[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: : Object oriented activity and communication
David Kellogg
dkellogg60@gmail.com
Sun Nov 12 03:38:32 PST 2017
Thanks for the note, Sasha. Yes, it is always interesting to see the same
familiar mountains from a totally unexpected angle. Sometimes the
differences are simply due to the fact that we are facing different
directions, sometimes due to the fact that we are making different
descriptions, and sometimes that we really are seeing different facts.
In your first part, you seem to be suggesting that there is a clear,
qualitative break between science and religion on the question of free
will. I think this is not even true in philosophy, which after all did not
begin with Marxism. Aristotle believed that the past and present were fully
determinate, and only the future was the domain of free will; the whole
story of Buridan's ass was made up by the neo-Aristotelians to try to make
fun of physicists like Buridan who believed that the future was determinate
as well. We can see the old Aristotelian idea has been encoded in English
grammar, which uses Finite tense to refer to past and present, but modality
to refer to the future. Many languages (e.g. Arabic) do likewise. I guess I
mostly just take science as a I find it: it is the form that human
knowledge takes after religion, and so it necessarily has a lot of
religious baggage, just as our art does. To tell you the truth, I think of
science and art as just being the historical forms that human knowledge
takes when religion becomes differentiated into thinking on the one hand
and feeling on the other. It seems to me that demanding that science be
completely free of naive religious beliefs is somewhat ahistorical, i.e.
somewhat anti-scientific.
In the second part, you demonstrate this admirably: you assert, for
example, that all toothache is more or less the same. There isn't any way
to prove this, but my dentist tells me that the amount of anaesthetic that
patients demand is highly variable. You also seem to argue that the ability
to deceive is evidence that words can cover opposite thoughts. I think what
I said was that there is no way for the use of words to NOT share ideas,
because we only stop using them when the idea we are trying to share has
been shared in some form. Of course, the sharing of ideas has nothing to do
with their truth value.
In your third section, you are right--I had Leontiev's attack on Vygotsky's
"Problem of the Environment" in mind; I thought Andy did an excellent
analysis of this, and I will sign my name to everything he wrote on it. It
is possible that ANL never published the article in his lifetime, but
certainly he publically embraced Lysenkoism in a number of published
articles and did nothing to retract them after Lysenko fell from grace. For
example, in "The Present Tasks of Soviet Psychology" he writes:
"The triumph of creative Soviet Darwinism, as expressed in the complete
victory of the Michurinist tendency int he Soviet Union, also meant the
foundation of a dialectical materialist theory of the development of living
organisms.... The phylogenetic theory of Michurin and Lysenko has also been
applied to psychology".
Winn, R. (1961). Soviet Psychology, a Symposium, London: Vision. p. 34.
ANL's later works, e.g. Problems of the Development of the Mind, do not use
anything from modern genetics, so I assume he never changed his view.
Certainly his rejection of the crisis in Problems of the Development of
Mind doesn't suggest a very sound grasp of evolution, not to mention
dialectics.
I think that one of the parts of modern science that is closest to religion
and that I believe in most firmly is simply accepting that we belong to a
community and not a desert island, that none of us has to be a Renaissance
man who understands it all, and that the views of my colleagues can be
trusted even without direct verification. So I am happy to accept that you,
Andy, and Hegel solved the problem of free will even without reading
"Philosophy of Right" (particularly since I strongly suspect I would barely
understand a word in ten). In return I get to spend my time on things like
the semantics of English modality and the quotability of thoughts but not
feelings which you, Andy and Hegel don't have much time for. I suppose this
is a kind of faith, but it's not exactly religious. It's actually faith in
the reality of the mountains, the keener eyesight of other mountaineers,
and the good fellowship of our fellow scientists!
David Kellogg
On Sun, Nov 12, 2017 at 7:03 AM, Alexander Surmava <
alexander.surmava@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Дорогой Дэвид Кэллог!
> Ваши реплики исключительно интересны, ибо всегда в высшей степени
> неожиданны. При том, что мы оба как будто принадлежим к одному и тому же
> академическому кругу, наше теоретические взгляды настолько противоположны,
> что это не может не поражать воображение.
> Так, вы утверждаете, что «свобода воли» может быть чем-то трудным для
> философии, но одновременно она является аксиомой для ряда наук. С моей,
> возможно старомодной марксистской точки зрения, сказанное Вами можно понять
> только таким образом, что Вы считаете научными дисциплины, исходящие из
> наивной религиозной веры в чудо, ибо ничем кроме чуда невозможно объяснить
> приписываемую человеку религией и идеализмом «свободу воли», то есть
> способность поступать так или иначе вопреки давлению всей совокупности
> естественных и исторических материальных причин. Хороша «наука»,
> основывающаяся на постулате возможности абстрактно чуда.
> Учитывая столь серьезное несовпадение наших теоретических взглядов я на
> всякий случай уточню, что в устах марксиста отрицание «свободы воли» вовсе
> не означает фаталистического отрицания возможности свободы и совсем не
> означает отрицания элементарной произвольности. Притча про Буриданова осла
> представляет теоретическую трудность для дуалиста Декарта, но никак не для
> диалектика, а значит мониста - Спинозы.
> Если сказанное здесь представляется Вам непонятным и парадоксальным, я
> готов дать соответствующие разъяснения и комментарии.
> Dear David Kellogg!
> Your remarks are extremely interesting, for they are always extremely
> unexpected. While both of us seem to belong to the same academic circle,
> our theoretical views are so opposite that it can not fail to impress the
> imagination.
> So, you say that "free will" can be something difficult for philosophy,
> but at the same time it is an axiom for a number of sciences. From my,
> perhaps old-fashioned Marxist point of view, what you said can only be
> understood in such a way that you consider scientific those disciplines
> that come from a naive religious belief in a miracle. Only a miracle can be
> the principle of "explaining" the "freedom of will" attributed to man by
> religion and idealism, that is, the ability to act in one way or another in
> spite of the pressure of the whole aggregate of natural and historical
> material causes. I do not know how you can call "science," a discipline
> based on the postulate of the possibility of an abstract miracle.
> Given such a serious discrepancy between our theoretical views, I will
> specify, just in case, that in the mouth of a Marxist the denial of "free
> will" does not at all mean fatalistic denial of the possibility of freedom
> and does not mean at all the denial of elementary arbitrariness. The
> parable of Buridan's ass is a theoretical difficulty for the dualist
> Descartes, but not for dialectics, and therefore for the monist Spinoza.
> If what is said here seems incomprehensible and paradoxical to you, I am
> ready to give relevant explanations and comments.
> Что касается непередаваемости индивидуальных чувств и напротив,
> способности слов быть трансляторами мысли, то, увы, и здесь я вынужден
> возразить. Мне почему-то кажется, что зубы у всех болят более или менее
> одинаково. А вот одни и те же значения слов могут прикрывать прямо
> противоположные мысли. Скажем те же дипломаты откровенно формулируют, что
> язык им и их коллегам дан для того, чтобы прятать свои подлинные мысли. То
> же самое, думаю, можно сказать и о всех прочих формах идеологии, то есть
> формах ложного сознания. Не обманывает не слово, но дело, деятельность.
> Поэтому, если мы хотим узнать что «на самом деле» думает наш партнер, мы
> должны посмотреть прежде всего на то, что он делает. Но это уже требует
> уходя от понимания мышления как лукавой, основанной на конвенции речи к
> пониманию мышления как предметной (объектно-ориентированной) деятельности.
> As for the non-transmissibility of individual feelings and, on the
> contrary, the ability of words to be the translators of thought, then,
> alas, here again I have to object. For some reason it seems to me that the
> toothache of all is more or less the same. But the same meanings of words
> very often cover directly opposite thoughts. Let's say diplomats openly
> formulate that the language for them and their colleagues is given in order
> to hide their true thoughts. The same, I think, can be said about all other
> forms of ideology, that is, forms of false consciousness. Do not deceive
> not the word, but the deed, the activity. Therefore, if we want to find out
> what our partner really thinks, we should first of all look at what he is
> doing. But this already requires departing from the understanding of
> thinking as crafty, convention-based speech to understanding thinking as
> object-oriented activity.
> Наконец, последнее, о докладе Дэвида Бэкхерста. Разумеется, репрессивный
> сталинский режим не мог не наложить отпечаток на жизнь и судьбу тех, кто
> жил в его условиях. Но думаю, что во всяком случае примеры подобного
> ужасного влияния, упомянутые Вами на редкость неудачны.
> Леонтьев никогда не был поклонником Лысенко, а Ильенков никогда не считал
> Сталина выдающимся философом. Тем более ему никогда бы не пришло в голову
> ставить мнимые теоретические заслуги Сталина выше собственных. Это вещи
> настолько очевидные, что их даже не имеет смысла обсуждать. Не знаю, что
> раскопал Дэвид Бэкхэрст, но абсолютно уверен, что какие-то сомнительные
> цитаты из Леонтьева или Ильенкова, даже, если они не являются чьей-то
> выдумкой, могли относиться к периоду до 1956 года, а значит их так же мало
> можно вменять им в вину, как «здравствуйте», сказанное заложником
> террористу.
> Другое дело, что тот же Леонтьев до конца жизни с преувеличенным почтением
> относился к Павлову с его стимул-реактивным учением и предостерегал
> Ильенкова от публичной полемики с теорией последнего. Но и это он делал с
> целью защитить самого Ильенкова от возможных преследований, а не из
> каких-то низких мотивов.
> В общем, и Леонтьева, и Ильенкова следует судить не по их вынужденным
> политическими обстоятельствами неосторожными заявлениями, а по их мыслям и
> делам. И в частности А.Н.Леонтьев заслуживает самого глубокого уважения и
> восхищения и как теоретик, и как человек за его блистательную статью
> «Учение о среде в педологических работах Л.С.Выготского», которую он
> сознательно не опубликовал при своей жизни.
> Я не ошибся? Вы именно эту статью презрительно назвали «жалкой статейкой»
> - «miserable article»?
> Если это так, то действительно мы с Вами стоим на диаметрально
> противоположных теоретических и нравственных позициях.
> Всего наилучшего
> Саша
> Finally, the last one, about the report of David Bakhurst. Of course, the
> repressive Stalinist regime could not but place the scars on the life and
> fate of those who lived in its conditions. But I think that in any case,
> examples of such terrible influence, mentioned by you are extremely
> unfortunate.
> Leontiev was never a fan of Lysenko, and Ilyenkov never considered Stalin
> as an outstanding philosopher. Moreover, it would never have occurred to
> him to put the imaginary theoretical merits of Stalin above his own. These
> things are so obvious that it does not even make sense to discuss them. I
> do not know what David Bakhurst dug out, but I'm absolutely sure that some
> dubious quotes from Leontyev or Ilyenkov, even if they are not someone's
> fake, could be related to the period before 1956, and so they can be as
> little imputed they are guilty, like "hello", said hostage to the terrorist.
> It is another matter that Leontyev treated Pavlov with his
> stimulus-reactive teaching with an exaggerated reverence for the rest of
> his life and warned Ilyenkov of public polemics with the theory of the
> latter. But this he did to protect Ilyenkov from possible persecution, and
> not from some low motives.
> In general, both Leontief and Ilyenkov should be judged not by their
> forced political circumstances by imprudent statements, but by their
> thoughts and deeds. And in particular, AN Leontiev deserves the deepest
> respect and admiration both as a theorist and as a person for his brilliant
> article "The Teaching on the Environment in Pedagogical Works of LS
> Vygotsky," which he consciously did not publish in his lifetime.
> I was not mistaken? It was this article you contemptuously called "a
> miserable article"?
> If this is so, then we really stand on diametrically opposite theoretical
> and moral positions.
> All the best
> Sasha
>
> ------------------------------
> *От:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> *Кому:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Отправлено:* среда, 8 ноября 2017 13:49
> *Тема:* [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: : Object oriented activity and communication
>
> I think that a conclusion can be perfectly absurd in philosophy, and yet
> completely correct in science. For example, the idea of free will is a
> problem in philosophy (partly because of the history of philosophy in
> religion), but it is essentially a postulate for science (because whole
> branches of science, including psychology, sociology and history, cease to
> exist without it).
>
> So the conclusion which Sasha calls absurd--that words are material and
> social and feelings are a void of that social, materiality--do seem
> scientifically correct to me. That was what I was trying to convey when I
> said that thoughts are quotable but feelings are not; that it is impossible
> to know if Sasha and I have the same feeling when we both have a toothache,
> but it is literally impossible NOT to know when and to what extent Sasha
> and I have the same thought when we use words, because the very use of
> words is precisely the process of coming to some kind of agreement about
> the nature of their meanings. As Hamlet says, "This was sometime a paradox,
> but now the time gives it proof."
>
> One of the plenaries in Quebec City that we haven't discussed yet was that
> of David Bakhurst on Ilyenkov's first run-in with Soviet philosophy, "Punks
> versus Zombies". One of the many important points that Bakhurst made was
> that, as any materialist would expect, the kind of repression that Leontiev
> and Ilyenkov lived under did not, seemingly, kill them, but left terrible
> scars on their work (not so much Leontiev's miserable article on the
> environment but his abject capitulation to Lysenko, and Ilyenkov's
> statement that Stalin had done philosophical work far more important than
> his own). The ending of Bakhurst's talk was, as he said, like that of a
> "Train to Busan": just when you think that our hero has escaped, a hand
> reaches out and drags him off...and the only fingerprints are those of the
> hero himself.
>
> David Kellogg
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 8, 2017 at 7:01 AM, Alexander Surmava <
> alexander.surmava@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Dear Colleagues.
> >
> > I must apologize for the long silence.
> > Meanwhile, our discussion is becoming more and more interesting for me,
> > pushing for new reflections and new plans. Well, or to return to the old
> > plans, the implementation of which I have long postponed.
> > I am referring to my plans to embark on a study with the aim to clarify
> > the Marxist view of the concept of "ideality" - the central category of
> > classical philosophy, starting at least from Plato. "The dialectic of
> > ideality" was the last theoretical work of Ilyenkov. Meanwhile, there is
> > enough reasons to believe that this topic, which was of the utmost
> > importance for philosophy and psychology, was far from complete.
> > Below, I will publish a rather large post, the logic of which brings our
> > discussion to the discussion of the problem of ideality.
> > In the meantime looking ahead I want to say that Bakhtin / Voloshinov,
> who
> > emerged in our conversation with his popular essay "Marxism and the
> > Philosophy of Language" with his "brilliant" substitution of the category
> > "ideality" with the category "ideology" is a gift for our future work on
> > ideality, for in a concentrated form he demonstrates how a false
> > understanding of ideality leads to a complete break with Marxism.
> >
> > Sasha
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> > *От:* Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
> > *Кому:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > *Отправлено:* понедельник, 6 ноября 2017 12:45
> > *Тема:* [Xmca-l] Re: : Object oriented activity and communication
> >
> > As a clarification, that sounds clear to me, David, thanks! I wonder how
> > does that sound to others,
> > Alfredo
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > Sent: 06 November 2017 10:37
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: : Object oriented activity and communication
> >
> > I'll try, Alfredo.
> >
> > I think that Sasha and Haydi are arguing that if we accept language as
> > sign, we risk treating it as a superstructure that has freed itself from
> > its base, that is, the labor of the worker and the peasant, labor which
> has
> > the power to materially transform a material environment. This is a move
> > they oppose, because there is the danger that a semiotic superstructure
> > will supply itself a "different" base--that is, a base not in the laborer
> > who materially transforms the material environment but rather in the
> > thinker who ideologically transforms an ideal context and thus acts on
> > himself or herself but leaves the worker and the peasant in the lurch.
> > Both Sasha and Haydi consider Leontiev and activity as an important
> > countermeasure to this semanticizing tendency in Vygotsky.This is an
> > argument with a lot of history, and it is one that I reject.
> >
> > I don't simply reject it on behalf of the child, who has to master signs
> > before she or he can master tools (and even when the child can master
> > tools, viz. toy tools, the child must master them as signs--as
> > meanings--and not as a means to transform the social environment. I also
> > reject it on the part of the worker and the peasant, as did Brecht, as
> did
> > Vygotsky, and...as did Volosinov. For if Haydi is going to read the whole
> > of Volosinov, he must indeed select aspects of Volosinov that he does not
> > like, including Volosinov's very Marxist distinction between the way that
> > the peasant experiences hunger and the way that the worker experiences
> it:
> > these are indeed different poles of the same experience, and one can go
> > much closer to the 'we pole' than the other. (The reason why the Chinese
> > famine of 1959-1961 was so devestating was precisely that it was
> > experienced very differently in the cities than in the countryside.)
> >
> > The use of "pole" is not mine; it is that of Volosinov (p. 87).
> Similarly,
> > the use of "water into wine" is not mine; it is that of Vygotsky
> > (Psychology of Art, p. 243). Vygotsky is rejecting the Bukharinist notion
> > of Proletkult, that of the artist as a Christlike figure, multiplying
> bread
> > and fishes for the masses. For Vygotsky, this isn't much of a miracle at
> > all, it is precisely what peasants and workers quite without art every
> > single day of their working lives. If we want art to permeate life, we
> > cannot do it by reducing art to the level of everyday experience: that is
> > not art permeating life, but only the tired old nineteenth century slogan
> > of life permeating art, repeated as Proletkult, as Soviet socialist
> > realism, and consequently, as Marx would say, as farce.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 6, 2017 at 5:10 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Thanks Haidy; I must confess it is difficult for me to follow; could
> you
> > > or anyone else help me understand?
> > >
> > > I take it that you are arguing to read Volosinov's attempt to a Marxist
> > > approach by going back to (or without severing it from) Marx. And,
> > reading
> > > the thread of messages you attach, the conclusion that "the forms of
> > verbal
> > > communication ... are entirely determined by production relations and
> the
> > > sociopolitical order" (quoting from the PDF you attach).
> > >
> > > Also, I am curious about the way you end up connecting the 'voila
> > > Voloshinov' with the crude reality of wealth distribution between 1% vs
> > 99%
> > > of world's population. Could you or anyone else help clarify?
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Alfredo
> > > ________________________________________
> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> > > on behalf of Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> > > Sent: 05 November 2017 19:17
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: : Object oriented activity and communication
> > >
> > > Alfredo,
> > > I'm by no means pretentious in saying that I have good reasons not to
> get
> > > engaged in any more discussion.
> > >
> > > If there are views and responses , I will just listen to them willfully
> > > and with care and attention and gratitude.
> > >
> > > You are right but when you have already made your utmost efforts to
> > > replace A BASE with ANOTHER. You try again , this time , to get support
> > > from Voloshinov. In this you've been selective. Now you will read a
> piece
> > > which is not selective , that is , the selector has tried to see both
> of
> > > the two aspects and their proper positions . In selection , he has not
> > > tried to hide the aspect he doesn't like to see. You're exempt from
> such
> > > condemnation.
> > >
> > > It makes a world of difference if you keep on sticking to the actual
> > base.
> > > The actual base does not sever ties with the 'over' one. It sees the
> over
> > > one raised in its bosom. When the base is replaced , the previous over
> > ones
> > > become the yardstick for measuring and such measuring leads to seeing
> the
> > > previous over ones not emanating from the beneath ones but as
> generative
> > of
> > > their self. And this leads to seeing THE WEST GREECE as ANTIQUITY and
> the
> > > whole EAST as BARBARITY erasing even the discrepancy between slaves and
> > > slave owners (old and new).
> > >
> > > When the captives rise in sword then , as hearts are not beating
> anymore
> > > but dead eyes in dignity! of judging , the sword becomes the verdict.
> > >
> > > Marx discusses the three functions of 'money' as medium of exchange ,
> as
> > > measuring values and as realized price , that is , money itself not
> just
> > a
> > > 'commodity' but the Almighty of cruelest acts every time every place.
> > Here
> > > verbage is disposed of articulation of Marx's mouth. All affects having
> > > co-existed with intellect , now in the blessed soul of wrath , passion
> ,
> > > sympathy and sense of victory predominate his whole existence! Now the
> %1
> > > pours out disgust and hatred. Universe is testing us! Why the %99
> worship
> > > evil!
> > > Voila Voloshinov!!
> > >
> > > Best
> > > Haydi
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
> > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > Sent: Sunday, 5 November 2017, 3:25:22
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: : Object oriented activity and communication
> > >
> > > Hi all, what an interesting path this thread has followed! From Capital
> > to
> > > Shakespeare, and from object-orientedness to apertures and vowels,
> > Brecht,
> > > Stanislavsky... and, perhaps most surprisingly, from democratic
> education
> > > to privileged access.
> > >
> > > How have we shifted from talking about democratic education to talking
> > > about privileged access (to immediate experience)?
> > >
> > > Here was Sasha's critique:
> > >
> > > "human development is not the ability of individuals to experience
> > > (perejivat’) the meaning of words, but to be genuine subjects of
> > > object-oriented activity, the subjects of labor."
> > >
> > > and that,
> > >
> > > "If we stay on Vygotsky's theoretical positions, which believed that
> the
> > > human psyche begins with acts of sensation that thinking is just a
> verbal
> > > 'generalization' of the material that our senses deliver to us, then
> any
> > > wretched ideologist, with a well-suspended language, will seem to us
> the
> > > owner of perfect wisdom, whereas a worker or a peasant doing his own
> > work,
> > > but not possessing the skill of ideological verbosity, will look
> > something
> > > inferior."
> > >
> > > Now, I find it interesting that, in responding to Sasha's critique, we
> > > ended up shifting from a concrete problem where 'privilege' had to do
> > with
> > > exclusive ownership of means of producing knowledgeability (and the
> quest
> > > for democratizing these means), to the problem of expressing out in
> words
> > > supposedly unsharable contents of inner or 'immediate' experience. Is
> the
> > > latter problem a "real need" in the sense Sasha had characterised the
> > issue
> > > of democratic education?
> > >
> > > My first inclination is to side with Greg, who in a previous post
> pointed
> > > out that the problem of privileged access (of immediate experience)
> seems
> > > quite derivative or secondary, or 'weird' as Greg poses it, rather than
> > > some essential problem of existence. Of course 'expressing oneself' is
> a
> > > quite real problem that needs to be solved everyday. And I am quite
> fond
> > of
> > > Vygotsky's and Volosinov's idea that in expressing we are not simply
> > > externalising something that had been formed internally but rather
> > > thinking develops in communicating and joint participation in practical
> > > activity. But it is this idea of immediate (individual, idiolect)
> > > experience and some opposite (cultural? social? dialect) version of it
> > that
> > > makes me suspicious.
> > >
> > > Volosinov's distinction between "I experience" and "we experience" has
> > > been mobilised in the thread:
> > >
> > > "not the pure "I experience" of sensation but the way that "I
> experience"
> > > goes out to "we experience" and then returns to an "I experience" and
> > > alchemically transforms it into something new, wine from water. It's
> not
> > > primordially an "I experience" but an "I experience" which is now an
> > > individuation of a social emotion" (D.K to Greg).
> > >
> > > I may be wrong or miss some of the background, but to me, this type of
> > > argument is the kind that lends itself to critique by those like Sasha,
> > who
> > > argue against a semiotic approach. Specially reading the comment on
> > > converting water in wine, no wonder there are concerns on signs
> becoming
> > > magic arbitrary forces.
> > >
> > > I do agree with James that when Volosinov speaks about inner sign, it
> > > "resembles" privileged access. In fact, Volosinov goes on to argue that
> > the
> > > most important problem in the philosophy of language is the solution of
> > the
> > > relation between inner and outer signs... But Volosinov (1973) proposes
> > > resolving the dichotomy by overcoming it, for 'only on the grounds of a
> > > materialistic monism can a dialectical resolution ... be achieved" (p.
> > 40).
> > > If for Vygotsky it was thinking and speech, for Volosinov it is psyche
> > and
> > > ideology, which he argues, 'dialectically interpenetrate in the unitary
> > and
> > > objective process of social intercourse' (p. 41). The point is then
> that
> > > social intercourse is primary over any inner 'immediate' experience.
> > >
> > > I do not think then that Volosinov is making the case that there is an
> > > I-experience that in going out THEN becomes social, magic happens. For
> it
> > > is the objective process of social intercourse that is primary.
> Volosinov
> > > in fact speaks about two ways of ideologizing experience, not of two
> > poles
> > > constituting it. The immediacy then is social through and through:
> > >
> > > "from the very start experience is set toward fully actualised outward
> > > expression and, from the very start, tends in that direction" (p. 90)
> > >
> > > and
> > >
> > > "Outside objectification, outside embodiment in some particular
> material
> > > (the material of gesture, inner word, outcry), consciousness is a
> > fiction.
> > > It is an improper ideological construct created by way of abstraction
> > from
> > > the concrete facts of social expression" (p. 90).
> > >
> > > But if, outside embodiment in material social intercourse,
> consciousness
> > > is a fiction, is not the problem of privileged access in the way it's
> > been
> > > posed here a fiction too?
> > >
> > > In The German Ideology, Marx & Engels write, 'As individuals express
> > their
> > > life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their
> > > production'. I wonder whether and how this identity between
> 'expressing',
> > > 'producing', and 'being' could be productive to a more united CHAT
> > > community.
> > >
> > > Alfredo
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ________________________________________
> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> > > on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > Sent: 01 November 2017 02:22
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object
> > oriented
> > > activity and communication
> > >
> > > Voloshinov begins his discussion on pp. 88-89 of Marxism and the
> > Philosophy
> > > of Language with the simple idea that the "I experience" of hunger is
> one
> > > end of a pole, the end we share with animals, one which cannot be
> > > communicated and ultimately leads to self-extinction, either when food
> is
> > > provided or the experiencer dies of inanition. As far as we know, this
> > > experience is undifferentiated: it is felt but not apperceived (that
> is,
> > > the feeling of feeling it is not felt; it is "live" but not "life o'er
> > > lived", "zhivanie" but not "perezhivanie"). At the other end of the
> pole
> > > is the "we experience" which is necessarily differentiated because it
> is
> > > over-lived differently by people of different classes--the vagabond
> > sullen
> > > and envious in hunger, the mystic fasting sententiously unto death, the
> > > peasant resigned and blaming the weather, and finally the proletarians
> > who
> > > reject hunger altogether precisely because they have the obscene sight
> > of a
> > > satiated boss and family before them and starving children at their
> side.
> > > (Voloshinov also says that there are human sexual experiences at both
> > > poles, but he refers us to pp. 135-136 of his book on Freudianism, and
> my
> > > English edition doesn't have a p. 135.)
> > >
> > > Brecht discusses how to convey this operatically (because of course
> > Brecht
> > > was a big fan of Chinese opera, and met the diva Mei Lanfang in Moscow,
> > > where Eisenstein was putting his work on film in the attached). He
> > wonders
> > > why the Biblical phrase "pluck out the eye that offends thee" is so
> much
> > > more "gestic" and horrifying the way that it is translated into German
> by
> > > Martin Luther ("If thine eye offend thee...pluck it OUT!"). I think
> this
> > is
> > > the "indexicality" that Greg is really interested in: not the pure "I
> > > experience" of sensation but the way that "I experience" goes out to
> "we
> > > experience" and then returns to an "I experience" and alchemically
> > > transforms it into something new, wine from water. It's not
> primordially
> > an
> > > "I experience" but an "I experience" which is now an individuation of
> a
> > > social emotion. Brecht describes how workers parading through Berlin on
> > > Christmas eve are chanting "Wir haben HUNG-ER!" and some of them
> actually
> > > supplement this with "Helft euch sel-ber, wahlt Thalmann!" ("Help
> > > yourselves--vote Thalmann", the then candidate of the German Communist
> > > Party).
> > >
> > > Incredibly, I just discovered that this is actually a children's song:
> > >
> > > We have hunger, hunger, hunger
> > > Have hunger, hunger hunger
> > > Have hunger, hunger hunger
> > > Have thirst.
> > >
> > > If we don't get something, get, get, get
> > > We'll eat flies, flies, flies
> > > We'll eat flies, flies, flies
> > > >From the wall.
> > >
> > > If they don't taste good, taste, taste
> > > We'll eat snails, snails, snails,
> > > We'll eat snails, snails, snails,
> > > >From the forest.
> > >
> > > If they don't last, last, last
> > > We'll eat corpses, corpses, corpses
> > > We'll eat corpses, corpses, corpses
> > > >From the grave.
> > >
> > > If they don't suffice, suffice, suffice
> > > We'll eat snakes, snakes, snakes
> > > We'll eat snakes, snakes, snakes
> > > >From the forest.
> > >
> > > (Notice that the tendency of German and French to make pains and lacks
> > into
> > > virtual entities that you can possess and be dispossessed of makes the
> > song
> > > much more gestic and indexical, because it allows parallelism of
> "hunger"
> > > with "flies", "snails", "corpses" and "snakes".. Note also that it
> would
> > be
> > > far more gestic to put the verse about corpses at the end...)
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > >
> > > (In this clip, Eisenstein films Mei Lanfang showing us the great
> heroine
> > > Mui Guiying who challenges an enemy general to battle and falls in love
> > > with him mid-struggle. Notice how much you can understand
> "gestically"..)
> > >
> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nlf5LW_nrQ
> > >
> > > dk
> > >
> > > On Wed, Nov 1, 2017 at 7:32 AM, Greg Thompson <
> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > >
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > And funny that, in addition to stumbling across David's review of
> > > > Volosinov that I just posted, I also just happened to have a tab open
> > to
> > > > this conversation between David and me in August of 2009:
> > > >
> > > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Mail/xmcamail.2009_08.dir/msg00054.html
> > > >
> > > > History repeats itself. All the more the less you remember (but are
> > > > archived).
> > > >
> > > > Also, just to be clear, I'm not suggesting that there is no such
> think
> > as
> > > > "privileged access", I'm simply suggesting that it may be a
> > > > cultural-historically peculiar phenomena and thus one worth being
> > careful
> > > > about while also asking tough questions about it. I think the most
> > > > important question remains "what is it that we are gaining privileged
> > > > access to?" (and to jump ahead of myself, in the end, I think that
> this
> > > is
> > > > a Schroedinger's cat moment where access to the thing is, in part,
> the
> > > > constitution of the thing being accessed).
> > > >
> > > > -greg
> > > > p.s. has anyone heard anything about Tony Whitson lately? I just
> > realized
> > > > how much I miss his snide and biting comments.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 4:09 PM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Perhaps I should say this was my privileged access because when I
> saw
> > > > > Volosinov in Greg's message it immediately reminded me of the link
> > > > between
> > > > > his inner sign and the notion of privileged access.
> > > > >
> > > > > James
> > > > >
> > > > > 2017年10月31日 下午9:50，"James Ma" <jamesma320@gmail.com>写道：
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm inclined to think Volosinov's inner sign resembles privileged
> > > access
> > > > -
> > > > > both are located within oneself, inaccessible for other people.
> > > > >
> > > > > James
> > > > >
> > > > > On 31 October 2017 at 20:36, Greg Thompson <
> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > and for those curious about Volosinov, here is a great review of
> > one
> > > of
> > > > > > Volosinov's works, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (it
> > happens
> > > > to
> > > > > be
> > > > > > the one that I was referring to with the mention of hunger):
> > > > > > http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1473-4192.
> > > > 2009.00210.x/full
> > > > > >
> > > > > > -greg
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 11:12 AM, Greg Thompson <
> > > > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > David,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I'd like to resist some of the individualism and internalism
> > > implied
> > > > by
> > > > > > > your notion of "privileged access". (and I suspect that this
> > > capacity
> > > > > > > presupposes "guess what I'm thinking" kinds of games, and these
> > are
> > > > > WEIRD
> > > > > > > phenomena in as much as they aren't culturally universal - in
> > some
> > > > > > cultural
> > > > > > > contexts they are seen to be rude!).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > To put my concern slightly differently and into questions:
> > > > > > > 1. What exactly is it that one has "privileged access" to?
> > > > > > > 2. Are there really no times in which we can have a feeling
> that
> > is
> > > > > > > someone else's? Can a child's fear not be the mother's fear?
> > > > > > > 3. Are our feelings all ours? and not of others? (Here I'm
> > thinking
> > > > of
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > > experience of watching my children be socialized into feelings
> by
> > > > > seeing
> > > > > > > what kinds of emotional expressions lead to what kinds of
> > practical
> > > > > > > outcomes (and here refer back to #1). But I'm also thinking of
> > > > > > Volosinov's
> > > > > > > notion of behavioral ideology - a feeling of hunger is
> something
> > > > > > different
> > > > > > > when shared by thousands of others).
> > > > > > > 4. What is inside (and privileged) and what is outside (and
> > not?)?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Anyway, that's a bit of a mess, philosophically and otherwise,
> > but
> > > > > seems
> > > > > > > like questions very relevant to thinking about Vygotsky in the
> > vein
> > > > of
> > > > > > > Hegel/Marx and attempts to transcend simple dualisms of
> > > > subject/object,
> > > > > > > inside/outside, individual/society, etc.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Hope you are well wherever you may be
> > > > > > > and may my well-being be your well-being...
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > -greg
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 3:35 PM, David Kellogg <
> > > dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > >
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >> I think that when your grandson feels fear, what the child
> feels
> > > is
> > > > > his
> > > > > > >> own fear and not your fear. As you point out, what is
> > communicated
> > > > is
> > > > > a
> > > > > > >> vague uneasiness and not urgent and immediately actionable
> > thought
> > > > > "I'm
> > > > > > >> afraid that my grandson is going to electrocute himself" or
> even
> > > > > > "Grandpa
> > > > > > >> is afraid that I am going to electrocute myself". I think
> that
> > > when
> > > > > > Alan
> > > > > > >> Bennet's mother sees the cow, what she feels is the sensation
> of
> > > > > seeing
> > > > > > >> shapes and colors and remembering seeing such patterns in some
> > > > > concrete
> > > > > > >> context and not the precise location of a specifiable semantic
> > > > > address.
> > > > > > So
> > > > > > >> it seems to me that Wittgenstein is confirmed and not
> > confounded.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Vygosky says that when a wild goose is startled and the whole
> > > flock
> > > > > > takes
> > > > > > >> wing, we should call it "contamination' rather than
> > > "communication".
> > > > > > What
> > > > > > >> is "communicable" here is symptom not cause. The first goose
> is
> > > > afraid
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > >> something and not because the other geese are afraid. The
> other
> > > > geese
> > > > > > are
> > > > > > >> not afraid of whatever it was that startled the first goose;
> > they
> > > > are
> > > > > > >> afraid because the first goose is afraid, and that is all.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> If you have a cold and sneeze, and I am sneezing because of
> the
> > > > pepper
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > >> my pickle sandwich, then I cannot say that I have caught your
> > > cold.
> > > > > > There
> > > > > > >> is a well-known joke which makes the same point: if you scream
> > in
> > > a
> > > > > > >> theatre, everybody tells you to shut up, but if you scream on
> an
> > > > > > airplane
> > > > > > >> they all join in. In neither case, however, is there a feeling
> > > > > > >> communicated: in both cases, the only thing being communicated
> > was
> > > > the
> > > > > > >> fact
> > > > > > >> of screaming, not the emotion that gave rise to it.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> It makes a difference to an undamaged human brain. Here's Dr.
> > > Adolfo
> > > > > > >> Garcia
> > > > > > >> demonstrating that there are good neurological reasons why you
> > can
> > > > say
> > > > > > "My
> > > > > > >> grandson ate breakfast" and even "My grandson felt/thought
> that
> > it
> > > > was
> > > > > > >> time
> > > > > > >> for breakfast'" but you cannot say "My grandson ate that it
> was
> > > time
> > > > > for
> > > > > > >> breakfast". Mental processes are one thing, and material
> > > processes
> > > > > are
> > > > > > >> another: a human brain knows the difference, and our languages
> > > > reflect
> > > > > > >> this
> > > > > > >> knowledge.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> https://vimeo.com/111374335
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Dr. Garcia has a good paper on this in Functions of Language:
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> https://benjamins.com/#catalog/journals/fol.23.3.02gar/
> details
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> If Alan Bennet's mum confirms Wittgenstein, but Alan Bennett
> > > thinks
> > > > > > >> Wittgenstein is confounded, can we really say that he has
> > > understood
> > > > > > >> Wittgenstein? if you prove my point, but you think you are
> > > actually
> > > > > > >> contradicting it, have we communicated or not?
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> David Kellogg
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> On Sat, Oct 28, 2017 at 10:36 PM, Julian Williams <
> > > > > > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> > David
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > When I see my grandchild fall and bang their head I ‘feel
> > their
> > > > > pain’
> > > > > > >> and
> > > > > > >> > wince even before I hear him cry… even more so, my grandson
> > > seems
> > > > to
> > > > > > >> feel
> > > > > > >> > my fear before I actually say anything about it (when they
> > poke
> > > > > their
> > > > > > >> > finger into the socket), and even though he is too young to
> > have
> > > > any
> > > > > > >> words
> > > > > > >> > for ‘fear’… when you see someone’s face twist in such and
> > such a
> > > > > way,
> > > > > > >> you
> > > > > > >> > mirror it and feel the sensation associated with the
> > expression
> > > > > > straight
> > > > > > >> > away, don’t you?
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > At some level of perception, we do communicate without
> words.
> > As
> > > > > Alan
> > > > > > >> > Bennet said in his diaries (when his demented mother pointed
> > to
> > > a
> > > > > cow
> > > > > > in
> > > > > > >> > the field and said ‘I know what they are but not what they
> are
> > > > > > called’)
> > > > > > >> > “Thus Wittgenstein was confounded by my mother”.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Am I missing your point?
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Julian
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > On 26/10/2017, 11:58, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on
> > > behalf
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> David
> > > > > > >> > Kellogg" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
> > > > > > >> > dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > All Vygotsky says is that thinking is represented in
> the
> > > > brain
> > > > > > >> > differently
> > > > > > >> > than immediate sensation. Vygotsky didn't have access to
> > MRI
> > > > > scans
> > > > > > >> or
> > > > > > >> > computerized tomography. In fact these can and do
> > distinguish
> > > > > > >> between
> > > > > > >> > verbs
> > > > > > >> > of sensation and verbs of verbal report. But what
> Vygotsky
> > > did
> > > > > > have
> > > > > > >> > access
> > > > > > >> > to is the grammar of reported speech.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > In all languages that I know, it is possible to quote the
> > > > words
> > > > > of
> > > > > > >> > another
> > > > > > >> > person. I can say, for example:
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Sasha says "Obviously, this has nothing to do with
> > Marxism".
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > I can also quote the thoughts of another person.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > Sasha thinks, "Obviously, this has nothing to with
> > Marxism."
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > I can do this even when there are no actual words, just
> as
> > I
> > > > can
> > > > > > >> read
> > > > > > >> > Sasha's thoughts without him speaking them.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > However, in no languages that Iknow is it possible to
> quote
> > > > the
> > > > > > >> > actions or
> > > > > > >> > the immediate sensations of another person. I cannot say,
> > for
> > > > > > >> example:
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > "Sasha stood "Up""
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > "Sasha felt 'Cold'".
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > When I try to say this, what I end up saying is that
> Sasha
> > > > > > thought a
> > > > > > >> > word
> > > > > > >> > meaning, not that he felt an immediate sensation.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > In Chinese we say, "The speaker has gone, and the tea is
> > > > cold."
> > > > > > >> This
> > > > > > >> > is
> > > > > > >> > originally a line from the revolutionary opera
> > "Shajiabang",
> > > > > > about a
> > > > > > >> > woman
> > > > > > >> > who runs a teahouse used by communists. In this scene,
> the
> > > > > > children
> > > > > > >> are
> > > > > > >> > acting out a visit by a Chinese quisling and a Japanese
> > > > officer;
> > > > > > >> they
> > > > > > >> > accuse the woman of communist sympathies, and she says
> that
> > > > all
> > > > > > >> people
> > > > > > >> > who
> > > > > > >> > come to her teahouse have sympathies, but as soon as they
> > go,
> > > > > > their
> > > > > > >> > tea is
> > > > > > >> > cold, and she throws it out (6:13).
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uUYvyRMvCNU
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > There is no way, as Wittgenstein says, to feel the
> > toothache
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> another
> > > > > > >> > person; all you can do is to describe it in thoughts and
> > > > words.
> > > > > > >> > Paradoxically, when we want to share thoughts, we can do
> it
> > > > > > >> > "immediately",
> > > > > > >> > because thoughts and words have already made the
> > dialectical
> > > > > > >> leap--the
> > > > > > >> > leap
> > > > > > >> > from idiolect into a sharable dialect.
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > David Kellogg
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > other verbs). First of all, notice that he is saying that
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 5:14 PM, Andy Blunden <
> > > > > ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > > > >> > wrote:
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> > > That is a tendency within our heritage, David. Some
> > people
> > > > > > >> > > take the category of "labour" rather than "activity" to
> > be
> > > > > > >> > > the key category.
> > > > > > >> > >
> > > > > > >> > > As I understand it, "labour," or "production," is
> > activity
> > > > > > >> > > in the case where production and consumption and
> socially
> > > > > > >> > > mediated, but I think that activity whose object is an
> > > > > > >> > > object of consumption should be included within the
> basic
> > > > > > >> > > category of Activity Theory, even if there are
> important
> > > > > > >> > > psychological differences. Some are also concerned to
> > > > > > >> > > separate symbolic activity, such as speech or
> supervision
> > > of
> > > > > > >> > > labour, from the fundamental category, giving tool-use
> > > > > > >> > > priority over sign use, and use of the term "labour"
> > > > > > >> > > suggests that. Vygotsky expressed himself firmly
> against
> > > > > > >> > > this move.
> > > > > > >> > >
> > > > > > >> > > So use of "activity" rather than "labour" or vice versa
> > > does
> > > > > > >> > > reflect certain tensions within the tradition.
> > > > > > >> > >
> > > > > > >> > > Andy
> > > > > > >> > >
> > > > > > >> > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org
> /ablunden/pdfs/Tool%20and%
> > > > > > >> > > 20Sign%20in%20Vygotskys%20Development.pdf
> > > > > > >> > >
> > > > > > >> > > ------------------------------
> > > > ------------------------------
> > > > > > >> > > Andy Blunden
> > > > > > >> > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
> > > > > > >> > > On 26/10/2017 6:14 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. wrote:
> > > > > > >> > > > Xmca seems to have a workerist tendency operating -
> for
> > > > > > myself I
> > > > > > >> > have
> > > > > > >> > > always found that the work of generalising (in
> Vygotsky's
> > > > > sense)
> > > > > > >> is a
> > > > > > >> > > labour of object-oriented activity. But that's just me
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > >> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > > > > xmca-l-bounces@
> > > > > > >> > > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Alexander Surmava
> > > > > > >> > > > Sent: 26 October 2017 00:13
> > > > > > >> > > > To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture,
> > Activity;
> > > > > Mike
> > > > > > >> > Cole;
> > > > > > >> > > ivan-dgf; Martin John Packer; Haydi Zulfei
> > > > > > >> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object
> > > > oriented
> > > > > > >> > activity
> > > > > > >> > > and communication
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Dear Alfredo,
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > thank you for your very accurate reaction. You
> > definitely
> > > > > > >> noticed
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > main thing. Today, in the era of globalization and
> > > developed
> > > > > > >> > technologies,
> > > > > > >> > > the class antagonism between exploited people and their
> > > > > > >> exploiters,
> > > > > > >> > between
> > > > > > >> > > capital and wage labor, assumes the appearance of the
> > > > opposite
> > > > > > >> > between
> > > > > > >> > > different ethnic groups and cultures. Capital itself
> has
> > > > > always
> > > > > > >> been
> > > > > > >> > a
> > > > > > >> > > global phenomenon, and a class of capitalists - a
> > > > cosmopolitan
> > > > > > >> class.
> > > > > > >> > > Putting military overcoats on workers and sending them
> to
> > > > > fight
> > > > > > >> and
> > > > > > >> > to kill
> > > > > > >> > > each other under nationalist slogans, they continued to
> > > > > > cooperate
> > > > > > >> > with
> > > > > > >> > > their exploitation colleagues, somehow continuing to
> > > receive
> > > > > > >> > dividends from
> > > > > > >> > > their enterprises located on the territory of their
> > > "enemy."
> > > > > > Today
> > > > > > >> > Putin's
> > > > > > >> > > friends and henchmen who curse the "insidious West"
> take
> > > > their
> > > > > > >> > capitals to
> > > > > > >> > > this West, buy property there, send their children to
> > study
> > > > > > there
> > > > > > >> > and go
> > > > > > >> > > there themselves to rest and be treated. And today Mr.
> > > > > > Poroshenko
> > > > > > >> -
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > president of the country that was subje
> > > > > > >> > > > cted to the aggression of the neighboring state,
> owns
> > > > > > chocolate
> > > > > > >> > > factories located on the territory of this country.
> > > > > > >> > > > In Russia, and in Western Europe, and in the United
> > > > States,
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > policy
> > > > > > >> > > of the ruling classes is based today on inciting
> against
> > > > each
> > > > > > >> other
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > working people of different ethnic groups and
> > confessions,
> > > > on
> > > > > > >> their
> > > > > > >> > > juxtaposition of each other as superior and
> second-class
> > > > > > >> creatures.
> > > > > > >> > > > And as an ideological justification of the enmity
> > incited
> > > > by
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > ruling
> > > > > > >> > > class towards working people of a different skin color,
> > > > > working
> > > > > > >> > people
> > > > > > >> > > speaking a different language and praying to other
> gods,
> > > > > public
> > > > > > >> > > consciousness is infected with totally false ideas
> > > > constructed
> > > > > > >> > allegedly on
> > > > > > >> > > a scientific basis. All this is not new. One hundred
> > years
> > > > > ago,
> > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > >> > > dominant ideology rested on undisguised racism. Today,
> > the
> > > > > same
> > > > > > >> task
> > > > > > >> > is
> > > > > > >> > > being solved by more sophisticated means, appealing to
> > > > > so-called
> > > > > > >> > "cultural"
> > > > > > >> > > differences. Although the old ideology appealing to
> > > > biological
> > > > > > >> > differences
> > > > > > >> > > has not disappeared. Only today it is covered by a new,
> > > > > > >> > molecular-genetic
> > > > > > >> > > argumentation, an appeal not only to livestock farming,
> > but
> > > > > also
> > > > > > >> to
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > "psychology of culture".
> > > > > > >> > > > It is possible to unmask this bourgeois lie, not only
> > in
> > > > > words
> > > > > > >> but
> > > > > > >> > also
> > > > > > >> > > in deeds, if we can understand that human development
> is
> > > not
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > ability of
> > > > > > >> > > individuals to experience (perejivat’) the meaning of
> > > words,
> > > > > but
> > > > > > >> to
> > > > > > >> > be
> > > > > > >> > > genuine subjects of object-oriented activity, the
> > subjects
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> labor.
> > > > > > >> > > > If we stay on Vygotsky's theoretical positions, which
> > > > > believed
> > > > > > >> > that the
> > > > > > >> > > human psyche begins with acts of sensation that
> thinking
> > is
> > > > > > just a
> > > > > > >> > verbal
> > > > > > >> > > "generalization" of the material that our senses
> deliver
> > to
> > > > > us,
> > > > > > >> then
> > > > > > >> > any
> > > > > > >> > > wretched ideologist, with a well-suspended language,
> will
> > > > seem
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > >> us
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > owner of perfect wisdom, whereas a worker or a peasant
> > > doing
> > > > > his
> > > > > > >> own
> > > > > > >> > work,
> > > > > > >> > > but not possessing the skill of ideological verbosity,
> > will
> > > > > look
> > > > > > >> > something
> > > > > > >> > > inferior.
> > > > > > >> > > > If someone is shocked by such an evaluation of
> > Vygotsky's
> > > > > > >> theory,
> > > > > > >> > open
> > > > > > >> > > his "Thinking and speach" and reread this key
> paragraph.
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > "It has been said that the dialectical leap is not
> > only a
> > > > > > >> > transition
> > > > > > >> > > from matter that is incapable of sensation to matter
> that
> > > is
> > > > > > >> capable
> > > > > > >> > of
> > > > > > >> > > sensation, but a transition from sensation to thought.
> > This
> > > > > > >> implies
> > > > > > >> > that
> > > > > > >> > > reality is reflected in consciousness in a
> qualitatively
> > > > > > different
> > > > > > >> > way in
> > > > > > >> > > thinking than it is in immediate sensation. This
> > > qualitative
> > > > > > >> > difference is
> > > > > > >> > > primarily a function of a generalized reflection of
> > > reality.
> > > > > > >> > Therefore,
> > > > > > >> > > generalization in word meaning is an act of thinking in
> > the
> > > > > true
> > > > > > >> > sense of
> > > > > > >> > > the word. At the same time, however, meaning is an
> > > > inseparable
> > > > > > >> part
> > > > > > >> > of the
> > > > > > >> > > word; it belongs not only to the domain of thought but
> to
> > > > the
> > > > > > >> domain
> > > > > > >> > of
> > > > > > >> > > speech. A word without meaning is not a word, but an
> > empty
> > > > > > sound.
> > > > > > >> A
> > > > > > >> > word
> > > > > > >> > > without meaning no longer belongs to the domain of
> > speech.
> > > > One
> > > > > > >> > cannot say
> > > > > > >> > > of word meaning what we said earlier of the elements of
> > the
> > > > > word
> > > > > > >> > taken
> > > > > > >> > > separately. Is word meaning speech or is it thought? It
> > is
> > > > > both
> > > > > > at
> > > > > > >> > one and
> > > > > > >> > > the same time; it is a unit of verbal thi
> > > > > > >> > > > nking. It is obvious, then, that our method must be
> > that
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> > semantic
> > > > > > >> > > analysis. Our method must rely on the analysts of the
> > > > > meaningful
> > > > > > >> > aspect of
> > > > > > >> > > speech; it must be a method for studying verbal
> meaning.
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > We can reasonably anticipate that this method will
> > > produce
> > > > > > >> answers
> > > > > > >> > to
> > > > > > >> > > our questions concerning the relationship between
> > thinking
> > > > and
> > > > > > >> speech
> > > > > > >> > > because this relationship is already contained in the
> > unit
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> > analysis. In
> > > > > > >> > > studying the function, structure, and development of
> this
> > > > > unit,
> > > > > > we
> > > > > > >> > will
> > > > > > >> > > come to understand a great deal that is of direct
> > relevance
> > > > to
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > problem
> > > > > > >> > > of the relationship of thinking to speech and to the
> > nature
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> verbal
> > > > > > >> > > thinking."
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Obviously, such an "understanding" of thinking has
> not
> > > the
> > > > > > >> > slightest
> > > > > > >> > > relation to either Spinozism or Marxism. It is a naive
> > > > attempt
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > >> > combine
> > > > > > >> > > eclectically the old ideas of empirical psychology with
> > the
> > > > > > school
> > > > > > >> > textbook
> > > > > > >> > > of formal logic.
> > > > > > >> > > > (Of course, I understand that this paragraph needs
> more
> > > > > > detailed
> > > > > > >> > > theoretical analysis. And I will not slow down this
> > > analysis
> > > > > in
> > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > >> > very
> > > > > > >> > > near future. In the meantime, I only note that
> Vygotsky's
> > > > > > >> assertion
> > > > > > >> > that
> > > > > > >> > > "generalization is a verbal act of thought" is a
> > maximally
> > > > > > >> aphoristic
> > > > > > >> > > expression of his idealistic position. For us, as for
> the
> > > > > > >> > materialists, the
> > > > > > >> > > generalization is a practical act and its instrument is
> > the
> > > > > > >> > instrument of
> > > > > > >> > > labor. And the initial and universal instrument of
> > > > > > generalization
> > > > > > >> is
> > > > > > >> > not a
> > > > > > >> > > sign, but an instrument of labor. So the ax is a means
> of
> > > > > > >> > generalizing the
> > > > > > >> > > properties of wood. The ax is, in the same time, a
> means
> > of
> > > > > > >> > analyzing all
> > > > > > >> > > the same wood. All this is obvious, looking through the
> > > > optics
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > >> > > Spinoza-Ilyenkov, that is, simply a Marxist definition
> of
> > > > > > >> ideality.)
> > > > > > >> > > Theoretical conclusions made by Vygotsky from the
> results
> > > of
> > > > > > >> Luria's
> > > > > > >> > trip
> > > > > > >> > > to Uzbekistan logically follow from the above. The
> Uzbek
> > > > > > >> illiterate
> > > > > > >> > > peasant, not from school textbooks, but from his own
> labo
> > > > > > >> > > > r experience knowing how the earth, aryk, water, hoe
> > and
> > > > > > melon
> > > > > > >> are
> > > > > > >> > > connected, and therefore refusing to produce
> meaningless
> > > > > formal
> > > > > > >> > logical
> > > > > > >> > > operations with words denoting these things, is
> declared
> > a
> > > > > > >> primitive
> > > > > > >> > > thinking by "complexes". Simultaneously, any school
> crap
> > > who
> > > > > > knows
> > > > > > >> > how to
> > > > > > >> > > pronounce definitions from his textbook and familiar
> with
> > > > the
> > > > > > >> melon
> > > > > > >> > only
> > > > > > >> > > when it is bought, washed and cut by his mommy, is
> > declared
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > bearer of
> > > > > > >> > > scientific consciousness.
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Only in this way can we, as psychologists and
> teachers,
> > > > come
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > >> > > value of instruments of labor, not only for the
> > > distribution
> > > > > of
> > > > > > >> > material
> > > > > > >> > > wealth, but also for the distribution of the spiritual
> > > > wealth,
> > > > > > for
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > distribution of the ability to think, for the
> > distribution
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> > culture. Only
> > > > > > >> > > in this way can we approach the Marxist definition of
> > > > culture
> > > > > as
> > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > >> > > totality of the means of its object-oriented activity
> > > > > > accumulated
> > > > > > >> by
> > > > > > >> > > humankind the means of its labor. Only on the path of
> > such
> > > > > based
> > > > > > >> on
> > > > > > >> > idea of
> > > > > > >> > > object-oriented activity understanding of man we will
> be
> > > > able
> > > > > to
> > > > > > >> get
> > > > > > >> > out of
> > > > > > >> > > the deadlock of the semiotic, with its symbolic
> > > > arbitrariness.
> > > > > > >> > > > Vygotsky's merit is that he was the first who
> seriously
> > > > set
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > task of
> > > > > > >> > > creating a Marxist psychology and his merit can be
> > > > considered
> > > > > > that
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > first real step in this direction was made by his
> friend
> > > and
> > > > > > >> student
> > > > > > >> > AN
> > > > > > >> > > Leontiev.Our task is to continue their mission.
> > > > > > >> > > > Sasha
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > От: Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
> > > > > > >> > > > Кому: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > > > >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > >> > >;
> > > > > > >> > > Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>; ivan-dgf <
> > > > ivan-dgf@migmail.ru
> > > > > >;
> > > > > > >> > Martin
> > > > > > >> > > John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>; Haydi
> Zulfei
> > <
> > > > > > >> > > haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; Alexander Surmava <
> > > > > > >> > > alexander.surmava@yahoo.com>
> > > > > > >> > > > Отправлено: среда, 25 октября 2017 15:03
> > > > > > >> > > > Тема: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object
> > oriented
> > > > > > >> activity
> > > > > > >> > and
> > > > > > >> > > communication
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > #yiv0081188988 #yiv0081188988 -- P
> > > > > > >> {margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:
> > > > > > >> > 0px;}#yiv0081188988
> > > > > > >> > > Dear Sasha, all,
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > apologies for late response, as we've had some health
> > > > issues
> > > > > > at
> > > > > > >> > home
> > > > > > >> > > that fortunately are now dissipating but which have
> > limited
> > > > > > >> > participation
> > > > > > >> > > anywhere else than home life.
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > The real need of democratic pedagogy. That sounds
> like
> > a
> > > > > > >> concrete
> > > > > > >> > aspect
> > > > > > >> > > to begin moving on to what we had hoped at the
> beginning
> > of
> > > > > this
> > > > > > >> > > conversation: how is this all gonna be of practical
> > (real)
> > > > > > >> relevance
> > > > > > >> > to us
> > > > > > >> > > and not only armchair discussion. So, in what sense is
> > this
> > > > > > >> 'real,'
> > > > > > >> > and is
> > > > > > >> > > this a 'need'? (I am not addressing Sasha alone, I am
> > > > > addressing
> > > > > > >> any
> > > > > > >> > and
> > > > > > >> > > everyone)
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Alfredo
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > From: Alexander Surmava <alexander.surmava@yahoo.com
> >
> > > > > > >> > > > Sent: 21 October 2017 13:36
> > > > > > >> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Mike Cole;
> > Alfredo
> > > > > > Jornet
> > > > > > >> > Gil;
> > > > > > >> > > ivan-dgf; Martin John Packer; Haydi Zulfei
> > > > > > >> > > > Subject: Отв: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object
> > > > oriented
> > > > > > >> > activity
> > > > > > >> > > and communication Dear Martin,I think that if we're
> going
> > > to
> > > > > > >> discuss
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > method of Marx, then it is better to do it discussing
> his
> > > > most
> > > > > > >> > mature work.
> > > > > > >> > > That is evidently "Das Kapital" and Ilyenkov's
> monograph
> > > > > > >> "Dialectics
> > > > > > >> > of the
> > > > > > >> > > abstract and concrete in theoretical thinking". I am
> > aware
> > > > > that
> > > > > > >> > there is a
> > > > > > >> > > point of view that the position of Marx as a humanist
> was
> > > > > > >> adequately
> > > > > > >> > > presented in Gründrisse, whereas the humanistic core of
> > > > Marx's
> > > > > > >> > theory was
> > > > > > >> > > allegedly lost in “Das Kapital”. Accordingly, Marxism
> is
> > > > > better
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > >> > study
> > > > > > >> > > with the help of Gründrisse, and not with the help of
> > “Das
> > > > > > >> Kapital”.
> > > > > > >> > Along
> > > > > > >> > > with Ilyenkov I do not share this view.I'm afraid that
> > the
> > > > > > >> > discussion of
> > > > > > >> > > this topic would take us too far from our psychological
> > > > > themes.
> > > > > > I
> > > > > > >> > think
> > > > > > >> > > that we should not get stuck in discussing the order of
> > > > > "steps",
> > > > > > >> but
> > > > > > >> > > immediately put our foot on the first "step" so that
> > after
> > > > > that
> > > > > > >> try
> > > > > > >> > to rise
> > > > > > >> > > from it to the seco
> > > > > > >> > > > nd, and so on ... Taking into account my not young
> > age,
> > > > it
> > > > > > >> seems
> > > > > > >> > to me
> > > > > > >> > > that at least for me, it's time to move on from the
> > > > discussion
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > >> > > method to the discussion of the subject, from the
> > > > preparation
> > > > > to
> > > > > > >> > thinking,
> > > > > > >> > > to the thinking as such. Especially because the Method
> > can
> > > > not
> > > > > > be
> > > > > > >> > studied
> > > > > > >> > > before and regardless of the study of the very subject.
> > > > > Perhaps
> > > > > > >> this
> > > > > > >> > seems
> > > > > > >> > > paradoxical, but it is a paradox only for those who are
> > not
> > > > > > >> familiar
> > > > > > >> > with
> > > > > > >> > > the dialectic of Spinoza and Marx. Meanwhile, instead
> of
> > > > > > >> discussing
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > question - what is activity, or what is the psyche - we
> > > > > continue
> > > > > > >> to
> > > > > > >> > carry
> > > > > > >> > > water in a sieve, discussing the singular or plural of
> > the
> > > > > term
> > > > > > >> > activity.
> > > > > > >> > > Without a doubt, this topic is very useful for
> > translators
> > > > > from
> > > > > > >> > Russian (or
> > > > > > >> > > German) language to English, but theoretically it is
> not
> > > > very
> > > > > > >> > informative.
> > > > > > >> > > And besides, we are convinced that Andy Blunden
> > completely
> > > > > > >> exhausted
> > > > > > >> > this
> > > > > > >> > > topic a few years ago. Much more interesting would be
> to
> > > > > discuss
> > > > > > >> the
> > > > > > >> > > question: what is the justificati
> > > > > > >> > > > on to declare Vygotsky the founder of activity
> theory.
> > > > > Where,
> > > > > > >> in
> > > > > > >> > any
> > > > > > >> > > > of his works, Vygotsky introduces the concept of
> > > activity,
> > > > > not
> > > > > > >> > just uses
> > > > > > >> > > the term «activity» in the theoretical contexts in
> which
> > it
> > > > is
> > > > > > >> used
> > > > > > >> > > habitually by idealistic psychology. “The activity (or
> > > > > > >> activities) of
> > > > > > >> > > consciousness”, “the activity (or activities) of mental
> > > > > > >> functions”,
> > > > > > >> > “speech
> > > > > > >> > > activity (or activities)”, the concrete activities of
> the
> > > > > > >> > personality”- all
> > > > > > >> > > this has nothing to do with object-oriented activity,
> > with
> > > > > > Spinoza
> > > > > > >> > and
> > > > > > >> > > Marx. It seems to me that our main mistake is that we
> are
> > > > > > >> discussing
> > > > > > >> > the
> > > > > > >> > > subtleties of understanding the categories of activity
> by
> > > > > > Vygotsky
> > > > > > >> > and
> > > > > > >> > > Leontyev, whereas we need something different. It is
> > > > necessary
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > >> > try to
> > > > > > >> > > formulate OUR OWN UNDERSTANDING of the activity,
> > proceeding
> > > > > from
> > > > > > >> THE
> > > > > > >> > REAL
> > > > > > >> > > NEED OF THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRATIC PEDAGOGY.It is
> > > impossible
> > > > > to
> > > > > > >> > understand
> > > > > > >> > > activity based on Vygotsky's ideas, because there was
> no
> > > > such
> > > > > > >> > theoretical
> > > > > > >> > > category in his theoretical system of views. AN
> Leontiev
> > > > > > >> introduces a
> > > > > > >> > > category of object-oriented a
> > > > > > >> > > > ctivity into psychology, but his theory is of little
> > use
> > > > > for
> > > > > > >> > solving
> > > > > > >> > > practical problems too, for saying “A”, Leontyev never
> > said
> > > > > “B”.
> > > > > > >> > Having
> > > > > > >> > > proposed the principle of activity as the universal
> basis
> > > of
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > > psychological theory, its germ cell AN Leontiev did not
> > go
> > > > > > further
> > > > > > >> > failing
> > > > > > >> > > to concretize this correctly chosen abstract
> > category.Once
> > > > > > again,
> > > > > > >> > from
> > > > > > >> > > thehobby group of lovers of Vygotsky, with his
> > > > > > >> "Сultural-Рistorical
> > > > > > >> > > Psychology" and AN Leontyev with his "Psychological
> > Theory
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> > Activity" we
> > > > > > >> > > all have to become community of researchers developing
> > > > > > >> fundamentally
> > > > > > >> > new
> > > > > > >> > > approaches to education, based on dialectical,
> > > revolutionary
> > > > > > >> method
> > > > > > >> > of
> > > > > > >> > > Marx.For the realization of this dream, it is necessary
> > to
> > > > > begin
> > > > > > >> not
> > > > > > >> > so
> > > > > > >> > > much - to learn to listen to each other...
> > > > :-)Sincerely,Sasha
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > От: Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> > > > > > >> > > > Кому: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > > > >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > >> > > > Отправлено: пятница, 20 октября 2017 3:08
> > > > > > >> > > > Тема: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Отв: Re: Object oriented
> > > > > activity
> > > > > > >> and
> > > > > > >> > > communication
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Right, Marx was himself well aware of this
> difference.
> > My
> > > > > > point
> > > > > > >> is
> > > > > > >> > that
> > > > > > >> > > we have begin to talk about “the start” of Marx’s
> > analysis,
> > > > > and
> > > > > > >> > about its
> > > > > > >> > > “stages,” but these should not be equated with the
> order
> > of
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >> > treatment
> > > > > > >> > > in Capital.
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Martin
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > On Oct 19, 2017, at 5:40 PM, Andy Blunden <
> > > > > ablunden@mira.net
> > > > > > >> > <mailto:ablu
> > > > > > >> > > nden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > https://www.marxists.org/archi
> ve/marx/works/1867-c1/p3
> > .
> > > > htm
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Of course the method of presentation must differ in
> > form
> > > > > > >> > > > from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate
> > the
> > > > > > >> > > > material in detail, to analyse its different forms
> of
> > > > > > >> > > > development, to trace out their inner connexion.
> Only
> > > > > > >> > > > after this work is done, can the actual movement be
> > > > > > >> > > > adequately described. If this is done successfully,
> if
> > > > > > >> > > > the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected
> as
> > > > > > >> > > > in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before
> > us a
> > > > > > >> > > > mere a priori construction.
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Andy
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > ------------------------------
> > > > > ------------------------------
> > > > > > >> > > > Andy Blunden
> > > > > > >> > > > http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
> > > > > > >> > > > On 20/10/2017 3:23 AM, Martin John Packer wrote:
> > > > > > >> > > > Seems to me that if we’re going to talk about the
> > details
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> Marx’s
> > > > > > >> > > analysis we need to look not at Capital but at the
> > > > Grundrisse.
> > > > > > The
> > > > > > >> > two have
> > > > > > >> > > virtually opposite organizations; it’s clear that the
> > order
> > > > of
> > > > > > >> > presentation
> > > > > > >> > > in Capital was not the order of analysis.
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > > Martin
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > > >
> > > > > > >> > >
> > > > > > >> > >
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >> >
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > > > Assistant Professor
> > > > > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > > > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> > > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > --
> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > > Assistant Professor
> > > > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > Assistant Professor
> > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
More information about the xmca-l
mailing list