[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination

Tue Dec 16 06:05:58 PST 2014

I'm not sure there is such a bright line between mediationalists and associationalists.  At least some of the associationists I have read don't deny mediation, they simply don 't prioritize it.  Any mediation artefact is couched within the associations people make from it.  An interesting view where history is contained within the act rather than the act being a product of history.  An extremely interesting thing happened in the United States as a football game.  I think others have mentioned the "hands up don't shoot" behavior/artefact that emerged after the Ferguson shooting and took on greater urgency after the failure to indict the police officer who shot an unarmed teenager who  (according to witnesses) had his hand up in the don't shoot position.  Anyway, four players entered the field of play with their hands up.  If you watched football games over the years you would realize there is nothing new in players entering the field with their hands raised above their heads - often meant to signal coming domination of the opponent - a mediating artifact for competitiveness and battle within the arena - at least I think that is the association thousands of wildly screaming fans would make.  Except this time the hands above the head gesture was associated with something completely different - the injustice towards and mistreatment of young men of color by the criminal justice system.  Almost every American who watched the gesture, whether in real time or on delay immediately made this association, and from there made further associations based on their histories and belief systems (you only had to listen to sports call in shows to see the different trails of association).  So which is more important the mediating artifact of the gesture or the associations you make from its transactional relaitonships to other things?  Or perhaps it is not important to even consider which is more important - development of ideas is not a competitive arena sport (well sometimes we associate it with that maybe).

Michael

________________________________________
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of HENRY SHONERD [hshonerd@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 12:24 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination

I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, “sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
Henry

> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an
> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention.
> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to
> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two
> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the
> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life
> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that
> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where
> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are
> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking
> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be
> more voluntary.
>
> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot
> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices  really are
> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal
> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional
> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory
> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>
> David Kellogg
> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>
> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all
>> for the food for thought.
>>
>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time
>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on
>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>
>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive?
>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of
>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative
>> newcomer to the topic.
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This
>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in
>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the
>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>> Henry
>>>
>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing
>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an
>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of
>>> course
>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>
>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems
>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this
>>> passage,
>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to
>>>> "memory."
>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse
>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have
>>>> illustrated.
>>>>
>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who
>>> clearly
>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible
>> to
>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>
>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly
>> links
>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act.
>> Parts
>>> of
>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was
>> also
>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and
>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the
>> two
>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>
>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing.
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>> approaches
>>>> to a pesum
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be
>> worth
>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>> Imagination
>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and
>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2)
>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says
>> leads
>>> to
>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the
>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>> through
>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>> trying
>>> to
>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must
>>> be a
>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned
>>> that
>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked
>> to
>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation
>>> and
>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting
>>> with
>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a
>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This,
>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take
>>> part
>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on
>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly
>>> the
>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination
>>> and
>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality:
>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which
>> I
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual
>>> and
>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under
>>> the
>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities
>>> that
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think
>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up
>> I
>>> am
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads,
>>> finally
>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the
>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of
>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came
>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at
>>> several
>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access
>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover,
>>> such
>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to
>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about
>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they
>> will
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>