[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination

[HENRY SHONERD]

I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, “sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
Henry

> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an
> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention.
> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to
> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two
> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the
> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life
> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that
> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where
> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are
> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking
> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be
> more voluntary.
> 
> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot
> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices  really are
> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal
> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional
> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory
> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
> 
> David Kellogg
> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> 
> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>> 
>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all
>> for the food for thought.
>> 
>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time
>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on
>> memory before, but not imagination.
>> 
>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive?
>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of
>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative
>> newcomer to the topic.
>> mike
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This
>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in
>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the
>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>> Henry
>>> 
>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing
>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an
>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of
>>> course
>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>> 
>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems
>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this
>>> passage,
>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to
>>>> "memory."
>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse
>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have
>>>> illustrated.
>>>> 
>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who
>>> clearly
>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible
>> to
>>>> include culture in it.
>>>> 
>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly
>> links
>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act.
>> Parts
>>> of
>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was
>> also
>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and
>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the
>> two
>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>> 
>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing.
>>>> mike
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>> approaches
>>>> to a pesum
>>>> 
>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be
>> worth
>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>> Imagination
>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and
>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2)
>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says
>> leads
>>> to
>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the
>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>> through
>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> 
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>> trying
>>> to
>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must
>>> be a
>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned
>>> that
>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked
>> to
>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation
>>> and
>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting
>>> with
>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a
>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This,
>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take
>>> part
>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on
>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly
>>> the
>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination
>>> and
>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality:
>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which
>> I
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual
>>> and
>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under
>>> the
>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities
>>> that
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think
>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up
>> I
>>> am
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads,
>>> finally
>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the
>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of
>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came
>> upon
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at
>>> several
>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I
>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access
>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover,
>>> such
>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to
>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about
>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they
>> will
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> --
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>