Re: Those radical constructivists...

Naoki Ueno (nueno who-is-at nier.go.jp)
Wed, 6 May 1998 04:00:17 +0900

At 10:47 AM 5/5/98 -0400, Bill Barowy wrote:
> Rather I should write that
>"Children participate in situations with patterns of description about the
>physical world that are often quite different from scientists and often
>quite resistent to change. "

Bill,

Patterns of description is different thing from that 'a kind of preconceptions
are also mutually, collaboratively, situatedly constituted with a teacher'.
Without collaborative organization of contexts, giving a specific problem,
children never automatically invent a specific patterns of description.
Very simple thing. For example, have children ever seen the a series of problems
or a way of asking questions in physics problems before?
Probably, these are new for them. If so, having patterns of description
in advance is impossible.
Diagnosis of preconceptions does not purely diagnose the inside or the
pattern of description that is already there.

This disucssion is partially related to the formulation of Andy diSessa' s
'ad hoc' explanation of children for physics problems. After that, he was
going to p-prims. I think that his p-prims are also mutually constituted.

>One can say that
>it is difficult to socially, reciprocally constitute situations in which
>the students describe the physical world using the same language game as
>scientists or one can say the students have difficulty learning the
>pre-ordained science. I have not yet been able to advantage the former to
>formulate better interventions.

Have you ever read my paper on "Newtonian Physics" in
Cognition and instruction, 1993, 10(2 & 3), 239-248?
Longer verison of my paper on Newtonian Physics is in LCHC newsletter,
April 1993, Vol 15, Number 2.
My answer of this your question is there.

If you have ever read my papers, and if these are nothing new for you,
this time I retire from this discussion on e-mail. I need another place
and time for this discussion.

>It does go farther than that. In the work I did with Paul Horwitz and Ed
>Taylor, I found research indicating the reason for one kind of difficulty
>with visually observing objects in motion, to be traced to eye-tracking.
>The human visual system tends to track objects in such a way that makes it
>difficult to 'percieve' an event the way a physicist conceptualizes it.

I think that it is difficult to see the "pure" perceptual system or
perceptual observation. Very simple example is socially, mediationally
constituted observation when one tries to draw a picture.
For example, you may stand a pencil in the center of scene in order
to organize your obsevation. Your drawing itself also organize and give
the direction to lead your observation of scene.

History of drawing is a rich resource for such mediationally organized
observation. For example, perspective drawing uses various tools.
Perspective drawing is not a copy of retina but the product
of organized observation by the specific tools.
Further, drawing and tool use has been embedded in language
game of what is reality and of drawing for what.

Science history is the same. (it is better to say that history of
drawing and scientific practice has been overlapped.)
Scienctists have invented various tools in order to organize their
observation. Actually, newtonian experiments use various artifacts
in orde to make visible of mass, force, gravity, motion of earth,
various types of motion and others. The observation of these things
is impossible without various specific tools.
Tools such as a telescope was also a very important artifact for
reorganizing the langauge game of physics.
Further use of telescope was ingeniously located in a specific
langage game by Galileo, for example.
Ingenious tools for organizing a specific observation or
preception has no meaning without organizing a specific langauge game.

Suddenly given pysics problems such as famous coin problem
conceal all these things, organized contexts of newtonian
physics. That makes school physics be funny language game.

Various everyday practices use various artifacts for organizing
observation in a specific language game.
In this way, there is no pure perceptual observation anywhere.

Interaction analysis in educational setting will also shows
that observation of pehnomenon is collaboratively, mutually,
mediationaly consituted and it is acompanied with collaborative
organgization of langauge game.

See the Gibsonian experiments. In the experimental session, Gibsonian
direct perception is mediationally, socially organized.
One of my colleauge did the interaction analysis of "direct perception"
experimental setting. Actually, it is impossible to pick up "critical
imformation" without coding categories, instructions, prepared motion
patterns on the monitor organized in a specific way.
In this way, "direct perception" is also socially, mediationally organized.
if so, what is human visual system? How did you know "illusion"
as "illusion"?

Pattern of eye scanning or a way of observation cannot be understood
only by "perceptual system" or only by the human visual system.
The "human visual system" is not destiny of our way of organizing
observation and langauge game.
Rather, one can say that we need tools and to organize a specific
langauge game in order to observe the pure human visual system itself.

Micheal Lynch and Steve Woolar' s book "Representation in Scientific
Practice" also gives another examples of how scientists socially,
mediationally organize their observation. The picture on the cover of
this book shows just tool use of perspective drawing.

Naoki Ueno
NIER, Tokyo