[Xmca-l] Re: Appeal for help

[Jonathan Tudge]

I think that virtue ethicists influenced by Aristotle would be cautious
about linking virtues and habits. A habit may be simply rule-governed.  For
example, I follow the rule to always say "thank you" when given a gift and
always give, in return, a gift of equal value, but I do so without
understanding why I should express thanks.  I can hardly be said to have
the virtue of gratitude.  That's why neo-Aristotelians invoke the concept
of phronesis, or practical wisdom.  I have to understand the meaning of
expressing thanks and engaging in grateful behaviour, as well as doing it
on a regular basis (when appropriate), and that comes with experience.

In case anyone's interested, fuller thoughts on this issue appear in Tudge,
Freitas, & O'Brien (2015). The virtue of gratitude: A developmental and
cultural approach. * Human Development, 58*, 281-300.

Cheers,

Jon


~~~~~~~~~~~

Jonathan Tudge

Professor
Office: 155 Stone

http://morethanthanks.wp.uncg.edu/

Mailing address:
248 Stone Building
Department of Human Development and Family Studies
PO Box 26170
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Greensboro, NC 27402-6170
USA

phone (336) 223-6181
fax   (336) 334-5076

http://www.uncg.edu/hdf/facultystaff/Tudge/Tudge.html


On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 11:30 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Anyone have suggestions of writings on ethics from a CHAT perspective?
>
> Also, I was quite taken by Annalisa's linking ethics to "habit" precisely
> because this is the way that I would like to construe ethics - embodied
> habits/dispositions (person X habitually responds to a particular type of
> situation with behavior Y). To say anything more requires invoking one
> ethical framework or another (and even my definition does this since the
> construal of "a particular type of situation" as such necessarily already
> invokes cultural meaningfulnesses that are also likely to entail ethical
> frameworks).
>
> -greg
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 10:52 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > ... and this is really not the forum for clarifying these issues of
> > Ethics, honestly.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden
> > http://home.mira.net/~andy
> > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> > On 8/07/2016 11:36 AM, Christopher Schuck wrote:
> >
> >> Much of this last interchange seems to be as much about meta-ethics as
> >> normative ethics. Andy chooses to identify ethics with human activity in
> >> terms of practical norms (and some epistemologists argue that practical
> >> reason is inherently normative). Others might see it more in terms of
> >> "ideal good" (as Annalisa put it). If we're discussing how ethics is to
> >> even be conceptualized and approached (e.g. questioning dichotomies of
> >> "good" and "evil", whether a priori or a posteriori is relevant, virtues
> >> as
> >> opposed to criterion-based consequentialism) - we're getting into
> >> meta-ethics. For what that's worth.
> >>
> >> On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 9:18 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi Andy,
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> So you are describing Normative Ethics, not Ethics.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Interestingly, "ethics" does derive from the Greek word for "habit"
> >>> (????).
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> A habit seems to have a lack of awareness in it. Certainly habits are
> >>> hard
> >>> to break, which is why we hope to have good habits, not bad ones.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Unless you would like to define what you mean by "Practical norms" it
> >>> seems to be an "amoral" phrase to me.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Typically, as I understand it, ethics is the study of human morality in
> >>> the attempt to define what is good and right, vs. not good and not
> right
> >>> so
> >>> one can determine what is proper actions to live by (what habits are
> >>> worth
> >>> having). I consider that to be a consideration of values a priori. In
> >>> terms
> >>> of what is ideal or hypothetical.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Normative ethics seems to be a study of actions a posteriori, after the
> >>> fact.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Please note that I do not like to use the terms "evil" or "wrong" and
> >>> prefer to orient from the relations of what is good and what is right.
> >>> This
> >>> avoids dichotomies, and it allows for a spectrum of something being
> more
> >>> right, or having more goodness than something else.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Getting back to utilitarianism, I still see it as a justification for
> >>> economics, that is, economics as practiced today, which is usually not
> >>> done
> >>> scientifically, though it is very mathematical in nature. To measure
> >>> utility requires all kinds of strange formulae, and that's why I used
> the
> >>> metaphor hall of mirrors.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Still, I prefer to consider utility as a projection, than a reflection.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Eating humans has a projected value of goodness in one society, but not
> >>> in
> >>> another.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Not harming myself or others seems to have a universal application, and
> >>> so
> >>> it doesn't seem to be a projected subjective value, but a reflected
> one,
> >>> if
> >>> I may claim that a projected value is relative and subjective while a
> >>> reflected one is a universal, objective value.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Happiness is also a universal, objective value. I don't know anyone who
> >>> doesn't value happiness. However what makes people happy is a
> projected,
> >>> subjective value. That's where utility comes in.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> For what that is worth.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Kind regards,
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Annalisa
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>