Andy,
Whereas, the Marxian notion of false consciousness as rooted in a view of
multiple class perspectives may pass postmodernist muster, it doesn't work
for poststructuralists. Essentializing a "class perspective" at the level
of the individual actor ignores the contradictory and shifting relations of
our constituent subjectivities.
David
Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.ne To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
t> cc: (bcc: David H Kirshner/dkirsh/LSU)
Subject: RE: false consciousness: real and virtual worlds
12/25/2003 05:47
PM
Please respond to
xmca
Judy, "False consciousness" has never been a word in my vocabulary, I
suppose because I find it kind of offensive. To the postmodern mind of
course it is offensive because it contains the implication, as you suggest,
that there is a "true" consciousness.
However, I think that very natural presumption misses the point of the
basic idea behind "false consciousness". As I understand it, it is normal
that every person or group of people has a viewpoint which flows from their
own position in society, their special interests and so on. This idea leads
to the basic idea that there is no "true" consciousness, only different
perspectives on the same totality, and broader or narrower visions. "False"
consciousness however, is where a person or group adopts the viewpoint of
another group not their own; so it is the employee who adopts the viewpoint
of the boss, mainly.
From the old standpoint of "being determines consciousness" it is obvious
why people hold opinions expressing their own self-interest. What Marx had
to explain was why/how people adopted views which expressed the interests
of those groups who oppress and exploit them.
Andy
At 06:38 PM 25/12/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Eugene, I agree with you (Ilenkov, apparently) that all consciousness
(& all
semiosis) has its virtual basis, so virtuality cannot be the basis of
false
consciousness. I don't understand your use of Latour, however; you
seem to
be equating irrationality w/ false consciousness, which just seems to
rephrase the claim about virtuality (except that your/Latour's
emphasis is
on cultural practices...) Where there is incomprehensibility between
subjects, there is the evidence that the culture is irrational -- can
you
please explain your notion of a rational (& thus coherent???)
culture?
I would like a definition of false consciousness that I could use to
refer
to a regrettable condition, but every definition I've heard refers to
a
condition that could be just the opposite -- a saving grace (like
denial in
general) for the subject under certain conditions. Like faith. But I
do see
the working class Latino's support for someone like Bush to be
regrettable,
in terms of that persons's interests. I suppose what I'm really
struggling
with is the notion that there is a consciousness of some kind that
ISN'T
false. But maybe that's because I "grew up" with Bateson, not
Ilenkov.
Judy
Eugene wrote: (snip)
In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
"irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to
reconstruct
cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of
irrationality
or "false consciousness" is about relationship of incomprehensibility
between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
I-am-now).
What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for
Schwarzenegger
embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for
Mike
embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when
people do
not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you
know
any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so,
did you
ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about
possible
economic consequences for his family?
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