>>>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object
>>>>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's
>>>>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not
>>>>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think
>>>>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of
>>>>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial
>>>>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order
>>>>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical
>>>>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>>>
>>>>>> New Article:
>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
>>>>>> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in
>>>>>> understanding narratives by
>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI:
>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>> To link to this article:
>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Some e-prints available at:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into
>>>>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics
>>>>>>> recognised.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy, Alfredo--
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that
>>>>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into
>>>>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting
>>>>>>>> hard for their inclusion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times
>>>>>>>> (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against
>>>>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> New Article:
>>>>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF:
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky’s
>>>>>>>> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in
>>>>>>>> understanding narratives by
>>>>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI:
>>>>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>>>> To link to this article:
>>>>>>>> https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Some e-prints available at:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the
>>>>>>>>> very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is
>>>>>>>>> attracting growing interest.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov’s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza
>>>>>>>>> to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic
>>>>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly
>>>>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his
>>>>>>>>> contribution.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of
>>>>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov’s impact on
>>>>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be
>>>>>>>>> relevant in the light of today’s crises.
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One
>>>> tree, many branches, deep roots.  Like a cypress tree living in brackish
>>>> water.  Anon
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> “All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times;
>> but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until
>> they take root in our personal experience.”    -Goethe
>>
>>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
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