Radically Reasonable

Bill Barowy (wbarowy who-is-at lesley.edu)
Wed, 6 May 1998 11:51:05 -0400

At 4:00 AM +0900 5/6/98, Naoki Ueno wrote:
>Patterns of description is different thing from that 'a kind of preconceptions
>are also mutually, collaboratively, situatedly constituted with a teacher'.
>Without collaborative organization of contexts, giving a specific problem,
>children never automatically invent a specific patterns of description.

Naoki,

I think we agree more than we realize. However, the interesting matter is
in the differences.

If by automatically, you mean 'spontaneously', then it is very difficult to
test your latter statement - that is, to do so would mean following around
a child and recording without interacting, when the very presence of an
observer affects to some degree, large or small, the setting in which the
child acts. I think if one takes mutual constitution to this fullest
degree, it no longer makes sense even to consider the idea of what children
automatically do. Perhaps that is your point.

>Very simple thing. For example, have children ever seen the a series of
>problems
>or a way of asking questions in physics problems before?
>Probably, these are new for them. If so, having patterns of description
>in advance is impossible.

Of course.

>Diagnosis of preconceptions does not purely diagnose the inside or the
>pattern of description that is already there.

When I was refering to patterns of description it is what children say (or
perhaps how they act - patterns of behavior) in social settings. It
certainly is possible to assess what students do (including what they say)
before intervention and compare it to what they do after intervention. I
agree that students behaviors are also a function of the social and
physical setting. Yet, by repeating the assessment before and after the
intervention we can meaningfully attribute learning or perhaps even
development on the part of an individual child. Agreed, it is messy. Not
everything is controlled. Even if it is an interview and the interviewer
manages to do everything the same, or if it is a normed test, the child has
learned something from participating in that kind of assessment previously,
and the assessment really only assesses the childs performance in that
setting.

>
>I think that it is difficult to see the "pure" perceptual system or
>perceptual observation. Very simple example is socially, mediationally
>constituted observation when one tries to draw a picture.
>For example, you may stand a pencil in the center of scene in order
>to organize your obsevation. Your drawing itself also organize and give
>the direction to lead your observation of scene.

Yes. I think we agree again. I think what we are both talking about is
the same, we see things as partially social, partially physical or
biological. All of this presumes us as 'superobservers' in some sense,
able to observe other people and nature. Without taking that stance, I am
out of business. But I keep in mind that I too am an organism, making
sense of the world, with my models, ideas, etc. and interactions with other
humans. All the making sense activity is provisional. And the observing
is theory laden, I think.

Jay might call this philosophical - but I mostly view this as
methodological. Viewing scientific (and otherwise) knowledge as
provisional, both individually and socially constructed, means to me that I
must address the applicability (or viability in radical constructivist
terms). One methodological issue is to determine what model is 'best' to
use for the moment. Another is to develop some standards for what is
'best'. In some way, in big print, 'anything goes' but there is also fine
print in my contract.

>
>Science history is the same. (it is better to say that history of
>drawing and scientific practice has been overlapped.)
>Scienctists have invented various tools in order to organize their
>observation.

I agree again. A past instructor/mentor of mine, Bill Gerace, was known to
say that scientific apparatus just extends the senses. He came from a
radical constructivist viewpoint and, as a physicist, made strong claims
about the lack of objectivity in science.

>
>Interaction analysis in educational setting will also shows
>that observation of pehnomenon is collaboratively, mutually,
>mediationaly consituted and it is acompanied with collaborative
>organgization of langauge game.

I think what you have is a good model for understanding what happens when
people come together and do or learn science. One of the lessons I have
learned from radical constructivism, and from modeling, and from the
history of science and mathematics, is not to make claims about what
analysis shows, but what it eliminates from the possibilities. I can make
the relatively weak claim about what analysis supports, but this is only
provisional - until a another theoretical framework or analysis comes along.

>
>Pattern of eye scanning or a way of observation cannot be understood
>only by "perceptual system" or only by the human visual system.
>The "human visual system" is not destiny of our way of organizing
>observation and langauge game.

I think it is a matter of which theoretical framework you choose. If I
adopt one that include optics, physiology and anatomy, some signal
processing, some brain research, then I can make sense in one way of
someone saying 'the plane doesn't move' or 'the plane doesn't appear to be
moving'. Yes, my making sense includes the ability to apply the language
games of those disicplines.

I think what I have been trying to say is that I cannot reduce all of
peoples behavior solely to language games. The phenomena are just too
complex for one theory. I need to bring in a description of the physical
and biological world and a description of individual as well as social
acting (or perhaps even knowing). I could be wrong, but that is just my
individual opinion. ;-)

>Rather, one can say that we need tools and to organize a specific
>langauge game in order to observe the pure human visual system itself.
>

Yes.

Bill Barowy, Associate Professor
Technology in Education
Lesley College, 29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
Phone: 617-349-8168 / Fax: 617-349-8169
_______________________
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself
and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]