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[Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community"

Your phrase,
"human -created, a particular historically sedimented, materialized
configuration of the human VOICE, that, dare we consider, it ART-I-facial.
I feel you have covered a lot of *ground* that tra-verses and foregrounds
key concepts. However, there is one other term that is very fluid but I
believe is basic and needs to be fore-grounded. That is *imaginal [not
imaginary] realms.
Charles Taylors *social imaginary* implying that community *meaning* and
community *voice* are fundamentally *imaginal*.
This concept is polyphonic and within history has a development which can
be traced often crisscrossing with reason and rationality as concepts [a
chiasmus as crisscrossing]
The phrase "in the beginning was the deed" crisscrossing with the phrase
"in the beginning was the word".
In Merleau-Ponty's terms the *word made flesh* [flesh as gesturing to
material artifacts, words, AS LIVING WITHIN interhuman realms.
The *gap* as receptive and the imaginal coming into form.
This is linking in another *tradition* but in this other tradition the
imaginal is NOT understanding the imaginal as located inside a private
mind, or in a transcendental beyond. The imaginal as art-fully calling the
other into *voice* within historical con-scientia.
This process can be *perceived* moving THROUGH ^history^ and moving through
^self^. I used * ^ * as a symbol to suggest that the concepts *self* and
*history* are imaginal concepts which imaginally come into *voice through
words and deeds.
Yes, actions within activity settings but understood within the
interhuman imaginal realms [and how we understand and voice and art-fully
con-figure  imaginal con-figurations.
If I have taken a step too far into the imaginal which has crisscrossed
 rational reasoning just ignore this commentary.


On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

> Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of
> "shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the word he
> wanted to say, and thought,
> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the
> embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular, historically
> sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare we
> consider it, ART-i-ficial?
> perhaps?
> mike
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared
> > meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive conclusion
> > that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural communities."
> >
> > There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words
> below:
> > "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that we
> may
> > all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very
> > different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal material
> > form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of
> natural
> > science is that matter exist independently of human activity, obedient to
> > natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to
> exist;
> > it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different meanings
> to
> > one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human
> > activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of it.
> This
> > is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal
> > foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a
> > multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the
> community.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> >
> > Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
> >
> >> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, or
> >>> "unit of analysis" for a study;
> >>>
> >>
> >>     We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of analysis we
> >> use.
> >>
> >>  one would have to first select an artefact or combination of artefacts,
> >>> (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of the
> said
> >>> "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not* defined by
> >>> shared *meanings*;
> >>>
> >>
> >>     So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings?
> >>
> >>  in fact, different components of the "community" may attach
> >>> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol,
> tool,
> >>> ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable.
> >>>
> >>
> >>     If community is defined by shared meanings, those with
> "diametrically
> >> opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural
> >> communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit).
> >>
> >>  But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever way
> >>> it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts is the
> >>> foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give us
> what is
> >>> *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one and the
> >>> same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is *individual*
> in
> >>> human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis.
> >>>
> >>
> >>     The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that
> >> we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have
> very
> >> different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite different
> >> actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict.
> >>
> >>     Cliff
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > --
> >
> >