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Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication

I have now had an opportunity to re-read your paper, Chuck. I am struck by the richness of material you have mobilised both from earlier case studies and informal examples (my example of the jury in a murder trial would have fitted nicely among your case studies). This material has allowed you to present a discussion which is nuanced, subtle and provocative. What I am interested in is an approach at the fundamental level which can do justice to the subtlety and complexity of your discourse. Let me cite from the American Pragmatic philosopher, a student of Richard Rorty at Pittburg, Robert Brandom: 

   "Traditional term logics built up from below, offering first
   accounts of the meanings of the concepts associated with singular
   and general terms (in a nominalistic way: in terms of what they name
   or stand for), then of judgments constructed by relating those
   terms, and finally of properties of /inferences /relating to those
   judgments. This order of explanation is still typical of
   contemporary representational approaches to semantics ... Pragmatist
   semantic theories typically adopt a top-down approach because they
   start from the /use /of concepts, and what one does with concepts is
   apply them in judgment and action."  [/Articulating Reasons/,
   Brandom 200, p. 13]
I imagine you would not be in disagreement with this, Chuck. What I am arguing for is, like Brandom, for a *top-down*, rather than the dominant *bottom-up* approach to concepts.You quote Hjorland saying that "concepts are negotiated ... meanings which classify the world, ..." - in other words a bottom-up approach, notwithstanding his claiming to situate this within Activity Theory.
I appreciate that you take motivation as central to concept formation. But I notice that when talk about your own work you refer to your "project," but when you are talking about others' work, you talk of domains, disciplines, communities, social groups, societies - all abstract general groupings. In other words, you objectify others' projects. In my view this is a problem in understanding the formation of concepts.
I am intrigued by your deployment of the concept of "gist," sometimes "internal gist." Could you elaborate, Chuck? 

Andy


Charles Bazerman wrote:

I look forward to your elaborations and will view your video.
Chuck

----- Original Message -----
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Date: Monday, November 12, 2012 6:27 pm
Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
I'm sorry for being so obscure, Chuck. I am still working on how to explain my position. But all I am proposing is my reading of Vygotsky on Concepts as set out in "Thinking and Speech." Nothing more. I certainly do not think concepts are "philosophic phantasms," although this is the most common response to discovery of the kind of points I am raising: "Well, if concepts are not like this, then they must be philosophic phantasms and not worth chasing after."
I am fine with locating yourself in this world in a pragmatist way, etc., etc. I do nothing different. Though I am not sure what you mean by "communal" and other allusions to "community." Maybe my video 

https://vimeo.com/groups/129320/videos/35819238
explains it better. Yes, I think there is a "more grounded approach," though those are not words of mine. I am certainly not trying to "deal with concepts in an abstract way," in fact that is a fair definition of what I am opposing. 

Andy
Charles Bazerman wrote:
Andy, I am not sure I see what you are driving at, and thus I do not
know how to continue the discussion. I know you have written and just published a book on concepts, but I have not read it.
Are you suggesting that there is a more grounded approach to
concepts or that concepts dissolve and that we should not chase after them as philosophic phantasms?
I am trying to deal with concepts not in an abstract philosophic way
but in a pragmatist way based on the social circulation of terms and their use in communal practices and then on what evidence we can glean about internal phenomena--and as I say in the essay, my primary activity system and project as a teacher of writing has to do with helping people engage with public circulation of words which people find of value in their endeavors and in their personal understanding of the world which they act within. To that task I bring the resources of Vygotsky and activity theory. I do not claim an epistemic position outside those realms of practice. So what are you trying to persuade me and others of, or what difficulty in my pursuit of my practices within my activity systems do you want me to attend to?
Once I have better bearings of the intersection of our interests, I 
may be able to say something more useful.

Chuck


----- Original Message -----
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Date: Monday, November 12, 2012 4:30 pm
Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Nice to meet you, Chuck. I read your original submission and the revised ms twice, but that is some time ago now. I will re-read it later
today
so I can be properly prepared for this multilogue. In the meantime
let
me make just one point, because my point about the drive to make aconcept into a typology has nothing to do with the distinction between dichotomous typologies and typologies that point to a continuous spectrum. The latter is always the refuge of a failed dichotomy.
Let's suppose you are on a jury. You are hearing a case of murder.
You
know what murder is, and I am assuming that everyone on this list knows and I won't try to define it. The case however turns out to be challenging, even though the facts are not in dispute. You hear
about
provocation and blind rage and fear, and about blows whose effect
far
exceeds intention, and the victim's heart condition. Before you
retire
to consider your verdict, the judge gives you a list of criteria against which you have to judge the facts.
My question is this: is the list of criteria which define a
typology
of homicide according to the various contingent circumatances of the
act
the *real, scientific* definition of "murder", and the vague ill-defined concept of murder that you arrived with a "spontaneous concept"? Or
is
it the fact that you had a better concept to start with, and the judge's criteria were the best approximation the law could make to that concept for teh purpose of categorisation?
Let us go further. You find the defendant guilty of murder and they
go
to prison, but there is a public outcry and a massive campaign to
have
her acquitted. The campaign is successful, the defendant appeals
and
is acquitted after which the government amends the law so that in
future
judges will give new directions to juries ensuring not-guilty
findings 
in such cases in future.
My next question is this: which is the "real concept" of murder? Or did it change? Or are there in fact multiple concepts of murder in competition with one another? Was everyone previously mistaken
about
the definition of murder? What typology of concepts do you use to distinguish them.
Now I float this hypothetical NOT to prove how complicated is real life, so that we can all shrug our shoulders and say "Goodness! What can
you
do?" But it is targeted specifically at the concept of concept
which
reads Vygotsky, like everyone else (almost), as taking the concept
of
concept to be a typology of contingent attributes with nothing underneath. And of course, Chuck, it is a question for everyone
else
as much as for you. 

Andy
https://vimeo.com/groups/129320/videos/35819238


Charles Bazerman wrote:
Mike Forwarded the current string, and I have now rejoined the
list.
An earlier message I sent about T.S. Eliot's poem got lost, and I
may
repost it later. Right now, however, let me respond to these Andy
and
Larry's thoughtful comments. I think Andy has got my intentions
and
situation right. I was certainly invoking my understanding of Vygotsky's ideas of scientific and spontaneous concepts, and was interpreting scientific to include organized sets of practices
where
there were stronger degrees of public criticism and social accountability, particularly with respect to coherence among
concepts
and collected evidence gathered according to communal standards in pursuit of communal projects. And thus I would indeed associate concepts with use and practice within social groupings. (I am
using
the term social groupings rather than the more common term
community
in order to emphasize the varieties among groupings and the differentiation of roles, positions, and objects within
those groupings, although collective objects may bind those groups 
together.)
To some degree any publicly articulated ideas are accountable to
communal expectations, practices, and rules of accountability, even
if
such rules are of the sorts such as "let it pass, because it is not important for immediate action" or "let's accept everyone's ideas, although we may not understand them or agree with them, in the name
of
goodwill or mutual support." Each of these do provide climates in which we formulate our ideas. So in this way the spectrum of spontaneous to disciplined/scientific concepts is continuous and
does
not provide bright lines, except as we historically construct them.
However, we have historically created more robust social groupings devoted to particular lines of practice and projects, with more explicit and detailed sets of expectations and criteria of judgment for the consequentiality of proposed ideas--and these groupings
have
as well been associated with emergent institutions associate with
the
objects of these groupings.
These might include not only the secular institutions and
disciplines of the academy and professions, but also those of the spiritual domain, the performing and graphic arts, commerce games
and
sports, politics, criminal culture, and other domains that have a robust alignment of practice and communal thinking. These may not
all
have occurred to Vygotsky as scientific, as attached as he was to
the
emergence of "scientific socialism" (though his connection with the arts, especially literature drama and the early film, may have led
him
to include them in his view of an increasingly scientific social order). Thus I may be drawing the fuzzy line between spontaneous
and
scientific concepts nearer to the spontaneous end than Vygotsky,
who
might as well have been drawing a somewhat brighter line. However, since Vygotsky did not elaborate extended visions of society or history, especially after he articulated his view of concepts, we
may
not ever know what he thought or even if he
thought very much about this issue. His earlier writings about
the
arts, however, did indicate that he did treat them as capable of disciplined evocation of internal states to create shared experiences.
This discussion still leaves me with the dilemma that both Andy
and
Larry point toward, that my own articulation of concepts is within
the
intellectual project and practices of historically emerged
disciplines
and projects. Guilty. I do not claim to escape social time or
social
space, but only speak to them. It is in fact Yrjo's call for the special issue that drew together my various ruminations about
concepts
in other contexts to a new articulation, directed towards the inter/multi-disciplinary world of MCA, situated within the wider social intellectual projects that have drawn on activity theory. I found this context gave fresh wind to my sails to push my thinking further. Additionally, it was the review processes and dialog
around
publication that further helped me articulate my thought for this particular social formation and occasion. Accordingly and
obviously, I
draw on the conceptual world and intellectual practices that come
with 
the activity theory projects. I
have cast my bets with this particular lot and the fate of my
text
depends on the usefulness for people engaged with this evolving project or with future projects that might find a useful resource
in
this set of concepts.
My last paragraph pulls me back to the Eliot poem and the last
sentence of my abstract--the need and value of rearticulating one's ideas and accounts to new moments, and how that provides new
refining
disciplines. What strikes me most about Eliot's poem, which I commented on in my lost message, is how urgent he feels the need to continually rearticulate himself, despite what others may have said more powerfully or even himself in better times. Of course, Eliot
was
caught up in both religious and artic stic disciplines which seemed
to
call for this constant rearticulation to measure the quality of his soul and his path in the world. To what extent, more generally all
of
us are driven to rearticulate the self in those disciplines
important
to the self, is a question I am now thinking about. Is this a characteristic of participation in particular social worlds or is a consequence of the organization of the human brain and
consciousness, 
in the manner Ramachandran proposes.

Chuck
----- Original Message -----
From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, November 12, 2012 8:11 am
Subject: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
To: Chuck Bazerman <bazerman@education.ucsb.edu>


Chuck-

There are some comments on your xmca paper. You might want to join
xmca for a bit or I will just forward for your comments.
mike

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Date: Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 6:45 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
I appreciated Bazerman's deployment of the conceptr of "genre"
and 
I also

liked his use of "gist".
To be fair, Larry, Bazerman qualifies the use of "scientific" by 
following
the term with "(or disciplined or schooled)," and this indicates
a 
much
broader concept of concept, much closer to what I would take to
be 
a "true"
concept in Vygotsky's sense. I wonder if his use of "scientific"
to 
"stand

for" that whole category of concept was a nod to Vyvgotsky? In general
though, I think what Bazerman calls "conceptual words" and "scientific
(disciplined or schooled)" concepts are precisely concepts which
arise 
from
problems in a definite system of practice, or dare I say it, a project. A 
set of practices has to have rules in order to generate contradictions
which are the source of new concepts.
But I think the problem that Bazerman has in developing this 
insight flows
from his concept of concept. Yes, the concept of concept is
circular. 
When
you make claims about concepts, or say anything about them, you
are 
already

presuming your interlocutor shares your understanding of the subject
matter, i.e. your concept of concept. ...
So Bazerman wants to categorise concepts and sets off trying to 
make a
typology, and so we have "spontaneous" and "scientific" concepts 
... which

immediately leads to observations like yours about the "fuzzy boundaries"
not to say "shifting boundaries" etc. Because despite it all, it 
seems,
Bazerman still cannot get away from the concept of concept as a
means 
of
categorisation. So the first thing you have to do in talking
about 
concepts

is to set up a typology of concepts.
There are a lot of nice things about this paper, but so long as
you 
are
stuck on categorisation and typologies you will forever be tied
in 
knots

trying to understand concepts, I think.

Andy


Larry Purss wrote:


Hi Mike
I will attempt a commentary on Charles Bazerman's article
"Writing 
With

Concepts: Communal Internalized and Externalized"
I struggled with how to enter into this genre of writing which
is 
exploring
the concept of concepts. The topic of the paper I find
fascinating 
and the
insight that concepts are embedded within genres allows
reflection 
on the

notion of *romantic science*
In particular the genre's propensity to explore concepts as two 
*kinds* -
spontaneous and scientific. Bazerman then offers a qualification 
that these

*kinds* have fuzzy boundaries.
It is this notion of the fuzzy boundaries within this particular 
genre that
I would like to explore further. When we enter into a dialogue
on 
the
relationship between spontaneous and scientific concepts and 
explore the

functions of each are we moving away from *strict* dialectcs towards
*interpretive* dialectics*?
In other words is the relationship BETWEEN spontaneous and scientific
concepts a *real* or an *interpretive* distinction?
Do these distinctions exist in the natural world or are they
aspects 
of a
particular genre which has developed textually and
intertextually 
through

effective history?

What I'm playing with is the theme of *romantic science*.

I also want to share an image which this article sparked.
At the AERA conference in Vancouver, I felt a sense or mood of
fragmentation within the *project* of AERA. There were multiple 
genres
with the corresponding conceptual *tools* or *artifacts*. The 
throngs were
moving aboutt as if at a trade fair picking up and putting down 
the
various tools, artifacts, and scientific concepts wondering if
these 
tools
would be useful for their particular projects. But where was the 
sense or

mood of *shared purpose* within *commonly shared projects*?
Charles Bazerman's article is exploring a fascinating theme of 
genres and
concepts. I hear Andy's voice calling us to put this particular 
genre in a
wider framework engaging with our ancestors. The topic as genre 
is

fascinating but it does have a history within an evolving dialogue.
As Andy is passionate about calling us to remember  the genre exploring
concepts of concepts has a romantic history. Exploring
scientific 
and
spontaneous concepts [with their FUZZY boundaries] is one way
into 
this

fascinating genre.

Larry
On Sun, Nov 11, 2012 at 11:38 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> 
wrote:



Dear Colleagues--
I have been reminded of an issue that has been nagging at me
for 
some

time,
that we have not had a discussion of any of the articles in the 
special

issue of
MCA called "concepts in the wild." The article selected by a 
plurality of

voters
was by Chuck Bazerman on concepts in the process of writing.
But
no 
one

has
commented on the article. That seems to me a shame. In fact,
the 
entire

issue,
with its stellar set of authors and papers is worth discussing,
and 
I

figure there will be more
articles on this general theme in the time to come, spanning as
it 
does,

the story of
all those practice in which we acquire and deploy concepts in organizing
our social life and experience the world.
Below are two items for your consideration: The first is the 
abstract of

Chuck's paper. The second
is a stanza from a poem by T.S. Elliott which I believe is
relevant 
to

topic of the paper and
in any event, worth considering in its own right. I first 
encountered it

in
Jack Goody's *Domestication of the Savage Mind, *a book about the
relationship between thinking and writing in societies varying
in 
their

practices related to the concept of literacy.
If the 25 people or more who led us to this article are not in
a 
position

to contribute to the discusion,
perhaps this invitation will be sufficient for others,
including 
Chuck, to

do so.
And if no one is interested in this discussion, we might
re-visit 
the

process by which articles for discussion taken from MCA. Or  not.

mike
-----------------------

T. S. Elliott from “East Coker”



So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years—

Twenty years largely wasted, the years of *l'entre deux guerres*

Trying to use words, and every attempt

Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure

Because one has only learnt to get the better of words

For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which

One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture

Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate

With shabby equipment always deteriorating

In the general mess of imprecision of feeling,

Undisciplined squads of emotion. And what there is to conquer

By strength and submission, has already been discovered

Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope

To emulate—but there is no competition—

There is only the fight to recover what has been lost

And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions

That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.

For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.
The whole poem is here: ______________________________**____________ 
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu





______________________________**____________
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xmca@weber.ucsd.edu






--
------------------------------**------------------------------**------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts



______________________________**____________
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xmca@weber.ucsd.edu


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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden


__________________________________________
_____
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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden

__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
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http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca





--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden

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