"[T]he researchers showed that dramatic color change is consistently associated with the *use* of color change as a social *signal* to other chameleons. The degree of change is not predicted by the amount of color variation in the chameleons' habitat, as would be expected if *chameleons had evolved* such remarkable color changing abilities *in order to* camouflage."
The Standford explanation says "opinion is divided" and identify teleology (as opposed to "naturalism") with the work of a Great Architect or simply pinning it on a sloppy choice of words. "Backwards causation" is an attempt to subsume teleology under causation which leads to nonsense of course.
In what sense is "teleology a hypothesis"? Each individual observation (like the one above on chameleons) is obviously hypothesis, but are you saying that the whole idea on which that newspaper article is based, i.e. that there is a functional explanation to biological traits, is hypothesis? (Let's leave aside their imputation of conscious purpose to reptiles)
All this is nothing to do with "objectivity". As I said, it seemed to me that you were raising two distinct new issues in your earlier post, objectivity vs absolute, and teleology vs mechanism.
Now you accuse me of understanding life as a journey and introduce the idea of a defined "end". I guess am guilty here, as I never intended "journey" to imply something which has a goal at the outset; Hegel repeatedly insists that it can be seen as a journey only in retrospect (Owl of Minerva etc). And of course the whole idea of identifying the absolute with simply the whole is to *negate* the idea of identifying the absolute with the end (that's the value of the journey metaphor, to contrast journey and end). So my point is precisely to avoid your "defined" end of totality, and avoid imputing "meaning" from outside life itself, and that's how one avoids the choice of absolute relativism and dogmatism - we are all part of the same totality. If you deny any continuity to the billions of human lives, then how do you avoid absolute relativism, Martin? I accept, BTW, that totality is also relative, so can we leave "grand narrative" and "totalising" out of it, as these are actually distinct issues. You can have a notion of totality without subordinating every part to the whole absolutely.
Andy Martin Packer wrote:
Andy, As always it's taking me a while to translate from Hegelian to English! Starting with point 2, it's by no means obvious that evolution requires reference to teleology: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/> ...even with chameleons: <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080129125524.htm> ...so I'll stand by my assertion that the view that there is a teleology to the universe remains at best a hypothesis. And when you say "teleology...exists whether we or anyone else knows the end" are you suggesting that knowing that teleology exists is enough for someone to say that they know the "objective laws" of the universe? We certainly don't know the ends, I would argue we are not at all certain that there is a teleology, and furthermore I don't think we are clear on what basis we could validly make such a claim. Regarding your point 1, you seem to be saying that human knowledge is objective (in the Hegelian sense, and perhaps for Ilyenkov too) because it is (part of) knowledge of the absolute. But this seems to me to beg the question - it *assumes* that there is an absolute of which our knowledge is part. The claim that there is a journey with a defined end, even if it is one we don't know - no, *especially* if it one we don't know - seems dangerously relativizing. If we destroy the environment, that's okay, because it's all just part of the big plan. I don't need to take any action, because things will work out in the long run. But perhaps the more dangerous version is the claim that we *do* know the ends of the journey. At least a few of us do, the enlightened ones. We have true knowledge, we are the masters of history. It's not that an appeal to teleology invokes a Divine Architect, but rather that the appeal to teleology has the *same effect* as the appeal to a god who guarantees that our knowledge "conforms" to the things themselves, and who guarantees that our actions (but not the actions of those who we must oppose, perhaps destroy) coincide with the grand plan. I see more clearly now why Hegel's system as been called onto-theology.MartinOn 1/23/09 11:07 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:OK, as I read you, Martin, so we are on to different issues here: (1) can knowledge which is relative be nonetheless objective. And you also raise in relation to the Hegel quote: (2) the problem of the objectivity of teleology. (1) As I read Hegel and Marx and ... knowledge is objective inasmuch as it is integral to forms of practice which are objective, i.e., practical. That knowledge is always incomplete (and in that narrow sense "subjective"), in the process of change and development, along with human practices, is also true. To make sense of this I know of no other source other than Hegel: everything is relative (i.e., just one step along a journey, within which there are also many routes) but the whole (i.e., the journey itself) is absolute. I.e., at any given moment, human knowledge is only as adequate as our practices at that time and place, but the entire journey, the whole development of all human knowledge in all its forms over all time, is absolute. So every relative knowledge partakes to a degree in the absolute. Yes? (2) On teleology: teleology is objective and exists whether we or anyone else knows the end or not. There is a prejudice among natural scientists to claim that only mechanism is objective, and falsely claim that teleology invokes a Divine Architect. But try to explain how it comes about that cameleons can change colour according to their surroundings without invoking teleology and having recourse only to cause and effect. It can't be done. Nonetheless, we know that the category of teleology in natural selection is not absolute and produces the clumsy feathers of the peacock. But do we respond by saying that evolution is wrong? No, we just refine the definition of the teleological process. Exactly what we do when we find that a mechanism proves to be an inadequate representation. Yes? Andy Martin Packer wrote:Andy, It certainly all hinges on what Ilyenkov means by "objectively-true," for sure. I still haven't yet got much beyond page 1, but jumping forward a bit: "These laws [I assume he's talking about dialectical logic] are understood as the objective laws of development of the material world, of both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective reality in general. They are reflected in the consciousness of mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice." (p. 15) But hang on, have we humans *really* identified the "objective laws... of the material world"? Let me juxtapose two excepts from your last message (!):This is the point: humans change the world, but only according to its own nature.In a similar way. the passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves and their purposes in accordance with their natural destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves."But Andy, it's one thing to say that we have to know a bit about the world to get tasks accomplished in it. It's another thing entirely to say that our tasks themselves are following some grand plan. Certainly, if there is a "natural destination" to the universe, and humans are part of that universe, then I suppose we are headed in that direction too. But surely you will agree with me that we do not *know* that there is such a natural direction. At best this is a hypothesis. It would be circular logic to say that we know that nature follows a dialectical law, because it is part of that law that our knowledge is objective. I'm very reluctant to say that we have already figured out the laws of the universe, especially when it is claimed that one of the consequences of these laws is that human cognition forms an objectively-true reflection of them. That would be to place ourselves at the end of history, wouldn't it? And Marx never made such a claim, to myknowledge.Martin On 1/23/09 9:27 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:Are you counterposing "objectively-true image" with "exact picture of the world", Martin? Andy Martin Packer wrote:Andy, thanks for adding to the height of my reading pile! :) Until I complete the assignment (at least partly) I will merely juxtapose here two quotations whose contrast gives me pause for thought. The first from the first page of the book by Ilyenkov you've provided: "And only materialist dialectics (dialectical materialism), only the organic unity of dialectics with materialism arms the cognition of man with the means and ability to construct an objectively-true image of the surrounding world, the means and ability to reconstruct this world in accordance with the objective tendencies and lawful nature of its own development." The second from Carlos Marx himself: "The formulation on [in? MP] thought of an exact picture of the world-system in which we live is impossible for us, and will always remain impossible. If at any time in the evolution of mankind such a final, conclusive system of the interconnections within the world... were brought to completion, this would mean that human knowledge had reached its limit, and, from the moment when society had been brought into accord with that system, further historical evolution would be cut short-which would be an absurd idea, pure nonsense" (A Handbook of Marxism, 1935, p. 234) Martin On 1/23/09 5:56 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:Martin, I have converted to PDF Ilyenkov's book defending Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism": http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positivism.pdf I think you can agree that if such a renowned Hegel interpreter as Ilyenkov can defend "reflection" and Lenin's book, then there has to be something in it. The above is much shorter and easier to read than Lenin's book, BTW. Sidney Hook is far from alone in the sentiments he expresses. But you have to take Lenin and Engels and the Russian CHAT people *as a whole* and this criticism (which I sympathise with) of the notion of "reflection" as "passive" is, as you have remarked yourself, constantly contradicted by the "change the world" notes constantly and discordantly accompanying every mention of "reflection." This is the point: humans change the world, but only according to its own nature. The aeroplane actually obeys the laws of nature as it flies across the sky. Hegel has a great bit on this: "So also when someone starts building a house, his decision to do so is freely made. But all the elements must help. And yet the house is being built to protect man against the elements. Hence the elements are here used against themselves. But the general law of nature is not disturbed thereby. The building of a house is, in the first instance, a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as means, the several substances required for the work iron, wood, stones. The elements are used in preparing this material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion in order to cut the wood, etc. The result is that the wind, which has helped to build the house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire, so far as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey the law of gravity and press downwards so that the high walls are held up. Thus the elements are made use of in accordance with their nature and cooperate for a product by which they become constrained. In a similar way. the passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves and their purposes in accordance with their natural destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves." http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/introduction.htm Andy Martin Packer wrote:At risk of actually killing the horse I'm flogging, I want to return one more time to the debate over 'reflection.' Mike asked me why I would be sad to hear that Vygotsky was significantly influenced by Lenin. I've been reading some of the work in the 1920s and 30s by Sidney Hook, on the topic of Marx and Hegel. I'm copying below a fairly long excerpt in which Hook takes to task both Engels and Lenin (in 'Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,' at least) for viewing ideas as "reflections" of reality - exactly in the sense of mirror images or copies. That Lenin did this was the sense I have got from reading other comments on Lenin, though I haven't read Lenin myself. The problem, as Hook points out, is that the reflection view treats thinking as a passive process, that solipsism and skepticism cannot be avoided, that in this view knowledge cannot be creative, and consequently knowledge of the world cannot change the world. This, as he notes, is a long way from Marx. Martin The excerpt is from: Hook, S. (1928). The Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism. II. The Journal of Philosophy, 25(6), 141-155. [ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014691 ] "He [Engels] presents the "dialectic" as the method which corrects the limited and ossified character of classificatory thinking and claims that it enables one to avoid the predicament of English empiricism which is peculiarly addicted to this way of thinking. But Engels failed to understand the real weakness of English empiricism. Otherwise he would have realized that his uncritical reference to ideas as reflections, pictures, or images (Abbilder, Spiegelbilder) of things made him fall into an epistemological trap whose mazes lead into the cul-de-sacs of solipsism and nominalism- the very positions he was anxious to avoid. Since sensations, accord- ing to Engels, gave immediate knowledge, the organizing activity of thought becomes purely ancillary to classifying and relating sensa- tions. Practice and experiment, which he later says must serve as the criteria of truth, are introduced by a double inconsistency. For if our sensations are copies, we can never know anything of the originals or even know that there are any, while if sensations give immediate knowledge there is no sense in trying to check up upon them by experiments which only give other sensations, just as im- mediate. The disastrous consequences of the belief in the cognitive character of sensations comes to light in Lenin's fanatical insistence upon accepting every word of Engels literally. According to Lenin, sensation is "a copy, photograph, and reflection of a reality existing independently of it." He takes Plekhanov to task for regarding sensations as "signs" or "symbols" of what things are, instead of adhering to the crude formula, "(sensations) are copies, photo- graphs, images, mirror-reflections of things" (p. 195). He adds further on, "the idea that knowledge can 'create' forms and change the primeval chaos into order, is an idealist notion. The world is a uniform world of matter in motion, and our cognition, being the highest product of nature, is in a position only to reflect this law." But if knowledge only "reflects" the laws of the world, how can it change the world? A mirror or a lake reflects the natural scene, but neither knows nor changes it. This is, indeed, a far cry from the functional and experimental theory expressed in Marx's gloss on Feurbach and strange words from one who believed that by "mass action" and the creation of new machines and forms of distribution, a better social system will be evolved." (p. 149-150) _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden: http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca