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Re: [xmca] Abstract to Concrete



Christine! Thank you very much indeed for those annotations and thoughts on the "ascent from abstract to concrete." I said I was "not sure" about the place of dual stimulation in Action 2, and you have convinced me. What I didn't see is that dual stimulation is precisely what characterises the use of the germ cell /after /Action 2, so my doubts must be dispelled. Thank you for that.

I also have long thought that the germ cell of Hegelian
concept-formation and Vygotskyan theory is the same thing as the "transitional object" which is central to Donald Winnicott's child psychoanalysis. This connection does shed a lot of light on concept formation when it is introduced, as you have done, into the "ascent from abstract to concrete." Most particularly it does away, once for all, any rendering of this process as a "purely congnitive/rational" process, from which all need-and-desire have been expunged. Of course, the object appears in Hegel's Psychology, as something with a unity of its own outside the domain of the subject itself, precisely via becoming the object of desire. So as you point out, this notion really ties together a lot of apparently disparate theory. Thank you for that!

I have collected my observations so far, begun in my conversation with you, Christine, here: http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/engestrom.htm

Thanks for that Christine!
Andy

Christine Schweighart wrote:
Thank you Andy, there are typos. My doubt about dual stimulation does arise from its role in intervention. When you say 'just here' I'm taking you to mean just between notions and grasping abstract concept 'germ cell', though as transitory objects in action research are just those kind of concepts ( theoretical& explanatory, generating phenomena and also enabling the transition movement to be revealed) - which isn't a 'wild' transition' but is intervention based on the value of achieving evaluation using theoretical analysis. There's a troublesome reaching back into what is 'notional' with what is already abstract ( but brought in by a researcher/teacher/some other), this does happen , though the resources to enable conditions favourable for exploration in intervention settings are often far different to 'Ok what's the idea your so keen on, who's any good at it, let's give it a go'. When you emphasise that 'Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades" rather than "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a "new stable form of practice" , this seems to be very true , but it's also of a form of theoretical thinking to be so. Maybe I'd see them differently, ( my influences/background's different.:)
•         The first action is that of..
 expressing disquiet with some situation or practice

    •         The second action is that of ..
identifying relationships that are significant to those attending to the expressions or feeling of disquiet ( Here origins and explanatory mechanisms are drawing on theoretical thinking already - so either this is present in practice , from varius discipines but not necessarily affording analytical insight across groups etc. So what is set out below as 'second' is problematic
    /Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical transformation
    of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
    mechanisms./

    •         The third action is that of ...
identifying abstract concepts , and " /modeling a new explanatory
    relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable medium.
    This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of the new
    idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it./" ( as there are various potentialities)

    •         /The fourth action is that of ....
examining the  ( relevant aspects through) model/ *S*,
    /..... experimenting on it in order to fully
    grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations../
 in relation to actual living practice.

    •         The fifth action is that of ...

/ concretizing / developing thinking and taking action to evaluate and refine /by means of practical applications, enrichments,
    and conceptual extensions./

    •        / The sixth and seventh actions are those of reflecting on
    and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes into a
    new stable form of practice./

Though still focussing on moving from notions and dual stimulation there are conditions conducive and if the germ cell isn't already there , then such rational thinking isn't what is affording (the aha moment), 'the conditions' are other aspects. Not to draw too much out here, I was deepening my reading of Ilyenkov ( I'm still in Chapter 1), by reading VV Davydov's Chapter 2 inActivity Theory and Social Practice , ' Activity Structure and Content - and his view that nothing can be said about activity without understanding how 'spititual or organic desire' and how it's tranformed into a need. Needs and desires make the basis on which emotions function. He says later the general functions emotions perform is that they enable a person to set a certain vital task; but they enable a person to decide from the very beginning whether physical , spiritual and moral means to fulfil a task are available, if not the task isn't taken up. Seems that these aspects might be relevant to 'conditions' for whatever 'actions' of whole process.

In this vein 'transitional object' might be more aking to Winnicott's. Though in schooling teaching 'formal concepts' what happens?

Christine.


On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

    Enjoy your Ilyenkov, Christine. If you come across any typos,
    please send them to me.

    Yes, the third action is the formation of the "germ cell" -
    getting to the abstract heart of the problem - and is therefore
    exactly what Ilyenkov is talking about in the passage you cite.
    But whether the concept of double stimulation helps just here I
    don't know. And also, I personally think it is worth devoting some
    time to grasping the *whole process* of concept formation and this
    paragraph of Engestrom's is one of the few places where a writer
    attempts to do this and analyse it. So I would encourage people to
    work on that whole process, rather than picking out one action,
    important as that also is.

    The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented
    here is proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the
    wild," as that is the title he himself chose for the special
    issue. But it looks much more to me like the ideal-typical
    sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention. In general, I find
    the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or "modelled."
    This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the most
    challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a *leap*. In
    general I would say it is a sudden insight that more resembles a
    moment of discovery than a "construction."

    One the other hand, I think the danger in presenting the concept
    of concept as an ideal-typical line of development (something
    which I also advocate) is that the reader may easily slip into the
    illusion that the given moment (here the discovery of the germ
    cell) or action, is a once-off moment. In fact, the germ-cell may
    be discovered in what turns out to be a misconception, but may
    nonetheless run the full gammet up to objectification and "a new
    stable form of practice" before falling into contradiction with
    itself and entering into conflict with a new germ cell, and being
    sublated into a new, deeper concept of the problem which figures
    in "action 1." This applies to all Yrjo's actions listed here.

    But one of the great merits of Engestrom's writing is that his
    reseach reports are equally much teaching and learning
    instruments, and this neat seven-step program functions as an
    excellent guide to practice. But one should remember that a real
    concept is not an ideal-typical concept (NB readers of Vygotsky).
    Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades" rather than
    "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
    cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a
    "new stable form of practice" signalling the end of the
    intervention and time to settle up and go home. The process of
    concept development never stops.

    Andy

    Christine Schweighart wrote:

        Hi Andy,
        In  the third action, developing an abstraction - Yryo's work
        uses a generic model in dual stimulation. This draws upon his
        historical development as argued in his research.
         Is it not also possible to explore this third action as an
        abstraction without that particular model structure,  I ask
        because I'm reading this section of Chapter 1 of Ilyenkov:
        http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra1d.htm
        "The task of logic as a science grows out of the real needs of
        the developing cognition of the phenomena of the surrounding
        world. The question with which a thinking man turns to logic
        as a science is not at all the question of how abstractions
        should be made in general, how one can learn to abstract the
        general from the sensually given facts. To do that, one need
        not at all ask the logicians’ advice, one merely has to have a
        command of one’s native language and the ability to
        concentrate one’s attention on the sensually given
        similarities and differences.

        The question with which one turns to logic and which can only
        be answered by logic involves a much more complicated
        cognitive task: how is one to work out an abstraction which
        would express the objective essence of facts given in
        contemplation and notions? The manner in which processing a
        mass of empirically obvious facts yields a generalisation
        expressing the real nature of the object under study – that is
        the actual problem, whose solution is identical with that of
        the problem of the nature of concepts as distinct from
        abstract general notions."

        and it strikes me that dual stimulation might be upon notions
        from 'action 2' ...

         Christine.

        On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 8:54 AM, Andy Blunden
        <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:

            Taylor & Francis allows xmca only discuss one article per
        issue,
            but I see no reason why we couldn't discuss this excerpt from
            Engestrom's paper. It concerns "rising from the abstract
        to the
            concrete," which we were recently discussing, but without
        resolution.

            --------------------------

            Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is achieved
        through
            specific epistemic or learning actions. Together these actions
            form an expansive cycle or spiral. An ideal-typical
        sequence of
            epistemic actions in ascending from the abstract to the
        concrete
            may be described as follows:

            •         The first action is that of questioning,
        criticizing, or
            rejecting some aspects of the accepted practice and existing
            wisdom. For the sake of simplicity, we will call this action
            questioning.

            •         The second action is that of analyzing the
        situation.
            Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical
        transformation
            of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
            mechanisms.

            •         The third action is that of modeling a new
        explanatory
            relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable
        medium.
            This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of
        the new
            idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
            offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it.

            •         The fourth action is that of examining the model,
            running, operating, and experimenting on it in order to fully
            grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations.

            •         The fifth action is that of implementing the model,
            concretizing it by means of practical applications,
        enrichments,
            and conceptual extensions.

            •         The sixth and seventh actions are those of
        reflecting on
            and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes
        into a
            new stable form of practice.


            --------------------

            MCA 19(1) pp. 288-289.

            Andy



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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden


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