[Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov

[Huw Lloyd]

Hi David,

Yes, Bateson's appreciation for logical types plays a central role in his
exploration of schizophrenia. But this is not at odds with Russell. Rather
it was Russell who was " 'upset' that the (mathematical) logical types did
not form a closed system within (mathematical) formal logic" (quoted as a
subjective simplification).

There are three of four papers in the steps anthology in which Bateson
explored "levels" of learning. These are also related to his exploration of
pathology. such as the hypothesis that it was hazardous to undergo certain
kinds of higher learning in some circumstances, in addition to the common
garden variety of incongruent communication inducing pathology.

There are hundreds of connections that may be made. However, perhaps a
necessary one in order to connect this wth Vygotskian appreciations is to
more explicitly bring in reflection into the process of deutero-learning
rather than referring to these levels as stochastic sets. This link can be
appreciated by relating Bateson typologies to Donald Schön's reflexivity.
The clearest bridge between them perhaps being the account of "double loop
learning" by Chris Argyris, colleague of Schön, which one can relate to
deutero-learning. Vygotsky, Bateson and Schön all have an appreciation for
morphogenesis (for Bateson see his paper on the plasticity of the giraffe's
heart in relation to Waddington's "genetic assimilation"; for Schön see his
account of metaphor as a technical process described in terms of the
technical development of a paintbrush).

Deutero-learning can be connoted with second-order cybernetics in the sense
that its discovery entailed a form of learning about one's learning. The
milestone of 2nd order cybernetics was perhaps established in response to
those who overlooked it, who adopted the cultural conventions of the (then)
typical engineering (and scientific) paradigm of occluding the observer.
Occluding the observer is not necessarily bad, it can be very productive,
but it makes it difficult to account for changes in the observer (i.e.
ontological and epistemological factors).

You are also correct in identifying a certain literalness or "stckiness" to
the circumstances of "hard" sciences etc. But in this one need not
sacrifice precision or technicality. It is sloppy and incorrect to connect
"vague" with "soft" in this sense (cf. Schön's elaboration of metaphor in
terms of a paintbrush). In (popular) psychological circles that kind
literalness has often been related to "autism' rather than "schizophrenia".

In all of this one needs to be careful about how the words are used in the
contexts from which they are drawn. Von Foerster, for instance, refers to
metaphysics as a kind of short-hand for ontology and epistemology (which
are the same thing seen from different perspectives), whilst Ilyenkov talks
of metaphysics in disparaging ways pertaining to typological errors in
philosophy.  If one takes the surface meaning they appear to be in flagrant
opposition, however much of it pertains to the way the words are used and
the audience they're intended for.

I have not dug that far into the conceptualisation of "perezhivanie",
seeing the same issues of interpretation. It was not a concise principle in
my formulations, but rather bridged across numerous principles.
Nevertheless, reflexivity is obviously quite central to its basis.
Reflexivity can be viewed as quite a natural process. It isn't really a
"pathology" to be excessively literal, it's a question of fit or deemed
fitness. Nevertheless one can relate reflexivity to cognitive development,
which is what I did in my explorations.

Best,
Huw

On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 22:18, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> Huw:
>
> In Part 3 of "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", Bateson develops the Theory of
> Logical Types, and he argues that the "double bind" that he sees as
> pathogenic in schizophrenia has its origins in a category error similar to
> the one which creates Russell's paradox. He argues that the defining
> characteristic of schizophrenia is the inability to distinguish between
> messages and messages about messages (e.g. the inability to know when a
> question is not a question but a complaint). Russell's paradox originates
> whenever messages and messages about messages are placed on the same level
> (as when a child places "flower" and "rose" on the same level).
>
> What you say about second order cybernetics is very interesting and useful
> (and I was clearly barking up the wrong tree when I associated second order
> cybernetics with Bateson's deutero-learning). Do you think
> that "perezhivanie" is a way of transition from an observed system to the
> observing one? This would fit perfectly with what LSV thinks as the
> distinguishing characteristic of schizophrenia (over-literalness,
> over-concreteness, and a failure in one direction or the other in the
> child's ability to distince him/herself from experience).
>
> David Kellogg
> Sangmyung University
>
> New Article:
> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in
> understanding narratives by
> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>
> Some e-prints available at:
>
> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 9:02 PM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi David,
>>
>> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry,
>> which I don't have any significant quibbles with:
>>
>> "*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics>, is the recursive
>> application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between
>> approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mead>, Heinz von Foerster
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_von_Foerster> and others.[1]
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-RG_01-1> Von
>> Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas
>> first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2]
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-2> It
>> is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon
>> Pask <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Pask>, and is closely allied
>> to radical constructivism
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_constructivism>, which was
>> developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_von_Glasersfeld>.[3]
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-3>"
>>
>> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is
>> between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily
>> maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to
>> the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co.
>> made this distinction in their study of organisational projects,
>> distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are
>> discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard"
>> system that may be produced as a result.
>>
>> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned
>> with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a
>> concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc.
>>
>> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and
>> epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics
>> recognises its potential fluidity and importance.
>>
>> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are
>> typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the
>> application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend
>> cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place
>> to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their
>> cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture
>> and design.
>>
>> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels,
>> but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his
>> levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels.
>> Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive
>> changes either.
>>
>> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by
>> Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout
>> much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to
>> "typological errors".
>>
>> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a
>> booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of
>> papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics.
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Huw...
>>>
>>> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble
>>> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to
>>> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this
>>> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it
>>> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time
>>> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just
>>> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just
>>> over-sensitive.
>>>
>>> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of
>>> the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are
>>> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite
>>> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a
>>> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters.
>>> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they
>>> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.)
>>>
>>> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero
>>> Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are
>>> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is
>>> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then
>>> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order
>>> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when
>>> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that
>>> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as
>>> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses
>>> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize
>>> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a
>>> well-defined context but in a context of context.
>>>
>>> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero
>>> and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH
>>> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This
>>> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object
>>> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language.
>>>
>>> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's
>>> paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not
>>> members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think
>>> that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of
>>> very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial
>>> worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics).
>>>
>>> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order
>>> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical
>>> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Sangmyung University
>>>
>>> New Article:
>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
>>> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in
>>> understanding narratives by
>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI:
>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>
>>> Some e-prints available at:
>>>
>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into
>>>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics
>>>> recognised.
>>>>
>>>> Huw
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Andy, Alfredo--
>>>>>
>>>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that
>>>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into
>>>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting
>>>>> hard for their inclusion.
>>>>>
>>>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true,
>>>>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against
>>>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something?
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Sangmyung University
>>>>>
>>>>> New Article:
>>>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
>>>>> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in
>>>>> understanding narratives by
>>>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI:
>>>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>
>>>>> Some e-prints available at:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very
>>>>>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is
>>>>>> attracting growing interest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Evald Ilyenkov’s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to
>>>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic
>>>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly
>>>>>> redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his
>>>>>> contribution.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of
>>>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov’s impact on
>>>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be
>>>>>> relevant in the light of today’s crises.
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>>
>>>>>
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