Well, I see that I did indeed miss important moments in the discussion
earlier this morning,
re-hearsaying what David wrote about units of analysis, missing his
interesting discussion
of the rise of the novel and its 19th Century inversion of concerns.
David-- Am I correct in saying that the following provides the answer for
you to how LSV resolved the two
psychologies problem:
I guess I think that the "self" is a little bit like the idealist
psychology that is so obsessively concerned with it. Martin's point is
really that LSV does NOT suggest a "synthesis" of idealist and objective
psychology. LSV wants us to cut off idealist psychology. He does this by
really REVERSING the relations between psychology and sociology; he does it
by saying that we do not begin by explaining the self and then use it to
explain society--we proceed the other way around. But as soon as we do this,
we discover that the "self" is not really a stable thing at all; it's more
like a moving interface between social ideology and personal ideology.
Is that what you concluded, too, Martin?
I'll have to think about this as I go about my distractions.
mike
On Mon, Feb 25, 2008 at 1:23 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> David,
> I have always taken it that by "unit of analysis" is meant the abstract
> concept of the thing, as outlined in Hegel's Logic. I agree that "unit of
> analysis" pertains to a specific set of problems which have arisen and
> resolves them in some way, by creating a new concept of a "thing" which
> then becomes the starting point for resolving that series of problems with
> a new science. As you say, the "unit of analysis" or Begriff, is relevant
> only to that foregoing series of problems, and a "universal unit of
> analysis" would be God.
>
> Andy
> At 12:43 AM 25/02/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> >Thanks for the very challenging response, Heidi. I'll do my best to give
> >you something equally challenging for your response to the response!
> >
> > I think that when LSV argues that "word meaning" is a unit of
> analysis,
> > we need to ASSUME that he is not arguing that it is a universal unit of
> > analysis. For example, I've got some data on my desk from BARELY
> > linguistic three year old children. "Word meaning" is barely a unit,
> much
> > less a unit of analysis.
> >
> > The same thing is true of analyzing the behavior of drosophilia or of
> > whole nations and civilizations. Word meaning doesn't make sense here.
> > What DOES make sense, at least to me, is the following METHOD:
> >
> > a) We need to find a UNIT OF ANALYSIS. This unit has to make sense in
> > terms of the thing that we are analyzing AND in terms of the purpose of
> > the analysis. It has to be a functional, and a functioning, whole. It
> has
> > to be irreducible. For drosophilia, that unit might be "activity". For
> > nations, that unit might be "class". For civilizations, that unit might
> > be "nation" (if we are talking about modern or bourgeois civilization
> for
> > example). Or not (if we are analyzing an ancient civilization or if we
> > are looking at civilization with an eye to philology). For language
> > growth in children, it seems to me that word meaning is quite workable,
> > and activity is somewhat problematic, particularly when we consider
> > adolescents (because as LSV points out, imagination and fantasy are not
> > particularly reducible to activities). In some ways, "play" is a more
> > suitable way of looking at child activity, and play is not reducible to
> > some form of stunted adult activity (as Leontiev claims).
> >
> > b) We need to isolate within that unit of analysis two counterposed
> > ELEMENTS. All units must have these elements to one degree or another,
> > even if one is almost invisible or merely potential. The two elements
> are
> > defined relationally, and cannot really exist without at least the
> > potential other; that is why they are elements and not units. For
> > example, within activity, there might be a tension between subject and
> > object, within the commodity it might be between use value and exchange
> > value, and within words it might be between "smysl" (pragmatic meaning)
> > and "znachenie" (semantic meaning). Within play I believe the two
> > counterposed elements are imaginary situations and abstract rules, and
> > that all forms of play have these two elements in common.
> >
> > c) We need to look at how the RELATIONSHIP of the two counterposed
> > elements changes over time. The elements may at first seem completely
> > merged. For example, when we look at verbal nouns like "being" or even
> > "sleeping" it is quite difficult to discern a subject and an object.
> > Similarly, when goods are just beginning to be used as commodities, it
> is
> > hard to discern their use and their exchange value. Words like "Hey!"
> and
> > "Hello!" do not seem to have any semantic weight other than their
> > pragmatic use, and children who play with their food do not appear to
> > distinguish an imaginary situation or an abstract rule (although their
> > behavior may be very gestural and regular). One element may then clearly
> > "emerge" from the other. For example, in "I sleep" or "I laugh" we can
> > see a very clear subject. Words like "this" and "that" have definite
> > pragmatic (context sensitive) meaning (smysl) although their semantics
> > are constantly in flux. Role play games like "house" or "cowboys and
> > indians" or "war" have clear imaginary situations although the rules
> are
> > negotiable. At some critical point, however, all of these relationships
> > can then be reversed. For example, money and stocks are pure exchange
> > values, scientific concepts have clear semantic meanings, and games like
> > chess are dominated by abstract rules rather than imaginary situations.
> >
> > d) We need to understand that development is UNENDING, that the means
> > of development itself develops. The endpoint of these transformations is
> > simply the starting point of new transformations: whole sentences become
> > elements in larger units called texts, games become elements in artistic
> > and cultural life, etc. It seems to me we also need to understand that
> > development develops the unit of analysis itself; that is essentially
> > what we mean when we say that development is transformative and
> > revolutionary and not simply accretive and incremental, and that is why
> > there cannot be a single unit of analysis (e.g. activity) for all the
> > different levels of analysis.
> >
> > To me, THIS is more or less what LSV takes away from Marx's Capital
> > (and of course Hegel). I would say it is a bit more than just "a model
> to
> > learn from" and more specific than merely a "philosophy". To tell you
> the
> > truth, I don't think it is accurately described by calling it a skill or
> > a technique, either. "Method" seems about right to me.
> >
> > I'm not against "dualism" per se. I think that when I talk to you,
> > there is a dualism: you and me. I even think that when I talk to myself,
> > there is a dualism. Not only that, I think that there is a real dualism
> > between lower functions and higher psychological functions. But the
> > dualism of mind and body, or "self" and body, I reject; it seems to me
> > another version of body and soul. By suggesting that the "self" is a
> kind
> > of imaginary friend, or a cyber-avatar, or simply the result of
> > multivarious and poly-perverse linguistic performances, I'm suggesting
> > the kind of surgery that LSV wanted to perform on idealistic psychology.
> >
> > I don't think I am "detaching" self from life's relations of essences.
> > I am rejecting the whole thinginess of a self; I am saying that it is a
> > piece of cyberspace, an illusion created by various linguistic
> > performances that I give, rather like the illusion created by many
> > computers simultaneously recreating the same website on their screens.
> It
> > looks like there really is a "thing" out there that all the screens are
> > looking at. But there isn't.
> >
> > You invite me to 'please read in the article from "Vygotsky described
> > these stages" up to "has received the rank of general from its
> > department"'. Why, I'll do better! I'll reread the whole LSV text for
> you!
> >
> > Actually, LSV is NOT talking about the ascent to the concrete at all.
> > He is parodying the glorious career of various tropes in psychology (e.g
> .
> > the Pavlovian reflex, the Freudian libido, the Gestalt, the
> personality).
> > He points out that they begin a limited explanations for rather limited
> > facts. They are then promoted to the administration of various adjoining
> > facts and their explanatory power is stretched very thin, according to
> > the principle that everyone is promoted from a job they do well to a job
> > they cannot really handle.
> >
> > Finally, they cover the WHOLE of their domain (psychology) at which
> > point they cease to explain ANYTHING. If the whole mind is a reflex, you
> > cannot explain it in terms of reflexes, and if the psyche is nothing but
> > libido, then saying that it is made up of libido is tautological.
> > Similarly, Gestalt becomes purely DESCRIPTIVE and not EXPLANATORY as
> soon
> > as the explanans is the size of the explanandum, and it makes no sense
> to
> > say that personality is explained by personality. That is why it's very
> > important to discern elements within the unit of analysis that are not
> > coterminous with the unit of analysis, why we cannot explain, for
> > example, word meaning as "thinking" or as "speech".
> >
> > When the unit of analysis becomes co-extensive with the domain, it
> > behaves a little like a country whose market has become saturated, whose
> > workers no longer have the buying power to sustain capitalist profits.
> It
> > has to invade other domains and explain them. So we have the application
> > of reflexes to physics, and the discovery of psychoanalytic tropes in
> > literature and anthropology, Gestalt in philosopy and "personality" in
> > animals. At THIS point, LSV says, it is time to retire--that's why he
> > says "it receives the rank of general from the department". I'm afraid
> > that this is NOT ascent to the concrete; it's more like descent to
> Gogol.
> >
> > I guess I think that the "self" is a little bit like the idealist
> > psychology that is so obsessively concerned with it. Martin's point is
> > really that LSV does NOT suggest a "synthesis" of idealist and objective
> > psychology. LSV wants us to cut off idealist psychology. He does this by
> > really REVERSING the relations between psychology and sociology; he does
> > it by saying that we do not begin by explaining the self and then use it
> > to explain society--we proceed the other way around. But as soon as we
> do
> > this, we discover that the "self" is not really a stable thing at all;
> > it's more like a moving interface between social ideology and personal
> > ideology.
> >
> > Let me give you an analogy: the novel. In the 18th Century, we had the
> > rise of the novel which told the story of the rise of a particular self:
> > Robinson Crusoe, Moll Flanders, Tom Jones, Pamela, Clarissa, Charles
> > Grandison. By the late 19th century novels tended to talk about the
> > LIMITS of that rise: Anna Karenina, Tess of the D'Urbervilles,
> > Middlemarch. Lukacs uses this to talk about the rise and fall of the
> > bourgeois epic.
> >
> > There are some problems with this. First of all, it suggests that
> > novels are going to disappear, and they show absolutely no sign of doing
> > so. It also doesn't do a lot to explain why novels read the way they do
> > (why, for example, they are longer than the longest poems, or why they
> > seem so very concerned with thoughts and conversations rather than
> > adventures and deeds).
> >
> > Bakhtin has a better idea: he sees the novel as being just a name for
> > what is "new" in literature, and what is "new" in written literature is
> > always the moving interface between spoken language and written
> language,
> > in every epoch represented by the novel (as opposed to poetry). That's
> > really what I meant by trying to demystify and materialize the self as
> > just another kind of "interface". I meant that it is just the point at
> > which inner speech becomes outer speech, in the same way that the novel
> > is the point at which spoken language becomes written language. That's
> all!
> >
> > You really mustn't take too seriously all those stereotypes and
> cliches
> > that Paul attributes to me, Heidi! I didn't write ANY of that stuff
> about
> > the "new man" and people becoming masters of their own destiny. Mind
> you,
> > I'm not disowning it; I have met many people who DID dream like that and
> > talk like that and they have always been people I admired intensely,
> > people I have wished to be like, and even talk like.
> >
> > It's just that the actual data I have to work with doesn't look very
> > much like children taking control of their language and their fate. This
> > morning I got up and put Gounod on the CD Player and sang along with
> good
> > old Faust:
> >
> > "Je suis avec ce breuvage
> > Le seul maitre de mon destin!"
> >
> > Except Faust was holding the chalice of poison (and then the elixir of
> > life). All I had was a cup of good strong coffee.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >---------------------------------
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> Search.
> >_______________________________________________
> >xmca mailing list
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>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> mobile 0409 358 651
>
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Received on Sat Mar 1 10:36 PST 2008
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