Are these two necessarily - direct relation between perceiver and object of
perception; actor's location in social practices - in opposition? I am
thinking of Bakhurst's articulation of 'radical realism' in his book
'Consciousness and revolution in Soviet Philosophy.' In contrast to
'conservative realism,' in which the mind is assumed to form 'reflections,'
representations or images of the external world, in 'radical realism' mind
is assumed to be *in* the world, knowing reality directly. But it is the
incorporation of natural entities into social practices that enables them to
present themselves to us *as* objects of a particular kind.
On 2/17/07 7:51 PM, "Ed Wall" <email@example.com> wrote:
> Thus, treating the relationship between a perceiver
> and an object of perception as a primary reality, as James did, is
> from Garfinkel's perspective a mistake. The possibility of perceiving
> objects as "objects of a sort" depends on the actor's location in a
> social organization and their commitment to the situated expectations
> belonging to that location.
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