Hi Victor and all other participants of our exciting discussion :-).
Unfortunately my capacity for quickly expressing theoretical ideas in
English is still limited, as well as free time for it. (Now I'm involved in
the organization of the annual international conference "Vygotsky's
Readings," which usually takes place on LSV's birthday at 15 of November in
Vygotsky Institute in RSUH in Moscow; so it leaves me only nights for the
discussion :-)) That's why I physically can't answer objections immediately.
So before starting arguing I'd like repeat after D'Artagnan
"And now you are assembled, gentlemen," said D'Artagnan, "permit me to offer
you my apologies.
At this word APOLOGIES, a cloud passed over the brow of Athos, a haughty
smile curled the lip of Porthos, and a negative sign was the reply of
"You do not understand me, gentlemen," said D'Artagnan, throwing up his
head, the sharp and bold lines of which were at the moment gilded by a
bright ray of the sun. "I asked to be excused in case I should not be able
to discharge my debt to all three; for Monsieur Athos has the right to kill
me first, which I must abate your valor in your own estimation, Monsieur
Porthos, and render yours almost null, Monsieur Aramis. And now, gentlemen,
I repeat, excuse me, but on that account only, and--on guard!"
Well let's draw our theoretic swords :-).
Victor, you asserted that:
"1. The positing of a fundamental dialectical contradiction between
subjectivity and objectivity is not a reversion to dualism, and it is hardly
implicitly idealist in concept."
And with a light heart I will fully agree with you. Moreover I will insist
on this thesis. Even more I will insist that the dialectical relationship
between objectivity and subjectivity is the central, core problem for all
CHAT theorists including Marx and Il'enkov.
Probably you will laugh but the first and the most popular formula of
Marxism itself deals with this very problem.
I permit myself to recall once again the first thesis on Feuerbach:
1. The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism - that of Feuerbach
included - is that the Object [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are
conceived only in the form of the object [Objekts], or of contemplation
[Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity, practice [Praxis], not
subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to
materialism, was developed by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of
course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach
wants sensuous objects [Objekte], differentiated from thought-objects, but
he does not conceive human activity itself as objective [gegenstandliche]
activity. In The Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christenthums], he
therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human
attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish
form of appearance [Erscheinungsform]. Hence he does not grasp the
significance of 'revolutionary', of 'practical-critical', activity.
(I'll add in parentheses that just this Marx's idea was the starting point
and inspiration for both Vygotsky and Leont'ev in their theorizing.)
In a popular Russian comedy a hero (Kisa Vorob'janiniv) after repeating the
first words from a long begging formula in German "Geben sie mir bitte."
interrupts himself "Well, I know it." and goes ahead repeating the full
begging phrases in French and in Russian. I'm afraid that the popularity of
this Thesis is playing the same bad joke with us. The familiarity with the
Thesis prevents its comprehension.
Let's notice that the very idea of subjectivity according to Marx is
fundamentally connected with the idea of practice or the objective
[gegenstandliche] activity, is derivative from it. But if we realize it the
very reproaches of Marx in underestimation of principle of subjectivity
turns into a mere misunderstanding of the most basic, the most principle
idea of a dialectical materialism.
Anna Stetsenko reproaches all founders of CHAT with such underestimation. It
sounds quite earnestly especially since these reproaches are as old as
anti-Marxist criticism. The leitmotiv of nearly all Marx's opponents is the
same "underestimation of subjectivity". The same shabby blunder is repeated
in Anna Stetsenko's "newly discovered" formula.
Well, let's pass by these arguments and try to look at the problem from the
Can we understand something, putting this something into the basis of our
understanding? "I" is equal to "I", the "consciousness" is equal to the
"consciousness", or the "subjectivity" is just the "subjectivity". Extremely
wise conclusions. Putting the "subjectivity" as one of the most basic
principles of our theoretical approach, we simply block the way to its
understanding. By the way, AS is not even making the slightest attempt to
give a theoretical definition of subjectivity as it is. She contents herself
with emotional agitation for enrichment of Marxist and CHAT approaches with
this principle and allow subjectivity as such to be completely undetermined.
We can't estimate her dissertation on conceptualizing of subjectivity as
something which is "emerging" in the situation of need "to help regulate the
collective material production of the very lives of individuals."
There is an illustration in point to all that. AS connects somehow the
subjectivity with humans and keeps silence about animals and life as such.
I'm not the first who is putting the question about animals before Anna.
It's easy to see that this question stays without answer.
Meanwhile if we left poor animals without subjectivity we will simply repeat
an old Cartesian (dualistic :-)) tale about soulless animals and face the
irresolvable problem of rational understanding of the nature of emergence of
this subjectivity on the human stage of development.
Petr Gal'perin fell into the same trap when energetically arguing that
Descartes and his dualism ascribed a psyche (subjectivity in AS terms) only
to human beings and relatively highly developed animals.
So if we are really going base our investigation on a dialectical
materialist grounds and are concerned with the problems of personality we
need start from the consequent definition of object directed activity as
such; especially since we haven't such a theoretical definition in CHAT. The
definition given by Leont'ev is full of self-contradictions and is hardly
sufficient for such a task.
Surely nobody can force us to follow dialectical materialist approach if we
prefer to base our investigation on some alternative logic. Simple in the
case we have to realize that we are leaving Vygotskian tradition.
Victor, is asserting that:
"I've seen no CHAT research that tackles impact of ideas on social reality
as subjective (Hegelian sense if you will) contradictions of that reality."
Here I have to ask you what you mean under CHAT? The aggregate of poorly
coordinated ideas from LSV and ANL? Something like ZPD plus mediating
triangle even perfected by Engestrom plus three activity levels ( I man
operation, action and activity) of ANL?
The paradox is that even in this underdeveloped form the CHAT approach can
attract an interest of an increasing number of researchers and works in some
The most developed problems of the type you've mentioned above can hardly be
resolved before resolving of substantially more abstract problems, say, a
problem of object activity as such. So it's a little early to give up under
the weight of the heavy theoretical problems and close the way for further
investigation putting the subjectivity as a preface instead of derivative
from subject directed activity.
Victor, is writing about:
the impact of subjectivity (i.e. ideas) on social life
Victor, surely that is the most interesting point of all discussion. But
it's already a morning (7 a.m. and I still dream to sleep for some time) and
I have to finish this post otherwise all this will finished not with
"fratricidal" but with banal suicide on the ground of sleeplessness :-).
Let's continue our discussion tomorrow.
Just the last remark.
least of all I should like to hurt anybody with my rigid dissident position
The thing is that this my position is a result of long years of
confrontation with soviet authorities and in spite of my will it may sounds
harder than I mean to be.
It doesn't mean that I give up my position :-)
it means only that I feel really happy to be discussing all this with such a
concerned group of colleagues.
From: email@example.com [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org] On
Behalf Of Victor
Sent: Monday, November 07, 2005 3:48 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Stetsenko- Material practice, human
While I am quite as concerned as you are with the integrity of the
materialist paradigm of CHAT and appreciate your criticisms of Anna's rigour
in this regard, I do not agree with your over-all evaluation of her work.
1.. The positing of a fundamental dialectical contradiction between
subjectivity and objectivity is not a reversion to dualism, and it is hardly
implicitly idealist in concept. Quite the contrary, the dialectical
contradiction between subject and object and subjectivity and objectivity is
a prerequisite of Historical Materialism in all its forms including CHAT. I
guess I should add here a reminder of our previous discussion of the
difference between Spinozan and Historical Materialism where I made the
point that the germ of their difference is that the latter adopts in full
the principle that the state of men's place in the universe is a product of
men's active (i.e. as subject) interaction with the objective material
conditions of his existence. AS sometimes appears to reify subjectivity into
a process or even a substance, which is a complete misinterpretation of the
meaning of the term, subject, in both Objective Idealism and in Historical
Materialism, but considering the general tenor of her work I regard this as
an problem of expression rather than of principle. Still, carelessness in
expression may of course engender new principles, and I whole-heartedly
appreciate your noting them and your explications of their theoretical
implications for CHAT.
2.. The dialectical principle that at higher levels of complexity
(concreteness) social and other derivative forms turn into active forms that
actively modify their own material basis may be well-known to and even
classical CHAT, but I reiterate my earlier comments that I've seen no CHAT
research that tackles impact of ideas on social reality as subjective
(Hegelian sense if you will) contradictions of that reality. The issue of
the real impact of ideas on material social conditions is of critical
importance for a materialist theory that lays claim to its relevance to all
aspects of human activity and human history. The basic principle of
dialectical reciprocity is at least as old as chapter 2 of Ilyenkov's
Dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in Marx's Capital, and, as I
understand it, what is new in AS's propositions is that the significance of
dialectical reciprocity be applied to the relation of ideas to social
organization, an application that necessitates the interpretation of ideas
as subjective products.
3.. Regarding the related problem of Truth in research. We should not
forget that the Truth in "intelligent materialism" is not one of absolute
being but of effective practice. The absolute truth of being is appropriate
to the objectivism of the contemplationist philosophies of the ancients;
Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, and Feuerbach, predecessors and important
contributors to Historical Materialism, but certainly not exemplars of the
materialism of Marx, Lenin, and Ilyenkov. For intelligent materialism Truth
is always relative to the practical problem posed, and is never a Truth of
being, but of action, of the movement between object and subject.
Anna's paper may not be an important revolutionary contribution to theory (I
hope I've shown that most of her arguments are easily integrated into the
existing CHAT paradigm), but rather as a truly revolutionary proposal for
the expansion of the field of CHAT into areas that should have been
addressed long ago by CHAT researchers, namely the impact of subjectivity
(i.e. ideas) on social life and the consequent results of this impact as
manifested in the impact of idea- modified social organization on men's
interaction with the material conditions of their existence (i.e. the forces
----- Original Message -----
From: "Alexander Surmava" <email@example.com>
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Sent: Sunday, November 06, 2005 17:09
Subject: RE: [xmca] Stetsenko- Material practice, human
> Hi Steve and everybody,
> Anna's article has provoked the XMCA community to a meaty discussion and
> this alone is enough for us to appreciate Anna for her good work. I can
> that Anna Stetsenko displays great courage choosing one of the most
> fundamental problems of CHAT as a subject of her criticism.
> I agree with AS that if we really want to be guided by the approach
> developed by Vygotsky and his followers, we must not just repeat their
> classical definitions but develop and update them ourselves; especially
> since neither Vygotsky, nor Leont'ev have left us an accomplished theory.
> Vygotsky has made the first and the most difficult steps to Marxist,
> dialectical psychology, but his bold attempt was interrupted by his
> death in the very beginning, he literally stopped in the middle of a
> sentence. Leont'ev who succeeded him did his best to elaborate a
> activity theory, but at the end of his life publicly confessed (in "Home
> discussion") that AT is still facing serious difficulties, that he say
> explain how external activity transforms into internal activity. That
> confession, more than anything else, testified to his high theoretical
> and his honesty as a researcher. Dealing with theoretical heritage of such
> high value we have to be accurate as we need to move CHAT approach forward
> to the status of a consistent theory which will be more effective in
> forms of practice and escape the danger of losing the critical passion of
> its core ideas.
> I'll be frank, I find Anna's article extremely ambiguous, not to say
> dangerous in the abovementioned meaning.
> Anna pretends to fix certain gaps
> "in initial formulations of activity theory (also
> taken up by many followers of this school)" for the purpose to resolve
> and "to move to new levels of a consequentially materialist and
> nonreductionist theory of human development that would not exclude human
> subjectivity from the dialectical account of social life."
> I fully agree with this statement. Let's see how she realizes her goal and
> let's start with a short definition.
> The principal distinction between materialism and idealism lies in what we
> put as the starting point of our theoretical movement. Materialists try to
> explain the most complex forms of objective reality starting from the idea
> of a material Nature or substance as the only and fully all-sufficient
> of existence and comprehension for all developed forms. Idealism finds
> task insoluble and puts forward some supplementary, extra principles like
> "soul" or "spirit", "consciousness" or "will", "thinking" or "psyche",
> "sensation", "creativity" or "socially organized experience" as equally
> basic and substantial forms.
> It's easy to see that the last sentence is simply a summary of Anna's
> article. She only adds to the abovementioned list a new term "human
> subjective ness" or "human subjectivity (in its various aspects)". It's
> obvious that it ranks with the abovementioned terms being according to
> of AS's article renamed from "psyche," "psychic reflection". Thus she
> her movement "to new consequentially materialist. theory" from declaring
> consequentially idealist one.
> Surely she repeatedly asserts that this human subjectivity is derivative
> from human activity and social practice, but here we have to make things
> 1. If so called human subjective ness is an entirely derivative form in
> relation to the object related activity, if it is not a causa sui but only
> modus of object related activity then Anna is pushing against an open door
> (with her extra principle) and doesn't add any novelty to classical AT. It
> is awkward to recall that a development in dialectical tradition was never
> understood as being derived solely from material activity, but we are
> dealing with real (not only formal) development when a social (derivative)
> form turns into active form, itself a form that actively reshapes its own
> material basis. That is an old and well known dialectical principle and
> the classics of CHAT knew it well enough. So, if Anna's "human subjective
> ness" is an entirely derivative principle (from the object related
> we are staying in old good AT. But the content (I mean something
> novel) of her article disappears before our eyes as morning fog under the
> 2. If not, if her new principle comprehends at the slightest degree as
> sui or a substance (I mean as something containing all its casualty inside
> its own realm), if she supposes that there is any side or feature of
> subjective ness" which cannot be derived from object oriented activity and
> has its own independent background, we are immediately leaving even
> inconsequential materialism, and as it plays a principal role for CHAT
> theory, we leave CHAT itself.
> Anna indicates that
> "a broad-and powerfully materialist-formulation is
> clearly emphasizing a one-sided dependence of human subjectivity on the
> processes of material production (especially in A.N.Leont'ev's works) and
> associated societal forms of exchange between people (especially in
> Vygotsky's works). Namely, human subjectivity is conceptualized as
> originating from, and subordinate to, the collective exchanges and
> Here she should better say IN besides AND because concerning so-called
> "societal (why not social?) form of exchange," Anna repeats the same
> as with "human subjective ness". Social relations according to Marxist
> CHAT) tradition have to be comprehended as derivative forms from human's
> material production of their life. So we can hardly estimate "the
> exchanges and material production" as two-fold system of interactions.
> less we can adopt her further argumentation.
> "This formulation is lacking one important idea that
> was implicitly present in Marx's works-the idea that in human history
> exists not only an interdependence and co-evolution of the material
> production on the one hand, and the societal (i.e., collective,
> inter-subjective) forms of life, on the other."
> Here we again meet with a serious error. "Social" (I don't know anything
> about a "societal") in Marx doesn't mean collective or inter-subjective.
> Thus a human personality for each of CHAT founders was an individual,
> non-collective phenomena and at the same time 100% social in essence. As
> Marx's comprehension of subjective ness we will discuss it a little later.
> "One other aspect of human life also co-evolves
> together with these two processes."
> "These two processes" are presenting a good example of false abstractions
> just like Cartesian two substances. "Material production" at least human
> "material production" can't be imagined in abstraction from society. So it
> doesn't need to be completed with another abstraction of the same false
> as "societal ness" interpreted in abstraction both from material
> and from human subjective ness."
> Namely, the subjective mechanisms allowing for
> individual participation in collective processes of material production
> also implicated in the functioning of what essentially is a unified
> three-fold system of interactions. That is, the idea that still needs to
> spelled out is that all three processes at the very foundation of human
> and development-the material production of tools, the social exchanges
> people, and the individual mechanisms regulating this production and these
> exchanges-all co-evolve, interpenetrating and influencing each other,
> becoming completely detached or independent from each other."
> Under dialectical logic to understand something we have to move, to ascend
> from abstract to concrete, tracing the development of a single germ cell
> the reach the variety of mature, developed forms. This way is rather
> difficult as it requires us to find in the very reality the notorious germ
> cell and then follow it in its fully contradictory path of development.
> contradiction itself is something hardly endurable which demands from an
> investigator all his intellectual as well as moral resources. Much easier
> well as nonproductive way is to multiply initial principles or germ cells.
> Here AS follows VPZ, who is trying to invent a substantially new CHAT
> liberated from Marxism, and by no means after LSV, ANL or EVI.
> But what about the principle of subjective ness as such?
> The most curious is that a principle of activity, or more precisely the
> principle of object determined activity or principle of "predmetness,"
> doesn't need to be enriched by Anna's newly invented principle of human
> subjectivity especially since the principle of activity and the principle
> subject ness (in a case of animals and human beings it appears in it more
> developed form as principle of subjective ness) one and the same principle
> for Il'enkov, as well as for ANL and LSV.
> The second curious detail is that both AS and Lois are quite right
> connecting the human possibility to change a world with his/her
> subjectivity, but what kind of subjectivity they are going to deal with:
> abstract subjective ness well-founded in a). human soul (Farewell to LSV,
> ANL, EVI) or b). in human's physiology (Farewell to LSV, ANL, EVI as
> both listed variants are leading us back at best to Piaget or Freud with
> their autistic subject adversarial to a misunderstood and aggressive outer
> world. The alternative choice is a subjective ness interpret as a form of
> human object determined activity.
> Let's recall the first thesis on Feuerbach:
> 1. The main defect of all hitherto-existing
> materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the Object [der
> Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of
> object [Objekts], or of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human
> sensuous activity, practice [Praxis], not subjectively. Hence it happened
> that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by
> idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know
> real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects
> differentiated from thought-objects, but he does not conceive human
> itself as objective [gegenstandliche] activity. In The Essence of
> Christianity [Das Wesen des Christenthums], he therefore regards the
> theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice
> conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance
> [Erscheinungsform]. Hence he does not grasp the significance of
> 'revolutionary', of 'practical-critical', activity.
> Here is the answer to the discussed problem.
> Let's try to expound the process of genesis of subjectivity.
> First of all we have to recall three logical as well as natural historical
> stages of development of Nature, I mean mechanism, chemism and organism.
>>From the logical point of view there is only three stages, three levels in
> organization of interaction: the mechanism, the chemism and the organism.
> Modern Physics as a science is not equal to mechanism. (Newtonian Physics
> Logically the essence of mechanical type of interaction characterized by
> principal symmetry. I mean that in mechanical interaction anything
> with everything. And we can't distinguish the acting side from passive
> In chemism the interaction remains symmetrical; we still can't point the
> active side of interaction. But now one (chemically) interacts only with
> specific "partner" in Hegelian terms called "it's own other" (svoye -
> inoye). For example an acid can chemically interact only with an alkalis
> metals. Otherwise the interaction will have only mechanic character.
> But the most advanced, the highly organized type of interaction is organic
> type. Here and now we can and have to distinguish acting side = "subject"
> and passive side "predmet". In contrast to mechanism and chemism living
> subject needs in specific interaction partner not only to have a
> to manifest its specific (mechanical or chemical) qualities, but to remain
> living subject.
> So the subject ness appears on the stage with the life as its essential
> Surely when we deal with an abstract life we haven't any reason to
> this subject ness with subjective ness or psyche. On this stage we meet
> subject ness "in itself".
> The next stage is the transition to the specific form of object directed
> activity characterized for multi-cellular animals. Here we meet with
> reflexive form of object directed activity, a psyche or subject ness "for
> Finally, only in human history the subject ness can transform itself into
> the highest form which possesses a logical form "in and for itself" which
> means that the very subjective ness starts to be a subject for itself and
> thus liberates itself from any external boundaries, comes to real self
> I want to underline that this third and highest stage is not a gift from
> high. That is something that mankind and each of us has to win in our
> permanent historical struggle with overwhelming forces of Nature and with
> alienated forces of mankind itself.
> To win in this severe competition with ourselves (we keep in mind that
> Nature as well as historically developing and inevitably imperfect
> society -
> are a human itself) we have to understand ourselves (in both Natural and
> social dimensions). And to realize this task we need to comprehend an
> objective truth. That's why I can hardly agree with Lois in her statement:
> "I don't think of Vygotsky's search for method as a
> search for truth, but as a step in the process of changing the world."
> Here some extra comments are necessary.
> Nowadays the very idea of searching for a truth is unpopular. The idea of
> absolute truth is usually associated with unilateral and obstinate
> and as a sole alternative to dogmatism a total relativism is expanding.
> Meanwhile in classical philosophy, I mean in the very philosophy which
> Vygotsky and his followers the philosophy marked by names of Plato,
> Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, Marx and Il'enkov, the absolute truth is not
> only a cause for being horrified but a sharp dialectical instrument. It's
> inappropriate to continue this argumentation so I'll add only that
> himself can't be understood properly from the relativistic stance. To
> it one has just to cast a glance into his "Historical meaning."
> He regarded his investigations as a search of truth and was certain of
> feasibility of this mission as a necessary condition of liberation of a
> human, of transformation them into real subjects.
> I'll repeat that we can try to approach to the problem of real subjective
> ness from two opposite directions. We can depart the stage of CHAT
> reproaching it with the lack of interest in subjective ness and simply
> postulate it as something substantial, something independent from object
> determined activity power. In this case all complaints against the
> insufficient ness of real subjective ness we'll be able to bring only for
> Nature or God.
> On the contrary if we are regarding a subject ness as a historically
> developing essence and without a blinkers of political correctness, are
> looking at the actual state of affairs as for instance that in modern
> society the intellectual, ideal and material work is divided among
> persons and the very subjectivity of a human being is substantially
> suppressed and distorted by the great amount of alienated social forces
> School for the masses, Mass media and advertisement then the hope for
> future still emerges.
> Finally I anyway want again to appreciate Anna's work for its stimulating
> role of our discussion.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: email@example.com [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org] On
> Behalf Of Steve Gabosch
> Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2005 8:26 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Stetsenko- Material practice, human
> The xmca discussion of Anna Stetsenko's paper shows this paper to be
> highly stimulating for discussing and possibly re-thinking the basic
> concepts of CHAT. Things that especially impress me about this paper
> as a stimulus for advancing CHAT's theoretical work include its
> affirmation of the basic Marxist sociological and philosophical
> premises at the foundation of CHAT, its applications of the principle
> of object-relatedness to all levels of activity, its criticism of
> gaps in the previous work of CHAT theorists and researchers, and its
> pointing toward a new materialist ontology of subjectivity that
> emphasizes the role of human subjectivity in human activities.
> As I see it, what is precisely new and potentially path-changing in
> this paper are two core ideas. In core idea one, AS advocates
> accurately seeing the co-evolutionary, interpenetrating, mutually
> influencing, and dialectically connected character ... of the cause
> and effect relationships among three emergent levels (my term) of
> regulatory mechanisms that she identifies human labor and activity as
> generating - (in my terms) socio-economic processes, socio-cultural
> activity, and subjectivity. Saying this core idea again because it
> is in some ways a major leap in conceptualization, human activity is
> conceptualized by Stetsenko as a generator of increasingly complex
> levels of regulatory mechanisms that are intrinsically interconnected
> and co-developing - namely, the socio-economic, the socio-cultural,
> and the subjective. In core idea two, she elevates the idea of
> object-relatedness to a foundational principle of CHAT and advocates
> applying this principle to all three of these levels of human
> activity to explore how they interpenetrate and co-evolve. Her
> criticisms of Vygotsky, Leont'ev, Ilyenkov and trends within CHAT in
> general, and her suggestions for improving the CHAT research project,
> illustrate how she sees her ontological outlook being applied, and
> how past CHAT efforts in specific ways fell short of their potential
> because the ontological outlooks they employed were incomplete and
> But if this new ontological conceptualization makes new demands on
> what and how CHAT should be researching human activity, then,
> conversely, there are also high demands on this restructured CHAT
> ontology to deliver the goods. One place it may need to begin would
> be to produce convincing empirical evidence for the existence, nature
> and interconnectedness of these levels of "regulatory mechanisms"
> (keeping in mind BTW Bill's wise caution that the term "mechanism" is
> a reductionist metaphor - which raises the question, just what is a
> "regulatory mechanism"?). Another beginning place is meeting the
> necessary challenge of developing practical applications that flow
> from this increased ontological understanding of how these levels of
> human activity work together. And then there is the challenge of
> reviewing previous research work in the CHAT tradition with these new
> lenses, looking for deeper insights than previously possible. In the
> same vein, if CHAT is destined to give birth to a general psychology
> that can unify the science of human subjectivity and human activity
> as a whole - as Vygotsky hoped - then AS's suggested improvements to
> the conceptualizations employed by CHAT should contribute to better
> explanations of research work from many other schools of psychology
> in ways not as possible for CHAT researchers before.
> I see Anna Stetsenko's paper as an exciting step forward toward
> meeting these historic challenges.
> - Steve
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