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Re: [xmca] speaking of rocks and cathedrals

Dear Mike 

I came to your message with delay . I've had the downloaded book (not in pdf format) somewhere I cannot locate now in my archive but I can provide you with the link and the text-format book .


 From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 
Cc: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> 
Sent: Monday, 2 January 2012, 11:53:27
Subject: Re: [xmca] speaking of rocks and cathedrals

Great to have Lektorsky brought into this conversation. I wonder, is the book widely available in English? Did I miss a link somewhere?

On Mon, Jan 2, 2012 at 11:02 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:

Overcoming the deep-thinking and worry of the problems of the Region , Dear Larry , I came to my study to read anew the once-read article sent to you and , happy to say , I'm exactly at the point you're stationing on page 22 . Yes , I accept the WHOLE of what V. A . Lektorsky says in this article and His "Subject,Object,Activity" , a book , indeed . Thank you , too , for your insistence on finding a way for 'dialogues' .  Haydi   ( out Net problems most of the time ! hope it works ! )
> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>Cc: Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>
>Sent: Monday, 2 January 2012, 10:02:13
>Subject: Re: [xmca] speaking of rocks and cathedrals
>Robert, I want to agree with you and acknowledge the poetic way Haydi expressed these relations.
>Haydi, I also am enjoying reading the article on Social Being and the Human Essence. On page 22 Lektorsky says,
>The self is seen as a system of relations, between myself and others. Outside of this system of relations, I simply cannot exist. I am by my nature a DIALOGICAL essence.... This approach gives rise to a whole range of questions which simply did not exist for Descartes or Fichte (they begin to emerge with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit).  There is the problem of my Being-for-others, Being-for-myself, and the Being-of-others-for-me....
>     In my view, introspection should not be conceived as a relation of someone to something purely INSIDE him - or herself, but as a SPECIAL WAY of relating oneself to others. Introspection is really 'EXTRA-spection'.  A human being ALWAYS lives on the BOUNDARY between self and other.
>Haydi, do you accept the centraity of the QUESTIONS that Lektorsky is posing as necessary themes to have conversations about???
>I'm going back to reading the article.  The method of written composition [the genre] in how David Bakhurst is presenting these themes is enjoyable as I love listening in on others conversations.
>Haydi thanks for taking the steps into action to respond to my reflections that come from left-field.
>On Mon, Jan 2, 2012 at 9:17 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>You are so kind , Robert !!  At times , in my confusion , I don't know how to :-)  Encouraging !! Thanks a lot !! I did wish you a happy New Year , too .    Haydi
>> From: Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>
>>To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>Sent: Monday, 2 January 2012, 7:47:41
>>Subject: Re: [xmca] speaking of rocks and cathedrals
>>Wow Havdi!
>>Have you written about this in greater detail anywhere?
>>If so can you direct me? If not, you need to.
>>Happy New Year!
>>Robert Lake
>>On Mon, Jan 2, 2012 at 6:04 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>True Andy !
>>>I didn't continue : " The moment the floundering footstep of the IDEAL touches the firm GROUND of the 'world of reality' , as to its nature , it jumps once again in a space of a blink , yearning to unite anew with her beloved consort fere , the ACTION , towards a re-start of another pulse of 'subjectivity' " 
>>> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>Sent: Sunday, 1 January 2012, 17:58:41
>>>Subject: Re: [xmca] speaking of rocks and cathedrals
>>>Well, it becomes an ideal I guess.
>>>And on that I beg to differ with just one of Haydi's dot points.
>>>Haydi said: "Ideal , when reified, is no longer ideal."
>>>I would have thought that when an ideal is reified, then it attains the most stable of all possible forms of reification. That pile of rocks, if exumed 2000 years later, may still exhibit the properties of a cathedral if the thought was put into action by Saint Exupery.
>>>For 2012, I guess I look forward to the deepening economic decline of Europe and the US putting pressure on China to stimulate its domestic market, and thereby lend more power to the rising tide of resistance among ordinary people demanding the rule of law in their country. And I would dearly like to see Syria join Libya and build something worthwhile from the ashes of their previous efforts to shake off imperialist domination. And it would be good to see Iran join the Arab Spring too. And keep the US the hell out of intervening in that country.
>>>mike cole wrote:
>>>> I want to join the voices for wishing all "present" the best of fortune in
>>>> the new year. We now reach from Invertebrates to God in our modest
>>>> explorations of the processes of human development. :))
>>>> The following thought came to me in thinking about what ensues if one
>>>> accepts the invitation to imagine
>>>> what will happen in the next year -- what you hope for, what you fear, what
>>>> you could not expect and so
>>>> can't think about. It is from St. Exupery.
>>>> A rock pile ceases to be a rock pile the moment a single man contemplates
>>>> it, bearing within him the image of a cathedral.
>>>>  Antoine de Saint-Exupery<http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/antoinedes161736.html>
>>>> Its an interesting thought, but "negative" in the sense that it tells us
>>>> what a rock ceases to be but does not
>>>> specify what it has become "the moment it a single man contemplates it."
>>>> It seems apt to the discussion.
>>>> An awful lot takes place in that moment!
>>>> Happy New Year,
>>>> mike
>>>-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>*Andy Blunden*
>>>Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1
>>>Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857
>>>xmca mailing list
>>>xmca mailing list
>>Robert Lake  Ed.D.
>>Assistant Professor
>>Foundations of Education
>>Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and
>>Georgia Southern University
>>P. O. Box 8144
>>Phone: (912)
>>Fax: (912) 478-5382
>>Statesboro, GA  30460
>> Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and
>>education is its midwife.
>>-John Dewey.
>>xmca mailing list
>xmca mailing list
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Emacs-Time-stamp: "2010-01-21 19:16:39"

__EMAIL__                  webmaster@leninist.biz

__OCR__                    ABBYY 6 Professional (2008.01.04)

__WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__     bottom




<p>     V.A. Lektorsky</p>

<br /> OBJECT
<br /> COGNITION</b>

__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2008-01-04T15:18:17-0800

__TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"


<p>     MOSCOW</p>


<p>     Translated by <em>Sergei Syrovatkin</em>

<p>     Designed by <em>Vladimir Bissengaliev</em></p>

<p>     <b>B. A. JleKTOpCKHH</b></p>

<p>     Cy6i&gt;eKT, ooicKT, noaHamie</p>

<p>     <b><em>Ha OHZJIUUCKOM X3blKe</em></b></p>

&copy;``Hayxa'', 1980
<br /> English translation &copy; Progress Publishers 1984
<br /> <em>Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</em>

<p>     <em><SUB>n</SUB></em> <u>0302020100- 212</u></p><p>

<p>     014(01)-84</p><p>





<b>Part One</b>



OF TWO NATURAL SYSTEMS..........,............. 21

1. Interpretation of Knowledge as the Result of a Causal
Effect of the Object on the Subject.............. 21

2. The Theory of Cognitive ``Equilibrium'' Between
Subject and Object........................... 27

3. The View of Cognition as an Ensemble of the Subject's
Physical Operations........................ 38


1. The Problem of Substantiating Knowledge and ``
Radical'' Reflexion........................... 48

2. Transcendental Subject, Empirical Subject. The
Conception of Self-Certainty of Transcendental
Consciousness as Guarantee of the Objectiveness of Knowledge . . 62

3. The Fact of Knowledge and the Transcendental
Interpretation of the Conditions of Its Possibility........ 79

4. The Conception of the &quot;Life World&quot; and the
Uniqueness of the Place of the Empirical Subject in the
Structure of Experience......................... 87

5. The Interpretation of Cognition as Conditioned by the
Individual Consciousness and, at the Same Time,
Mystifying the Essence of the Latter. The Ego, &quot;the
Others'', and the World of Objects.............. 95

<b>Part Two</b>



ACTIVITY AND COMMUNICATION.....................118

1. Sensory Information and Object-Related Knowledge . . 118


2. Illusions and Reality.......................127

3. Cognition and Object-Related Practical Activity.....134

4. Reification of Knowledge, Communication, and the
Social Nature of Cognition...................144

<b>Chapter 2.</b> THEORY AND THE WORLD OF OBJECTS...........155

1. Observable and Non-Observable Objects...........155

2. Idealised and Real Objects....................166

CONTINUITY OP EXPERIENCE.......................174

1. Objectiveness of Knowledge and the Possibility of a
Gap Between Perceptive and Conceptual Systems .... 174

2. The Conception of Ontological Relativity.........180

3. Translation and the Problem of Understanding......193

4. &quot;Other Worlds&quot; and the Successive Replacement of the
Forms of Objectification of Knowledge...........210

DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITION...........................214

1. Self-Consciousness and Reflexion. Explicit and Implicit

2. Substantiation and Development of Knowledge......218

3. Reflexion as a Unity of Reflection and Transformation

of Its Object.............................227

4. The Collective Subject. The Individual Subject......232

5. How Is a Theory of Cognition Possible? ..........248



Name Index....................................278



<p>     A great interest is shown in recent English and American
literature on epistemology and the philosophy of science
in the problem of the development of knowledge, of the
socio-cultural conditions for scientific cognition, and the
possibility and fruitfulness of the so-called realistic
interpretation of scientific knowledge. I believe that the reader
abroad is not always fully aware that the view of
knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular as
historically developing, the orientation at studying
cognition in a socio-cultural context, and perception of
knowledge as reproduction of objective reality are not something
entirely new to Marxist philosophers. These approaches
express the most significant traits of the Marxist study of
knowledge and cognition. It is important to note that the
interpretation of these problems in Marxist philosophy is
essentially different from those of other philosophical
trends. Here I have made an attempt at a Marxist
presentation of these problems at the present level of their
development. In all cases, of course, I offer my own
interpretation and solution of the problems considered. At the
same time I endeavour to take into account the results
obtained by other Soviet scholars (e. g.,in the philosophical
interpretation of psychological data in terms of the
socalled theory of activity).</p>

<p>     I believe that the critical analysis from the Marxist
positions of the conceptions of some influential modern
English and American philosophers, methodologists, and
historians of science (P. W. Bridgman, Th.K uhn, W. Quine,
K. Popper, and others) will be of some interest to the
reader of the English edition,</p>

<p>     I would like to point out a growing interest of the
Soviet researchers today in the study of problems of
knowledge with due reference to the data of the special sciences
about cognition and at the same time in a broad
worldview, socio-cultural, and historical context, in terms of the
dialectics of subject and object, of the object-related
practical and cognitive activity. I assume that the nearest
future will see further publications on the subject. In any
case, I intend to continue the studies begun in this book.</p>

<p>     <em>V. Lektorsky</em></p>

<p>     <em>Moscow</em>
<br /> <em>November 1982</em></p>



<p>     We are all aware that man is not only a practically acting
being but also a cognizing one.</p>

<p>     Recording this fact is no problem. Problems do arise,
however, as soon as we attempt to understand what
cognition and the cognitive relation are and what are the
properties of the specific product of human activity that we call

<p>     These questions necessarily emerge with the very first
attempts of theoretical interpretation of reality and man's
place in it. Formulation and discussion of worldview
problems at the theoretical level assume a conscious attitude
to the abstractions used, and an understanding of what is
genuine knowledge as opposed to false wisdom, that is,
mere claim to knowledge.</p>

<p>     The terms &quot;to know&quot; and ``knowledge'' are used in
several distinct senses in everyday language. For instance,
one may speak of ``knowledge'' as ability to do something
(``I know how to use this instrument'', &quot;I know how to
build a house'').</p>

<p>     We also speak of ``knowledge'' in the sense of ability to
recognise an object or person (``I know Moscow well'', &quot;I
have known this person for twenty years'').</p>

<p>     Finally, ``knowledge'' is taken to mean a product of
human activity which characterises (and characterises
correctly) a certain state of affairs in reality: the presence of
certain properties in definite objects, the existence of some
relations, the realisation of certain events or processes, etc.
(``I know that such and such things occur'').</p>

<p>     It should be noted that analysis of the last type of
knowledge has been given preferential treatment ever since
men started musing on what knowledge is---and that
happened almost at the same time as philosophy appeared.
And that is quite understandable, for it is this type that
includes theoretical knowledge (though certainly not only
theoretical knowledge) which was both the result of
philosophers' activity and the subject of their cogitation. But
can the specificity of the last type of knowledge be
understood in isolation from the other two?</p>

<p>     In particular, what is the relation between knowledge as
understanding the content, structure, properties, and


relations of the given object, and knowledge in the sense of
ability to reproduce this object in human activity,
including practical activity?</p>

<p>     This question, along with others, kept arising
throughout the history of philosophical thought, and various
trends and schools in philosophy endeavoured to answer

<p>     Contemplation of the structure of the cognitive relation
leads to the conclusion that it is specified by a certain type
of connection between the cognising man (the subject of
cognition) and the object cognised (the object of cognitive
activity). If I assert that I know something about
something else, that implies my simultaneous realisation of the
following: first, that my knowledge relates to some object
that does not coincide with that knowledge, that is
external with regard to it; second, that this knowledge belongs
to me, that it is I who implement the process of cognition;
third, that I claim to express an actual, or real, state of
things in knowledge and can support that claim by some
procedure for substantiating knowledge.</p>

<p>     Stating these points immediately gives rise to a number
of questions. For instance, what is the object of knowledge
and what is its nature? Can the cognising subject be the
object of cognition himself, and if so, in what sense? How is
it possible to know the object that is external relative to
the subject and at the same time to be conscious of the
subject himself as the ``focus'' of cognitive activity? And in
general, what is ``I''? Is it man's body or something else?
What are the modes of substantiating knowledge, the
norms and standards which permit to distinguish between
that which corresponds to reality and illusion or empty
``opinion''? Do such norms and standards exist? If they
do, in what way are they substantiated, in their turn? Can
unconscious knowledge exist, i.e., the kind of knowledge
where I do not realise that I know something? Does
knowledge of something coincide with its understanding?
Finally, what are the mechanisms of the cognitive process?
What is the actual interaction between the two terms of
the cognitive relation, subject and object (if this
interaction does exist at all, of course)?</p>

<p>     It should be stated that for a long time all these
questions, which have been discussed in all their aspects since
antiquity, were analysed in philosophy (in its special
branch termed ``epistemology'') largely on the basis of
studying the features of such systems of knowledge which
were embodied, on the one hand, in everyday knowledge
(``common sense''), and on the other, in philosophy itself
as the first form of theoretical reasoning (some


philosophers also included mythology among the systems of
knowledge under analysis). True, science also existed in
antiquity, first of all as one of the branches of
mathematics, geometry. Contemplation of the specificity of the
cognitive process in mathematics had from the outset a
substantive impact on the modes of formulation and
discussion of many epistemological problems. But science
became an independent kind of theoretical activity distinct
from philosophy only in the 17th century, that is, with the
emergence of experimentally based natural science. From
that moment, scientific knowledge, its structure, content
and potential, as well as the modes of its substantiation
and correlation with everyday knowledge, became, along
with other questions, the subject of careful consideration
by philosophers. It is thus impossible to understand the
specific traits of the epistemological conceptions of
Descartes and Kant, which had a significant effect on the
development of philosophy, unless one takes into account
their relation to contemporary science, of which classical
mechanics was a model or paradigm.</p>

<p>     At the same time, the epistemological cogitations of
the scientists specialising in the particular areas of
knowledge were not typical then; they sometimes appeared
irrelevant to what they did as professionals. Science is, of
course, an area of human activity specialising in obtaining
or producing knowledge. However, questions as to what
science is, what the ways of substantiating it, the standards
of cognitive activity, etc. are, at one time seemed to many
natural scientists and specialists in the particular fields of
knowledge to be abstruse and even probably scholastic,
and in any case not at all obligatory for success in
scientific work.</p>

<p>     Undoubtedly, every scientist knew that the knowledge
he obtained pertained to real objects existing outside this
knowledge and independent of it (that is to say, he shared
the attitudes of so-called spontaneous materialism). The
existence of the objective domain of knowledge was not
problematic. As for the standards to be met for the result
of the scientist's activity to be included in the system of
scientific (experimental or theoretical) knowledge, they
were more or less spontaneously assimilated in mastering
the content and the research methods of the accepted
theories (in the first place of the model theories that served as
research paradigms), in learning to handle apparatus and
measuring instruments, to process experimental data,
interpret device readings, etc. The question of substantiation of
the standards themselves did not, as a rule, arise.</p>

<p>     The situation changed radically at the turn of this


century, when the problematic nature of the foundations of
classical natural science (including mathematics) became
apparent. As is well known, an all-sided Marxist analysis of
the revolution in natural science was given by Lenin in his
famous book <em>Materialism and Empirio-Criticism</em>. Later,
Marxist philosophers made a considerable contribution to
the study of this phenomenon. We shall not dwell in detail
on the essence of the revolution in natural science,
referring the reader to available =

__NOTE__ Endnotes are superscript numbers, and so is this
one footnote, so, due to conflict superscript "1" changed
to superscript "*".


<p>     Let us note merely that changes in the modes of
theoretical reasoning and methods of comparing different
scientific theories in the wake of the scientific revolution at the
beginning of the present century, substantively changed
the attitude of workers in the special sciences to
epistemological problems. There is literally not a single creator of
any major scientific theory in the 20th century who would
not endeavour to provide an epistemological substantiation
of his special scientific constructions, often raising in the
process general questions about the nature of cognition,
criteria of knowledge, etc. It is even said that the
epistemological problem of the correlation between subject and
object, which was for a long time mostly of interest for
philosophers, becomes at this time one of the cardinal problems
of specialised scientific knowledge as well.</p>

<p>     This circumstance is largely due to the actually increased
complexity of the relation of scientific knowledge to
the corresponding system of objects. The point is that any
cognitive process assumes the use of certain mediators
between the cognising subject and the cognised object. In
pre-scientific cognitive practice, this role was performed,
first of all, by the labour implements, by all objects
created by man for man and embodying certain socio--
cultural values (that is, actually the whole of man-made
&quot;second nature'', the artificial environment), and finally
various sign-symbolic systems (in the first place the natural
language) and various conceptual formations expressed in
these systems and terms of these systems. In science,
added to this are, on the one hand, a system of devices and
measuring instruments, and on the other, the totality of
theories standing in certain relations to one another, which
are expressed in artificial, specially constructed languages
along with the natural language. In these days the system
of such mediators in science has become so complicated
and their relations to one another and to the object
cognised so far from elementary that in some cases a special
study is required to single out the objective domain of a


<p>~^^*^^ See Notes at the end of the book.</p>


theory and to ascertain its objective meaning. In the
process, it becomes apparent that the choice of one type
of mediators over another (that is, the choice of a definite
type of apparatus, modes of description of the research
results, frames of reference, etc.) is not indifferent for the
objective meaning of the knowledge obtained but
essentially affects the singling out of certain aspects of the
objective reality that is cognised. Because of this, man
himself, as a being constructing apparatus and systems of
theoretical knowledge, comes to the attention of
specialists in those sciences which deal with nature rather than

<p>     It was especially noticed, among other things, that the
specific physical, psychical, and other traits of man as the
cognising being affect the nature of the research
instruments used. It should be pointed out in this connection
that objective interpretation of scientific knowledge and
establishment of its objective meaning is not merely the
product of idle philosophical curiosity but a necessary
element of scientific work, a condition of successful
implementation of a given research programme.</p>

<p>     The establishment of significant and essential elements
of the cognitive relation and the discovery of an intimate
connection between epistemological contemplation and
success in the special sciences have in some cases entailed
certain losses of philosophical nature. The reasons for that
are numerous, one of them being that some major Western
scientists who tackle general philosophical problems (and
the interrelation between subject and object in the
cognitive process is one of them) do not always possess the
necessary philosophical training and a knowledge of the
scientific philosophy of dialectical materialism. The need
for determining the place of the subject in the production
of knowledge is sometimes idealistically interpreted as
elimination of the distinction between subject and object,
as the impossibility of conceiving of objective reality
outside its realisation, etc.</p>

<p>     In any case, many important and interesting
epistemological deliberations of modern Western scientists need a
thorough Marxist philosophical analysis for separating their
rational meaning from idealistic irrelevancies.</p>

<p>     Let us now cite just a few instances of the discussion of
the epistemological problem of the subject-object
relationship by specialists in the sciences.</p>

<p>     Thus, in studying the objects of classical physics one
could either ignore the effect of the research instruments
on them or take this effect into account in processing the
information about the events under study. But in the


methodology of quantum mechanics, physical objects are
considered in their interaction with the measuring devices,
which significantly affect the behaviour of the objects of
study.^ The mode of describing an individual quantum
phenomenon is essentially dependent on the class (inner
structure) of the measuring devices used for localising this
phenomenon in space-time. Accordingly, &quot;the
unambiguous account of proper quantum phenomena must, in
principle, include a description of all relevant features of the
experimental arrangement&quot;.^^3^^ The well-known Soviet
physicist V. A. Fok writes, that &quot;the result of interaction
between an atomic object and a classically described device&quot;
is &quot;the basic element&quot; constituting &quot;the subject-matter of
physical theory&quot;.^^4^^ A number of prominent modern
Western physicists (including even such scientists as Werner
Heisenberg) inferred from this circumstance that in quantum
mechanics the distinction between the cognising subject
and the cognised object is obliterated.</p>

<p>     Furthermore, the problems of substantiating
mathematics, which became very acute in connection with the
discovery of set-theoretical paradoxes early in this century,
called to life one of the trends in the philosophy of
mathematics---intuitionism, which offered a mode of handling
the question of the permissible objects of mathematical

<p>     ``In [classical mathematics], the infinite is treated as <em>
actual</em> or <em>completed</em> or <em>extended</em> or <em>existential</em>. An infinite
set is regarded as existing as a completed totality, prior to
or independently of any human process of generation or
construction and as though it could be spread out
completely for our inspection. In [intuitionist mathematicsj, the
infinite is treated only as <em>potential</em> or <em>becoming</em> or <em>
constructive.&quot;.^^5^^</em> Intuitionists created new mathematics,
including the theory of the continuum and set theory. This
mathematics does not use actual infinity as an object of
discourse. At the same time it contains concepts and rules
that are absent in classical mathematics.</p>

<p>     Intuitionists base their conception of the nature and
meaning of mathematical discourse on certain
philosophical assumptions that intricately interweave attainments of
mathematical thought and their idealistic interpretations.
Thus, in the view of Heyting, there is for mathematics &quot;no
other source than an intuition, which places its concepts
and inferences before our eyes as immediately clear&quot;.^^6^^
This intuition, existing as it were before mathematical
language and discursive logical reasoning, coincides at the
same time with a specific activity of consciousness. As
Brouwer remarks in passing, &quot;mathematics is more an


activity (<em>Tun</em>) than a theory&quot;.^^7^^ Activity, in its turn,
coincides, in his view, with intuitive consciousness of time,
so that the objects of mathematics exist only in human

<p>     Finally, let us cite the so-called conception of
ontological relativity propounded quite recently by Willard Quine,
a major American specialist in symbolic logic and the
philosophy of logic and mathematics. Quine started out
directly from problems in the foundations of mathematics,
discovering that defining the essence of the objects of a
given mathematical theory assumes translation of this
theory into another language with a different system of
objects, and drawing the conclusion that it is this
translation that determines its ontology. He formulates the
proposition that one can describe the ontology of a given
theory (that is, characterise its objects) not absolutely but
only relatively, i.e., relatively to another theory which is
the model of the given one. Quine ascribes to this
proposition a significance greater than the purely mathematical,
believing that it is extremely important for understanding
the nature of theoretical knowledge in general.^^8^^</p>

<p>     The development of special scientific knowledge now
spotlights other aspects of the problem of the relationship
of the subject and the object of cognitive activity. We refer
here to the rapid growth of special sciences studying
certain forms and mechanisms of the cognitive process (these
sciences are sometimes termed &quot;the sciences of man'').</p>

<p>     Psychology, undoubtedly, belongs among them.</p>

<p>     Psychological thinking goes back quite a few centuries,
and psychology as an independent science based on
experiment is at least a hundred years old. The concepts of ``
subject'', ``object'', ``consciousness'', ``self-consciousness'' and
others have long been fundamental in psychology. As a
rule, psychologists borrowed their understanding of the
fundamental significance of the relation between subject
and object and of the nature of the cognitive process from
various philosophical conceptions.</p>

<p>     One of the distinctive features of modern psychology is
an attempt at extensive experimental investigation of the
cognitive process by the methods of the special sciences.
Such branches of this science as the psychology of
perception and the psychology of intelligence have obtained
significant results in the last few decades. The so-called
cognitive psychology commences to develop, which endeavours
to take a new approach to the study of cognitive processes
through studying their integration in complex structures
formed in the framework of a definite cognitive task.</p>

<p>     The conception of the genesis of the mechanisms of


cognitive activity worked out in detail by the well-known
Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget has attracted considerable
attention. Offering a theoretical interpretation of his
experimental data, Piaget claims to have solved the basic
epistemological problems. He studies various structures of
which subject and object are component elements, and
analyses the connections between intellectual and
objectrelated practical activity.</p>

<p>     Linguists, ethnolinguists, cultural anthropologists, and
psycholinguists still debate with some animation the
SapirWhorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity that gained wide
currency in the late 1940s.</p>

<p>     The starting point of the hypothesis is that we cannot
be fully conscious of reality without the help of language,
the latter being not only a secondary means of solution of
some special problems of communication and thinking but
also a mode of constructing our world.</p>

<p>     Noam Chomsky, a well-known American linguist and
author of the generative transformation model in
linguistics, propounded a critique of the behaviourist, empiricist
theory of language learning. Chomsky believes that this
theory does not take into account a number of important
aspects of the language, such as the creative character of
language using; the existence of an abstract generative
structure of language (``the deep structure''); the universal
character of certain elements of language structure. To
explain these aspects of language, Chomsky postulates the
existence of certain fundamental psychological structures 
---the subject's innate ideas, consciously reviving certain
elements of Cartesian epistemological conception.^^9^^</p>

<p>     Let us finally point out the rapid development of
Scientology as a special interdisciplinary area of study whose
goal is investigation of science by the methods of the
special sciences. Scientology studies not only the economic,
sociological, socio-psychological, and communication
aspects of scientific activity but also the process of
production and transformation of scientific knowledge. There are
beginnings of a rapprochement between Scientology and
certain aspects of studies in the history of science. Of
special interest in this connection is the book <em>The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions^^10^^</em> by Thomas Kuhn, an
American specialist in the history of science, which met with
considerable response. On the basis of theoretical analysis
of extensive historical-scientific materials, the author
discloses the important role for scientific research of the
so-called paradigms, that is, theories accepted as model
ones in the given scientific community at a given time
along with their characteristic methods of specifying and


solving scientific problems and modes of comprehending
empirical facts. Kuhn places special emphasis on the
collective nature of scientific activity, pointing out that an
individual scientist cannot be regarded as an adequate
subject of scientific activity. Kuhn draws far-reaching
conclusions from his conceptions, mostly of epistemological and
methodological nature. That is precisely the area where the
untenability of certain elements of his theory becomes
particularly apparent. In Kuhn's view, there are no logical
transitions between the separate paradigms (he likens them
to different worlds in which researchers live). The
paradigms are incommensurable, which produces gaps between
the various fundamental theoretical conceptions in science.
Thus, certain aspects of Kuhn's theory warrant relativist
and subjectivist conclusions.</p>

<p>     We have cited here only some examples of the
discussion in the modern special sciences of fundamental
epistemological problems in the interpretation of knowledge and
cognition and of the subject-object relation, that is, of the
kind of problems that a hundred years ago were believed
by most scientists to be the exclusive domain of
professional philosophers.</p>

<p>     It appears important and fruitful in this connection to
compare the implications for general epistemology of the
development of modern special sciences with the traditions
of formulation and discussion of these questions that took
shape in the history of philosophy as a special discipline.
Indeed, these problems that have relatively recently
become of immediate concern to specialists in the various
sciences, have a long history of discussion in philosophy,
where different general types of their specification and
analysis have been established and tested, a whole series of
fundamental difficulties of epistemological research
revealed, and ways found (in Marxist philosophy) for fruitful
work in this area.</p>

<p>     At the same time the development of modern special
sciences, and in the first place the sciences of knowledge,
provides material for drawing important conclusions of a
general epistemological nature, posing new problems
before philosophy or throwing light on some new aspects of
old problems. One such problem, now again attracting
attention, is the question of the nature, status, and methods
of epistemological research itself.</p>

<p>     A number of scientists, including Piaget, Quine, and
some structuralists, believe that epistemology has lost its
right to exist as a special philosophical discipline
irreducible to the sum total of the data of the special sciences of
cognition. All problems pertaining to understanding


cognition are solved, in this view, either in psychology or
in semiotics or in the general theory of formal structures.</p>

<p>     One of the propositions which we shall endeavour to
substantiate in the present work is as follows.
Epistemology does indeed change its forms and certain methods
that have traditionally taken shape in philosophy. The
relation of scientific epistemology to special scientific
knowledge also changes. The essence of these changes has been
analysed by the founders of Marxist-Leninist philosophy
which has formulated the basis of a scientific
epistemological conception adequate to the development of human
cognition. At the same time the fundamental problems in
epistemology do not disappear, and the nature of this
theory as a special philosophical discipline irreducible to the
sum total of scientific knowledge remains unchanged.</p>

<p>     Proceeding from the fundamental works of the classics
of Marxism-Leninism and generalising the experiences of
modern science, Soviet philosophers have made in the past
twenty years a considerable contribution to the study of
the nature and specificity of the cognitive relation. A
whole series of studies have been devoted to the analysis of
the place of cognition among other forms of reflection;
many works have studied the general nature of the links
between cognition and practical activity; great attention has
been given to the forms of the activity of the subject in
reflecting reality; some works analysed the problem of the
interrelationship of the individual and the social in
cognition; the relation of the object and the subject-matter of
knowledge has been investigated; many works have inquired
into the interrelation of the subjective and the objective
in the development of knowledge.^^11^^ A considerable
number of works deal with the dialectics of the subject and the
object in cognition in connection with the analysis of the
philosophical problems arising in the development of the
modern natural sciences. These works focus on the
relationship between the object and the instruments of
research, the nature of physical reality, and the objectivity
of natural scientific knowledge.^^12^^ Finally, a number of
significant aspects of the cognitive relation have been
considered in connection with the discussion of the
philosophical problems of psychology, such as the interrelations
of activity and consciousness, the role of object-related
practical activity in the genesis of perception, the nature of
the so-called cognitive actions, and the problem of the

<p>     The present work attempts, first, to sum up the studies
in this field of both the author himself^^14^^ and of other
Soviet specialists in epistemology, and, second, to analyse a


number of aspects of the given problem that are of a
general and fundamental nature and at the same time have not
been sufficiently studied in Soviet literature.</p>

<p>     We shall try to specify and consider here the main types
of conceptions of the cognitive relation, of the subject--
object relationship, i.e., the various modes of formulation
and discussion of the basic epistemological themes. Our
objective is a clear formulation of those conditions of
studying this problem which ensure the fruitfulness and
scientific quality of the theoretical quest on the basis of the
dialectical-materialist epistemology and at the same time
accord with the specificity of the cognitive situation created
by the development of modern science.</p>

<p>     We begin our analysis of the cognitive relation with a
critique of the modes of formulation of the problem
characteristic of pre-Marxian and present-day non-Marxist,
bourgeois philosophy. Our investigation in this part of the work
has a double significance. First, it fixes those modes of
epistemological analysis which necessarily lead the research
into a <em>cul-de-sac</em>, generating contradictions between the
philosophical conception and the real facts of cognition
and consciousness as well as internal contradictions in the
epistemological conception itself. The identification and
discarding of the methods of studying the cognitive
relation which do not ensure the construction of a genuinely
scientific epistemology help to outline more precisely the
specific approach to the analysis of cognition which is
characteristic of Marxist-Leninist epistemology.</p>

<p>     In our critique of the pre-Marxian and non-Marxist
theories of knowledge we have endeavoured to carefully
separate the actual facts of cognition, with which these
theories juggle, from the false interpretation imposed on these
facts. As for the interpretations, we believed it necessary
to take most careful stock of the arguments used in these
theories and to analyse them critically in detail, in order to
specify precisely the fundamentally false moves of
philosophical reasoning that are responsible for the untenability
of these epistemological studies.</p>

<p>     An investigation of the methods of inquiry into the
cognitive relation characteristic of the pre-Marxian and
non-Marxist theories of knowledge has another significance
as well. These epistemological approaches are often
reproduced abroad in one form or another by specialists in the
various sciences (in psychology, in the discussion of the
philosophical problems of physics, in studying the
foundations of mathematics, etc.). A critical analysis of these types
of perception of the cognitive relation of subject and
object, therefore, proves to be of great importance for


correct philosophical interpretation of many branches of
modern scientific knowledge.</p>

<p>     <em>The first chapter of the first part</em> critically analyses the
interpretation of the cognitive relation as a relation
between two physical systems. This conception is
characteristic of metaphysical materialism. The basic weaknesses of
metaphysical materialism compel its representatives to make
concessions to subjective idealism on a number of essential
points. In the past, the conception of the subject-object
relation as a relation of two physical systems was on the whole
materialistic, although it did contain some elements of
subjectivism, while in present-day bourgeois philosophy this
conception of cognition is formulated, as a rule, in the
framework of subjective idealism, only occasionally including
elements of mechanistic materialism (Russell). We also
consider in a critical light further modifications of this scheme
of the cognitive relation produced by the introduction in it
of a naturalistically interpreted subject's activity: Piaget's
genetic epistemology and Bridgman's operationalism.
Prominent specialists in their respective fields (psychology and
physics), these scientists established a number of facts
essential for understanding the process of cognition. Their
attempts at philosophical interpretation of these facts,
however, do not go beyond the first type of conception of
the cognitive relation, which predetermines serious defects
in their epistemological constructions.</p>

<p>     The community in the basic understanding of the
subject-object relation in cognition justify bringing under one
heading the epistemological conceptions which differ in
other respects (unlike Locke or Russell, Piaget and
Bridgman are not professional philosophers; Piaget is inclined
towards mechanistic materialism with elements of
subjectivism, and Bridgman, to subjective idealism with certain
elements of materialism).</p>

<p>     <em>The second chapter of the first part</em> contains critical
analysis of a type of understanding of cognition that is
extremely influential in bourgeois philosophy--one which
endeavours to explain the essence of cognition by
analysing the structure of individual consciousness. This
conception of cognition was first clearly expressed by Descartes
and later developed by various schools of subjective
idealistic epistemology. This approach is of special interest in the
study of the cognitive relation in transcendentalist
conceptions (Kant, Fichte, Husserl's phenomenology). The main
problem of the epistemological conceptions proceeding
from the interpretation of cognition considered here is one
of substantiating knowledge. In the course of its
discussion, a number of important epistemological issues are


considered: the interrelation of consciousness and
knowledge, knowledge of the world and knowledge of self, the
structure of the act of reflexion, the interrelation between
the ego and the other subjects in the process of cognition.
All these questions, however, are interpreted in a
fundamentally erroneous way: the real facts of cognition and
consciousness which subjective-idealist epistemologists
encounter are mystified. The present book considers in detail
all those defects of subjectivist epistemological
conceptions which make a scientific study of the cognitive
relation impossible. Besides, it is shown that all these defects
are rooted in the fundamentally erroneous understanding
of the cognitive relation itself as one that is determined by
the structure of a self-contained individual consciousness.</p>

<p>     It should be noted that in the first and second parts of
the book we do not pursue the goal of a maximally
comprehensive analysis of all those non-Marxist conceptions
that could be included under the general epistemological
viewpoints under analysis. Our choice of the objects of
criticism is guided by a desire to specify and analyse those
modes of expression of the epistemological positions
considered which, on the one hand, represent their classical
form, and on the other, are widespread in modern Western
philosophy, affecting also specialists in the various sciences.
Thus, the first two chapters are by no means a &quot;
historical introduction&quot; to the rest of the work.^^15^^</p>

<p>     These traits of the critical analysis determine the fact
that the order in which the conceptions are criticised does
not always coincide with the sequence of their emergence
in the history of philosophy.</p>

<p>     To a considerable extent the materials critically
analysed here (e.g., some aspects of HusserPs epistemology,
the epistemology of Sartre) are considered from Marxist
positions for the first time. Besides, we endeavoured to
specify those aspects of the epistemological conceptions of
Descartes, Kant, and Fichte which have not yet attracted
the attention of Marxist philosophers.</p>

<p>     <em>The second part</em> of the monograph studies the specific
traits of the interpretation of the cognitive relation in the
system of scientific, that is, Marxist-Leninist,
epistemology, and outlines the prospects which open up in this
approach for the analysis of a number of fundamental
problems now discussed in terms of the dialectical-materialist
conception of subject, object, and cognition in works on
the methodology of science, Scientology, and psychology.</p>

<p>     The work shows that the dialectico-materialist
interpretation of the cognitive relation does not only permit an
answer to questions that confound non-Marxist


epistemology, or provide a scientific explanation of the real facts
which bourgeois philosophers encounter and are unable to
grasp the meaning of. Marxist-Leninist conception of
cognition opens up fundamentally new horizons of
epistemological studies, posing before epistemology tasks and
problems that are impossible in the type of epistemology that
is traditional for bourgeois philosophy.</p>

<p>     We undertake a detailed analysis of the basic position of
the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the cognitive
relation between subject and object, a position that involves a
fundamental recognition of the unity of reflective,
objectrelated practical and communicative activity and a
recognition of social mediation and the historical nature of
cognition. The dialectico-materialist epistemology provides
the basic principles for working out a number of problems
raised by the development of the modern special
sciences and of scientific epistemology itself. Many of these
questions have not been considered in Marxist
epistemological literature at all or else have not been studied
comprehensively enough; then again, they were studied in aspects
different from those analysed in the present work. This
applies to the role of object standards in the formation of
sensory knowledge, the interrelation of the objective and
operational components in the system of knowledge, of
different types of links between ideal and real objects, the
interrelations of ``alternative'' conceptual systems and
corresponding objects, the connection between continuity and
discontinuity of cognitive experiences, the correlation of
substantiation and development of knowledge, the
relationships between knowledge, self-consciousness, and
reflexion, between explicit and implicit knowledge, the
relations of individual and collective subjects of cognition, of
the status and specific traits of scientific epistemological
research, its relations to the specialised sciences of
cognition, etc. Analysis of these problems is linked up with the
philosophical interpretation of the materials of a number
of special disciplines (the psychology of perception,
cognitive psychology, ethnolinguistics, Scientology, the
history of science, formal logical analysis of scientific theories,
etc.). Side by side with elaborations of the positive views
on the problems considered, a critical analysis is
undertaken of some modern non-Marxist conceptions erroneously
interpreting the epistemological problems which have
arisen from the development of modern science the
conceptions of Kuhn, Sapir and Whorf, Quine, Popper, and others.
Some of them (e.g., Quine's theory of ontological
relativity) are analysed for the first time from Marxist positions.
The second part also contains a critical analysis of the


conception of cognition which was formulated on an objective
idealistic basis by Hegel. Hegel came closest to
understanding a number of important features of the dialectics of
subject and object in cognition but, remaining an idealist, he
could not formulate a scientific epistemology.</p>

<p>     The monograph substantiates a number of propositions
which, in the author's view, follow from the specificity of
the Marxist-Leninist conception of the nature of cognition
and are essential for further study of problems in
scientific epistemology.</p>

<p>     In particular, these include the following propositions:</p>

<p>     1) The conception of the subject as a material being and
the recognition of the importance of the subject's material
activity in cognition is necessary but in itself is insufficient
for a scientific treatment of the cognitive relation. A
limited naturalistic interpretation of the subject's practical and
cognitive activity cannot stand up to subjectivism. A
scientific conception of the cognitive relation implies a
consistent defence of the unity of reflection and activity. But
that in its turn only becomes possible if the subject
himself and his activity are understood as socio-culturally and
historically conditioned, if it is recognised that the
subject's object-related and cognitive activity is mediated by
his relation to other subjects.</p>

<p>     2) Human cognition as the highest form of reflection of
reality assumes not only the subject's conscious attitude to
the abject but also a conscious attitude to himself.
Elementary forms of knowledge (e.g., perception) are
accompanied by a realisation of the place of the individual
subject in the system of the spatio-temporal relations of the
objective world. Scientific activity is only possible where
cognition encompasses the objects under study and where,
furthermore, there is a realisation of the modes and norms of
cognitive activity inherent in the collective subject.</p>

<p>     3) A scientific epistemology is a special kind of
reflexion about knowledge, one that purports to find out the
necessary conditions of any knowledge, to single out
universal cognitive norms. One of the important specific features
of this theory is that the characteristics of actually existing
knowledge are reflected in it in close unity with ascribing
definitive norms of cognitive activity. The general image of
cognition and science created by epistemology is itself
included in the actual course of cognition, restructuring it
in certain respects.</p>

<p>     It is up to the reader to judge whether the author has
coped with his task. The author will gratefully accept any
critical suggestions inspired by a desire to deepen the
discussion of the problems studied in the book.</p>


<b>Part One</b>


<b>Chapter 1</b>



<p>     The epistemology of metaphysical materialism starts
from a premise that is entirely correct: reality is
understood as a system of material structures connected in
definite ways by certain relations and actual dependences.
This conception emphasises that both subject and object
must be considered as definite interconnected material
systems. It is correctly noted that the subject is not some
supramaterial being outside the objective real world but is
included in the objective reality itself. ``Subject'' and ``
object'' are distinctions within this reality. Therefore both
the interactions of subject and object and the processes
within the subject are objectively real.</p>

<p>     In metaphysical materialism, however, these correct
materialist premises are combined with assumptions which
drive the study of some fundamental epistemological
questions into a <em>cul-de-sac</em>, and also compel one to make
serious concessions to subjectivism on some points,
abandoning the materialist theory of reflection. We refer here to
the interpretation of the subject as a purely natural
physical body or biological being interacting with the world of
material objects according to natural laws, laws given by
nature. This conception of the interrelation between the
cognizing subject and the cognized object is unacceptable
in a scientific, dialectical and materialist, epistemology.</p>

<p>     Let us try to point out the fundamental defects of
interpretation of cognition as interaction of two natural


<p>     Already in antiquity, the view is formed that the
knowledge of an object results from a causal impact of the


object on the subject. True, that action is interpreted in an
original way: an ``image'' of the object is separated or
``emanates'' from it and floats in the space between the
object and the subject; getting into the subject, the image
assumes the quality of knowledge.</p>

<p>     The philosophy of the New Times lends a different
shape to a basically similar conception of the mechanism
of origin of knowledge. In terms of the ideas of classical
mechanics, which had taken shape by that time, only
material physical bodies can affect one another, the only
qualities immediately inherent in the bodies being density,
extension, and form. There can be no question of ``
emanation'' of ``images''. Bodies can leave only material traces of
impact in each other. The result of the physical impact on
the sense organs (whether it be direct impact, as in the case
of tactile impressions, or a mediated one, as in the case of
vision) is sense perception---the primary and basic kind of
knowledge. All other kinds or types of knowledge are, in
one way or another, derivative from perception. Therefore
to discover its mechanism would in fact mean to discover
the essence of knowledge, of the cognitive relation in

<p>     Here is how one of the classical adherents of such
conceptions, the English philosopher John Locke, reasoned:
&quot;... Simple ideas [that was the term Locke used for what
is now called sense perception <em>---V. L. ]</em> are not fictions of
our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of
things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry
with them all the conformity which is intended, or which
our state requires; for they represent to us things under
those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us;
whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of
particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to
take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses.
And this conformity between our simple ideas and the
existence of things is sufficient for real knowledge.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     It is by the specific formations arising in the subject
himself, by the ``ideas'' or sense perceptions, that man
judges of the really existing objects. The relation of the
system of interconnected perceptions to the real objects
reminds one of the relation of a map to the actual landscape.
The map is not the terrain itself. At the same time a man
who can read the map will clearly understand the
interrelations of the real objects in the area described by the map.</p>

<p>     The argument seems clear and logical. The development
of modern neurophysiology indeed describes a great many
dependences characterising causal chains that form in the
external objects, then pass through man's senses and


further to the brain. These descriptions take into account the
laws of diffusion, reflection and diffraction of light in the
case of vision, the specificity of the spread of sound
oscillation in the case of hearing, the structure of the retina,
the laws of excitation of the conductor nerves, etc. It is
important to emphasise that modern studies have
established that the cortex plays an exceptionally important
role in the process of perception. Where a certain centre
(visual, auditory, etc.) is damaged, the corresponding
perception process is disrupted.</p>

<p>     Neurophysiological studies undoubtedly have an
immense significance for disclosing the material mechanisms
of perception, and a great deal will have to be done in this
direction. The question, however, is whether these studies
by themselves are sufficient to understand perception as a
special kind of knowledge, and whether the
neurophysiological data can be interpreted in the theory of perception
which we have briefly outlined here and which has been
termed in philosophy representationism.</p>

<p>     Let us note that in representationist terms, not all that
exists in perception corresponds to the features of actually
existing objects. Since the natural sciences, and in the first
place physics, do not use the concepts of colour, taste,
smell, etc., the corresponding properties of perception, the
upholders of this view believe, should be regarded as
emerging through the object influencing the subject rather than
inherent in the actually existing objects (characterised by
the concepts of extension, density, quantity, form,
motion, etc.). Thus the theory of the so-called primary and
secondary qualities is formulated, a theory that was presented
in clear form by Locke and still has some supporters. The
``primary'' qualities of our perceptions (perception of
spatial relations between objects, their size, etc.) reproduce
more or less precisely the real properties of the objects
themselves. As for the ``secondary'' qualities, they do not
reproduce the properties of objects existing outside us,
although they have objective causes. The ``secondary''
qualities, though not fully subjective and illusory, are thus
more subjective than the ``primary'' ones.</p>

<p>     Let us now consider the logic of the representationist
conception. This will enable us to see its weak points.^^2^^</p>

<p>     (1) Let us begin with the fact that the very division into
``primary'' and ``secondary'' qualities is extremely shaky.
It is true, of course, that the natural sciences do not use
such concepts as colour, taste, smell, etc. (although these
sciences might, of course, use concepts correlative with
those of colour, taste, and smell---e.g., the concept of
electromagnetic wave length). Neither does such a science


as neurophysiology resort to the concepts of colour and
taste, explaining the mechanism of perception through
description of various spatial arrangements of the
conductor nerves and brain centres and also studying the
frequency of propagation of excitation along the nerve paths. The
so-called secondary qualities do not appear as objects of
neurophysiological analysis, for they cannot in principle be
introduced into the system of physical interaction. But the
question arises then, where do they emerge and in what
``space'' do they exist? We can no longer be satisfied with
the answer that they emerge &quot;in the process&quot; of the object
operating on the subject, for analysis of this process in
terms of interaction between natural bodies does not make
use of a concept pertaining to these ``qualities''.</p>

<p>     The assertion also appears unconvincing that the ``
primary'' qualities, as distinct from the ``secondary'' ones,
reproduce more or less precisely the properties of real objects.
The subjective element in the perception of colour, in
gustatory senses and others is rather prominent. But the
element of subjectiveness is always present in the perception
of spatial forms and relations of actual objects, too. In
some cases this subjectiveness is so great that it necessarily
produces various illusions of perception that have been
studied in detail in modern psychology. In everyday life,
however, it is correctly believed that perception of spatial
forms of things is on the whole objective. Why then is
subjectiveness ascribed to the perception of sound, colour,
smell, etc.? It is correct that the conceptual picture of the
world drawn by the natural sciences does not include
colours, sounds, or smells. But it does not include many of
the spatio-temporal interrelations fixed in material bodies
which from the standpoint of pre-scientific &quot;common
sense&quot; are necessary attributes of the objective, real world.
If we should accept that only those characteristics of
reality actually exist which are expressed in the concepts of the
modern natural-scientific theories, we arrive at the
conclusion that not only properties corresponding to ``
secondary'' qualities are non-existent, but so are the objective
correlates of the ``primary'' qualities, for that which we
perceive as things more or less distinctly localised in space and
time is, in terms of modern physics, merely a complex
agglomeration of processes on the quantum mechanical level.
In this case, our ordinary notions of space, time, and
localisation of objects no longer work. The ordinary
perception of external objects including both ``secondary'' and
``primary'' qualities will here appear as something that
does not accord with their nature, as a consequence of the
specific structure of our sense organs and of the fact that


our body size is on the macroscale.</p>

<p>     But doesn't this assumption take us too far along the
path of subjectivism?</p>

<p>     Let us point out finally that the other assumption on
which the division of perceived qualities into ``primary''
and ``secondary'' is based is open to criticism. We mean
ascribing some fundamental affinity between the result of
impact of the ``primary'' qualities of the object on the
sense organs and the qualities themselves. As shown by
neurophysiological research, the processes that take place
in the nervous system at the moment of perception have,
as a rule, no external similarity to the phenomena that are
the objects of perception.</p>

<p>     (2) It follows from the &quot;causal theory&quot; of perception
that the subject is directly concerned with the ``traces'' of
the object's impact on the perceiving apparatus rather than
with the object itself. The subject &quot;transports outside'', as
it were, the features or ``qualities'' of these ``traces'', ``
projecting'' them onto the real object and ascribing them to
the object itself, although not all of them are actually
inherent in the latter.</p>

<p>     It is not clear, however, just why the subject necessarily
ascribes to the object qualities that are not characteristic
of it, and how it does so. The mechanism of projection is
impossible to understand in terms of action of one
physical system on another.</p>

<p>     (3) Then there is this puzzle: how can the subject ``read'',
i.e., perceive the ``imprints'' or ``traces'' of the action of
the object on his perceiving apparatus?</p>

<p>     Indeed, according to the given conception, all
perception is necessarily mediated by the sense organs and the
nervous apparatus. What are the sense organs that can
perceive the ``imprints'' given in the apparatus itself that
realises the process of perception? Even if we assume that
such special &quot;sense organs&quot; do exist, that is no solution of
the problem, for in these &quot;sense organs&quot; there must be
some new ``imprints'' which again have to be ``read'' by
someone, etc. And who is that ``someone'' reading the
imprints? The subject? But the basic premise of this
conception is that the subject is a physical body, a natural
material system, which cannot exist somewhere in its own
nervous apparatus reading imprints in its own brain.</p>

<p>     The only way out is to recognise that the process of
perception of ``imprints'' in the perceiving system is
fundamentally different from the perception of external objects
and that the former process is realised directly, without
sense organs or ``reading'' the corresponding traces.
However, that would mean rejecting the view that the origin of


sense perception as a special kind of knowledge can he
fully and exhaustively interpreted in terms of action of
one physical system upon another.</p>

<p>     (4) Consistent adherence to this conception inevitably
entails subjectivistic conclusions contradicting the
materialist theory of reflection. Here is one of them. The ``
causal'' theory of perception postulates that direct perception
is characteristic of processes in the subject's receiving
apparatus and can be correlated with the real object in a
very mediated manner. The actual processes during
perception may be disclosed by studying the work of analysers
and the brain and nerve structures. If we follow the logic
of this conception, we shall have to accept that the
physiologist studying the work of the brain does not, in actual
fact, deal directly with that brain but only with his own,
for any object is accessible to the scientist only through
the ``imprints'' in his own brain, which ``symbolise''
external reality rather approximately, being similar to that
reality only in some respects. Bertrand Russell, an adherent of
the ``causal'' theory of perception, draws this conclusion,
insisting that it is a mistake to assume &quot;that a man can see
matter. Not even the ablest physiologist can perform this
feat. His percept when he looks at a brain is an event in his
own mind, and has only a causal connection with the brain
that he fancies he is seeing.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     Following the path of subjectivism, Russell, unlike
Locke and other metaphysical materialists, includes the
&quot;causal theory&quot; of perception within the framework of a
subjective idealistic philosophical conception. That which
was a concession to subjectivism in metaphysical
materialists, becomes the nucleus of Russell's epistemology.</p>

<p>     (5) Let us finally point out an essential circumstance
that is hard to explain, if one regards perception as simple
causal action of one physical system on another. We refer
to the fact that perception always assumes realisation of
percepts and their inclusion (in the process of perception
itself) in some category of objects, which is expressed in
understanding the object perceived.Understanding means
a certain activity of the subject, manifested, among other
things, in different objective interpretations and
perceptions of one and the same action of the object on the
subject's receptive apparatus. The objective interpretation
of reality takes place in the framework of a certain system
of objective ``standards''. Perception thus has definite
normative features.</p>

<p>     Generally speaking, it is those features of perception
which have to do with its conscious and normative
character that are least amenable to interpretation in terms of


causal impact of one physical system upon another. The
need to view perception as a special structure, a
phenomenon of consciousness rather than a simple ``imprint'', has
come up in other cases, e.g., when we spoke of the
problem of localising the sensual image, explaining the
mechanism of ``projection'', etc.. Most supporters of the ``causal''
theory of perception recognise, in one way or another,
that the chains of natural causation in the subject's
receptive apparatus result in the emergence of a specific
phenomenon that cannot be directly understood and explained
in the concepts of mechanics, physics, chemistry, and
other natural sciences---the phenomenon of sensual image
consciously realised by the subject (that is Russell!s
position). This recognition, however, means in fact a rejection
of the interpretation of the cognitive relation as merely a
special type of connection between two physical systems.</p>

<p>     Let us stress that critique of the ``causal'' conception of
perception does not at all mean rejecting the idea that the
subject is in some respects indeed a complex natural
system, that the object does indeed act on the sense organs of
the cognizing subject, and that cognition is in general
impossible without this action.</p>

<p>     Then again, it is impossible to ignore the enormous mass
of material accumulated by neurophysiology. The task lies,
apparently, in a philosophical-theoretical interpretation of
that material.</p>

<br /> AND OBJECT</b>

<p>     Some modern adherents of the interpretation of the
cognitive relation as a special type of interaction between
two natural systems believe that the defects of
epistemological conceptions criticised in the previous section are not
determined by cognition being regarded as a purely natural
process but by a one-sided view of the subject-object
interaction: the action of the object on the subject is studied
but the reverse action of the subject on the object is not.
In this connection it is believed that proper attention to
the subject's own activity in the analysis of cognition, in
particular to his external material activity, would allow to
overcome the fundamental shortcomings of the
epistemological conception of metaphysical materialism: the
normative nature of cognition, for instance, will then be
explained. It should be stressed that the activity the necessity
of studying which is asserted is in this case understood in


the spirit of natural philosophy, as a purely natural
characteristic of a specific body---the cognizing subject.
This approach to the analysis of activity is quite acceptable
to the adherents of this view. In fact, it does not in
principle go beyond the interpretation of the cognitive relation
as a natural interaction of a special type. Although its
adherents analyse some cognitive problems with greater
discrimination and precision than Locke and the other
theoreticians who stressed the one-sided action of the
object on the subject, it is still in principle impossible to
construct an adequate epistemological conception in the
framework of a modernised naturalist model of
cognition. The theoreticians who interpret the subject's
cognitive activity in a naturalistic fashion, either stick to the
positions of metaphysical materialism or accept the
standpoint of subjective idealism, or even assimilate both of
these positions.</p>

<p>     An illustration of this conception of the cognitive
relation is the system of the so-called genetic epistemology of
Jean Piaget, one of the most prominent Western
psychologists. &quot;Genetic epistemology'', which is extremely
influential abroad, has arisen as an attempt to philosophically
interpret the extensive results of experimental and
theoretical psychological studies carried out by Piaget and his
collaborators during several decades. In analysing &quot;genetic
epistemology'', we shall endeavour to separate the actual
facts discovered by Piaget (we shall return to these facts,
characterising important aspects of the process of
cognition, in. our positive inquiry into the problem) from his
theoretical interpretation, which is largely untenable in its
philosophical aspects.</p>

<p>     Two features distinguish the approach of the Swiss
psychologist. First, he recognises the subject's active role at all
levels of the cognitive process, beginning with perception
and ending with complex intellectual structures. This
activeness of the subject is expressed in the transformation of
the object, in the fact that the latter can only affect the
subject in the course of his activity, which varies in
character at different intellectual levels. Second, the cognitive
relation is interpreted in the framework of the system--
structural approach: various cognitive formations are viewed as
integral structures; and the subject-object relation itself is
regarded as a special type of system in which subject and
object are mutually ``balanced''.</p>

<p>     The main ideas of the operational conception of
intelligence (as Piaget refers to his psychological theory) are as

<p>     1. Intelligence is defined in the context of behaviour,


that is, of specific exchange (interaction) between the
external world and the subject.</p>

<p>     ``...Unlike physiological interactions, which are of a
material nature and involve an internal change in the bodies
which are present, the responses studied by psychology
are of a functional nature and are achieved at greater and
greater distances in space (perception, etc.) and in time
(memory, etc.) besides following more and more complex
paths (reversals, detours, etc.).''^^4^^ According to Piaget,
intelligence is a definite form of the cognitive aspect of
behaviour, whose functional purpose is <em>the structuring of
relations between environment and the organism</em>.</p>

<p>     2. Intelligence, just as all the other biological processes
and functions, is of <em>adaptive</em> nature, in Piaget's view.
Adaptation is in this case understood as equilibrium between
assimilation (of the given material by the existing systems of
behaviour) and accommodation (of these schemes to a
definite situation). Adaptation may obviously vary quite
extensively in its nature. It may be material, with
equilibrium attained by &quot;interpenetration between some part of
the living body and some sector of the external
environment'',^^5^^ or functional, which is not reducible to such
material interpenetration (or exchange). A most important
element in this understanding of the nature of intelligence
is the assertion of the <em>specifically functional</em> nature of
adaptation in the intellectual sphere.</p>

<p>     3. Cognition realised by intelligence is not, according to
Piaget, a static copy of reality. To cognize an object means
to act on it, to reproduce it dynamically, and that is why
the essence of intelligence lies in its <em>active</em> nature.
Psychical and, consequently, intellectual life begins &quot;with
functional interaction, that is to say from the point at which
assimilation no longer alters assimilated objects in a
physico-chemical manner but simply incorporates them in
its own forms of activity (and when accommodation only
modifies this activity)&quot;.''</p>

<p>     4. Intellectual activity is <em>derivative</em> from the subject's
material actions; its elements, or operations, are <em>
interiorised</em> actions which prove to be operations in the proper
sense of the word only if they are mutually coordinated,
forming <em>reversible, stable</em>, and at the same time <em>mobile
integral structures</em>.</p>

<p>     5. These integral structures may differ essentially both
in the degree of their reversibility and the nature of
mobility, and in their being related to a given sphere of objects.
Moreover, other cognitive functions (for example,
perception) are also characterised by structural organisation. The
problems of genetic affinity between cognitive functions


(and behaviour as a whole) and the specificity of
intelligence are solved by Piaget in the following manner.
Intelligence &quot;is an extension and a perfection of all adaptive
processes. Organic adaptation, in fact, only ensures an
immediate and consequently limited equilibrium between the
individual and the present environment. Elementary
cognitive functions, such as perception, habit and memory,
extend it in the direction of present space (perceptual
contact with distant objects) and of short-range
reconstructions and anticipations. Only intelligence ... tends towards
an all-embracing equilibrium by aiming at the assimilation
of the whole of reality and the accommodation to it
of action, which it thereby frees from its dependence on
the initial <em>hie</em> and <em>nunc.&quot;i</em> Hence the principle of <em>genetic
deduction</em> of the intellectual operations, the reverse side of
this principle being the impossibility of indicating the
strict boundaries of intelligence: the latter has to be
defined only &quot;by the direction towards which its
development is turned&quot;.^^8^^</p>

<p>     Thus intelligence is, according to Piaget, a special form
of interaction between subject and object, specific activity
which, being derivative from external object-related
activity, emerges as the totality of interiorised operations
mutually coordinated and forming reversible, stable, and at
the same time mobile integral structures. Intelligence, says
Piaget, may be defined &quot;in terms of the progressive
reversibility of the mobile structures&quot; or, which is the same,
as &quot;the state of equilibrium towards which tend all the
successive adaptations of a sensori-motor and cognitive
nature, as well as all assimilatory and
accommodatory interactions between the organism and the

<p>     Piaget's psychological and epistemological conception
thus proves to be derivative from his interpretation of the
interrelation between the organism and the environment,
showing distinct biological orientation. We shall later see
that Piaget endeavours to interpret the biological processes
of assimilation and accommodation, in their turn, in terms
of a physical and mechanistic theory of equilibrium.</p>

<p>     The core of the genesis of intelligence is, according to
Piaget, the formation of logical thinking, ability for which
is neither innate nor preformed in the human mind.
Logical thinking is the product of the subject's growing activity
in his relations with the external world.</p>

<p>     Piaget singled out four basic stages in the development
of logical reasoning: sensori-motor, pre-operational
intelligence, concrete operations, and formal operations.^^10^^</p>

<p>     I. Intellectual acts at the stage of <em>sensori-motor


intelligence</em> (up to the age of two) are based on coordination of
movements and perceptions and do not involve any
notions. Although sensori-motor intelligence is not yet
logical, it ``functionally'' prepares logical reasoning proper.</p>

<p>     II. <em>Pre-operational intelligence</em> (between two and seven
years) is characterised by well-formed speech, notions,
interiorisation of action in thought (action is replaced by
some sign: word, image, or symbol).</p>

<p>     At the stage of pre-operational intelligence, the child is
not yet capable of applying an earlier acquired scheme of
action with constant objects either to remote objects or to
definite sets and quantities. The child does not yet have
reversible operations and the concepts of retaining
applicable to actions at a level higher than sensori-motor

<p>     III. At the stage of <em>concrete operations</em> (between eight
and eleven), different types of intellectual activity that
have appeared during the previous period finally reach a
state of &quot;mobile equilibrium'', that is, they become
reversible. At the same time, the basic concepts of retention are
formed, the child is capable of concrete logical operations.
He can form both relations and classes out of concrete
things. But the logical operations have not yet become
generalised. At this stage children cannot construct correct
speech independently of real action.</p>

<p>     IV. At the <em>formal operations stage</em> (between 11--12 and
14--15) the genesis of intelligence is completed. The ability
to reason hypothetically and deductively develops at this
stage, and the system of operations of prepositional logic
is formed. The subject can equally well operate with both
objects and propositions. The emergence of these systems
of operations shows, in Piaget's view, that intelligence has
been formed.</p>

<p>     Although the development of logical reasoning forms an
important aspect of the genesis of intelligence, it does not
fully exhaust this process. In the course and on the basis of
formation of operational structures of varying degrees of
complexity, the child gradually masters the reality
surrounding him. &quot;During the first seven years of life f write
Piaget and Inhelderj the child gradually discovers the
elementary principles of invariance pertaining to the object,
quantity, number, space and time, which lend his picture
of the world an objective structure.''^^11^^ The most
important components in the interpretation of this process, as
suggested by Piaget, are (1) dependence of the analysis of
the reality as constructed by the child on his activity; (2)
the child's spiritual development as a growing system of
invariants mastered by him; (3) development of logical


reasoning as the basis for the child's entire intellectual

<p>     Piaget's psychological and logical conception was the
concrete material on which the conception of &quot;genetic
epistemology&quot; developed.^^12^^</p>

<p>     Piaget believes that the numerous attempts at
constructing a scientific epistemology in the past have been
fruitless, because they proceeded from a static standpoint.</p>

<p>     Piaget's &quot;genetic epistemology&quot; substantiates the
existence of a &quot;dialectical connection&quot; between the subject
and the object, the indivisibility of the subject S and the
object O. It is, writes Piaget, from the interaction S ^= O
that action, the source of cognition, follows. The starting
point of this cognition is neither S nor O but the
interconnection =?*, characteristic of action. It is on the basis of this
dialectical interaction that the object and its properties
gradually come to light---through decentration, which
frees cognition from external illusions. Starting from this
interaction ^=, the subject discovers and cognizes the
object, organising actions in a consistent system constituting
the operations of his intellect or reasoning.^^13^^</p>

<p>     The development of cognition, Piaget believes, leads to
the subject's knowledge of the object becoming
increasingly more invariant relative to the changing conditions of
experience and the subject's position relative to the object.
On this path the author of &quot;genetic epistemology&quot; arrives
at the idea of applying the theory of invariants (in
particular, of the mathematical theory of groups) to the study of
the processes of cognition. Piaget presents in mathematical
form the cognitive entities taking shape at various stages in
the development of intelligence as different structures,
namely, as algebraic groups (and groupings), order
structures, and topological structures. From Piaget's standpoint,
the invariant of a transformation group in an intellectual
structure is knowledge about the object itself, about its
own properties, irrespective of any particular reference
frame in which these properties are discovered. The
reversibility of operations in the intellectual structures is
directly linked with the presence of invariants in them.</p>

<p>     In Piaget's theory, in variance of knowledge about an
object relative to some subjective ``perspective'' is ensured by
the actual interaction of subject and object, connected
with the subject's action and quite unambiguously defined
by the properties of the object itself which exists
objectively and actually. In Piaget's discussion of this problem,
materialism as the basic philosophical premise of his
conception stands out particularly clearly.</p>

<p>     The appearance of stable and reversible operational


structures does not, of course, mean, in Piaget's view, that
situations of instability cannot henceforth arise at all in
the subject's knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge
of an external object, whose properties are inexhaustible:
it presents to the subject ever new aspects and poses ever
new problems. When Piaget points out the growth in the
stability of knowledge of the object in intellectual
development, he has in mind, first of all, the formation of
reversible structures of intellectual operations, that is, of <em>
logical</em> instruments which permit the subject to solve those
tasks which reality poses before him. Inasmuch as Piaget
believes that the solution of tasks is based on well--
formedness of operational structures permitting to solve classes
of problems of the same type, the growth in the stability
of intelligence structures also indicates a growth in the
stability and invariance of the subject's knowledge as a whole.</p>

<p>     But it is a well-known fact that, however important the
invariance criterion may be as an indicator of the
objectiveness of knowledge, it is not the only or the main
criterion, and that becomes quite clear at the highest stages
of the development of cognition, particularly in the
construction of scientific knowledge.</p>

<p>     It is this variety of forms which the invariance criterion
can assume, and its derivation from other, more
fundamental criteria, that are not taken into account in Piaget's
works. He singles out mostly those aspects of the
formation of invariant knowledge of the obiect which may be
adequately described by the available mathematical
apparatus and, in the first place, by group theory. The
proposition concerning the role of reversibility of operations as a
means of attaining invariant knowledge is also derived by
Piaget from group theory. But if one takes into account
the diversity of forms which invariance of knowledge
assumes, one will have to admit that reversibility of
cognitive operations is not apparently the kind of universal
indicator of objectiveness of knowledge which Piaget believes
it to be.</p>

<p>     Attempts to solve the problem of objectiveness of
knowledge with the help of the invariance concept are
numerous in the foreign literature on epistemology and
the methodology of science. Thus Max Born, one of the
prominent modern physicists, points out in his discourse
on the nature of &quot;physical reality&quot; that the concept of
invariant of a group of transformations is a key to the
concept of reality not only in physics but also in any
aspect of the world.</p>

<p>     ``Invariants are the concepts of which science speaks in
the same way as ordinary language speaks of `things', and



which it provides with names as if they were ordinary
things.''^^14^^ Most measurements in physics, Born believes,
do not pertain to objects themselves but to their
projections on other objects. &quot;The projection... is defined in
relation to a system of reference... There are in general
many equivalent systems of reference. In every physical
theory there is a rule which connects the projections of the
same object on different systems of reference.''^^15^^</p>

<p>     However, the attempts to identify construction of
objective knowledge with establishment of the object's
invariant characteristics run into serious philosophical
difficulties. The apparatus used by the physicist during
experiments function in this aspect as quite real physical bodies
interacting with other bodies according to objective laws,
so that the results of interaction, just as, generally
speaking, the properties arising from the relation of one object
to other objects, the so-called projections, must exist
objectively and really. Besides, invariance is not an absolute
characteristic of a given property, being established only in
a definite system of relations, and that which is invariant
in one system may be non-invariant in another, to say
nothing of all possible systems. Thus, the theory of
invariants cannot have that fundamental epistemological
significance which Piaget and other researchers abroad ascribe to

<p>     Piaget's &quot;genetic epistemology&quot; endeavours to link up
the theory of invariants with the theory of equilibrium.
Here the fundamental philosophical weakness of Piaget's
conceptions comes to light most clearly.</p>

<p>     Piaget believes that the emergence of invariants in the
structure of intelligence (and, consequently, the
appearance of reversible operations) is directly connected with
mutual balancing of operations and, as a result of this,
with the subject-object equilibrium. The theory of
equilibrium must therefore provide a key to understanding
intellectual development. Equilibrium is interpreted by
Piaget as the maximum magnitude of the subject's activity
compensating for certain external changes, rather than as
balance of forces in the state of rest.</p>

<p>     In building the model of subject-object equilibrium on
the analogy of the equilibrium between a physical system
and its environment, and later on the analogy of the
equilibrium of the biological organism with the environment,
Piaget cannot deduce from this model the specific
properties of the kind of ``equilibrium'' between subject and
object and is therefore compelled to introduce these
properties into his system from the outside, in apparent discord
with his own basic model.</p>


<p>     In mechanics, a closed system is believed to be in
equilibrium if the sum of all possible types of work within the
system equals zero.</p>

<p>     Using the term ``equilibrium'' in his theoretical
arguments, Piaget at first understood it in the sense that is
close to the above. The subject-object system (and by ``
object'' he means, first of all, that part of the subject's
environment with which he directly interacts, practically and
cognitively) may be regarded as being in equilibrium if the
sum of all possible interactions between the subject and
the object equals zero (that means that the subject can
always perform an action reversing the first action thus
regaining the original situation). The external equilibrium
between the subject and the object is ensured by
establishing an equilibrium within the operational structure: the
existence in this structure of an operation that is the
reverse of the basic one gives precisely this effect that the
sum of all possible operations within the structure equals

<p>     It soon turned out, however, that Piaget's analogy
between equilibrium in a mechanical system and equilibrium
in the structure of intellectual operations is extremely
imprecise. First, the mechanical principle deals with a closed
system, that is, one that is isolated from the influence of
the environment, whereas the whole purpose of the ``
balancing'' of intellectual operations of which Piaget speaks
is the attainment of stability of the knowledge about the
object relative to the mutable experience. In other words,
Piaget deals with an ``open'' rather than ``closed'' system.
Second, it came to light that in physics itself system
equilibrium is only rarely expressed by the above principle. In
the more general cases of system equilibrium, considered,
e.g., in thermodynamics, there is a minimum of potential
energy in the system (which is conditioned by the
attainment of the most probable state by the system).
Mechanical equilibrium proves to be only a special case of the
more general equilibrium state. In recent years, a number
of physicists and mathematicians (I. Prigozhin and others)
have generalised the concept of equilibrium to include
&quot;dynamic equilibrium''. It proved to be possible to apply
the mathematical theory of dynamic equilibrium of a
system to the study of &quot;open systems'', i.e., systems
exchanging matter and energy with the environment. Some
biologists have made attempts to apply the theory of dynamic
equilibrium to the study of living organisms as &quot;open

<p>     Piaget speaks of ``balancing'' operations within a
cognitive structure, believing this ``balance'' attainable due


to complete reversibility of operations. Endeavouring to
get rid of teleology in explaining the inner trend of the
subject's actions towards mutual balancing, Piaget aims at
constructing his conception on the basis of the physical
theory of equilibrium. As we know, the tendency of a
closed physical system towards the most probable state is
explained by the action of statistical laws, without any
reference to hidden goals. However, equilibrium in
physical systems is very often achieved by attaining some
irreversible state rather than by increasing the reversibility
of processes within the system.</p>

<p>     Finding it impossible to deduce from the physical model
of equilibrium cognitive ``equilibrium'' of subject and
object, which is of fundamental importance for his
psychological and epistemological conception, Piaget was compelled
to stress more and more the <em>specific</em> character of psychical

<p>     Piaget believes it necessary to distinguish between &quot;
instrumentally possible&quot; and &quot;structurally possible&quot;
operations. The former operations are those which the subject
himself regards at a given moment as possible, that is, as
operations he might perform. Although from the
standpoint of the subject himself &quot;instrumentally possible&quot;
operations are not those actually performed by him, an
outsider (e.g., the psychologist studying the given person) may
regard them as real, for the subject's contemplation of his
possible actions is just as real a psychological process as
an external activity. &quot;Structurally possible&quot; are those
operations of the subject which he himself does not regard at
the given moment as possible (or he may even be unaware
of his ability to perform them) but which he is
nevertheless capable of performing, for he has at his disposal an
objectively formed operational structure including these
operations. The basis of all operations of the subject is thus
&quot;structurally possible&quot; operations, coinciding in fact with
the operational structure itself. Piaget asserts that in the
intellectual operational structure the equilibrium of actual
and possible changes is expressed in a manner quite
different from a physical system. While in the intellectual
structure there exist &quot;instrumentally possible&quot; operations that
are mediating links, as it were, between real and possible
changes, in a physical system there can only be a sharp
dichotomy between real and possible changes. So the
analogy between intellectual and physical equilibrium cannot be
taken very far.</p>

<p>     Analysis of the actual ``equilibrium'' between the
subject and the object in the process of cognition led Piaget to
a recognition of such characteristics of this equilibrium


which can in no way be deduced from the model of
equilibrium of a physical system or a biological organism.
Referring to ``instrumentally'' and ``structurally'' possible
operations, Piaget is compelled to speak of <em>consciousness</em>,
of <em>contemplation</em> by the subject of his possible actions and
of other specifically psychical states as the necessary
component of the subject-object equilibrium.</p>

<p>     Recognising the insufficiency of the physical theory of
equilibrium for understanding the subject-object
equilibrium, Piaget demonstrated, in fact, the weakness of his own
epistemological stand, although he failed to work out a
conception that would adequately explain the facts which
he analysed.</p>

<p>     Characteristically, when Piaget had to define the
concept of ``reversibility'' of an action (i.e., the concept of
operation, for an operation is a reversible action), he could
not restrict himself to pointing out the connection between
reversibility and the possibility of performing an
action in two opposite directions and had to indicate the
importance of <em>realisation</em> of the fact that the action remains
the same as it is performed in either of the directions.^^18^^
Naturally, the concept of reversibility cannot be defined in
this way in physics.</p>

<p>     Piaget admits that the reversibility of intellectual
operations of which he speaks has nothing to do with the
reversibility of actual physical processes. Thus, speaking of the
formation of the concept of time, he remarks that
reversibility of time does not mean for the subject that actual
physical time can flow in the opposite direction (actual
time is irreversible) but merely the fact that the subject
can mentally proceed not only from the previous moment
of time to the subsequent one but also from the
subsequent to the preceding (i.e., he can not only perform the
operation A -&gt; B but also the operation B -&gt; A), <em>realising</em>,
however, that the actual sequence of moments does not
change (i.e., A precedes B). &quot;Constructing time ... is an
excellent example of joint action of the reversible processes
of the subject and the irreversible processes of the object,''
remarks Piaget.^^19^^</p>

<p>     Thus Piaget fails to deduce in the framework of his
conception the normative character of cognitive structures
without resorting to the phenomena of consciousness,
those phenomena whose study cannot be carried out by
interpreting the subject-object interrelations in terms of
mechanics, physics, and biology, and thus does not accord
with the fundamental approach of &quot;genetic epistemology''.
It proves impossible to explain objectiveness of knowledge
and other fundamental characteristics of cognition by the


theory of ``balancing'' the subject and the object
interpreted as bodies given by nature.</p>

<br /> OPERATIONS</b>

<p>     According to Piaget, the subject's activity serves as a
means of reproducing the characteristics of the real object
in the system of knowledge; in the view of other adherents
of the naturalistic model of cognition, who focus on the
subject's active character, it is in general impossible to
regard the existence of a real object of cognition as
independent of the subject's activity. Cognition is in this case
no longer treated as reflection but merely as an ensemble
of the subject's individual external actions or operations.
Adherents of these conceptions formulate a number of
naturalistic, metaphysical-materialistic premises as their
starting point (both the subject and the object being
included in the structure of natural reality, and the subject's
actions or operations being interpreted as physical, or
material), ending with constructing systems of
subjectiveidealistic epistemology.</p>

<p>     Here belongs the epistemological and methodological
conception of operaticnalism that was rather influential
until recently among Western philosophers and natural
scientists. Operationalism takes into account a very
important characteristic of the cognitive process, namely the fact
that in this process man introduces certain artificially
created objects between himself and the cognized object:
devices, measuring instruments, etc. Let us note that this
fact is not duly appreciated in Piaget's theory. However,
the objects or ``mediators'' used in cognition are regarded
in operationalism as fundamentally the same as the rest of
the natural bodies. That these objects are produced by
mun, not nature, and that they are included in a system of
socio-cultural ties, is of no great epistemological
significance for this conception.</p>

<p>     The main ideas of operationalism were formulated by
P. W. Bridgman, a well-known American physicist.</p>

<p>     Bridgman drew attention to the fact that the special
theory of relativity not only changed essentially our views of
the world but also necessitated a new approach to a
number of logical and epistemological problems involved in the
interpretation of the mathematical formalisms used in
physics and in specifying the meaning of physical concepts. &quot;It
was a great shock to discover that classical concepts,


accepted unquestioningly, were inadequate to meet the
actual situation, and the shock of this discovery has resulted
in a critical attitude toward our whole conceptual

<p>     In thinking about the logical meaning of the procedures
applied by Einstein in defining the basic concepts of the
special theory of relativity, Bridgman concluded that
despite the generally held view that most concepts of classical
physics characterise the properties of objects, of things,
the actual meaning of physical concepts lies in an ensemble
of experimental operations or, to be more precise, in an
ensemble of measurement procedures. Bridgman reasons,
for instance, that we evidently know what ``length'' is if
we can determine the length of a concrete object. To do
so, we have to perform certain physical operations. &quot;The
concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations
by which length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept
of length involves as much as and nothing more than the
set of operations by which length is determined. In
general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of
operations: <em>the concept is synonymous with the
corresponding set of operations.''^^2^^^</em> If the concept is &quot;mental, as
of mathematical continuity, the operations are mental
operations''. Bridgman indicates here that &quot;we must
demand that the set of operations equivalent to any
concept be a unique set&quot;^^22^^ (i.e., only <em>one</em> set of
operations corresponds to each concept).</p>

<p>     In this connection, Bridgman continues, it is easy to
show that such concepts of classical physics as &quot;absolute
time&quot; or &quot;absolute simultaneity&quot; are devoid of meaning,
for there are no physical operations that could be used to
ascribe the absolute time predicate to some event.</p>

<p>     If we take into account that the operations to which a
physical concept is equivalent are <em>actual</em> physical
operations, the conclusion is inevitable in operationalism that
concepts can only be defined in the range of actual
experiment, becoming meaningless in regions as yet untouched
by experiment. Therefore, Bridgman believes, we cannot
express any assertions about these domains. And if we do
make these assertions, we must regard them us
conventionalised extrapolation, of the looseness of which we
must be fully conscious, and the justification of which is
in the experiment of the future.</p>

<p>     Thus, before the emergence of the special theory of
relativity, it was believed that any two events A and B
possessed this property with regard to the time of their
realisation, that A takes place either before B or after it or
simultaneously with it. This assertion seemed to be a


simpie description of the behaviour of objects given in
experience. But the experience itself which this assertion
claimed to describe was very narrow. When the range of
experience was broadened, and research became concerned
with bodies moving at high velocities, the untenability of
the concept of simultaneity used by classical physics was

<p>     Einstein showed, Bridgman writes, that the operations
which permitted the statement of simultaneity of two
events involved measurement by an observer, so that
simultaneity is not an absolute property of the two events
but one involving the relation of the two events to the
observer, the subject, his frame of reference, the velocity
of these events relative to the observer's frame of

<p>     Bridgman makes further specifications in his
methodological conception using a detailed operational analysis of
the concept of length as his proving ground.</p>

<p>     He asks this question: by what operations do we
measure the length of any concrete physical object? The
measurement of the objects of ordinary experiment is effected
by a procedure which is crudely described as follows. A
rod is used as the measure of length; it is imposed on the
object in such a way that one of the ends of the rod
coincides with one of the ends of the object, then the position
of the second end of the rod is marked on the object, after
which the rod is moved along the line that is the
continuation of its previous position in such a way that the first
end of the rod coincides with the previous position of the
second end. This procedure is repeated until the second
end of the object is reached. The number of separate
applications of the rod is called the length of the object in this

<p>     Bridgman points out that the operation described here,
which appears so simple, is in actual fact very complex. It
is necessary to satisfy a whole series of conditions to really
measure the length of an object. Thus we must be certain
that the temperature of the rod is normal, one at which
the length of given obiects is usually measured, otherwise
we would have to introduce correctives in the results of
our measurements to account for the effect of the
temperature changes. If we measure the vertical length of an
object, we have to account for the influence of the
gravitation forces on the length of the measuring rod. Finally, we
must be certain that the measuring rod is not a magnet
and is not affected by electric forces. All of these
conditions are usually taken into account by the physicist who
makes measurements with some concrete aim in view.</p>


<p>     However, Bridgman continues, in operational analysis
we must go even further in determining the conditions of
measurement and specify <em>all the details</em> relevant to the
movement of the rod in measurement: e.g., the precise
path of the rod in space, its velocity and acceleration. In
practice, when objects of ordinary experience are
measured, these conditions are neglected. And that is quite
understandable, for in ordinary experiment variations of
these conditions do not affect the end result.</p>

<p>     But we must recognise, Bridgman asserts, that
experiment is always subject to errors, and that extending the
boundaries of experiment and increasing the precision of
measurement may reveal that the conditions that now
seem to leave the result of measurements unaffected
actually seriously affect it. &quot;In <em>principle</em> the operations by
which length is measured should be <em>uniquely</em> specified. If
we have more than one set of operations, we have more
than one concept, and strictly there should be a separate
name to correspond to each different set of operations.''^^23^^</p>

<p>     If we want to measure the length of a moving object,
the operations applied will be different. At first glance, it
will appear enough to climb on the object and repeat the
procedure that was used in measuring the length of the
object at rest. In actual fact the situation is somewhat more
complicated. A full specification of the operations
employed assumes several additional conditions. In what way shall
we overtake the object with the measuring rod in our
hands? Shall we first overtake the moving object and then
try to jump on it, or shall we await the moment when the
object approaches us? If the object moves rather fast, one
obviously cannot jump on it directly from an immovable
support, and we shall have to use some special device, such
as a moving automobile.</p>

<p>     Since operations applied by Einstein for defining the
concept of length, are different from the operations used
for measuring length in ordinary experience, Einstein's
``length'' does not mean the same as the ``length'' of
ordinary experience. These are <em>different concepts</em>, although
they do have some features in common: where the velocity
of the moving body relative to the measuring system
reaches zero, the operations of measuring the moving
object coincide with those applied in measuring the length of
the object at rest.</p>

<p>     Bridgman's epistemological thinking on the nature of
surrounding reality is directly connected with the essence
of operational analysis.</p>

<p>     An analysis of the logical meaning of this concept allows
Bridgman to conclude that the attribute of physical reality


is ascribed to those concepts which may be defined by <em>
different</em> sets of physical operations <em>independent</em> of each

<p>     We bear in mind that the main idea of operationalism is
that each set of operations essentially corresponds to one
concept only. If two (or more) sets of operations
independent of each other yield the same results, we may, from
the operationalist standpoint, conditionally identify the
differing concepts corresponding to different sets,
regarding them as one concept to which the status of physical
reality is ascribed. Such a concept appears as an invariant
relative to different sets of operations or as an expression
of some correlation between different sets of physical
phenomena. At the same time we should not forget, Bridgman
insists, that the identification of the results of different
sets of measurements is, to a certain degree, conditional,
being justified by the available measurements only; future
experiments may reveal discrepancies in the results of
measurements belonging to different sets, and in this case a
single concept will have to be ``split'' into two or more,
that may or may not have the status of physical realities.</p>

<p>     We thus see that the basis of operationalism is emphasis
on the uniqueness of the experimental procedures
performed by the experimenter, the need for singling out all
the physical operations in defining concepts. Continuing
this line of reasoning, Bridgman quite logically infers that,
strictly speaking, each operation is unique, being
implemented by the given single individual at a given time and
place. The operations must not be generalised, as there is
no method to guarantee the future of such generalisation.</p>

<p>     But if one accepts these theoretical premises, the
conclusion is inevitable that not only non-operational but also
operational definitions of concepts are in fact impossible.
A. C. Benjamin, an American researcher in operationalism,
remarks: &quot;Another operation, however similar to the first,
must be a different one since it will be distinguished at
least by spatial or temporal location. Two measurements
of the length of a given object, even if the results are the
same, can be distinguished. Now if a concept is always to
be defined by an operation, and each operation is a
particular, the concept itself takes on the particularity of its
mode of definition. Not only will there be a difference
between the tapeline length of a field and the triangulation
length (even if the measured values are the same), but
there will be a difference in <em>meaning</em> between all
individual tapeline lengths of the field (again, even though the
measured values are the same).''^^24^^ But concepts defined in this
way are devoid of any cognitive value at all, for they


essentially cease to be concepts, which must, as is well
known, capture something that different situations have in
common. This taking one of the basic premises of
operationalism to its logical end comes into a decisive
contradiction with the statement of Bridgman himself that
physical operations in terms of which definitions of concepts
are given must be <em>repeatable</em> and always realisable.
Moreover, Bridgman writes: &quot;Operational definitions, in spite of
their precision, are in application without significance
unless the situations to which they are applied are
sufficiently developed so that at least two methods are known
of getting to the terminus.''^^25^^</p>

<p>     It might be assumed that this contradiction in the
foundation of the conception could be eliminated by assuming
that each concept is synonymous to a set of repeatable
operations rather than to one single operation. It is easy to
see, however, that introducing a set of operations does not
eliminate the main logical difficulty. Any two operations
are similar in some points and different in others. Unifying
a series of operations in a single set (or a single class)
synonymous to the meaning of some concept implies, in
the first place the singling out of some general feature or
property inherent in all these operations and not definable
by an operational mode (operational definitions thus
necessarily assume the existence of some characteristics
interpreted non-operationally). Then again, the existence
of a criterion is assumed which indicates the degree to
which the operations must be similar to form a single set
(depending on the required degree of similarity, different
sets of operations may be specified to which different
operationally defined concepts will correspond). Inasmuch
as operationalism is in principle incapable of indicating
such a criterion, its basic methodological assertion that
different concepts correspond to different sets of physical
operations proves to be untenable. Indeed, why can we in
one case include different operations in a <em>single</em> set,
correlating with one and only <em>one</em> concept, while other
occasions, different sets of operations (even if they are
expressed in identical or similar results) are said to
characterise <em>different</em> concepts? Then, if we sometimes refer,
for practical convenience, different sets of operations to
one concept, why can this reference be regarded merely
as a temporal procedure, pragmatically convenient but
methodologically unjustifiable?</p>

<p>     A necessary methodological correlate of Bridgman's
position is subjective idealism.</p>

<p>     <em>The Logic of Modern Physics</em> contains, along with
subjectivist general philosophical assertions, some statements


in the spirit of natural-scientific materialism.^^26^^ In
Bridgman's later works the subjective-idealist position following
from operationalism is realised more clearly and
implemented quite consistently. In his book <em>The Nature of Physical
Theory</em> he defends undisguised solipsism: &quot;It seems to
me that as I have stated it, the solipsist position, if indeed
this be the solipsist position, is a simple statement of what
direct observation gives me, and we have got to adjust our
thinking so that it will not seem repugnant.''^^27^^</p>

<p>     In one of his works Bridgman argues that there is no
operation to prove that the universe arose more than five
minutes ago, &quot;for any of our methods of proof are things
that we do nou&gt;&quot;.^^28^^</p>

<p>     But the most significant circumstance that has
determined the rejection, becoming evident now, of
operationalism as a methodology and an epistemology by the wide
circles of scientists abroad is not so much the self--
contradictory nature of operationalism as the wide gap between
the operationalist recommendations and the actual course
of the development of science, a gap that became obvious
and clearly realised in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1930s it
was sometimes stated that operationalism is something
generally accepted in physics,^^^9^^ whereas at present the
conviction is widespread that operationalism is very far
from understanding the real problems of scientific

<p>     The fact is that scientists prefer to use the so-called
open concepts in the actual practice of scientific cognition,
i.e., concepts whose significance relative to an
experimental situation is not fully defined (since it is impossible to
fully exhaust all these situations beforehand). As for
operational definitions, they characterise closed concepts, for
they fix the meaning of concepts only for some definite

<p>     The gist of the matter is that the so-called open
concepts, with which science mostly operates, function within
the framework of systems of theoretical knowledge.
Operations of measuring certain magnitudes have a
meaning in these frameworks, characterised by definite
premises, ontological assumptions, and modes of specifying a
definite aspect of objective reality. In other words, the
measurement operations, far from being capable of
specifying the meaning of scientific concepts, do not, as a rule,
exist in isolation. As for the fundamental question of the
standards and norms to which production and evaluation
of theoretical knowledge (and knowledge in general) is
subordinated, it cannot in principle be solved in an
operationalist framework, as has been said above.</p>


<p>     Most participants at the 1954 symposium on the Present
State of&quot; Operationalism^^30^^ came to the conclusion that &quot;if
the rule of operationalist caution is strictly and
consistently applied, physics must reduce to a mere record of
isolated data&quot;.^^31^^</p>

<p>     The question naturally, arises, if operationalism as an
epistemology and general methodology of science must be
rejected, does that mean that the technique of
operationalist analysis has absolutely no rational content?</p>

<p>     We have noted already that, although most concepts of
science cannot be defined in terms which fix the results of
measurement (and it is in this sense that operational
definitions are understood in strict operationalism), these
definitions still have a certain significance. They are used when a
general non-operational definition indicating the specific
properties and relations of the concept defined has not yet
been worked out. &quot;We may not be able to give a general
answer to such questions as 'What is length?', What is
causality?', 'What is simultaneity?', etc. But.as long as we can,
in most concrete cases, determine length and simultaneity
through measuring operations, as long as we can determine
the position of the body at a time <em>t</em> from its position at
t, and the momentum lent to it, we dan say that the words
`length', `simultaneity', and `causality' have quite a definite
unambiguous meaning,&quot;^^32^^ writes D. P. Gorsky.</p>

<p>     An &quot;operational definition&quot; is not a definition in the
proper sense of the word but a formulation of the
empirical conditions of application of a theoretical concept, one
and the same theoretical concept amenable to several
empirical interpretations through different &quot;operational

<p>     Evaluating the significance of operationalism for the
methodology of science in general, we conclude that
Bridgman's emphasis (following Einstein) on linking up
theoretical constructs with experimental operations was not
without a foundation, although the nature of this link was
given a fundamentally erroneous interpretation in

<p>     ``Bridgman's operationalism'', [remarks V. S. Shvyrev],
&quot;reflected in a distorted form the indubitable fact of the
methodology of natural science that the establishment of
the meaning of ... theoretical concepts ... implies fixing
certain empirical dependences between experimentally
reproduced situations and the consequences, also empirically
fixed, of these operations.''^^33^^</p>

<p>     As we see, the significance of the technique of
operational analysis is not very great. This technique may only
be fruitfully used if the meaning of the measurement


operations and the nature of their reference to some
scientific concept are already given, that is to say, if
there already exist certain systems of knowledge
characterising the state of affairs in the objective world
independent of the subject and his operations. Any elementary
measurement operation already presupposes the singling
out of the objective magnitude or parameter which is to
be measured, as well as ``incorporation'' of the results
obtained into the system of relations between the
mathematical objects (the result of measurement being
expressed in mathematical form). As for the norms of
obtaining and evaluating the systems of the very
knowledge correlated with objects, this question is insoluble
from the positions of operationalism as an epistemological
and methodological conception. In other words, one
cannot arrive at an understanding of the nature of
knowledge and the character of the cognitive relation within the
framework of this conception.</p>

<p>     We have endeavoured to show that the naturalistic
interpretation of the cognitive relation between subject and
object as a kind of interaction between two natural systems,
leaves a number of fundamental epistemological problems
unsolved, regardless of the share of activity ascribed to
each of the poles of interaction. Here belong questions of
the interpretation of the nature and character of the norms
of acquiring and evaluating knowledge, and those of the
place and role in the cognitive process of such a specific
structure as consciousness.</p>

<p>     Starting out from metaphysical materialism, the
adherents of the naturalist model of cognition are compelled
to make inevitable concessions to subjectivism, siding, in
some cases, entirely with subjective idealism and giving up
the materialist theory of reflection.</p>

<p>     Let us once again note that revealing the untenability
of the epistemological conceptions formulated by the
supporters of the naturalist interpretation of cognition,
in no way signifies ignoring the real facts that are given
a false interpretation in these conceptions (some of them
were discovered by the upholders of the conceptions
criticised here).</p>

<p>     Indeed, man as the cognizing subject has a body liable
to the action of mechanical, physical, chemical, and
biological laws. This and other factors have a definite bearing on
the mechanisms of implementing cognition. The whole
point is, however, that man's characteristic as a subject
acting and cognizing in a specifically human manner cannot
be understood from the natural specific features of man's
body. It proves impossible to interpret the fundamental


and most essential traits of the cognitive relation within
the mode of presentation of the subject-object problem
discussed in this chapter.</p>

<p>     It is all evidently a question of philosophical and
scientific theoretical interpretation of the facts described and of
evaluation of their significance for epistemological


<b>Chapter 2</b>


<br /> REFLEXION</b>

<p>     Widespread in pre-Marxian and particularly in modern
non-Marxist philosophy are conceptions which endeavour
to solve the fundamental problems of epistemology
starting from the premise that cognition is determined by the
structure of individual consciousness. The latter is treated
as a completely autonomous phenomenon, dependent on
nothing else and determined by nothing else. Clearly these
conceptions express the positions of subjective idealism.</p>

<p>     These idealistic conceptions exploit the real problems
that cannot be passed over in silence in analysing the
cognitive relation. It is a question, first and foremost, of the
norms and standards functioning in cognition and
permitting to distinguish between knowledge and absence of
knowledge. In other words, the reference here is to the
problem of substantiating knowledge, which is a pivotal one
for the subjectivist idealistic conceptions to be analysed in
this chapter. These conceptions do not merely proclaim
the need for starting out from the traits of individual
consciousness in studying cognition. They propound a
system of arguments to prove that only adopting the
subjectivist idealistic stand in epistemology can solve the
problem of substantiating knowledge, and that any other
philosophical interpretation of knowledge and cognition
fails to cope with this problem. These conceptions are not
only influential in bourgeois philosophy: they also exert a
great influence on specialists in the sciences (mathematics,
psychology, etc.). All of this compels us to analyse in
detail the arguments of the principal adherents of this
interpretation of the cognitive relation, to show the
untenability of their reasoning and to clearly separate the
real problems of epistemology, the true facts of cognition
and consciousness (the representatives of the conceptions
criticised here encountered a number of such facts) from
their idealistic, false interpretation.</p>


<p>     Let us, first, tackle the problem of substantiation of
knowledge itself.</p>

<p>     If knowledge is a specific formation inherently
possessing the property of truth, that is, correspondence to the
objectively real state of things, there must obviously exist
some norms or standards permitting to judge whether we
do indeed deal with knowledge, and to separate
knowledge from ignorance.</p>

<p>     If we have such standards at our disposal, we shall be
able to make judgements concerning the degree of truth
of all those specific products of human activity which
claim to be knowledge; in other words, we shall
evidently be able to show the falseness of the claims of some of
them and at the same time to finally confirm others in
their status of knowledge. The task, consequently, consists
in singling out the normative constituents of any

<p>     Let us take into account that the very formulation of
the problem of substantiating knowledge implies a critical
attitude to various existing kinds of knowledge, beginning
with the current opinions of &quot;common sense&quot; and ending
with theories of the special sciences and philosophical
constructions. Not one of the various kinds of knowledge
regarded outside of special epistemological analysis can lay
claims to absolute truth merely because it is now believed
to be true---that is a necessary premise of the approach to
the problem discussed here. And that means allowing the
possibility that epistemological research will result in
recognising the insufficient substantiation not only of
certain propositions of &quot;common sense&quot; but also of some
propositions and probably whole branches of theoretical
knowledge. Indeed, the discussion of the problem of
substantiating knowledge in the history of philosophy was
necessarily accompanied by rejection of the justifiability
of a number of theoretical constructs that for a long time
were regarded as generally accepted (consider, e.g., Kant's
rejection of the whole range of the problems of rationalist
ontology in the 17th and 18th centuries). The study of the
foundations of certain scientific disciplines, which became
so vital in the 20th century, also necessarily involves
recognising the justifiability of some modes of specifying
problems and methods of discourse, and rejecting others
(of precisely this nature are the arguments between
different trends in the foundations of mathematics and the
modern debate concerning the interpretation of quantum
mechanics). The theoretical activity in substantiating a
given scientific discipline, including as it does analysis of
the modes of reasoning and evaluation of knowledge in


this area, assumes, as a rule, not only solving special
questions pertaining to the given science but also, to some
extent or other, investigating some general philosophical
problems. It is therefore not accidental that the problems
of the foundations of mathematics are often referred to as
the &quot;philosophy of mathematics'', while problems in the
meaningful interpretation of modern physical theories are
included among the &quot;philosophical questions of physics''.
At the same time, the general problem of substantiation of
knowledge as posed in philosophy has certain features
distinguishing it from substantiation of the special

<p>     In philosophy, it is not knowledge of a given type that
is substantiated but any knowledge in general regardless
of its concrete content, that is, criteria are sought which
permit to distinguish between knowledge and ignorance in
any given case.</p>

<p>     In this connection we would like to draw attention to
the fact that, in discussing a very real and fully justifiable
problem of substantiation of knowledge, the adherents
of the approach to the cognitive relation analysed in this
chapter proceed from two premises which appear to them
quite natural but actually predetermine the subjectivist
nature of their epistemological conceptions. This is, in the
first place, the metaphysical notion of the existence of
standards which permit once and for all to separate
genuine knowledge from error, to draw a sharp boundary
between knowledge and absence of knowledge, and to single
out &quot;in pure form&quot; some systems of ``absolute''
knowledge that could be used as the foundation for the entire
system of scientific theories. The epistemological
conceptions considered here are also based on another
assumption: since the problem of substantiation of knowledge
implies a critical attitude to certain kinds of it, the
problem itself was interpreted as the need to reject the
reliance on the results of the special sciences or the propositions
of pre-scientific &quot;common sense&quot; in the philosophical
analysis of the cognitive relation between subject and
object. In other words, since the degree of
substantiatedness of scientific knowledge is to be determined
through philosophical analysis, a philosophical
investigation of knowledge cannot assume certain propositions of
the special sciences to be truths substantiated in
themselves (it assumes them only as its subject-matter, just as
the propositions of &quot;common sense&quot; and philosophical
theories). That means that the field of philosophy which is
concerned with this problem, i.e., epistemology, must
be understood as a specific sphere of theoretical activity


fundamentally different from all kinds and types of
special scientific knowledge, that is, as a field where the data
of the special sciences cannot be used. (Thus the approach
to the study of cognition analysed here differs in its
attitude to the special sciences from the approach considered
in the first chapter: the latter, as we remember,
presupposed wide use of the data of mechanics, physics, biology,
physiology, and other sciences.)</p>

<p>     We must agree that the task of cognition consists in
overcoming errors and obtaining true knowledge.
Epistemological reflexion about knowledge indeed plays an
important role in the solution of this problem. It is also true
that positing the problem of substantiation of
knowledge implies a critical attitude to certain areas of existing
knowledge. At the same time, the view that ``pure'' or ``
absolute'' knowledge can be established is false, and so is the
assertion that in substantiating knowledge we must
ignore all the facts of the special sciences. In the second part
of the present work we shall characterise an approach to
the substantiation of knowledge which does not accept
these false premises, namely, Marxist-Leninist

<p>     The question of substantiation of knowledge was first
formulated, in classical form, by Descartes. The positing
of this problem and its acuteness were largely due to the
specific traits of the socio-cultural and scientific situation
in which Descartes' theoretical activity took place, a
situation which was characterised, on the one hand, by the
emergence of the bourgeois mode of production (and thus
by a growing acuteness of individual self-consciousness)
and, on the other hand, by the emergence of the science of
the New Times which set itself in sharp opposition to the
scholastic tradition. On the whole, however, Descartes'
theoretical arguments transcend the concrete historical
situation, for the mode of analysis which he accepted
proved to be archetypal and was many times reproduced
with various modifications in western bourgeois philosophy.</p>

<p>     The starting point of Descartes' reasoning is his
distrust for the cultural tradition: &quot;I learned not to believe
too firmly anything of which I was only persuaded by an
example or custom.''^^34^^ &quot;As soon as my age permitted
me to be free of the supervision of my tutors, I abandoned
the study of letters entirely... resolving not to seek any
other science but that which I could find in myself or in
the great book of the world...''^^35^^</p>

<p>     For philosophy &quot;had been cultivated by the most
excellent minds that ever lived for many centuries, and yet
there <SUB>was</SUB> <SUB>no</SUB>t a single thing in it which could not be


disputed and consequently which would not be
doubtful...'';^^36^^ that was Descartes' formulation of the
proposition which was later repeated by numerous philosophers
who tackled the problem of knowledge. And further:
&quot;As for the other sciences, since they borrowed their
principles from philosophy, I judged that it was impossible to
construct anything that would be solid on such infirm

<p>     Thus the question here is one of a radical attempt to
substantiate the entire system of theoretical knowledge.</p>

<p>     Where could one look for the solution of this problem?</p>

<p>     Descartes starts out from the premise that only that
should be taken as true which is cognized as such quite
obviously, that is to say, it appears to the mind so
clearly and distinctly that there is no reason to call it in

<p>     But can we trust our sense perceptions? They often
deceive us. Thus towers which seem round from a distance
prove to be rectangular at close quarters, while giant
statues at the top of these towers seem small if looked at
from below. Errors may result not only from the evidence
of our external senses but also from that of the internal
ones. &quot;...For is there anything more intimate and interior
than pain? And still, I have heard on several occasions
from persons who had their arms or legs cut off that it
sometimes seemed to them that they felt pain in the parts
that had been cut off, which gave me reason to believe
that I could not be certain that any of my limbs is ailing
though I should feel pain in it.''^^38^^</p>

<p>     True, one can believe that there are things with regard
to which our senses can hardly deceive us. For instance, it
can hardly be doubted that I am sitting here behind this
table, informally dressed, holding this paper in my hands,
etc. &quot;And how could I negate that these hands and this
body are mine? Perhaps, only then when I compare
myself to these insensates...''^^39^^ It may very well turn out,
however, that all this is merely my dream. &quot;Stopping to
consider this idea, I see so clearly that there are no
conclusive features or sufficiently unquestionable marks by
which it would be possible to distinguish neatly between
being awake and sleeping, that I am quite astounded; and
my astonishment is such that it can nearly persuade me
that I am asleep.''^^40^^</p>

<p>     At the same time, our mind faces such clear and
distinct propositions concerning the elementary and universal
things studied in arithmetic and geometry (these
propositions pertain to the extension of corporeal things, their
configuration, magnitude, number, time, etc.), that they


cannot be doubted. Arithmetic, geometry, and similar
sciences are not concerned about the actual existence in
nature of the objects that they study. At the same time,
these sciences contain something indubitable and reliable.
&quot;For whether I sleep or stay awake, two and three joined
together always form the number five, and the square will
never have more than four sides.''^^41^^</p>

<p>     But can we not allow, Descartes continues, that God or
better say some evil spirit, just as cunning as he is
powerful, used all his art to deceive me? In this case, however,
the sky, air, earth, colours, sounds, all external objects
will be mere illusions and dreams.</p>

<p>     ``And then, as I judge sometimes that the others err,
even in things which they believe to know with the
greatest certainty it may be that he wanted that I should be
mistaken each time that I add two and three, or count the
number of the sides of a square, or judge about things that
are even easier, if one can imagine something easier than

<p>     Thus, Descartes concludes, one may doubt even
mathematical proofs.</p>

<p>     But is there anything certain, in general? Descartes
believes that the original and basic certainty lies in the idea
of myself as something existing. &quot;There is no doubt,
however, that I exist, if he deceives me; and let him deceive
me as he will, he will never make it so that I shall not exist
as long as I think myself to be something... This
proposition: <em>I am, I exist</em>, is necessarily true each time I
pronounce it or conceive it in my mind.''^^43^^</p>

<p>     One can doubt anything, but I cannot doubt that I,
the doubter, exist, insists Descartes.</p>

<p>     ``So, we have so much repugnance to conceiving that
that which thinks does not exist at the same time as it
thinks, that, notwithstanding all the most extravagant
suppositions, we shall not prevent us from believing that
this conclusion: <em>I think, therefore I exist</em>, is true, and
consequently is the first and the most certain conclusion
presenting itself to him who conducts his thinking in an
orderly manner.''^^44^^</p>

<p>     Thus, the idea of my existence, self-consciousness, is
the most reliable and indubitable truth, asserts Descartes.
My essence is thinking, he believes, i.e., &quot;everything that
takes place in us in such a way that we perceive it
immediately by ourselves&quot;.^^45^^ (Thinking thus includes not
only understanding but also desire and imagination, that
is, all those psychical processes that are accompanied by
self-consciousness.) Descartes believes that I therefore
cannot deduce my existence from the facts which are


expressed in such representations as &quot;I see'', &quot;I walk'',
etc., for the content they render is not absolutely
unproblematic: &quot;I may myself believe that I see or walk,
although I have not opened my eyes or budged from my
place; for this sometimes happens when I sleep, and might
even happen to me even if I had no body.&quot;46 it is quite
different when I have in mind only the &quot;consciousness
that is in me, which makes me believe that I see or walk...''
In the latter case, &quot;the conclusion is so absolutely true that
I cannot doubt it&quot;.^^47^^</p>

<p>     Man believes, Descartes continues, that he perceives
actually existing objects through his sense organs, but their
reality can well be doubted. At the same time, there can
be no doubt that it seems to me that I perceive them. &quot;In
any case, it is certain at least that it seems to me that I
see, that I hear, and that I feel warmth.''^^48^^ &quot;For if I
conclude that wax is or exists, from seeing it, it is certainly
much more evident that I am, or exist myself, from the
fact that I see it. It is quite possible that what I see is not
in fact wax; it may also happen that I have no eyes even to
see anything; but it cannot so happen that when I see or
when I think that I see (which I do not distinguish), I that
think am not something.''^^49^^</p>

<p>     It is important to stress that from Descartes' point of
view my existence and my thinking are not just two
properties equally belonging to reasonable substance
(<em>res cogitans</em>). That substance itself is a certain unity of
the activity of thinking and its product, the reasoning
``I'', so that when activity ceases, ``I'' itself ceases to exist,
too. &quot;/ <em>am, I exist</em>: that is certain; but how long? As
long as I think; for it may so happen that if I should cease
to think I would at the same time cease to be or exist.&quot;^^50^^
Thus, according to Descartes, self-consciousness, the
idea of one's own existence, is characterised not only by
clarity and distinctness, i.e., immediate obviousness, but
also by the greatest certainty.</p>

<p>     But what, is to be done about recognising the actual
existence of the world external relative to consciousness?
Are there any convincing instruments for proving it?</p>

<p>     At this point in his arguments Descartes is compelled
to invoke God, for his system possesses no other
instruments for the solution of this question. Descartes
endeavours to persuade the reader that present in
consciousness is a clear and distinct idea of an all-perfect being,
that is, God, whose existence follows from his very essence.
This being cannot be a deceiver, Descartes continues.
And that means that everything that is conceived
clearly and distinctly, must be true, that is, it must pertain


to a really existing object.</p>

<p>     Now, Descartes concludes: &quot;I no longer think verily that
I must admit with temerity all things which the senses
seem to teach us, but I do not think either that I must
generally doubt them all.''^^51^^ &quot;At least it is to be avowed
that all the things which I conceive in them clearly and
distinctly, that is to say, all the things, generally speaking,
that are comprised in the subject-matter of speculative
geometry, are really in them.''^^52^^</p>

<p>     Let us single out certain fundamental points in
Descartes' reasoning that are important for our subsequent

<p>     First of all, Descartes believes that the knowledge by
the subject of the states of his own consciousness in their
relation to ``I'' is something different from the knowledge
of external objects. From his standpoint that means
that the subject has direct access to the subjective sphere,
whereas the knowledge of external bodies is only something
mediated. For this reason, although cognitive activity in
ordinary experience is directed, first of all, at external
material objects, and although the role of the subjective
world and its characteristics usually remain in the
background, as it were, Descartes believes that logically it is
the cognition of subjective states in connection with the
``I'' that produces them that is the simplest matter. (Let us
note that it is this point of Descartes' reasoning that
served as the starting point for empiricist introspectionist

<p>     Let us further take into account that Descartes links
substantiation of knowledge with the degree to which
it is assimilated in reflexion. He insists that precisely that
knowledge is the genetic and logical starting point of any
other which has been most thoroughly reflected upon, that
is, contains not only an indication of its object but also a
reference to the conditions of its own obviousness and
certainty. It is this knowledge, in Descartes' view, that is
contained in the proposition &quot;I think, therefore I exist&quot;
which must, in his opinion, be made the foundation of the
entire system of knowledge.</p>

<p>     An important element of Descartes' conception is the
thesis that the subject, the thinking ``I'', does not exist side
by side with his activity but <em>is</em> its product and at the same
time permanent condition, that is, it exists only insofar
as the activity of thinking is realised (and is in a certain
sense even implied by that activity).</p>

<p>     Finally, let us point out Descartes' fundamental
distinction between judgement about objective reality and
positing the reality itself. Precisely these fundamental


elements of the Cartesian conceptions were assimilated by
later idealistic philosophy in its attempt to solve the
problem of substantiation of knowledge.</p>

<p>     Let us critically analyse some of these attempts and also
Descartes' reasoning.</p>

<p>     In Descartes' view, only those propositions fully satisfy
the criteria of clarity and distinctness whose content is
correlated with the act of subjective reflexion. For instance,
mathematical propositions are only clear and distinct
to the extent to which we do not ascribe an objectively
real meaning to them (that is, we consider the properties
of a triangle without going into whether triangles exist in
reality). In principle, Descartes believes, sense perception
can also be clear and distinct but only if we correlate it
solely with the states of our consciousness (i.e., include it
in the act of self-consciousness) ignoring the question of
the objectiveness of its meaning. It is easy in ordinary life
to neglect the objective meaning of mathematical
propositions; mathematics is therefore, in Descartes' view, an
absolutely reliable science and a model of science in
general. It is extremely difficult to apply this operation to sense
perceptions, therefore sciences based on the sense
organs' data are far from the ideals of strict science. To be
more precise, they can approach these ideals only to the
extent to which they can be mathematised. Sense
perceptions, Descartes believes, are often clear but they are
rarely distinct (``I call clear that which presents and
manifests itself to an attentive mind; ...[I call] distinct that
which is so precise and different from everything else that
it does not contain in itself anything that does not appear
manifest to him who properly considers it... For example,
when someone feels strong pain, the consciousness that he
has of that pain is clear in his view, and yet it is not always
distinct, for ordinarily he confuses it with the false
judgements which he makes about the nature of that which he
believes to take place in the wounded part...'').^^53^^</p>

<p>     These arguments confirm the rationalist nature of
Descartes' epistemological conception.</p>

<p>     But can we agree that the act of cognition of the states
of one's own consciousness, that is, the act of subjective
reflexion, is a means of obtaining the most obvious and
indubitable assertions, without departing from the
positions of empiricism in epistemology?</p>

<p>     This possibility, far from being excluded logically,
actually proved to be one of the principal ways of the
development of metaphysical empiricism in West European
philosophy---a path on which empiricism becomes
subjective idealist phenomenalism.</p>


<p>     Attempts at cardinal solution of the philosophical
problem of substantiation of knowledge through subjectivist
interpretation of the sense data took a most sophisticated
and technically elaborate form in the doctrine of the
&quot;sense data&quot; which was the subject-matter of lively debate
in English and American philosophical literature in the
first half of the present century.</p>

<p>     The adherents of this doctirne (which in different
variants developed within the philosophical systems of
neorealism, critical realism, and logical positivism) tried to
combine the view that obvious and directly given
knowledge expresses, in one way or another, the subject's
reflexion about himself, with the assumption that
experience contains knowledge about really existing objects, and
not merely to combine these propositions but to deduce
the latter from the former without invoking God, unlike
Descartes. With this aim in view, certain specific objects,
&quot;sense data'', the knowledge of which is intuitive and
indubitable, were postulated to be the results of reflexion
about the content of perception.</p>

<p>     Here is a typical mode of introducing &quot;sense data&quot; as
objects of epistemological study: &quot;When I see a tomato
there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it
is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted
piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing
there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really
a reflection; perhaps I am even the victim of some
hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there
exists a Ted patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape
standing out from a background of other colour-patches,
and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field
of colour is directly present to my consciousness.''^^54^^</p>

<p>     It is these colour-patches, sound tones, etc. that are
regarded as &quot;sense data''. Importantly, they are not
identified with sense perceptions. The &quot;sense data&quot; are
ascribed the status of objects of a special kind while sense
perceptions are the result of direct, intuitive knowledge
of these objects. The elementary process underlying any
cognition is regarded as special ``sensing'', direct
perception of the &quot;sense data&quot; in the act of directly grasping
their content. At the same time, the &quot;sense data&quot; are not
material things either, for possession of certain &quot;sense
data&quot; is no guarantee yet of the actual existence of the
material object to which they will prove to pertain. Each
cognizing subject has his own private &quot;sense data&quot;
different from the &quot;sense data&quot; of another person.</p>

<p>     H. H. Price, one of the well-known theoreticians of this
conception, thus describes the main characteristics of &quot;sense


data&quot;: (1) They are individuals, not universal. (2) They
are not substances, for they are created <em>ex nihilo</em> and
return in <em>nihil;</em> they depend for their existence, origin and
properties on the state of the person sensing. (3) They may
be regarded as events, but they are not phases of material
things. (4) They are not phases of the conscious subject,
for they are in some respects constituents of the surfaces
of extra-cerebral physical objects existing in this sense &quot;at
a long distance from the skull''. (5) Hence, unlike other
events, they seem to be phases of no substance and inhere
in none; they are thus neither mental nor physical.^^55^^</p>

<p>     This description shows the paradoxical nature of the
objects postulated. The attempt at reconciling the thesis
of immediate, intuitive, unquestionable nature of grasping
the &quot;sense data&quot; (a thesis which compels the theoreticians
of this conception to emphasise the private character of
these specific objects, their dependence on the cognizing
subject) with the view that in actual experience we deal
with physical, material objects rather than with the
subject's states, induced the theoreticians to ascribe
incompatible features to the &quot;sense data''.</p>

<p>     Indeed, what is a real material object and how does
knowledge of it arise in the opinion of the supporters of
this conception?</p>

<p>     A material object is nothing but a definite ensemble,
class, or family of &quot;sense data'', reply these theoreticians.
This family consists both of actual &quot;sense data&quot; existing at
a given moment (which, as we have been told already, are
created <em>ex nihilo</em> and return <em>in nihil</em>) and of an infinite
number of possible &quot;sense data&quot; which are not actually
present in the sense field at the present moment but can
become real under definite conditions. There was a debate
among the adherents of this conception as to whether
the status of real existence should be ascribed to potential
&quot;sense data''.</p>

<p>     Potential &quot;sense data&quot; are linked with actually existing
ones by definite dependences arranged in series. All &quot;sense
data'', both actual and potential, pertaining to the given
material object, are divided into two subclasses: those
which characterise the ``real'' or ``standard'' features of the
given object vs. those which constitute its distorted form,
its ``appearance''. A round object will from a certain angle
be perceived as an elliptical one, while a red-coloured
object in unusual lighting will look black, etc. On these
grounds the &quot;sense data&quot; pertaining to the given material
object were divided into ``nuclear'' and ``non-standard''.</p>

<p>     Analysing the logic of such reasoning, we observe, first
of all, that recognising the dependence of the &quot;sense data&quot;


on the subject and his states is apparently incompatible
with ascribing these ``data'' to the material objects
themselves which exist objectively and really (``at a long
distance from the skull''); we even observe here an attempt at
reducing the latter to an ensemble of &quot;sense data''.
Indeed, it is well known that the clarity and detail with
which my consciousness perceives the various sense
qualities of an object depend on the concentration of my
attention, on my absorption in the procedure of
considering the aspects of the given object. Moreover, a close
scrutiny of the object may reveal some properties which
have previously been unnoticed. But that means that the
act of generation of &quot;sense data'', which are regarded as
existing &quot;at a long distance from the skull'', is
determined by the subject's awareness!</p>

<p>     It also proves untenable that &quot;sense data&quot; as objects
<em>sui generis</em> are discovered by reflexion about experiences,
about sense perception. Sense perception is always
directed, in one way or another, at actually existing material
objects. These objects include, among others, mirror
images, artificial presentation of some object, etc. It is
a different matter that the subject may err in the process
of perception, taking one object for another, e.g., a mirror
image of the given object or its cleverly made lookalike
for the object itself. The subject may erroneously assess
the conditions of perception of an object, so that
numerous illusions arise, which are analysed in detail in
the modern psychology of perception. (Hallucinations are
different from perception, including illusory perceptions,
not only in that there is no real object corresponding to it
but also in its own subjective mode.) Errors of perception
are thus quite possible and occur not infrequently. It is
important to stress, however, that, first, perception is always
aimed at real material objects rather than at &quot;sense data'',
and second, that ordinary practice always has quite
definite methods permitting to separate erroneous perceptions
and illusions from those to which real perceptions
correspond. Of course, in practical experience tasks have to be
solved which involve qualities and sensual aspects of
objects (colours, spatial forms, sounds, etc.) regarded as
special objects by the theoreticians of modern empiricism.
But the point is that a knowledge of these aspects is
derivative from the knowledge of real objects as a whole. In
other words, in real experience the dependence is the
reverse of that assumed in the conception analysed here.
&quot;Sense data&quot; as objects <em>sui generis</em>, neither material nor
psychical, and the corresonding elementary cognitive
process of ``sensing'' are by no means introduced into the


epistemological conception as a result of analysing the
structure of genuine sense experience (as claimed by the
authors of the doctrine) but postulated as a mode of
solving the problem of substantiating knowledge on the basis
of accepting the thesis about the existence of immediate
and unquestionable knowledge containing a reference to
the cognizing subject.</p>

<p>     The very task of identifying and reidentifying those
aspects of objects which were hypostatised as &quot;sense data&quot;
(i.e., the task of defining whether we deal with one and the
same single colour shade, the given individual note, etc.,
rather than simply with two similar individual
representatives of one and the same colour or sound as a sense
universal), can only be solved if the sense properties
referred to are correlated with material objects instead of
being regarded as independent essences. Only by solving
the task of identification and reidentification of material
objects (and that task has a definite mode of solution in
experience) can we identify and reidentify the separate
sense aspects and qualities of the objects. Thus we can
assert that we contemplate precisely the given colour
spectrum rather than a similar copy of the same sensual
``kind'' only if we correlate it with that material object in
which it inheres, e.g., the given picture, distinguishing this
object from all the others (we distinguish the original from
its copy or reproduction or clever imitation). We can
assert with certainty that we hear the same performance of a
symphony (this question may arise if we are compelled to
stop listening for a while) only if we can reidentify the
material source of sound and the real objective situation,
that is, if we discover that we are hearing the same
musicians, see the same conductor, sit in the same concert hall,
etc. Thus, if &quot;sense data&quot; existed as independent objects,
they could be neither identified nor reidentified. In this
case, however, they could not form the foundation of

<p>     Let us now analyse the question of whether
propositions about material objects can be deduced from the
propositions about actual and potential &quot;sense data''. This
doctrine in its linguistic version, developed by logical
positivists, asserts that an utterance about a material object is
equivalent to a set of utterances about &quot;sense data&quot;
(actual and potential).</p>

<p>     Let us take into account, however, that this set is
infinite, for it must include indications of all possible
conditions (the point of view, the position, the conditions of
lighting, etc.) under which the given object will be
observed. Each condition will characterise &quot;sense data&quot; that


are somewhat different from all the others. But elements
of an infinite set cannot be enumerated in finite time,
while the procedure of identification and reidentification
of material objects is, in actual experience, carried out
rather quickly and, as a rule, without mistakes.</p>

<p>     Let us further consider that utterances about material
objects are characterised by a specific indeterminateness
and openness with regard to the possible sets of &quot;sense
data&quot; which are assumed to be relevant to them. Thus, the
statement &quot;There is a car in the garage&quot; does not specify
anything about the car's colour, size, shape, style, make
and so on. Hence if we start to draw up a ``sense-datum''
analysis of the content of this utterance we shall quickly
come to the conclusion that there are a great many
variants of this analysis, and whatever variant we should
choose, we have no guarantee that the choice was made
correctly (e.g., we may include &quot;red sense data&quot; in our set,
and the car may prove to be blue, and so on).^^56^^</p>

<p>     The most essential objection to the analysis of the
meaning of utterances in ``sense-datum'' terms is that this
analysis cannot in fact be implemented in pure form even if
we accept the task <em>as</em> meaningful. Explicating the content
of an utterance about a material object in ``sense-datum''
terms necessarily includes a reference to both an
observer and the conditions of observation. Both assume the
concept of material objects (the subject is not, of course,
a material object only, but it is this quality that is
essential in this case, that is, the fact that he can change his
position relative to other objects, move among them, etc.).
Thus, from the standpoint of the conception here analysed
the utterance &quot;There is a car in the garage&quot; means: &quot;If
the observer enters the garage and performs certain actions
(e.g., turns his head in a given direction, moves his hands in
a given manner, etc.), he will have the following set of
'sense data'.'' It is important to note that this analysis
implies a normal functioning of the observer's sense

<p>     Naturally, the concepts of the observer, his sense
organs, action, the place of observation, direction of
observation, etc., characterise definite material objects, their
relations, states, processes in which they participate, etc.
Thus an attempt to give an analysis of the meaning of
utterance only in terms of &quot;sense data&quot; is unsuccessful, for it is
impossible to avoid using terms pertaining to material
objects in the analytic sentence. All attempts by the
adherents of the ``sense-datum'' conception to evade this
fundamental difficulty have been fruitless.</p>

<p>     Let us point out another paradox to which this doctrine


leads. Supposing I know that you have a magnet hidden
in your pocket. If I stand at your side, compass in hand,
the needle of the compass that should point north will
deviate affected by the hidden magnet. This fact is easily
explainable in terms of material objects and their causal
connections. However, if I adhere to the ``sense-datum''
conception, I must make the strange conclusion that
actual events (the actual ``data'' pertaining to the
behaviour of the compass) are conditioned by merely potential
ones (the &quot;sense data&quot; pertaining to the hidden

<p>     It thus proved impossible to substantiate the real
sensual experiences to which, in the empiricists' view, all
cognition is ultimately reducible, by the doctrine of the ``
sensedata'', essences of a special kind having a private nature
and dependent on the subject. The concept of material
object independent of the individual observer is a
necessary characteristic of experience directed at the external
world, the kind of characteristic that can in no way be
reduced to some ensemble of &quot;sense data''.</p>


<p>     Does recognising the independence of the material
object from individual consciousness signify a rejection of
the attempt itself of substantiating knowledge through
assertion of the self-certainty of knowledge or some
subjective structures connected with it? The experiences of
philosophy throughout its history show that it is not
obligatory. There are epistemological conceptions in
bourgeois philosophy which try not to make the mistakes
characteristic of subjectivist empiricism, of the ``
sensedatum'' doctrine, and at the same time to substantiate
knowledge through fundamental recognition of the
specific and autonomous nature of subjectiveness. It is stressed
in this case that any cognitive experiences have such
constitutive links (stipulating the presence in experience of
physical objects with a definite correlation and
subordination of the various aspects of these objects, of causal
chains, of spatio-temporal arrangement of objects and
events, etc.) which cannot be reduced to &quot;sense data'', to
some chance empirical filling of experience or mere
physical impact of an external object on the cognizant


subject's sense organs. The structure of experience is
objective in nature, assert the adherents of this approach,
and it does not depend on the individual observer,
individual subject, his states and &quot;sense data''.</p>

<p>     At the same time a fundamentally important step is
taken in the interpretation of the subject himself: the
subject is split, as it were, into two distinct constitutive strata,
the individual and transcendental subjects. As regards the
first, the objective structure of experience is believed to be
independent of it. At the same time, this structure, the
norms and criteria applied in the cognitive process, are
rooted in the propertied of the transcendental subject. This
approach, which came to be termed transcendentalism, is
thus a kind of reformulation of Descartes' programme of
analysing cognition. Various types of transcendentalism
differ from each other in their treatment of the
possibility itself of discovering the transcendental structure of
experience and, consequently, the possibility of solving
the problem of substantiation of knowledge.</p>

<p>     One of the most influential conceptions of this type
in modern bourgeois philosophy is Edmund Husserl's
transcendental phenomenology. It should be noted that of
all the transcendentalist doctrines, phenomenology is the
closest to Descartes in the formulation of tasks and in the
search for the methods of epistemological research. Husserl
endeavours to analyse transcendental consciousness by
applying a specific procedure which he calls a
phenomenological description of what is given to consciousness with
the greatest obviousness and self-certainty.</p>

<p>     Husserl believes that any cognition of reality is founded
on direct, intuitive knowledge identified in
phenomenology with perception. The latter, however, is not understood
at all in the spirit of philosophical empiricism. Sense
perception and direct perception are not synonymous in
Husserl's philosophy. First, Husserl singles out various types of
direct perception and the corresponding experiences of
obviousness, pertaining not only to physical objects but
also to states of consciousness, not only to individual
objects but also to their essences, ``eidoses'', or universals
(the so-called immediate insight into essence). Second,
Husserl asserts that perception of physical objects, or
&quot;external perception'', is by no means reducible to a given
ensemble of sensual components, the &quot;sense data'', but
always includes certain non-sensual elements or layers
characterising the schema of the given kind of objectiveness.</p>

<p>     Substantiation of knowledge in transcendental
phenomenology is reduced to singling out the acts of
cognition whose objects are experienced quite obviously,


that is, are actually and immediately given to
consciousness. The other aspect of the solution offered is separation
of the actually given from that which is not actually given.
The point is, Husserl argues, that in ordinary cognition as
it factually occurs, the actually given, i.e., immediately
grasped, is mixed with what is not actually given, what is
added in thinking, assumed or supposed (``imagined'', in
Husserl's terminology). Certainly that which is not given
actually but merely assumed is linked in a definite way
with what is given quite obviously. However, this link is
not of the sort to warrant certain expectation that future
experience will ensure the ``implementation'' of
experiential components that are purely ``imaginary'' at the given
stage (i.e., it will provide corresponding data experienced
with certainty).^^59^^</p>

<p>     For instance, if I perceive a house, I obviously perceive
at the given moment only the givenness to me of the side
of the house that directly faces me. At the same time, the
very act of my perception includes the assumption of the
existence of the house's other sides and the <em>possibility</em>
for me to see these sides provided I move in a certain
manner round the house. (That is exactly what the
representatives of the empirical conception analysed above called
the &quot;possible sense data&quot;.) Without assuming the
possibility of obtaining corresponding obvious entities, the act
of perception itself would be impossible. It may so
happen, however, that in moving round the house I shall
discover that its back wall is destroyed by some
catastrophe, that consequently it is no longer a house in the proper
sense of the word, and that the dwellers have left it. In this
case my original perception of the given object as a normal
house will prove to be erroneous, and expectations of
corresponding obvious entities connected with the given
object, unrealised.</p>

<p>     Thus, the assumption in the act of perception itself of
some individual object being a thing of a given kind, in
this case &quot;a house&quot; (its perception &quot;against the horizon&quot;
of a definite kind of objectiveness, as Husserl puts it),
proved to be unsatisfied by the corresponding individual
certainties. The individual object, &quot;this house'', was not
given to consciousness with complete certainty. It is,
however, important to emphasise, Husserl continues, that
the very act of assumption, the act of ``opinion'' about the
given individual object, is given to consciousness with
certainty. The perception of the individual object as a
house proved to be unrealised, but the very act of such and
such orientation of consciousness, in this case orientation
at perception of the given object as a house, is fully


obvious to the consciousness.</p>

<p>     From Husserl's standpoint, a &quot;material thing always
remains incompletely and one-sidedly open. This involves
the possibility of disappointment, that is, the possibility
that in new `perspectives' the thing will not prove to be
identical to itself. A material thing always reveals itself
relatively, so that doubt about its actual being is not
excluded, and its being thereby manifests itself as accidental.
The being of a material thing is never considered other
than along with the consideration of the possibility of its
non-being. We shall never be able to assert with full
certaintiy, that is, apodictically, that this table actually
exists because I actually and directly see this colour and
this figure.''^^60^^</p>

<p>     The fact, however, is given to consciousness with full
apodictical obviousness that it performs at a given moment
the acts of such and such orientation, assuming, ``opining''
something. One can doubt the being of the external
world but one cannot doubt the being of consciousness
itself, the being of self, Husserl repeats Descartes' train of

<p>     As we orientate our consciousness at direct perception,
at experiencing its acts with apodictical certainty, ignoring
the question whether actual objects correspond to these
acts (i.e., performing in Husserl's terms the <em>epoche</em>
procedure, that is, refraining from asserting the actual existence
of the corresponding objects), we are dealing, from the
standpoint of transcendental phenomenology, with a
special kind of object---&quot;pure consciousness , and with a
special act of direct comprehension, intuitive grasping of
this object---transcendental reflexion.</p>

<p>     Husserl underlines the fact that ordinary experience,
with which everyday practice has to do, and the special
sciences, proceed from the actual existence of the world of
material objects. That is the so-called natural attitude of
consciousness. Transcendental reflexion, whose task is
finding out apodictical certainties (and that is the only way
to &quot;solving the problem of substantiation of knowledge,
Husserl believes), is forced to abandon the ``natural''
attitude of ordinary consciousness, that is, it has to perform
the <em>epoche</em> procedure.</p>

<p>     But &quot;transcendental reduction&quot; and <em>epoche</em> are not
enough for substantiating knowledge, Husserl believes. To
achieve that goal, &quot;eidetic reduction&quot; is also needed.</p>

<p>     Knowledge of certain objective givenness always
assumes direct grasping not only of individual givenness but
also of the substantive, necessary connections, of object
structures. Individual certainty itself is given only in the



framework of ``horizon'' of essential (``eidetic'')
dependences. Substantiation of knowledge is therefore, first of
all, establishment of these dependences which determine
the possibility of any concrete experience pertaining to the
comprehension of individual real objects. In other words,
the answer to the question &quot;How is knowledge possible?&quot;
assumes, first of all, the establishment of the essences, the
``eidoses'' of all the various types of ``thingness'' with
which experience has to deal.</p>

<p>     ``Eidoses&quot; in transcendental phenomenology are not
the same as concepts, although they appear very close at
first glance, for concepts, too, characterise the essence of
objects. ``Eidoses'' are not cognitive, logical constructions
but rather meanings and essential structures of various
types of thingness, which are given, in Husserl's view,
directly, intuitively, within a specific attitude of
consciousness. They exist prelingually, although they may be
expressed in language, too. However, language is incapable of fully
expressing all their shadings, for first, it is the instrument of
reasoning rather than of direct contemplation, and second,
it is inseparable from the ``natural'', ordinary attitude of
consciousness. The task of phenomenological description
is exceptionally difficult, both because of the difficulty
of performing the act itself of intuitively grasping the ``
eidoses'', an act assuming a rejection of the ``natural''
attitude of consciousness, and because of the impossibility of
describing precisely in language the results of
transcendental reflexion; it therefore proves necessary to resort to
metaphors, hints, allegories, and other modes of oblique
rendering of meaning, including the invention of new
verbal constructions.</p>

<p>     The types and kinds of ``eidoses'' are assumed to be
varied and irreducible to one another in transcendental
phenomenology. They include the ``eidoses'' of separate kinds
of physical objects (a ``table'', a ``chair'', a ``house'', etc.);
such ``eidoses'' as &quot;physical object'', ``number'', ``figure'',
``perception'', ``reasoning'', etc.; such ``eidoses'' which
phenomenalist empiricists would refer to as &quot;sense universals&quot;:
``redness'', ``blueness'', ``colouredness'', ``loudness'', etc.</p>

<p>     Thus for Husserl, genuine knowledge essentially
coincides with experience, with direct perception of the
corresponding objective givenness (it is another matter that
perception itself, as we have said, is interpreted very
broadly, with various types of perception singled put, etc.).</p>

<p>     In Husserl's view, thinking taken by itself does not
give true knowledge but only knowledge in a tentative
sense of the term, ``figurative'' or ``symbolic'' knowledge,
one that is derived from and dependent on genuine,


experiential knowledge. Although thinking is necessarily
woven into the flow of experience and scientific
activity is impossible without it, overestimating the significance
of thinking at the expense of underestimating the
fundamental role of the intuitions lying at its basis leads
cognition into a <em>cul-de-sac</em>, insists Husserl.</p>

<p>     Let us pay special attention to this point in
transcendental phenomenology, for the view of knowledge as
being very close, if not identical, with a certain mode of
immediately grasping the ojbject essentially characterises
all the varieties of substantfation of knowledge
undertaken in the bourgeois philosophy of the New Times. The
trend of thinking leading to this understanding of the
problem of substantiation is very simple. Indeed, if purely
cognitive knowledge is derivative in nature, its premises
are obviously different, for they would otherwise be
themselves conditioned and substantiated. They cannot
therefore fail to be, to some extent or other, given
immediately and intuitively.</p>

<p>     What are the modes of discovering the ``eidoses'', that
is, the possibilities of experiential knowledge? They
include transcendental eidetic reflexion, the experience of
consciousness of a special type, inner perception realised
without the mediation of the sense organs and directed at
&quot;pure consciousness&quot; itself. Husserl believes that ``eidoses''
are usually not given in consciousness in pure form, being
merged, as it were, with certain individual certainties.
Transcendental consciousness takes up the ``eidetic''
attitude, which permits it to separate an ``eidos'' from its
concrete, individual exemplification and grasp it directly
as such (``intuitive insight into the essence''). It is in
principle enough to have one copy, one individual embodiment
of some ``eidos'' to grasp the ``eidos'' itself; e.g.,
transcendental eidetic reflexion about the act of perception of
the given house is enough to discover the ``eidos'' of
houses in general. In practice, however, this procedure is
difficult to realise, if not at all impossible, Husserl has to
concede. He therefore suggests a special technique for
&quot;eidetic description&quot; which he worked out.
Proceeding from an actual instance of assuming the given
object to be associated with the given meaning (e.g., the
meaning of ``house''), we start freely fantasising, varying
the exemplifications of the given meaning, the given
``eidos''. We discover something invariant in these
exemplifications, something that cannot be eliminated as long as
we continue to ``imagine'' objects associated with the
given meaning. That invariant will be the ``eidos'' of the
objective givenness. &quot;Eidetic analysis'', in Husserl's view,


permits to single out the structures of experience, and in
the first place, the necessary a priori connections
independent of any concrete accumulation of experience. This, in
its turn, enables one to construct apriori &quot;regional
ontologies&quot; corresponding to various types of objective
givenness and specifying the ``horizons'' of cognitive activity
both in the sphere of pre-scientific knowledge and in the
diverse scientific disciplines.</p>

<p>     Fundamentally important for Husserl is the
circumstance established in transcendental reflexion that
consciousness is always aimed or intentionally directed, as
Husserl puts it, at some <em>thing</em>, at some <em>object</em>. This object
need not necessarily be a material individual thing, it may
also be an ideal ``essence'', ``eidos'', a universal, or acts of
consciousness itself. The object may exist really, and then
it may not be real but merely ``imagined'' in the acts of
consciousness. If transcendental reflexion reveals ``eidoses''
that are not related to a certain &quot;material ontology&quot; but
characterise the nature of consciousness itself; if, for
instance, the object is the ``eidos'' of &quot;perception in
general'', the act of perception in this case may not actually
exist as a subject of reflexion but be merely ``imagined''
in the free variation in fantasy of various copies of
perception associated with the meaning of perception in general.
In this case the act of perception, being an object of
intentional analysis, is irreal, while the act of transcendental
reflexion directed at this object, pertains to the reality of
consciousness, continues Husserl. Thus, the possibility of
real or irreal existence obtains not only for such objects
as material bodies but also for such potential objects of
transcendental reflexion as acts of consciousness. As for
the ``eidoses'' that are either included among the
material bodies, or else are formal (logical and mathematical)
``eidoses'', or the ``eidoses'' of consciousness itself, they
have a special ideal existence in transcendental
consciousness, for, as distinct from the real events which ``happen'',
``eidoses'' cannot ``happen'': their existence is
inseparable from the existence of transcendental consciousness
itself. It is important, according to Husserl, that
consciousness is in any case objective, it is objectively oriented.
Each act of consciousness assumes the existence of two
poles, the intentional <em>object</em> of some kind and the <em>subject</em>
himself implementing the act of consciousness, of ``I'', the
<em>ego</em>. The object lies outside consciousness, for it is
transcendental relative to the intentional act, and at the same
time it is in another respect immanent to consciousness, for
it is assumed or ``imagined'' by consciousness, while the
question of the existence of reality corresponding to the


given intentional object always remains open, Husserl

<p>     Thus, the specificity of organisation of consciousness,
from the standpoint of transcendental phenomenology, is
expressed in its <em>subject-object</em> structure. The subject--
object relation is only inherent in consciousness and
expresses the links between its different poles. It would be
absurd and meaningless to try to model this relation in
terms of some physical bodies or systems, Husserl believes,
for the components of this relation (the intentional act,
the intentional object, the subject implementing these
acts) characterise only &quot;pure consciousness&quot; and would be
inconceivable without it.</p>

<p>     The so-called natural attitude proceeds from the
existence of both the ``I'' and the world of real objects
external with regard to me. The ``I'' in this case refers to a
concrete corporeal individual endowed with the psyche,
with consciousness. However, since the act of
transcendental reduction assumes temporary removal from
consideration of the real existence of the world of material objects,
Husserl reminds us, the question of the existence of my
body also remains open. Transcendental reflexion has to
do only with &quot;pure consciousness''. The latter is formed of
intentional acts with corresponding intentional objects. If I
perform, however, not only transcendental but also
``eidetic'' reduction, setting myself the goal of discovering
the ``eidoses'' of certain material and formal objects as well
as the ``eidoses'' of consciousness itself, Husserl insists, I
reveal and directly grasp the essence of &quot;pure
consciousness&quot; itself, namely the Transcendental Ego as underlying
all these ``eidoses'' and intentional acts, as constituting
the meanings of all the objective givennesses. The object
correlative to the Transcendental Ego is the &quot;eidos of the
world&quot; as the horizon of all possible types and kinds of
objects. It is the Transcendental Ego that implements the
acts of transcendental reflexion, Husserl believes.
Therefore, when the latter is directed at the Transcendental Ego
itself, it coincides, as it were, with itself, having itself for
an object of its own reflexion. In this case, &quot;absolute
reflexion&quot; is realised, &quot;absolute knowledge&quot; is attained
which underlies all knowledge and is the supreme instance
of substantiating cognition in general. The whole of
transcendental phenomenology can therefore be regarded as
``egology'', a doctrine of the Transcendental Ego. It is
the knowledge of subjective being that underlies any
knowledge, Husserl believes, stressing the need for &quot;
looking towards&quot; the subject.^^61^^</p>

<p>     Thus from Husserl's viewpoint, reflexion and self--


cognition underlie knowledge and experience. That
knowledge is the most adequate which coincides with absolute
reflexion, absolute self-cognition, that is, the kind of
knowledge which knows that it knows, being fully cognizant
of both its own object and its own being and those
procedures by which it is attained. Let us pay special attention
to this important point of transcendental phenomenology.

<p>     Let us further single out certain traits of the
Transcendental Ego as Husserl understands it. It must not be viewed
as a kind of supraindividual essence unifying various
concrete consciousnesses and, still less, different corporeal
individuals (the way Hegel presents the Absolute Subject).
Of course, at the level of transcendental reflexion
directed at the Transcendental Ego, Husserl believes, there
is no question of difference between concrete individual
consciousnesses (and in this sense no question of
difference between ``me'' and ``thou''), for in this case it is
a matter of finding the ``eidos'' of consciousness itself.
But the main thing, from the standpoint of transcendental
phenomenology, is that the Transcendental Ego is grasped
as a result of a definite type of my reflexion directed
at my own consciousness. The Transcendental Ego proves
to be the deep formative basis of my consciousness and,
consequently, the basis of myself. The ordinary language,
which is in the power of the ``natural'' attitude, Husserl
believes, is capable in this case, too, to lead into error,
for I can speak of ``myself'' as of a concrete corporeal
individual, with a characteristic figure, gait, facial
expression, as of the unique individual life of
consciousness with its unique ``biography'', a specific attitude to its
past and future, and finally as the supreme instance of all
cognitive activity and of all intentions, that instance which
exists before any individual psychological biography (and
in this sense before any individual ``I'') and at the same
time underlies it. It is this supreme instance that is the
Transcendental Ego which, as is clear from the above, is
also I myself residing in me, not somewhere else. There is
no access to the Transcendental Ego other than through a
special type of analysis of my own consciousness.</p>

<p>     Let us now go back to the assertion of the
subjectobject structure of consciousness---a thesis characteristic
of phenomenology. The intentional object in Husserl's
interpretation is not something ephemeral and purely
individual (as we have indicated already, that is the way
phenomenalist empiricists interpret such &quot;special objects&quot;
of consciousness as &quot;sense data''), for it is always given
&quot;on the horizon&quot; of some ``eidos'' or other, within the
framework of certain essential, necessary object structures


(and in the case of transcendental eidetic reflexion the
object may also be a pure ``eidos''). In this connection
Husserl criticises empirical introspectionism which prevailed
in West European psychology for two centuries. Following
a definite interpretation of Descartes' philosophy and
combining this interpretation with empiricist propositions,
adherents of introspectionism believed the task of
psychology to be, above all, the discovery of empirical dependences
between the data of consciousness which are
interpreted, first, as purely individual ``events'' in the
consciousness field, and second, as purely subjective data, whose
relation to the objects must be completely eliminated for
the sake of purity of inquiry. Husserl shows (and he is quite
right on this score) that analysis of the subjective, of
consciousness, is impossible outside its relation to the
object (its intentional orientation at the object, as Husserl
puts it). Husserl also insists that the data of consciousness
are not purely individual events but facts included in
certain stable and necessary structures. Meanwhile, if one
regards the task of psychology to be the description of
individual facts in the field of consciousness and
establishment of their empirical dependences, it will have to be
recognised that the act of self-consciousness, of empirical
introspection, interferes in the flow of psychical life,
distorting the purity of the object studied (for self--
consciousness is also included in the life of consciousness) and
thereby preventing the realisation of that very goal that is set
before it. This criticism was traditionally levelled at
introspectionist empiricist psychology. Husserl believes,
however, that psychology must not set itself goals characteristic
of introspectionism. The task of psychology
indubitably consists in studying subjective reality, consciousness,
and in this connection psychology is close to
transcendental phenomenology, although in the former the study
of consciousness must be carried out from a somewhat
different angle than in the latter (the question of the
relation of phenomenological psychology and transcendental
phenomenology is a special theme which we shall not
touch upon here). The study of subjective reality is
certainly inconceivable outside of acts of self--
consciousness, Husserl believes. But the procedure of self--
consciousness, he continues, must be carried out as
phenomenological reflexion aimed first of all at discovering the ``
eidoses'' of consciousness rather than as empirical
introspection. Traditional introspectionist psychology has not
attained any considerable results, he thinks, precisely
because it followed from the very first a wrong path
determined by a false understanding of the subject-matter and


methods of research. It was not due to but in spite of its
general approach that it did obtain certain results.</p>

<p>     Husserl believes that the discovery of the subject--
object structure of consciousness also helps to overcome
Descartes' dualism with its characteristic orientation at
establishing &quot;purely subjective&quot; structures outside their
objective correlation.</p>

<p>     As can be seen from the above, Husserl's phenomenolo- *
gy touches on a number of real problems in the analysis of
cognition and consciousness. Let us point to some of them
only insofar as they are important for the present study.
As we have pointed out already, he stresses quite
correctly the impossibility of studying the subjective,
consciousness, without taking into account its objective correlation
(its &quot;intentional orientation''). Husserl correctly shows
some fundamental weaknesses of introspectionist
empiricist psychology, of the epistemological conception of
subjectivist empiricism. He also states quite rightly that
consciousness is an object of a special kind, and that its
cognition must differ in some respects from cognition of a
material object external with regard to consciousness (for I
have &quot;an internal access'', as it were, to my consciousness).
It is also true that a definite connection exists between the
cognition of an external object and the fact of correlating
knowledge to the cognizing subject, that is, the fact of
self-accounting, self-consciousness, self-reflexion. It should
also be pointed out that within the framework of
transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological
psychology both Husserl and-his disciples described a great
number of facts pertaining to the work of consciousness.
Certainly these facts require critical evaluation, for their
description by phenomenologists exists within the
framework of a false conception (we shall dwell on this point
somewhat later), but at the same time they may be taken
into account and re-interpreted in those disciplines which
in one way or another deal with the analysis of
consciousness: psychology, psychiatry, esthetics, epistemology, etc.

<p>     However, with reference to Husserl's general
epistemological conception, to his solution of the problem of
substantiation of knowledge, the untenability of
transcendental phenomenology must be stated quite definitely. Let
us discuss this point in greater detail.</p>

<p>     We must recall that Husserl proceeds from the
fundamental division into what is and what is not actually given
to consciousness. Only the former, he believes, is
accompanied by the experience of self-certainty, which is
proclaimed in transcendental phenomenology to be an
indication of genuine, actual existence of the


corresponding objective givenness. We all know, however, that
experiencing some fact or event as evident is by no means
a guarantee of its actual existence. All illusions of
perception show, for instance, that we can perceive something
that actually does not exist as evident and indubitable.</p>

<p>     Husserl fully realises this fact. He therefore indicates
that phenomenological self-certainty is not identical to
subjective psychological confidence. The former is, as he
says, attained through a special attitude of consciousness,
through special procedures of transcendental reflexion.</p>

<p>     The latter, in Husserl's view, can also exist when
consciousness assumes intentional objects to which no
reality corresponds; it is here that perception illusions arise.</p>

<p>     Let us ask this question: does transcendental
phenomenology offer a method for distinctly separating subjective
confidence from the experience of certainty? Husserl sees
such a method in transcendental reflexion (assuming
<em>epoche</em>, ``transcendental'' and, in some cases, ``eidetic''
reduction, etc.). But how are we to find out that we have
performed all the operations required by transcendental
reflexion? This can only be ensured by attaining the result
of this reflexion, Husserl answers, that is, by the
emergence of a specific experience of self-certainty. We thus
find ourselves in a vicious circle.</p>

<p>     Husserl himself has to admit that in the process of
phenomenological description it is in practice very difficult to
separate ``pure'' transcendental experience of evidence
from subjective psychological phenomena that look like
it. The development of his conception was therefore
continually accompanied not only by specification of
descriptions already carried out but also, in some cases, by
essential modifications. As for Husserl's followers, they often
``saw'' quite different things as ``self-evident''. Let us also
add to this the assertion, characteristic of
phenomenology, that ordinary language cannot render precisely the
data experienced, so that even where the doctrine's
requirements are satisfied, there is no guarantee of adequate
expression of the results of analysis. All of this makes it
practically impossible to indicate any clearcut criteria
which will permit to state that the necessary purity of
phenomenological research has been attained. But if that
is the case, there is much room for arbitrariness and
subjectivism. Husserl therefore has to concede that a pure
description of the data of transcendental consciousness is
not so much an actual result of existing
phenomenological studies but rather a kind of ideal goal towards which
they must strive. That goal, Husserl believes, is conditioned
by the very formulation of the problem of


substantiation, assuming the existence of such knowledge in which
the corresponding object is given immediately, intuitively
and self-evidently.</p>

<p>     Thus the assertion of experiencing self-certainty as true
indication of objective reality is based not so much on
factual analysis of cognition and consciousness as on definite
assumptions about the nature of the problem of
substantiation of knowledge and the possible ways of its
solution, those very same assumptions of non-Marxist
epistemological conceptions of which we spoke at the beginning
of this chapter. But why should we take the assumptions
themselves to be justified?</p>

<p>     The method, suggested by Husserl, of free variation in
imagination of different expressions for the given meaning
for determining their invariant, or ``eidos'', is an attempt
at overcoming subjectivism in phenomenological
description. This method was intended to ensure some kind of
generally valid technique for analysis of consciousness. It
is easy to see, however, that this method is
fundamentally the same as ordinary empirical generalisation through
comparing individual objects. Why must the results of such
generalisation be viewed as apriori entities of
consciousness rather than as what they actually are---expressions of
finite empirical experience?</p>

<p>     Generally speaking, the procedure itself to which
Husserl refers as transcendental reflexion appears
doubtful on several significant counts. First of all that applies
to <em>epoche</em>, that is, refraining from judgement about the
existence of the objects of the material world. Of course,
situations sometimes arise in our experience when we
cannot say with certainty whether we actually deal with
the object which appears to us as really existing or
whether that is no more than appearance, an error of
perception. It is essential, however, that, first, situations of this
kind are not very frequent; second, that there are always
means of ascertaining the nature of perception, that is,
of establishing whether it is illusory or genuine; and third,
that the experiential distinction between illusion and
reality is based on a well-founded conviction of the actual
existence of at least the overwhelming majority of the
objects given us in perception. Thus the ``natural'' attitude
of consciousness taking the existence of the material
world for granted is not at all naive; on the contrary, the
belief in the universality of the situation of uncertainty
about the reality of the object of perception is unfounded.
The assertion of phenomenology that the existence of the
objects of the material world (of all the material objects in
general, rather than of particular objects of this world)


is never given with complete certainty, is the result of a
false preconception and not of analysis of actual
experience. This attitude is closely linked with the desire for
establishing the conditions of &quot;absolute knowledge''. The
latter is said to be attained when knowledge of the object
coincides with reflexion about knowledge itself, which,
in Husserl's view, occurs in transcendental reflexion.</p>

<p>     But can &quot;absolute knowledge&quot; alone be viewed as
genuine? What grounds have we for disclaiming the status
of real knowledge (and that is what Husserl insists on) for
the results of cognitive activity both in the sphere of
everyday experience and in the domain of various scientific
disciplines studying empirical facts? Would it not be more
correct to correlate, on the contrary, our ideal model of
knowledge with actual samples of knowledge obtained in
the actual cognitive process? Let us state in this
connection that those examples of apriori &quot;absolute
knowledge&quot; which Husserl cites (the truths of logic and
mathematics, the so-called regional ontologies, that is,
phenomenological descriptions of ``eidoses'' that are said to
underlie the scientific disciplines) have failed the test of the
development of science in the 20th century, as far as their
apriori and absolute quality is concerned. That is the point
where the fundamental defect is revealed not only of
Husserl's phenomenology but also of all kinds of
transcendentalism as a mode for substantiating knowledge.
We shall have occasion to return to this question.</p>

<p>     Finally, let us consider the assertion of the
Transcendental Ego's existence, the supreme substantiating
proposition of phenomenology. This assertion is obtained, as
we have seen, as a result of transcendental reflexion. But
the procedure of transcendental reflexion, involving <em>
epoche</em> and the singling out of a special object, &quot;pure
consciousness'', is very doubtful, as we have said. Therefore the
attempts to separate the ego as a unity of consciousness
and material corporeality from the ego as ``pure''
individual consciousness, and the latter, from the Transcendental
Ego, appear to be unconvincing. As for the statement that
all referential meanings, just as all individual subjects
(i.e., I myself and other sentient beings) are constituted by
myself as the Transcendental Ego, it cannot but lead to the
most odious form of subjective idealism, so completely
compromised---to solipsism, hard <em>as</em> Husserl might try to
dissociate himself from it. Although Husserl insists on the
impossibility of analysing the subjective, of analysing
consciousness, outside its objective correlation, that is not
enough to overcome Cartesian subjectivism, for the
intentional object is viewed as existing in the framework of


transcendental consciousness and as constituted by the
latter, while the existence of real objective givenness
corresponding to the intentional object is assumed to be
irrelevant to transcendental phenomenology.</p>

<p>     But can the basic premises of transcendentalism in
substantiating knowledge be retained while such obvious
weaknesses of phenomenology are discarded as its appeal
to the subjective experiences of self-certainty unsupported
by any other procedures that would be more convincing
logically? In other words, are there such variants of solving
the problem of the possibility of knowledge which
endeavour to take a more logical path remaining at the same
time in the fundamental framework of transcendentalism?
Let us consider the epistemological conception of
Fichte as an attempt to provide this kind of solution.^^62^^</p>

<p>     Fichte starts from propositions which appear to be
similar to those of phenomenology. He sets himself the task
of transforming transcendental philosophy, the doctrine of
the possibility of cognition in general and of scientific
cognition in particular, into an &quot;evident science'',^^63^^
pointing out that the theoretical doctrine of science (<em>
Wissenschaftslehre</em>) &quot;presupposes the possibility of freedom of
inner contemplation&quot;.''^^4^^ The foundation of knowledge,
Fichte insists, must be found as something absolutely first,
something that cannot be either proved or defined.</p>

<p>     Starting from the facts of empirical consciousness, and
then mentally discarding everything that is accidental,
and leaving only that which can no longer be separated
from consciousness (that is, performing a procedure which
somehow reminds one of Husserl's transcendental
reflexion), Fichte' arrives at Descartes' proposition &quot;I am&quot; as
the supreme fact underlying all others. This proposition
&quot;must probably be assumed without any proof, although
the whole doctrine of science is busy proving it&quot;.^^65^^</p>

<p>     Fichte's train of thought then reveals fundamentally
new elements. He asserts that the self-consciousness of the
Transcendental Ego, expressed in the proposition &quot;I am'',
is not simply the product of direct inner perception of a
certain evidence (as Husserl would have said) but the
result of the <em>activity</em> of determining the indeterminate.
Selfconsciousness must be understood not simply as intuitive
grasping of the object given, as it were, to the
intentional act from the outside, but as mental positing of the
object itself and at the same time as reflexion about the
product of this positing, the reflexion (which appears
as only one of the moments of a complex procedure of
self-consciousness) is by no means reduced to mere
contemplation of givenness, constituting the strenuous


activity of analytically breaking down the posited
givenness. Thus, the Transcendental Ego is not simply a given
object, as it appears to Husserl, but a kind of unity of
activity and its product, or ``act-action''. The Pure Ego does
not exist outside of the activity of self-consciousness
directed at it (let us recall a similar point in Descartes'
reasoning): &quot;The ego <em>posits itself</em>, and it is only thanks to this
self-positing; and vice versa: the ego <em>is</em>, and it <em>posits</em> its
being, only due to its own being.---It is simultaneously the
agent and the product of action; the source of activity and
that which emerges as the result of activity; act and
action are one and the same; and that is why 7 <em>am'</em> is the
expression of an act-action...''^^66^^</p>

<p>     Fichte insists that the ego outside the activity of
selfpositing and self-reflexion is nothing, it simply does not
exist. But it is precisely the active nature of the
Absolute Ego, which compels it to strive towards an ever greater
degree of self-determinateness (resulting from action upon
itself), that further leads to the necessity of opposing to it
the non-ego, which, on the one hand, delimits the ego, and
on the other, exists in the framework of the Absolute Ego,
being posited by the latter. The ego becomes an object in
its own right for itself only with the opposition of ego
and non-ego, states Fichte, that is, with the appearance of
an object external with regard to the ego. It is only
through the non-ego that the ego becomes something, i.e.,
that of which something may be said. That ego which
exists in the framework of the opposition to non-ego is
no longer an Absolute Subject but an empirical one, for
it is restricted by an object external to it. While the pure
activity (act-action) of the Absolute Ego does not assume
any object, &quot;turning back on itself'', the definition of the
ego as an empirical subject (``descending'' from the
Absolute Subject to the empirical one) reveals the mutual
mediation of ego and non-ego as the law of consciousness:
&quot;<em>no subject, no object- no object, no subject&quot;.^</em> Thus,
while the original proposition &quot;I am&quot; appears as something
immediately given and certain, the activity of
selfconsciousness necessarily leads to its self-mediation, to the
generation of a whole series of positings and
contrapositings which, in Fichte's view, logically follow one from
another. To this mediating activity of self-consciousness
corresponds the reflective activity of the theoretical
doctrine of science, in which the proposition is formulated
that the activity of the ego can only be mediated, and
&quot;there can be no unmediated&quot; activity at all.^^68^^ The
abstract moments of these positings and
contrapositings of the Pure Ego following from each other are logical


categories (reality, negation, causality, interaction, etc.)
expressing the necessary connections and dependences of
experience and making knowledge possible. The reflexion
of the theoretical doctrine of science singles out the
categorial dependences of knowledge.</p>

<p>     Attention should be paid to the following traits of the
epistemological conception analysed here, which will be
of importance in our further inquiry.</p>

<p>     According to Fichte, self-consciousness and self-cognition
are not just passive immediate grasping of some given
object but always an excursion <em>beyond the boundaries</em> of
the immediate, an attempt to define, to interpret the latter
(any elementary consciousness already contains in it an
element of thinking, Fichte believes).</p>

<p>     The ego, the pure consciousness, is not a ready-made
object from the outset, it <em>becomes</em> such, being <em>objectified</em>
as it becomes the object of its own self-cognizing activity.</p>

<p>     Hence the ego as my own object is in a certain sense a
result of creation, of constructing (positing).</p>

<p>     To the extent to which the ego becomes the object of
its own activity and reflexion, contrapositing itself to the
non-ego, it becomes different from what it originally was,
dialectically <em>changing</em> and developing itself. In other
words, the object of self-cognition is the product of its
own activity, not in the sense, however, that it is a certain
fabrication of consciousness, an arbitrary fiction, but
in the sense that the ego as an object appears as the result
of the necessary unfolding and dialectical mediation of
what originally emerged as the purely immediate
indentity 1=1. Self-cognition and reflexion assume the
exteriorisation and objectification of what was at first purely
internal and subjective, directly merging with itself as a &quot;fact
of consciousness&quot;: &quot;I am''.</p>

<p>     Generally speaking, the definition and unfolding of the
essence of what appears to be directly given and evident,
reveals a complex system of the activity of consciousness
hidden behind it, Fichte affirms.</p>

<p>     In these arguments, Fichte grasps in a speculative
idealistic form some moments of cognitive activity to which
we shall recur in our positive discussion of the problem.
It is easy to show, however, that the Fichtean conception
does not solve the problem of substantiation of
knowledge either.</p>

<p>     Fichte correctly states that the necessary condition of
cognition is determining the indeterminate, mental
mediation of what originally appeared as purely immediate;
he also notes correctly that these conditions are relevant
not only to the cognition of objects external to the


subject but also to the cognition of the subject himself. He
cannot prove, however, with any degree of convincingness,
that the required determination of the indeterminate,
equivalent to the construction of experience, must be realised
precisely in those categorial forms of which his <em>
Wissenschaftslehre</em> treats. In other words, he cannot deduce
apriori the essential dependence of any knowledge on
the acts of positing and contrapositing of the Pure Ego, as
he claims. In fact, Fichte's <em>Wissenschaftslehre</em> assumes a
number of categorial links characterising the available
empirical experience, as well as the traditionally accepted
laws of formal logic (the laws of identity, contradiction,
etc.). Thus the assertion that the self-positing of the Pure
Ego (``I am'') underlies all knowledge and its
substantive apriori dependences; an assertion central to his
conception, remains an assurance without proof or support.</p>

<p>     Furthermore, we do not touch here on the fact that
acceptance of Fichte's Absolute Ego as the centre
constituting knowledge and objective reality leads to the <em>cul--
desacs</em> of idealistic subjectivism, just as Husserl's
Transcendental Ego.</p>


<p>     However, can one remain in the framework of
transcendentalism without claiming to deduce the substantive
dependences of knowledge from the fact of self--
consciousness &quot;I am I&quot;? In this case the philosopher is forced to set
himself the task of establishing the conditions of the
possibility of knowledge by logical analysis, by breaking
down and making a preparation of knowledge that actually
exists and is recorded both in the truths of everyday
consciousness and in the propositions of the special sciences.
Clearly, in this approach to knowledge, the relation
between knowledge and self-consciousness has to be
understood in a way different from that of Husserl and Fichte.</p>

<p>     This possibility was realised in Immanuel Kant's ``
critical'' transcendental epistemology.^^69^^</p>

<p>     Kant does not at all discuss the question &quot;Is knowledge
possible?'', and in this his philosophy differs significantly
from, let us say, that of Descartes. One of the fundamental
premises of Kantian epistemology is that knowledge is not
only possible but also real, it actually <em>exists</em>. In other
words, Kant faces the <em>fact</em> of knowledge, as neo-Kantians
later put it. He believes this knowledge to be expressed


at any rate in the special scientific disciplines relating to
pure mathematics and pure (i.e., theoretical) natural
science. The main preoccupation of his epistemology is
finding out <em>how</em> mathematics and pure natural science are
<em>possible</em>, that is, how knowledge is possible in general.
Kant proceeds from the existence of indubitable and
recognised product of cognitive activity, of scientific
knowledge, endeavouring to reconstruct the logical
conditions of its production through analytically breaking it
down; that is to say, he proceeds from the study of the
result to revealing the possibilities of its generation.</p>

<p>     From the Kantian standpoint, this approach is justified
by the fact that, while the existence of pure mathematics
and pure natural science is beyond doubt, the assertion
of the reality of metaphysics as true knowledge is
extremely problematic. Finding out the universal conditions of the
possibility of knowledge could not only provide an answer
to the question of whether or not metaphysics is possible:
should the answer prove to be affirmative, the methods of
working in this area most fruitfully might be discovered,
Kant believes.^^70^^</p>

<p>     Moving towards the realisation of this task, Kant
arrives at the conclusion that experience as knowledge of
objectively existing things independent of the given
empirical individual and the states of his consciousness implies
at the same time continual references to the subject. These
references are of twofold nature. First, it is the singling
put of the objectiveness of experience and the
distinguishing of the processes fixed in it from subjective
associations, from the accidental flow of representations, etc.
that signify constant (actual and potential) correlation of
the world of objects and the processes of consciousness.
Second, the unity of experience itself implies the unity of
consciousness. The latter circumstance is especially
important, Kant believes. The unity of objective experience
would be impossible, in his view, if the flow of objective
experience could not be continually accompanied by a
certain act of self-consciousness in the form of recognising the
identity of the ego to which experience belongs (this act
is, according to Kant, expressed in the assertion &quot;I think'').</p>

<p>     The objectiveness of experience is inseparable from the
existence in it of various dependences, including necessary
ones. The object is an embodiment, as it were, of a certain
rule for linking up various sense impressions. The flow of
objective experience presents an internally coherent
picture of necessary interaction of all its components; there is
a certain continuity about this flow, that is, the
subsequent state necessarily follows from the previous one. If


there were ``gaps'' in experience, that is, if subsequent
events did not follow from the previous ones according to
obligatory rules, we would have no grounds to believe
experience to be objective, Kant affirms; instead we would
be forced to describe it as a subjective connection between
associations, that is, as pertaining to individual
consciousness rather than the world of material objects. At the same
time any experience is <em>my</em> experience, that is, it belongs to
me as the person experiencing it; there is no experience
that would be nobody's. Let us now assume, Kant argues,
that the ego as the subject of experience retains no
identity, that is, that it can entirely disappear as one ego and
be reborn as another having nothing in common and no
links with the former.</p>

<p>     In this case, experience itself must change, for its
relevance to the ego is a necessary characteristic of experience,
as we have just recognised, and if the ego becomes
different, so does experience. But if there is no connection
between the first and the second egos, there is no
connection between the first and second experience either. That
means that there are ``gaps'' in the flow of experience. In
this case, experience itself is therefore subjective and not
objective. It follows, Kant concludes, that a necessary
condition of the objectiveness of experience is the
selfconsciousness of the ego as identical to itself in the
assertion &quot;I think'', which potentially accompanies the flow of
experience (in Kant's view, the act of self-consciousness
&quot;I think&quot; does not have to accompany experience in
actuality; the objectiveness of the latter merely implies
constant possibility of this self-consciousness).^^71^^</p>

<p>     Individual empirical self-consciousness, enabling us to
distinguish between the subjective connection of
associations and the objective dependences between the things
external with regard to this self-consciousness, Kant calls
subjective unity of consciousness. As for the unity of
consciousness which makes possible, in his view, the
objectiveness of experience itself, it is termed in Kantian
philosophy objective unity of self-consciousness or
transcendental unity of apperception, and is distinguished from the
former in principle.^^7^^ *</p>

<p>     The subjective unity of self-consciousness has to do with
the flow of individual representations, characterising the
&quot;internal sense''. The manifold given in the internal sense
is also ordered in a certain manner (the rules of this
ordering are determined by the apriori form of time),
although this ordering is not objective, that is, it is
different from types of order in the world of external
objects existing in the forms of space and time and given


to the subject through the &quot;external sense''. The
subjective unity of self-consciousness is extremely specific. As
distinct from the unity pertaining to objective (``external'')
experience, the former does not characterise any constant
substance remaining identical to itself under the various
changes of its states. Kant therefore believes that it is
impossible to reveal, through the internal sense, the
necessary dependences and rules of succession of sense
impressions which would permit the construction of an object of
cognition in its own right. The objects of external sense
given not only in the forms of time but also in those of
space (the latter thus appearing in Kant's epistemology as
the necessary condition of objectiveness) assume apriori
categorial schemes as their substantive basis, schemes on
which to develop theoretical (``pure'') natural science. As
for the objects of inner sense, they are not objects in the
strict sense of the term, for states of consciousness are
unstable, indefinite, and ephemeral. Of course, they are also
ordered in a certain manner---in temporal forms. This
ordering, however, cannot create the possibility of a
theoretical (``pure'') science about the phenomena of individual
consciousness. Psychology, in Kant's view, is only
possible as an empirical descriptive science stating accidental
links in the subjective flow of representations and, in
principle, incapable of using the methods of mathematics (in
Kant's view, true science must speak the language of

<p>     More than that, inner experience is not only devoid of
some essential features of external experience, those that
permit the latter to be the basis of theoretical science---it
is also impossible without external contemplation.
Determination of time, which is a form of ordering internal
experience, exists only through implementation of the flow of
time in certain spatial processes, that is, in processes
involving given material objects. &quot;...It is possible to perceive
a determination of time only by means of a change in
external relations (motion) to the permanent in space; (for
example, we become aware of the sun's motion, by
observing the changes of its relation to the objects of this earth).
But this is not all. We find that we possess nothing
permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the
conception of a substance as intuition, except <em>matter..</em>. It follows,
that this I has not any predicate of intuition, which, in its
character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the
determination of time in the internal sense---in the same
way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an
empirical intuition.&quot;&#8482;</p>

<p>     A highly important consequence follows from this,


namely, &quot;internal experience is itself possible only
mediately and through external experience&quot;.^^74^^</p>

<p>     Kant regards this consequence as a direct refutation of
&quot;the <em>problematical</em> idealism of Des Cartes, who admits the
undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion (<em>
assertio</em>), to wit, / <em>am&quot;.^^15^^</em> Idealism &quot;assumed [writes Kant]
that the only immediate experience is internal, and that
from this we can only <em>infer the</em> existence of external things.
But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects
to <em>determined</em> causes, idealism has reasoned with too much
haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause
of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we
ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows
that external experience is properly immediate, that only
by virtue of it---not, indeed, the consciousness of our own
existence, but certainly the determination of our
existence in time, that is, internal experience---is possible.''^^76^^</p>

<p>     From Kant's viewpoint, that means that where it is a
question of concrete individual consciousness, of the
subjective, we cannot regard it in the spirit of Husserl as &quot;pure
consciousness&quot; but must necessarily correlate it with
those processes which are implemented by material objects
or bodies. True, Husserl also speaks of the need for
correlating any subjective act with the object at which this act
is directed. But Husserl speaks only of the intentional
object, that is, the object which exists in the framework
of transcendental consciousness and does not have to be
real. In principle, therefore, Husserl does not go beyond
the boundaries of the Cartesian position at this point.
Kant's approach to the problem is fundamentally different:
the consciousness of self, the &quot;internal sense'', must be
mediated by the consciousness of external objects, of real
material things. Kant certainly realises that not always
does representation of external things signify their actual
existence, as the facts of illusions, hallucinations etc. show,
that is, precisely those facts which form the starting point
of the assertions of Husserl and Descartes on the ``
certainty'' of the givenness of consciousness to itself and the
``uncertainty'' of the givenness of external objects to
consciousness. But Kant writes that the illusions,
hallucinations, etc. &quot;are themselves created by the reproduction of
previous external perceptions, which ... are possible only
through the reality of external objects... Whether this or
that supposed experience be purely imaginary, must be
discovered from its particular determinations, and by
comparing these with the criteria of all real experience. &quot;7 7

<p>     Now, what has Kant succeeded in showing? First, that
empirical self-consciousness (the &quot;inner sense'') necessarily


assumes perception of external objects independent of the
given individual consciousness. Second, that the unity and
coherence of objective experience also signify the
unity and coherence of the cognizing subject (this fact is
termed the &quot;objective unity of self-consciousness&quot; in
Kantian epistemology). Third, that the cognitive relation to
the external object is also necessarily accompanied by a
relation to the cognizing subject, that is, by different
forms of self-consciousness.</p>

<p>     However, Kant makes a further step in propounding a
thesis which does not follow from the above assertions but
is presented as their logical consequence. He formulates
the proposition that objective unity of self-consciousness,
or the transcendental unity of apperception, is the basis
of the objective unity of experience. The proposition &quot;I
think&quot; is declared to be the supreme foundation of any
knowledge,^^78^^ and Kant thereby actually reverts to
Descartes, and that after criticising him for &quot;problematic

<p>     True, on this point, too, Kant's position is essentially
different not only from that of Descartes, but also from
the position of Husserl and Fichte. For Kant the
proposition &quot;I think&quot; (just as the proposition &quot;I exist''), being an
expression of a special kind of consciousness, or rather
self-consciousness, does not, however, express
knowledge. A necessary condition of knowledge, according to
Kant, is the givenness of the corresponding object in
experience; that is to say, knowledge and experience
coincide. True, experience itself is not understood by Kant as
something purely immediate at all: his position here is
opposed both to empiricism and phenomenology.
Nevertheless, synthesising immediate sense components is a
condition of experience. Where this does not occur, there
is no experience and, consequently, no knowledge.</p>

<p>     For this reason, to take an example, the apriori
categories of intellect by themselves do not contain knowledge
(and no &quot;substantive insight&quot; into their conter t in the
sense of Husserl is possible). They can be thought of, that
is, their content may be analytically broken down, but
that will not be knowledge, that will not be cognition.</p>

<p>     Thus Kant separates thinking from cognition and
consciousness from knowledge. The proposition &quot;I think&quot;
expresses an act of self-consciousness. But that is not
knowledge, for the object corresponding to it, the
thinking ego, is not given in any experience. The subject of
transcendental apperception cannot become the object of
itself. It can only be thought of or somehow
symbolically hinted at: &quot;...This unity is nothing more than the unity


in <em>thought</em>, by which no object is given; to which
therefore the qategory of substance-^which always
presupposes a given intuition---cannot be applied. Consequently,
the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the
categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates
these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the

<p>     It is important to' note that the Transcendental Ego
which, in Kant's view, underlies the whole experience,
cannot be directly grasped in the framework of his system.
Kant merely suggests that we logically deduce it as a kind
of otherworldly entity of a ``thing-in-itself''.</p>

<p>     Even if empirical reflexion (the subjective unity of
selfconsciousness) is not, from Kant's standpoint, knowledge
in its own right, since its objects, given in the internal
sense, are devoid of a number of traits of real objects with
which external experience deals, transcendental reflexion
(the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) is not
regarded as knowledge at all. (Let us recall that for Husserl
it is precisely transcendental reflexion that is an expression
of &quot;absolute knowledge&quot;.) According to Kant, the
Transcendental Ego is absolutely outside experience. As for
empirical self -consciousness, that is merely the
Transcendental Ego appearing to the empirical subject as a

<p>     This means in fact that Kant fails to substantiate
knowledge through transcendental self-consciousness. He is
himself compelled to admit that there are no instruments
for passing on from the latter to the former within the
framework of finite, actually existing experience. HusserPs
method for implementing this transition through &quot;direct
insight&quot; into some ``certainties'' is unacceptable to Kant:
the Konigsberg philosopher believes that ``certainty'' in no
way guarantees the actual existence of the corresponding

<p>     ``Deduction&quot; of apriori forms of any knowledge from
the activity of the Transcendental Ego (Fichte's method)
is also impossible for him, for in Kant's view the ego as
the basis of knowledge cannot be the object of
experience and of knowledge, being a fundamentally extra--
experiential ``thing-in-itself''. There can be even less
possibility of substantiating knowledge through empirical (
subjective) self-consciousness. The latter, as we know, implies
the existence of the world of material objects, and a
knowledge of them is itself substantiated thereby, far from
being the basis of knowledge. Besides, the empirical ego, as
Kant emphasises, cannot be a guarantee of the
universality and necessity of the characteristics of any


knowledge precisely due to the empirical and accidental nature
of the processes inherent in it.</p>

<p>     That is why Kant's only way out is to assure his reader
that the transition from the transcendental unity of
apperception (regarded as the supreme basis of any knowledge)
to constituting experience (that is, on the one hand, the
world of objects appearing to finite consciousness as
&quot;empirically real'', and on the other, the corresponding
kinds of knowledge) is realised in certain otherworldly
spheres, &quot;behind the back&quot; of empirical consciousness, as
it were. This transition, called transcendental synthesis,
expresses the self-activity of the Transcendental Ego.</p>

<p>     The transcendental unity of apperception therefore
appears in two forms, according to Kant. Its profound
essence is expressed in its self-activity, that is, in the
work of transcendental synthesis. It is the <em>synthetic</em>
unity of transcendental apperception that is the supreme
foundation of cognition. As for the consciousness of the
identity of the cogitating subject, given to each
empirical individual as the self-realisation &quot;I think'', it appears
only as a reflection of the spontaneous activity of the
Transcendental Ego, characterising not so much that
activity as its result---the identity of the ego with itself (1=1).
Kant suggests that the latter should be called the <em>analytical</em>
unity of transcendental apperception.</p>

<p>     But, insofar as the finite empirical individual has no
direct access to the Transcendental Ego but merely to a
chink through which bits of its activity can be grasped in
the self-realisation &quot;I think'', the Transcendental Ego
itself is given extremely contradictory characteristics in
Kantian philosophy. On the one hand, it is considered as
a kind of deep force in myself, and here Kant's views have
something in common with Husserl's and Fichte's. But
the Transcendental Subject is also declared to be a
thingin-itself, a kind of otherworldly entity. Here it appears as
something that is not only in me but also outside me, as
&quot;consciousness in general'', as an objective structure
underlying all individual consciousnesses. The Transcendental
Subject should in this aspect be referred to as ``We''
rather than ``I'' (and Kant often does so). In other words,
Kant's subjective idealism is not at this point without
some traits of objective idealism.</p>

<p>     Thus, in substantiating knowledge Kant tried, first of
all, to proceed from analysis of the characteristics of the
final product of cognitive activity---knowledge---to
reconstructing the logical conditions of its generation. Not only
certain propositions of &quot;common sense&quot; but, above all,
the results of mathematics, of contemporary


mathematical natural science (classical mechanics), and the results of
formal-logical studies, were chosen as the samples of
knowledge that served as the reference points. Theoretically
separating and analytically investigating these various
kinds and types of knowledge, Kant singles out certain
structures and invariants in knowledge that was actually
available to him, and which characterised a definite period
in the development of consciousness. In this way he
obtains some results that are not merely of historical interest.
But substantiation of the universality and necessity of
these results was only possible, from Kant's standpoint,
through correlating them with the activity of the
Transcendental Subject, with the transcendental unity of self--
consciousness. It is this task that Kant fails to solve, for his
system has no logical instruments for expressing the
spontaneous activity of the Transcendental Ego. Therefore
Kant's epistemological conception, being indubitably
subjective-idealistic, cannot nonetheless be regarded as ``
egology'', unlike the transcehdentalist systems of Fichte and
Husserl. Kant established a number of important moments
in the study of cognition and consciousness. But the
problem of substantiation of knowledge is not solved in his
conception either; nor can it be solved here, for his
conception remains idealistic.</p>

<p>     Thus we see that the attempts to substantiate
knowledge and fathom the nature of cognition relying on the
postulate about the existence of a special kind of
knowledge, indubitable, certain and directly pertaining to &quot;pure
consciousness&quot; prove unavailing. The so-called radical
reflexion about ``pure'' consciousness (``turning to look at
the subject'', as Husserl puts it) cannot substantiate the
objectiveness of experience and, moreover, cannot even
guarantee in its framework the actual reality of other
cognizing individuals (``other egos''). Neither is the question
of the nature of the ego and of the modes of
comprehending it solved. The transcendentalist version of the
subjective-reflective procedure for substantiating knowledge,
postulating the a priori nature of definite structures and
norms of everyday and special scientific knowledge,
contradicts the development of modern scientific knowledge.</p>


<p>     There are other influential variants of the idealistic
solution of the problem of substantiating knowledge in


modern bourgeois philosophy. The empirical subject, that is,
a special kind of unity of consciousness and corporeality,
is regarded as the substantiating instance, rather than the
Transcendental Subject interpreted in its isolation from
the world of real material objects, from the empirical
corporeal individual and the community of other such egos.
On this path, an attempt is made to establish the
necessary dependences of knowledge and experience.</p>

<p>     These approaches to understanding cognition* are a
departure from transcendentalism. They do not, however,
constitute a rejection of the interpretation of cognition as
determined by the structure of individual consciousness.
Consciousness is merely understood not as the ``pure''
consciousness of a ``pure'' individual ego but in its organic
links with corporeality and its inclusion in the network
of interactions with other subjects. The rejection of the
ail-too manifest subjectivism of the philosophical
conceptions based on ``pure'' consciousness does not yet signify
breaking away from idealism. This last circumstance
predetermines the untenability of those attempts to solve
the problem of substantiation of knowledge which we shall
here consider.</p>

<p>     The interpretation of the subject outlined here is
characteristic of the late works of Husserl. Opposing the
everyday, pre-scientific and extra-scientific &quot;life world&quot;
(<em>Lebens-Welt</em>) to the objectified world of mathematicised
science, Husserl endeavours to prove that the
scientifictheoretical attitude to life is derivative in its essential
dimensions from the immediate, ``life-oriented'' attitude to
the world which is characteristic of the <em>Lebens-Welt</em>.</p>

<p>     At the same time, the philosopher believes, science has
a tendency (and it is inalienably inherent in the
scientific-theoretical form of cognition itself) to separate
itself from the ``life'' sources, to forget about them, as
it were, and to undertake constructions that are rooted in
the &quot;life world&quot; and not in the pre-theoretical
meaningful givennesses. This path, that is, the path of
formalistic objectivism, inevitably leads cognition into <em>cul-de-sacs</em>,
to paradoxes, to a crisis in its foundations, and this, in
Husserl's view, is characteristic of the whole of
contemporary European science (these statements date from the
1930s). The only way towards substantiation of science
(and the crisis of its foundations is at the same time
the crisis of the whole of European culture), and towards
substantiation of cognition in general, is through finding
the real sources of science and recovering the thread that
binds the latter to scientific-theoretical cognition. The
conditional, restricted, and dependent nature of the scientific


spirit of &quot;pure objectiveness&quot; will thus be demonstrated,
depriving objectivism and scientism closely associated with
it of the status of a universal worldview orientation. The
immediate &quot;life world&quot; underlying all human modes of
relation to reality, including scientific-theoretical
cognition, is, in Husserl's view, marked by a specific unity of the
objective and the subjective, the source of unity lying in
the subject, the unity itself being ``centred'' on the
individual empirical ego.</p>

<p>     Indeed, continues Husserl's argument, what is given to
the empirical subject in the first place is the subject
itself as the individual ego with the consciousness and
unique body inherent in it.</p>

<p>     All the necessary relations of experience are determined
precisely through the properties of the individual subject.
It is well known, for instance, that objective experience
implies the existence of a generally significant network of
spatial relations which determines the mutual arrangement
of material objects (let us recall that for Kant the forms of
spatial dependences, as distinct from temporal ones, are
mostly modes of expression of the objective nature of
experience). But in what way is the spatial structure of
experience formed?---asks Husserl.</p>

<p>     The principal spatial meanings are ``here'' and ``there''.
&quot;`Here' is the place where I with my body am, or, to be
more precise, it is my body. What is `there'? `There'
defines itself through `here'. If there is no `here', there is no
`there'. `There' is `not-here' that can become `here'. `There'
is understood as a potential`here', it is understood in terms
of `here'. `There' defines itself relative to `here', that is to
my body. `There' defines itself depending on the extent
and the manner in which it is transformed into `here'.
`There' is `remote' if it is hard to transform it into `here'; it
is `close' when it is easily transformed into `here'... What is,
in concrete terms, the transformation of `not-here' into
`here', that is, the attainment of `there'? `There' is the
place' where not-my body is, or rather, it is not-my body.
Therefore the transformation of `there' into `here', that is,
the attainment of `there', signifies the transformation of
not-my body into mine, into a continuation of my body...
The transformation of not-my body into a continuation of
my body therefore means its transformation into my
instrument. But the condition of transforming some body
into my instrument is its transformation into a
continuation of my body, that is, its attainment in the sense of
my body's simple contact with it. `Contact' is here meant
in the broadest sense of the word. Seeing with an eye
constitutes a special kind of this contact.''^^82^^</p>


<p>     If we ignore this relation of ``here'' and ``there'' to the
individual subject, any distinction between them will
lose its meaning, states Husserl.</p>

<p>     The relations between &quot;in front&quot; and ``behind'', &quot;on
the right&quot; and &quot;on the left'', ``higher'' and ``lower'', are
defined in a similar way, that is, on the basis of the
possibility of transformation of ``there'' into ``here'', he

<p>     ``In front&quot; is that which is before my face, ``behind''
that which is at my back and to which I must turn in
order to attain it; ``higher'' is that which is above my head,
``lower'', that which is under my feet, etc. If we ignore the
relation of these differences to different parts of my body
and the possibilities of attaining them, the differences
themselves will disappear. If there were no differences
between the parts of my body, there woud be no
differences between &quot;in front&quot; and ``behind'', &quot;on the right&quot;
and &quot;on the left'', etc.</p>

<p>     Further Husserl analyses the stages in the ``
objectification'' of spatial relations, that is, the stages of abstracting
them from those initial dependences of origin which
connect them with the individual subject and the subject's body.
One of these stages consists in transferring, as it were,
the point of reference, that is, ``here'', from my body to
some other (which originally emerged as existing ``there''),
and in defining the spatial relations of other things,
starting from the latter (which does not coincide with
my own) e.g., we say that the river is not far from the
house, that one object is to the right of another, etc. In
this case we define the spatial relations between things
regardless of our body, as it were, ignoring it. However, it
is important to bear in mind, Husserl points out, that it
only became possible because we tentatively identified
ourselves, our body, with that body which we chose as the
starting point of defining spatial relations, putting
ourselves in imagination in place of that body, since for the
bodies taken as such, that is, outside their relation to the
subject with its body, there are no relations like &quot;on the
right&quot; or &quot;on the left'', ``close'' or ``far'', etc. But that
means, Husserl believes, that ``objective'' spatial relations
between things are ultimately determined through my
body, through me as the subject.</p>

<p>     Further steps in the ``objectification'' of space involve
the use of certain universal standards for measuring length,
that is, of some special objects which are manufactured
specifically for expressing the spatial relations between
objects. In this case, we can know, through
communication, even distances that we cannot observe directly. Using


universal standards can consolidate the illusion of
independence of the spatial relations of objects from the subject
and its body. However, Husserl continues, the standard of
measurement is not only chosen as such by the subject but
is constituted in its spatial properties only through its
relation to the subject's body, that is, through the &quot;here/
there&quot; relation.</p>

<p>     The ``objectiveness'' of space, he explains, &quot;does not
lie in the independence of spatial meanings from the
subject but in their equal repetitiveness. I can, in principle,
repeat the position which I once assumed relative to a
definite thing, and then the spatial meaning of the latter
will be repeated. I can, in principle, repeat the position
occupied by another subject relative to some thing, and
then again the spatial meaning of the latter will be
repeated. Objectiveness lies precisely in this repetition of
meanings; it should be remembered, however, that repetition of
meanings depends on the repetition of the positions of the

<p>     As we see, from Husserl's viewpoint, ``objectiveness'' of
space assumes the existence of other empirical subjects and
my definite relation to these subjects. In general, the
objectiveness of experience, Husserl indicates, implies its
intersubjectivity, that is, its universal significance for
all the other subjects.</p>

<p>     But what does &quot;another subject&quot; mean?</p>

<p>     Another subject, Husserl believes, is constituted in the
same way as the spatial dependences of experience are
constituted by their relation to me. Among the bodies
surrounding me there are those that are similar to mine in
the mode of their functioning. If I were at the place where
such a body is, it might serve me and my conscious
intentions. (Thus the subject is for Husserl not just a body
of a special kind but a unity of consciousness and
corporeality.) In this way, on the analogy with myself, the
meaning of &quot;another subject&quot; is formed which, as distinct
from myself, is not given me directly but is only
constituted by myself.</p>

<p>     The body of another subject, on the one hand, belongs
to my world, for it is constituted by myself, while on the
other hand it belongs to the world of that other subject.
Therefore my world must coincide with his world. This
world, common to ourselves and all the other subjects and
having a meaning common to all, is the ``objective'' world.
In other words, the objectiveness of the world consists,
according to Husserl, in its universal significance, that is,
in the universal meaning it has for any subject, rather than
in its independence from the subject.</p>


<p>     According to Husserl, scientific-theoretical cognition,
concerned with finding and analysing invariants of various
measurements, and later of invariants of these invariants,
abstracts from the determination of the measurements by
the nature of the standards chosen which, in their turn, are
constituted by their relation to the individual subject with
its body. Identifying the invariants established by
science with the objective world, this mathematicised science
interprets objectiveness as complete independence from
any subject whatever. The fundamental fact is forgotten,
Husserl believes, that the meaning of the objectiveness
of the world is constituted by the subject and is
determined relative to it and to its body. (The universal
significance of the world, its intersubjectivity itself, ultimately
depends on myself as the individual subject, Husserl states,
for the other subject is also constituted by myself, in my
experience.) Carried away by the ideal of falsely conceived
objectivity, mathematicised science succumbs to the sin of
scientism, inevitably ending in a crisis of its own
foundations. The only way out of this crisis is establishment
of the meaning of the individual subject as the centre of
the universe---thus ends Husserl his discussion of this theme.</p>

<p>     Let us try to analyse these arguments and see if they
are well grounded. Husserl starts from the fact (which he
regards as primary giyenness) that the individual subject
is given to itself with its consciousness and body. The
primary spatial meaning of ``here'' is determined, in his view,
by its connection with this subject. As for the meaning
of ``there'', whith belongs to something that lies outside
the subject and its body, it is, in Husserl's opinion,
constituted or defined depending on the meaning of ``here'',
namely as something that can become ``here'', that can
be attained by the subject coming into direct contact with
its body. It is easy to show, however, that this analysis is
inadequate even by the criteria of phenomenological
description. The point is that ``here'' already subsumes ``there'',
these meanings being mutually dependent. It is true
that ``there'' can be transformed into ``here'', can become
``here''. It is also true that ``here'' is ``not-there''. In other
words, the meaning of ``here'' implies the meaning of
``there''. It is just as true that ``here'' is ``there'' from the
standpoint of another subject or, generally speaking, from
another reference point. If there is no dependence of this
second kind for the subject, there is no meaning of ``here''
for it either. The ``here/there'' relation implies equal
role of both of its poles.</p>

<p>     Of course, the elementary ``here/there'' spatial relation
includes a reference to the individual subject, for the


``here&quot; meaning has sense only for that subject. At the same
time, the meaning of ``here'' includes from the
beginning the'fact that it is ``there'' from another viewpoint,
from another position, while ``there'' is that which exists
outside the subject and its body. Therefore the reference
to the individual subject in the ``here/there'' relation
does not mean constituting that relation as depending on
the subject and itS body but a realisation (with varying
degrees of clarity) of the incorporation of the empirical
subject in a certain network of objective spatial relations
appearing for it at the given point as the meaning of

<p>     Husserl shows the dependence of the relations
``above/below'', &quot;in front/behind'', &quot;on the left/on the
right'', etc. on my body and differences between its parts.
It can be conceded that these meanings have a certain
anthropomorphic colouring, implying as they do a
reference to the subject and the various parts of the subject's
body. However, the subject's body itself exists as a special
type of object for it only if it appears as included in an
objective network of relations, including spatial relations,
with other bodies, both material things and the bodies of
other subjects. For me to realise the various parts of my
body (including those which I do not see under ordinary
conditions: face, head, back, etc.) as forming a certain
unity, belonging to one and the same object, I must
possess the faculty of perceiving my body from the
outside, as it were, from the standpoint of another subject, that
is to say, as spatially localised and existing in certain
relations with other bodies. In other words, constituting
the &quot;in front/behind&quot; and other meanings already assumes
the existence for the subject of a definite network of
elementary objective spatial relations and is merely
superimposed on this network, so to speak, far from
determining the latter, as Husserl insists.</p>

<p>     In other words, the subject may conceive of itself as
being in the place of some other object and take this other
object as a reference point for determining distance, e.g.,
for determining the ``close/far'' relations, only if it is
simultaneously capable of conceiving of its body as
replaceable by any other body as the determinant of spatial

<p>     Husserl points to the connection between the
objectivity of space and the possibility of repeating the position
taken up by the subject relative to a certain thing. But the
conception of the possibility of repeating the subject's
spatial position already assumes the existence for the
subject of an objective network of spatial relations that lends


sense to the taking up of a certain position, just as it
implies the objective meaning of the subject's body and
spatial localisation.</p>

<p>     It is of course true that the introduction of universal
standards or scales for measuring spatial relations and,
later, the establishment of invariants of these relations at
the stage of scientific-theoretical cognition, mark the
discovery of increasingly more general dependences of the
objective world, accompanied by abstraction from those
connections which include in these dependences a
certain empirical subject or group of such subjects (a
sociocultural community). A transition is necessary, however,
to the study of more general types of dependences and not
stages of ``objectification'' of the original, purely ``
subjective'', meanings, as Husserl would have it. Any
experience, however direct and ``life-like'' it might be, always
includes a distinction between my subjective stream of
consciousness and the objective system of dependences
between material objects, if it lays a claim to cognitive
significance. Therefore, however great the differences
between scientific-theoretical cognition and those forms of
pre-theoretical relation to the world which Husserl calls
the &quot;life world&quot; (and these differences undoubtedly do
exist and are of fundamental significance in certain
aspects), all kinds of the cognitive relation are inevitably
aimed at the world of objects existing independently from
consciousness, that is, they are inevitably guilty of the &quot;sin
of objectivism'', as Husserl puts it, which in the
philosopher's view predetermined the crisis of the foundation of
modern European science.</p>

<p>     The attempt to place the subject in the ``centre'' of the
cosmos and to deduce the objectiveness of the world from
the characteristics of the individual subject was not a
success, for the subject proves to be included in a certain
system of objective dependences from the very outset.</p>

<p>     Let us consider yet another element of Husserl's
analysis. We may recall that the objectiveness of the world is,
for Husserl, identical with its intersubjectivity, that is,
universal significance of its meanings for any subject. The
latter implies the existence of another subject, apart from
myself. But this other subject is originally constituted by
myself, that is, it exists as a definite product of my
cognitive experience, it exists in my experience and is
understood &quot;on the analogy&quot; of myself. That means that when
Husserl takes up the standpoint of the other and starts
cogitating about the body of this other subject, along with
myself and my body, also existing in the experience of
that other, it should be remembered that, in the


framework of his philosophy, the other subject cannot in
principle be equipollent with myself, being ultimately
constituted by myself, whereas I with my body am given to
myself directly and am the true starting point of
constituting all the dependences of experience. And that means
that the thesis of Husserl's philosophy of the
intersubjectivity and universal significance of the world actually proves
to be fictitious, and that in the final analysis Husserl
cannot escape from the circle of solipsism which he
himself drew.</p>

<br /> &quot;THE OTHERS'', AND THE WORLD
<br /> OF OBJECTS</b>

<p>     Any attempt to understand the specific features of
knowledge is bound to take into account the fundamental
facts---that the empirical subject is necessarily included or
incorporated in the world of material objects existing
independently of it and of its consciousness, and that the
other subjects are not less real than myself, and cannot
be regarded as products of my experience only.</p>

<p>     There is a conception in modern Western philosophy
which endeavours to take these fundamental facts into
account within the scope of an originally interpreted
phenomenology and at the same time to link up the
fundamental traits of knowledge and of the cognitive relation
with the specific characteristics of the individual
empirical subject. This attempt is undertaken by Jean-Paul
Sartre, a prominent modern French phenomenologist
and existentialist, in his main philosophical work <em>Being
and Nothingness. &deg;</em>~^^4^^</p>

<p>     Let us point out from the beginning that
epistemological problems, the question of substantiation of
knowledge, are not the focal points of Sartre's analysis, although
he offers his solution of these questions. The relation
between subject and object is considered in his works within
the framework of a definite conception of consciousness
and man. But Sartre's interpretation of the relation
between consciousness and knowledge is of interest for our

<p>     The starting point of his cogitations is recognition of
the existence of two realities: of the objective material


being which he refers to as Being In-Itself, and
consciousness, or Being For-Itself. The former exists by itself and
does not need the latter. The latter is, however,
impossible without the former, for it has no content at all, is
absolutely empty, transparent, open both to the external
world and to itself, is, in a word, a ``nothingness'', a ``hole''
in Being In-Itself, a hole which has no density at all and
continually needs to be filled. However, precisely because
consciousness is a kind of ``gap'' in material being, it is
excluded, as it were, from the action of all the
substantive connections and dependences, and is absolutely free.
Consciousness is thus not just emptiness filled with
content given from the outside but a being of a special kind,
a centre of free activity.</p>

<p>     The content provided by Being In-Itself does not
determine the activity of consciousness but merely serves as a
kind of pretext for it, a bridgehead for its unfolding.
However, since this activity is not determined by content
given from the outside and is at the same time devoid of its
own inner content, it is essentially a negation of any sort
of dependence. It is in negation that the freedom of
consciousness is expressed, according to Sartre.</p>

<p>     At the same time Sartre states that consciousness does
not exist outside the material world, outside Being
InItself. In his view, consciousness cannot be similar to
Kant's or Husserl's Transcendental Subject, first, because
it is included, as it were, ia the world of material objects,
though not being an object itself (Sartre criticises in this
connection Husserl's doctrine of transcendental reduction,
of <em>epochs</em>), and second, because it factually, empirically
exists in definite concrete situations and is connected with
the body of a given empirical subject.</p>

<p>     Moreover, in a certain sense consciousness, Being
ForItself, coincides with the body of the empirical subject and
is indistinguishable from it. The reference here is to that
aspect which, in Sartre's view, specifically characterises
the basic, original perception by the individual of his own
body and which is fundamentally different from the way
I and my body are perceived by another subject. In the
primary, original experience, Sartre argues, I do not
perceive myself as an object. The eye does not see itself. I
do not see my face. I cannot conceive of myself as an
object among other objects. Objects are something that
exists outside myself and belongs to the material world,
to Being In-Itself. However, I must receive certain sense
perceptions from the movements of my own body. At any
rate, that is what psychology says. The assertions of
scientific psychology, Sartre says, proceed from the existence


of my body as a material object among other objects,
connecting my definite experiences with processes in my body
understood in this way. But the essence of the matter is,
according to Sartre, that the individual's body is not given
him in the basic primary experience as an object, and he
therefore cannot in principle connect any processes in
his consciousness with his body understood as an object
(he cannot in principle localise any sense perceptions,
e.g., the sensation of pain; he cannot associate his
experiences with his own physical state, etc.). At the outset,
the individual is given only the world of external material
objects and himself as different from these objects, as
consciousness, as Being For-Itself. To the extent in which
experiences have a certain ``density'', they pertain to external
objects. For instance, if I sense resistance in acting upon an
external object, the resistance itself is not perceived as
connected with the action of my hand characterising my
subjective experience, one that is &quot;in me'', but as
pertaining to the objective properties of the external objects
and expressing their traits, in this case the measure of their
resistance. Pain is not something localised in me either,
but that which expresses the properties of some objects
under definite circumstances. As for my body, in its
primary and basic sense it, first, determines the factuality
of my consciousness, that is, the concrete objective
situation in which I find myself (in particular, it determines
``where'' exactly I am), and second, it functions as the
possibility and the mode of the activity of my
consciousness, of Being For-Itself, essentially coinciding with the

<p>     Thus Sartre has an original conception of consciousness
which does not coincide with the widely accepted one.
Consciousness or Being For-Itself, writes Sartre, is not the
same as the psyche or the subjective world characterised
by certain processes, connections, dependences,
complicated mechanisms, special types of relations between
conscious and unconscious phenomena etc., a world that is the
subject-matter of special studies in scientific psychology.
Consciousness, Being For-Itself, is in principle
apsychological. The emergence of a special subjective world is,
according to Sartre, a consequence of objectification of
consciousness and expresses a distorted conception of the
basic and primary characteristics of Being For-Itself and at
the same time the ontological fact of the degradation of
consciousness itself.</p>

<p>     As we see, far from relying on the assertions of
scientific psychology, Sartre endeavours to prove the dubiety
of some of its basic abstractions and assumptions. Like



Husserl, he insists that phenomenological description does
not imply any scientific results, and that it is science that
has to reckon with the results of phenomenological
analysis rather than vice versa. (Among other things, Sartre's
understanding of the world of material Being In-Itself does
not coincide with the natural-scientific doctrine of matter,
as we have had occasion to see above.)</p>

<p>     Let us now consider the following important point of
Sartre's reasoning. That relation between Being In-Itself
and Being For-Itself of which we spoke above is, for him,
not only the basic and primary point but also an
expression of the true essence of their relations, the essence
which is under usual circumstances fenced off, put away,
hidden, distorted by various circumstances. For this
reason, for instance, when the subject is capable of
localising the feeling of pain in some part of his body, when he
scrutinises the world of his experiences and correlates
them with the past and present events of his life, when
he follows the development of his own thought and
controls this process, in all these cases, says Sartre, the
genuine characteristics of consciousness, of Being For-Itself,
are distorted.</p>

<p>     Consciousness as ``nothingness'' does not coincide with
the psychical life of the empirical ego but underlies the
latter, being hidden in its depth. (It is important to note that
from Sartre's standpoint the situation where consciousness
proves to be something lying deeply in the foundation of
the individual ego, of his psychical life, reveals the
ontological fact of distorted expression of the true nature of
consciousness. It is a question of the situation as it is, rather
than of our distorted understanding, for consciousness
has neither depth nor essence of any kind.) On the one
hand, consciousness determines the entire course of the
psychical life of the ego, the whole of the individual
subjective biography, while on the other hand, it is not
only different from that biography but is also distorted
by it. At the same time consciousness, according to Sartre,
is not the Transcendental Ego in the sense of Husserl,
either: first, because it is factual and not transcendental,
coinciding as it does with the subject's body understood in
a certain manner; second, any ego, including the
Transcendental Ego, has a certain inner definiteness, density,
certain content. Consciousness is entirely devoid of such
content, it is absolutely empty. Therefore it is not the ego,
concludes Sartre.</p>

<p>     Ordinary subjective life necessarily assumes reflexion.
Reflexion is only possible on condition that its object
exists and catches the subject's inner eye. True


consciousness, Being For-Itself, Sartre believes, is absolutely
transparent, it is a complete vacuum which the inner eye pierces
without stopping anywhere or being reflected by anything.
Therefore self-consciousness, the relation of the subject to
itself which is characteristic of consciousness (and this
relation is continually realised, Sartre believes, for
consciousness clearly distinguishes itself from the outset from
the world of things-in-themselves) is not reflexion.
Consciousness is in principle pre-reflexive, in Sartre's view.</p>

<p>     Reflexion emerges together with its object, the ego, and
in a certain sense produces the object itself. Sartre points
out the important fact which also played a fundamental
role in the philosophical system of Fichte and which we
shall later analyse on the positive plane. The fact is .that
individual reflexion aimed at consciousness does not simply
find before itself a ready-made object in the shape of the
ego and its states but, being an activity of a certain kind,
acts on its object, changes it, reconstructs and in a
certain sense creates it.</p>

<p>     For Fichte, this positing of oneself as the Absolute
Subject in the form of one's own object was the kind of
determination of the indeterminate which was not only
involved in the shaping of the ego and the contrapositing
of ego to non-ego but which also revealed the inner essence
of the Absolute Subject. For Sartre, the positing of the ego
as the object of reflexion and the coming of the latter on
the scene does not in any way reveal the nature of
consciousness. Moreover, Sartre believes that at the stage of
reflexion the purity of consciousness is distorted and
consciousness itself degraded. At the same time, according to Sartre
(and here there is another difference between him and
Fichte), there is no Transcendental or Absolute Ego, the
ego can only be empirical, expressing as it does the unique
traits of the given individual person distinguishing him
from all the other egos. Let us note that consciousness,
Being For-Itself, is, according to Sartre, also individual in
a sense, so that different empirical subjects have different
consciousnesses. However; if the ego expresses a certain
density, a unity of an individual biography, and the
subject's personal traits, consciousness or Being For-Itself is
in itself empty and impersonal. Therefore different
consciousnesses differ from each other merely as different
centres of free activity, as structureless points of activity
included in different factual situations. Of course, in our
experience we distinguish between consciousnesses on the
basis of their connections with different individual egos.
But this differentiation does not characterise the
metaphysical distinctions between consciousnesses, so to speak.</p>


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<p>     Thus, according to Sartre, the ego as an expression of
the unity of the subject's psychical life does not express
the essence of consciousness and even distorts it, to a
certain extent. The ego may be said to be ``invented'' by the
subject---with the essential reservation that this ``
invention'' is realised in constant contacts and
communication with other subjects. The positing of the ego is an
attempt to introduce determinateness into the
fundamentally indeterminate life of consciousness, to lend
consciousness density and substantionality, making it its own

<p>     At the same time, according to Sartre, consciousness is
continually inclined towards substantivisation, precisely
because it is void and needs to be filled. However, it
endeavours to fill itself, to acquire content, in such a way,
as not to lose its primary faculty, that of the activity of
free negation, the activity of desubstantivisation. In other
words, consciousness endeavours to turn itself into a kind
of synthesis between Being In-Itself and Being For-Itself,
which is impossible because of the mutually exclusive
characteristics of the two. Therefore the reification of self by
consciousness, acquiring features of a certain ego, is
accompanied by continual attempts to sublate that
reification. This sublation, however, is not expressed in
reverting to the purity and ``contentlessness'' of true Being
For-Itself but in constant positing of ever new
definitenesses of consciousness as a succession of the characteristics
of the ego inherent in it. Man's personality is something
subject to changes. The ego is not equal to itself, argues
Sartre against the formula of Descartes, Kant, and
Fichte.^^86^^ Inasmuch as consciousness cannot acquire any final
objective image in the shape of a certain ego, one cannot
say what it is. Consciousness is that which it is not, and it
is not that which it is, asserts Sartre.</p>

<p>     Sartre therefore separates in principle the cognitive
relation which implies the existence of the object, from the
act of self-consciousness pertaining to being that is in
principle unobjectifiable, Being For-Itself. We remember
that Kant also separates cognition, the relation of the
subject to the object, from self-consciousness, the relation of
the Transcendental Subject to itself, insisting that the
latter is not given in experience and therefore cannot be an
object of knowledge. However, for Kant the
Transcendental Subject exists as an otherworldly, transcendental
entity, as a thing-in-itself, which, although it is not an
object of knowledge, can still be conceived of. For Sartre,
consciousness, Being For-Itself, does not know itself,
cannot be the object of its own cognition precisely for the


reason that it has no essence and is devoid of any depth.</p>

<p>     For the present, we shall put off the analysis of Sartre's
understanding of the external world, concentrating now
on Sartre's interpretation of the process of self-cognition,
of reflexion. Reflexion is, in Sartre's view, to some
extent fictitious, for it is incapable of grasping the true
nature of consciousness. This fictitiousness does not mean,
however, that it has no 'object of its own or that it does
not express its specific features. Such an object is always
present: that is the individual ego, and reflexion is
adequate to that object (Sartre criticises in this connection the
doctrine of the unconscious in its Freudian version).^^87^^
The point, however, is that the object (the ego and its
states) emerges together with reflexion, is its result, and
does not express the true nature of consciousness. (Sartre
critically assesses both introspective psychology and
Husserlian phenomenological psychology.)</p>

<p>     How does reflexion emerge? It appears as a result of a
relation to another subject. The given individual
consciousness by itself, outside a relation to other consciousnesses,
is incapable of generating reflexion, insists Sartre in
opposition to the philosophical tradition represented by
Descartes, Kant, Fichte, and Husserl, and one has to admit
that he is much closer to the truth at this point than the

<p>     The other subject, Sartre believes, is just as real as
myself, and cannot be regarded as simply the result of my
constitutive activity, contrary to what Husserl thought. At
the same time, according to Sartre, my conviction in the
existence of another consciousness is by no means based
on cognition (no cognitive procedures will ever
convincingly prove the existence of somebody else's consciousness,
Sartre affirms), but is a kind of primary ontological
givenness, of the same type as the givenness of the external
objective world to our consciousness. However, what is
directly given to me is the existence of somebody else's
consciousness itself but not the possibility of penetrating
that consciousness. Different consciousnesses are in
principle separated and cannot merge with one another.
Besides, the other consciousness is given in my experience as
connected with the body of another subject. This body
appears as a material object localised in space and
adjacent to and interacting with other material objects.
Though cognition of external actions, the reactions of this
other subject's body conditioned by external stimuli, as
well as of the nervous processes taking place in this body,
does have some meaning, it does not at all characterise,
Sartre believes, the free consciousness of the other subject


which actually underlies all its actions. (Sartre adds a
critique of psychological behaviourism to the critique of
introspective psychology.)</p>

<p>     Thus the body of another subject appears in my
experience as an object of a special kind, as it does not appear
to the other subject itself, just as my body is not
originally an object for me, being merged with my own
consciousness. It is precisely the fact that another consciousness
appears in my experience as inseparably linked with an
object of a special kind, the body of another subject, that
compels me to treat the other subject generally as an
object of a special kind, unique in its physical and
psychological characteristics, and to ``insert'' the conscious
processes ``in'' that body, that is, to constitute a special
&quot;world of the subjective life of consciousness'', a world of
psychical processes existing in definite relations with the
material corporeal processes. At the same time the
relation to the other person compels me to recognise myself
as ``another'' for that other subject (that recognition is
attained in the process of communication with the latter)
and to ascribe myself all the characteristics which the
latter has in my experience. And that means that
consciousness begins to treat itself in the same way as another
treats it, that is, as a subject possessing a body in the shape
of a material object localised in space and endowed with
psychical experiences placed ``within'' that body. The
subject comes to distinguish these experiences and their
course from the course of the objective processes of the
external world, positing the unity of its psychical life as a
special object, the ego. The objectification, the
reification of self as a person, as the ego, thus implies the
other person's view, a view of self from the outside, from
the standpoint of the possible ``another''. It is in this
connection that reflexion emerges, being, according to Sartre,
the product of communication with other subjects.</p>

<p>     The process of objectification of consciousness, of
transforming it into the ego as the object of another
consciousness, and later of the subject itself, goes through several
stages. At one of them consciousness merely feels itself
the object of another subject but does not fully know
itself in this capacity. This happens when the given Being
For-Itself feels itself the object of scrutiny on the part of
another (the problem of ``scrutiny'' has an important
ontological meaning in Sartre's philosophy). Only as a
result of communication with another can consciousness,
through language, objectify itself to the end and generate
reflexion. The individual subject, therefore, which sees
itself in the mirror and is at the same time deprived of the


possibility of communication, cannot in principle
recognise itself in the mirror image (this image merely appears
to it as a strange play of external objects), for it does not
exist for itself as an object outside of communication
with others.</p>

<p>     For Sartre, objectification of consciousness through a
relation to another is an indication of the ontological
degradation of Being For-Itself.</p>

<p>     My ego does not express my true nature, Sartre believes.
Although consciousness internally gravitates towards
objectification, although it performs this objectification
itself and is responsible for it, it appears as something
imposed by the external relation to other consciousnesses,
by the process of communication. The relation to another
does not follow logically from the nature of Being For--
Itself. That other consciousnesses apart from my own exist
is a real and fundamental fact, but it is metaphysically
accidental. A situation is conceivable in which my
consciousness would exist in solitude, Sartre believes.^^88^^ I
do not know myself, for my reflexion pertains only to the
external integument of my consciousness, an integument
existing as the ego. At the same time I have, in principle,
an access to my consciousness and a capacity for directly
grasping it in the form of a non-objectifying pre-reflective
act of self-consciousness. As for the other, according to
Sartre, I do not know his true depth, for I deal only with
his external visage, but moreover, unlike in my own case,
I have no possibility at all to penetrate his consciousness
from the inside, for, to perform that feat, I must be in
his place, whereas different consciousnesses are individual,
they are metaphysically distinct. The other is given in my
experience as an expression of a certain individual
consciousness which is just as real as my own. At the same
time I can grasp or comprehend the other only as a body,
as a material object endowed with the psyche, Sartre
insists; the conditions of the problem predetermine in this
case the impossibility of solving it. Meanwhile, the
tendency of Being For-Itself towards substantivisation, towards
meaningful filling is also necessarily connected with the
desire for merging or fusing with another consciousness. The
impossibility of the latter predetermines the tragedy of
individual existence.</p>

<p>     Now, what about the cognition of the external world, of
Being In-Itself; how does Sartre solve the problem of
substantiation of knowledge?</p>

<p>     The world of objective material things pertaining to
Being In-Itself is given to consciousness directly, he
believes. In terms of content, the cognitive or subject-object


relation is entirely determined by the external object, for
consciousness by itself is empty. Only ``nothingness''
separates it from the world of external objectiveness.
However, this distinction between cognition and the external
world is at the same time fundamental for it means that
consciousness, being a ``nothingness'', can never simply
merge with the world of objects or merely absorb their
content. The cognitive relation of consciousness to
material being necessarily includes the element of negation that
is inherent in consciousness. This negative activity of
consciousness coincides, according to Sartre, with the primary,
basic characteristics of time. The objective spatial relations
of material objects inherent in Being In-Itself necessarily
appear in the cognitive process in the forms of time, so
that time itself, which originally coincided with Being
For-Itself, is ``spacified'' acquiring the characteristics of
objectiveness. The interaction of the spatial and
temporal features of experience produces various forms of the
necessary structural organisation of knowledge (types of
causal dependence, constancy of the objects of
knowledge relative to the flow of time, etc.). It is these
fundamental features of the cognitive relation that underlie any
knowledge, including scientific knowledge. To find out the
invariant characteristics of experience, science constructs a
certain system of abstract or ideal objects. But these
objects are, according to Sartre, essentially fictitious, being in
themselves devoid of content and performing a purely
pragmatic function. The meaning of scientific-theoretical
knowledge is determined by the primary cognitive relation
of consciousness to Being In-Itself, although science
itself forgets about it, claiming to discover the hidden
essence of things that is not immediately given in primary
cognitive experience.^^89^^</p>

<p>     As we see, Sartre endeavours, in the final analysis, to
deduce the fundamental properties of knowledge from the
specific characteristics of individual consciousness and its
relation to the world of objects.</p>

<p>     In Sartre's view, however, scientific-theoretical
cognition does not know the true properties of Being In-Itself,
dealing merely with abstract invariant relations between

<p>     The primordial, pre-scientific and pre-theoretical
relation of consciousness to Being In-Itself grasps the
characteristics of the objects themselves, but no cognitive act
may be directed at consciousness and its relations,
including cognitive ones, since consciousness is in principle
unobjectifiable. That means, according to Sartre, that the
problem of substantiation of knowledge cannot be the


object of theoretical inquiry, that is to say, epistemology in
the traditional sense of the term is impossible. The primary
specific properties of knowledge are not found through
cognitive research of a special kind of objects but
comprehended through phenomenological non-objectifying
insights into consciousness and its relations with Being

<p>     Speaking more precisely, however, the establishment of
the dependence of the fundamental characteristics of
cognition and knowledge on the features of consciousness
does not, according to Sartre, solve the problem of
substantiation even if this solution is to be sought for on the
path of phenomenological insight and not of cognitive
research. Indeed, in his view consciousness is devoid
of essence or depth. It therefore has no foundation and
cannot serve as a foundation for anything whatever. In
general, the problem of substantiation of anything (
knowledge, values, norms of activity, etc.), Sartre insists, only
emerges at the level of &quot;human reality'', expressing the
vain tendency of Being For-Itself to &quot;take root&quot; in
something, to acquire density, substantiality, self-confidence.
This problem is insoluble, Sartre believes, because of the
fundamental properties of Being For-Itself. For this
reason, the fundamental structural characteristics of
knowledge do not express substantiation of knowledge by
something but rather &quot;absence of its substantiation'', that is,
the important fact that, being conditioned in its content
by the world of external objects, knowledge is at the same
time a relation of consciousness, that is, it is &quot;
suspended from nothingness'', as it were, hanging in a vacuum.
The necessary connections of cognitive experience always
express, in one way or another, the temporal flow of
events, while time directly characterises consciousness and
its intrinsic negativeness.</p>

<p>     The fact that Sartre rejects the problem of
substantiation of knowledge and, in general, epistemological inquiry
in its traditional form, does not mean that he regards
theoretical analysis of cognition as impossible. On the
contrary, his conception does not exclude such an analysis (
directed, e.g., at establishing the logical structure of
knowledge, the mechanisms of its origin, various methods of
theoretical investigation, the modes of verification of
knowledge, etc.). Sartre merely insists on the
impossibility of theoretical, cognitive investigation of the very
essence of the cognitive relation, of the fundamental
meaningful characteristics of knowledge, of the problem of
substantiation of knowledge, that is, of those problems which
have always been the concern of epistemology as a


philosophical discipline. Those problems of cognition and
knowledge which are not philosophical in nature can be,
according to Sartre, the subject-matter of specialised
scientific investigation.</p>

<p>     Let us now consider more closely Sartre's conception of
the interrelations between subject and object.</p>

<p>     Sartre proceeds from the immediate givenness of
consciousness to itself in the act of non-objectifying self--
consciousness. Even before it reifies itself as the ego, before it
is included in relations with other consciousnesses, before
the act of elementary reflexion emerges, consciousness
already distinguishes itself from the world of external
objects, elementary cognitive experience being expressed
in the intentional orientation at the latter. As this starting
point of Sartre's analysis lacks substantiation, his
conception as a whole proves to be basically defective.</p>

<p>     We have no grounds for distinguishing self--
consciousness pertaining to ``pure'', non-objectified consciousness,
from ordinary reflexion aimed at the individual ego as an
object. In any case, the experience of the consciousness
of an adult gives no grounds for this differentiation.
(The facts of the development of the child's psyche will
be discussed somewhat later.) Moreover, the very
emergence of consciousness as a unified centre of psychic life,
as a certain individuality distinguishing it from other
consciousnesses, implies that its states are related to the
activity of a certain object that is my body (though not
identified with this activity). The very differentiation between
consciousnesses, the possibility of their individuation,
assumes their correlation with the bodies of different
subjects included in objective relations with other things.</p>

<p>     Sartre agrees that distinguishing myself as the ego from
the others implies a relation to myself as an object of a
special kind connected with other material objects and
other egos appearing before me as other objects. In his
view, however, the true individuality of my consciousness
is not expressed in the ego but in the very fact of the
existence of a pure structureless point---Being For-Itself.</p>

<p>     But pure consciousness as something absolutely empty
and contentless indeed proves to be ``nothingness'', though
not in the sense of Sartre, who not only ascribes
absolute emptiness to consciousness but interprets it at the
same time as a special kind of being, as a metaphysical
reality, as a centre of activity: it proves to be ``nothingness'' in
the sense of absolute fiction. Structureless and contentless
consciousness devoid of any properties or qualities cannot
in principle be individualised. Consciousnesses
interpreted as ``nothingness'' must merge, they must be &quot;glued


together''. But in this case Sartre's fundamental
philosophical premise falls---the assumption of uniqueness of
separate consciousnesses, of the impossibility of one
consciousness penetrating another.</p>

<p>     Let us consider in this connection the development of
child psychology, which provides additional arguments for
a critical evaluation of Sartre's conception.</p>

<p>     As we have seen, consciousness distinguishing itself from
the external world is, according to Sartre, the starting
point of experience which does not assume a relation of
consciousness to other persons and their consciousnesses.
But there are grounds to believe (and psychological data
confirm this opinion) that the individual who does not
treat himself as an object of a special kind included, on
the one hand, in the world of material objects and, on the
other, in the world of interpersonal relations, does not
possess consciousness and self-consciousness, that is, simply
does not distinguish himself from the rest of reality. But
that means also that cognitive experience itself is not in
this case fully endowed with the features of unity and
continuity which Kant believed, with every justification, to
be indications of its objectiveness.</p>

<p>     Indeed, objectiveness of experience implies that the
subject is at least capable of distinguishing those of its
features which are produced by the action of the external
objects themselves from those which are caused by the
subject, that is, those which are conditioned, on the one
hand, by changes of its position relative to certain objects
(its movement, changes in viewpoint, the perspective of
perception, etc.), and on the other hand, by changes in
the states of consciousness. But the existence of this
faculty in the subject means that he can conceive of
himself as a special object possessing consciousness, that is, he
can perform an act of elementary self-cognition. It also
means that to the extent in which self-consciousness and
self-cognition are absent in the subject (and there are no
grounds for distinguishing between them, as we have
endeavoured to show), cognitive experience cannot retain
its unity and continuity, that is, it cannot be viewed as
fully objective.</p>

<p>     Jean Piaget, whose works on the psychology of
intellectual development and genetic epistemology were discussed
in the first chapter, singles out different stages in the
development of the child's cognitive structure on the basis
of the results of experimental studies. At the beginning,
at the stage of the so-called sensori-motor intellect, the
child is absolutely unconscious of itself as an object and,
consequently, as a subject. For this reason the objects


surrounding him do not retain in his experience their constant
relation to one another and their own constant
characteristics independent of the flow of experience
itself (such as size, volume, weight, etc.).</p>

<p>     The object disappearing from the perception field (e.g.,
when the child looks away or when one object obstructs
the view of another) does not exist for the child, it &quot;
disappears absolutely'', as it were. Cognitive experience is
thus discontinuous. Grown-ups are perceived by the child
as merely particularly active objects, sources of pleasure
and punishment.^^90^^</p>

<p>     This stage in the development of cognitive structures
recorded in Piaget's studies has, as we see, certain
similarities with the initial experience of which Sartre writes.
The latter also stresses that initially consciousness does not
realise itself as an object, neither is it aware of its body
as an object and cannot therefore constitute a special
subjective world of consciousness distinct from the objective
connections between objects given in experience: it cannot,
for instance, localise the sensations coming from the various
parts of its own body but merges as it were with the latter.
However, there is a fundamental difference between the
views of Piaget and Sartre in the interpretation of that
experience. As opposed to Sartre, Piaget insists that at the
first stages of intellectual development the subject is
incapable of perceiving himself reflexively, so that his
consciousness does not exist either objectively or subjectively.
That means that not only the difference between the
subject's consciousness and his body is non-existent for the
subject (that fact is also recognised by Sartre), but neither
is its difference from the world of external objects (which
Sartre does not recognise). At the first stages of
intellectual development, the subject merges, as it were, with the
world of external objects in his own experience. It is for
this reason that the objects of experience do not appear
here as things yet, that is, as something different from the
subject (whereas for Sartre Being In-Itself is immediately
given to consciousness as the world of objects).</p>

<p>     Another important circumstance should be noted. For
Sartre, the initial cognitive experience underlies the entire
subsequent development of cognition determining the
content and meaning of all the types, kinds, and structures of
knowledge including scientific-theoretical knowledge. But
Piaget shows that the development of cognition in
individual psychical evolution implies complete restructuring
of the intellectual mechanisms which took shape at the
first stages; thus it absolutely cannot be understood from
the latter alone.</p>


<p>     At the same time it would be quite wrong to
interpret the characteristics of the initial stages of intellectual
development established by Piaget as a kind of &quot;
experimental confirmation&quot; of the proposition of philosophical
subjectivism that what is given to the subject initially is the
subject himself and the states of his consciousness, and
not the world of objective things. The subject is from the
very beginning of the development of the psyche
objectively included in definite relations with external objects and
other men. Although subjectively these things do not
initially appear before him as objects, and other persons
as subjects, only a knowledge of the development
mechanisms of these objective relations, in which man is included
immediately after birth, enables one to explain the
development of consciousness. As for the form in which the
subject perceives the objective relations indicated here, its
knowledge cannot by itself explain the nature of the
successive changes of the cognitive structures. On the contrary,
the subjective form itself can and must be explained from
the system of objective relations. Finally let us point out
that at the initial stages of intellectual development the
subject is not given either the world of objects or the
subject himself, the states of his consciousness. Therefore
that picture of the initial cognitive relation which
philosophical subjectivism outlines is completely at variance
with the actual data of cognitive experience.</p>

<p>     Piaget shows that the development of cognitive
structures from non-reversible to reversible intellectual operations
(see Chapter 1) includes a change in the child's
psychological relations with adults. At the initial stage these
structures are ``centred'', that is, they offer no possibility for
distinguishing between the immediately given standpoint
and the objective relations of things. ``Centring''
necessarily implies also that imitation of the adult, who appears as
an absolute authority, is the main mechanism of the child's
involvement in socio-cultural experience. The stages of
cognitive development characterise the phases of
consecutive ``de-centring'' of the intellectual structures, that
is, achieving the view of oneself from the outside, as it
were. But simultaneously that means a change towards
complete reversibility of relations with adults. In other
words, the child begins to treat the adult as in principle his
equal, as another subject. The adult's authoritarian
pressure gives way to intellectual exchange and cognitive
cooperation. It therefore becomes possible for the child to treat
himself fully as an ego, that is, a being like any other.</p>

<p>     Thus what Piaget calls complete reversibility of
intellectual operations necessarily includes the subject's reflexive


relation to himself.</p>

<p>     The fundamental features of the emergence of
individual reflexion were formulated on the philosophical plane
by Marx: &quot;In a sort of way, it is with man as with
commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a
looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtean philosopher, to
whom T am I' is sufficient, man first sees and recognises
himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own
identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as
being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in
his Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the
genus homo.''^^91^^</p>

<p>     Thus the subject's relation to himself as the ego is
necessarily mediated by his relation to another. Reflexion
is not born as a result of the inner needs of ``pure'',
isolated consciousness, as Descartes, Fichte, and Husserl
believed, but in interpersonal relations, as a complex
product pf the development of a system of
communications. At the same time it would be wrong to interpret
the words of Marx quoted above in the sense that the
individual first recognises the other as a subject, another
ego, and only after that begins to treat himself as a subject,
on the analogy of that other. In actual fact there is
mediation of dual kind: the individual not only perceives himself
on the analogy with the other---he perceives, at the same
time, the other on the analogy with himself. In other
words, the ego and another ego emerge simultaneously and
necessarily presuppose one another. This fact is, by the
way, clearly recorded in Piaget's studies.</p>

<p>     Let us emphasise that we use in this context only
experimental facts obtained by Piaget, and certain concrete
psychological generalisations. As for the general
epistemological and psychological conception of that author,
according to which the development of intellectual
operational structures is determined by inner, ``spontaneous''
maturing of the subject's schemes of activity, its
substantive critique was given in the first chapter.</p>

<p>     Let us also note that the theory of gradual ``de-centring''
of the cognitive structures developed in Piaget's latest
works must not be confused with his early propositions
concerning the overcoming of the child's initial
intellectual ``egocentrism'' in the course of development. We know
that the thesis about ``egocentrism'' was sharply criticised
by the Soviet psychologist L. S. Vygotsky.^^92^^ He correctly
reproached Piaget for choosing wrongly the starting point
pf the investigation: the individual only gradually becomes
involved in the system of social relations, essentially
modifying his cognitive instruments in the process. Vygotsky


insisted that no such independence of the individual in his
original state from society and his subsequent socialisation
existed at all.</p>

<p>     Piaget now recognises the correctness of much of
Vygotsky's criticism.^^93^^ All three stages in intellectual
development, Piaget insists, are stages in the process of
socialisation: &quot;..Human intelligence is affected by the action of
social life on all levels of development, from the first day
of life to the last&quot;.^^94^^ The whole point, however, is, Piaget
believes, that the influence of society varies at different
stages of intellectual development. The stages in the process
of ``de-centring'' characterise only the phases in the gradual
sublation of the primacy of the direct viewpoint incapable
of changing the given cognitive perspective. The early
stages in intellectual development are better referred to as
``centrism'' rather than ``egocentrism'', Piaget points out.
This change in Piaget's position on a number of questions,
although it makes his conception more sophisticated,
permitting a more precise description of some facts,
particularly those which interest us most of all in this
section, does not of course signify any radical reorientation
of his philosophical and psychological theory as a whole.</p>

<p>     Mutual assimilation apparently begins with
identification of the subjects' actions. In insisting that the attitude to
self as an object is alien to the very nature of
consciousness, Sartre, as we remember, pointed out that in the
initial cognitive experience man does not perceive even his
own body as an object: the eye does not see itself, man
cannot look at his own face, etc. But Sartre fails to see
that there are parts of the body which are simultaneously
perceived both &quot;from within&quot; as something belonging to
the given being, and &quot;from without&quot; as objects
incorporated in the world of material objects. These are the organs
with which I perform actions with things and which
enable me to move in the object world---my hands and my
legs. Outwardly, they look just as the corresponding parts
of another man's body. In the course of joint activity of
one person with others (in the first place, of an adult and
child), the actions of different individuals are apparently
identified and then individuals as wholes are mutually
likened, that is, the ego and another ego take shape

<p>     What we have said here about the mutual mediation of
my attitude to myself and to the other does not entail my
self-consciousness and my cognition of another person
being in principle identical. Indeed, individual reflexion
implies the view of oneself from the standpoint of another,
as it were. At the same time I always know something


about myself which is not directly accessible to the other:
I have perceptions, experiences, memories that are only
given to the act of my reflexion and can be concealed from
everybody else (I can, for instance, even conceal pain).
Thus I have direct &quot;inner access&quot; to the states of my
consciousness. This important real fact was recorded and
philosophically interpreted by the adherents of subjectivist
and transcendentalist philosophical conceptions. Indeed, I
can only judge of the subjective states of another in an
indirect way---either by observing his actions or receiving
his own information about himself. In either case the
possibility of error or deceit is not ruled out. It is
important to note, however, that the very nature of self--
consciousness, of individual reflexion, is such that its emergence
necessarily implies a fundamental likeness between what I
perceive in myself &quot;from within&quot; and that which is or may
be perceived by another subject within himself. Of course,
that other may conceal from me certain states of his
consciousness, just as I can do with my consciousness. That
does not, however, exclude the fundamental identity of
the mechanisms of our psychical life, while the actual
process of communication assumes as a premise of its
success the attainment of mutual understanding in most
cases. My subjective states are directly given me in the act
of self-consciousness, in a way in which they cannot be
given to another, but I realise them in forms which are not
my personal property but are inter-individual in nature. In
other words, the act of subjective reflexion presupposes,
on the one hand, an object which is directly accessible to
me only (my subjective states), and on the other, such
instruments of cognitive fixation of this object which
subsume &quot;any other&quot; person (i.e., that which would be
realised by that other if he had a direct access to the states
of my consciousness).</p>

<p>     Thus Sartre's proposition that there is no access to the
consciousness of another subject is at variance with the
actual data of interpersonal communication, expressing, in
fact, the thesis of &quot;pluralistic individualism&quot;: according to
Sartre, a multitude of consciousnesses exists, each of them
closed in itself and incapable in principle of penetrating
the others.</p>

<p>     Thus cognitive experience which has the characteristics
of objectiveness, that is, experience assuming the subject's
conscious relation to the world of objects, necessarily
includes the subject's reflective relation to himself and
distinguishing his own body from all the other objects, as
well as differentiation between changes in the state of
consciousness and the objective changes in the world of things.


The subjective experience expressed in the act of self--
consciousness and self-cognition is different from the
objective experience pertaining to the world of external objects.
But these are not simply two series of experience existing
independently from; each other and following parallel
paths, as it were. As we have tried to show, both of these
series presuppose and mediate one another. Subjective
experience only becomes possible as a result of a relation
to oneself as an object included in the network of
objective relations with things and other persons. In their turn,
the external things emerge before the subject as a world of
objects independent of him and of his consciousness
only when the first elementary act of self-consciousness

<p>     The subject realises not only his inclusion in an
objective network of relations but also the uniqueness of his
own position in the world. The latter manifests itself, first,
in his body occupying a place in the system of spatio--
temporal connections which is not taken up by any other
subject, and second, in the fact that only he has &quot;inner
access&quot; to his own subjective states. The objective fact of
the uniqueness of this position, just as the subjective
realisation of this fact, is assumed by the very structure of
experiential knowledge (any attempt to apply theoretical
knowledge to the description of the data of experience
also assumes this fact). As we have seen, however, this
circumstance has nothing to do with ``centring'' the world
around the individual subject, a thesis which Husserl
endeavoured to substantiate in his later works.</p>

<p>     Let us note in this connection that some epistemological
conceptions of the empiricist variety current in modern
bourgeois philosophy, criticising the Cartesian thesis (``I
exist&quot; as the supreme substantiation of any knowledge),
often deny any serious cognitive significance to the act of
individual self-consciousness. Thus A. J. Ayer insists that
the proposition &quot;I exist&quot; does not in fact say anything
about me, being devoid of any content, it does not
identify me with any object (Ayer stresses in this respect that
this assertion is different from the statement that there
exists a person of such and such a sort). The utterance &quot;I
exist'', the English empiricist believes, may be likened to
simply pointing to an individual object without words.
This pointing, as we know, does not carry any
information. Besides, he believes that there can be knowledge that
is not accompanied by self-consciousness.^^95^^</p>

<p>     But self-consciousness, as we have endeavoured to show,
is impossible without reference to oneself as a definite
object possessing specific unique characteristics and


ineluded in a network of objective relations. The act of
individual self-consciousness itself can only emerge due to
the existence of certain meaningful dependences of
experience (subjectively one may not, of course, be
immediately aware of all these dependences, but implicitly they
are always present). The relation to oneself as the ego thus
includes a whole system of connections of knowledge.
Descartes, Fichte and Husserl were therefore right in asserting
that the act of self-consciousness and reflexion
implicitly assumes the fundamental characteristics of knowledge.
Their error lay elsewhere: in the attempt to interpret the
specificity of knowledge and of the cognitive process by
analysing the act of reflexion, a ``pure'' self-conscious ego.
The real dependence is directly the reverse: the
emergence of the ego and of its self-consciousness and reflexion
must be understood as a result i of the formation of
cognitive experience, as a consequence of the development of
definite objective relations of the given subject to the
world of material objects and other persons.</p>

<p>     The fundamental error of transcendentalism and
subjectivism lies in their assumption that knowledge of one's
own existence is more indubitable than knowledge of the
existence of the external world. In reality, the most
elementary act of self-consciousness always implies
recognition of the world of external objects independent of
consciousness and connected by stable relations.</p>

<p>     Thus the attempts to substantiate knowledge
undertaken within the framework of philosophical subjectivism,
and to interpret cognition as determined by the structure
of individual consciousness, could not in principle be

<p>     That does not mean that the adherents of the
conceptions considered in this chapter have not established any
real facts about the cognitive relations of subject and
object. In our critical analysis we have pointed to the most
important of these facts. Summing up what has been said
in this chapter, we can say that philosophical subjectivists
exploit for their purposes, first, the specificity of the
nature and functioning of the subject's consciousness (the
existence of direct &quot;inner access&quot; to the states of one's
consciousness, self-consciousness as the necessary
feature of the objectiveness of experience, etc.) and, second,
the normative characteristics existing in any knowledge.</p>

<p>     Idealistic juggling with these facts of cognition and with
the real problems arising in epistemological research makes
an adequate interpretation of the cognitive relation
impossible. Philosophical subjectivists inevitably find themselves
in blind alleys because of the very mode of specifying the


initial cognitive relation between subject and object.
Understanding the fundamental properties of
knowledge and cognition assumes an essentially different
interpretation of the subject-object connections.</p>

<p>     We have not analysed here the conceptions of cognition
developed in the framework of objective-idealistic systems.
As is well known, the most thorough investigation of the
problem of cognition in the spirit of objective idealism is
to be found in the philosophy of Hegel, who succeeded in
establishing a number of important aspects of the cognitive
relation and in revealing many elements of the dialectics of
the cognizing subject and the cognized object. At the same
time Hegel, being an idealist, thoroughly mystified the
essence of the matter. Hegelian philosophy does not view
cognition as determined by the features of individual
consciousness but as an expression of the specific mode of
existence of the Absolute Spirit embodied, in particular, in
the objective forms of human culture. Because of the
nature of the real problems exploited by the Hegelian
conception of cognition, we shall criticise the latter in the
second part of the monograph, in direct connection with a
positive analysis of the problem.</p>

<p>     In our critical analysis of Sartre's conception of
consciousness and knowledge we came to recognise the
important role played in the cognition of an external object
by the relation of the individual subject to other persons
and to culture created by them and embodied in
objects. A solution to the problems with which we are
concerned should be sought for in the framework of an
interpretation of the subject and objects which can take these
fundamental facts into account. Such a solution of this
problem is possible in the framework of the Marxist--
Leninist approach to cognition as the socially mediated and
historically developing activity of reflexion.</p>


<b>Part Two</b>

<br /> OF REFLECTION</b>


<p>     Marxist analysis of the problem of the cognitive relation
starts with a recognition of the basic fact that cognition is
<em>reflection</em> of the objective reality existing independently of
consciousness, that the cognizing and cognizant subject
himself is a natural being included in the objective reality,
and that cognition is a function of the brain as a specific
highly organised material system, and presupposes the
action of the external objects on man's sense organs.</p>

<p>     These propositions are shared by all materialist
conceptions, and Marxist-Leninist philosophy as the highest
form of materialism includes them in its theory.</p>

<p>     But we have seen (in Chapter 1 of Part One) that
acceptance of these propositions is not by itself sufficient
for a comprehensive and adequate understanding of the
specificity of human cognition and knowledge. Human
cognition is a reflection of a special type, and explanation
of its properties requires substantive additions to the
epistemological conception propounded by pre-Marxian
materialism, the additions being of a kind to radically
transform this conception without taking it beyond the
framework of materialism but, on the contrary, making
it more flexible and at the same time more consistent, that
is, dialectical.</p>

<p>     The task that we shall here attempt to solve will be to
demonstrate the fruitfulness of the mode of interpreting
cognition, the cognitive relation between the subject and
the object, which is suggested by Marxist-Leninist
philosophy. Our goal is to outline, from the positions of
dialectical materialism, the principal directions in the solution,
on the one hand, of those problems that emerged in the
history of philosophical thought, and on the other, of
questions actively discussed in connection with the
development of modern science, the latest data of psychology,
Scientology, and logical and methodological studies.</p>


<p>     Marxist-Leninist philosophy assumes cognition to be a
socially mediated, historically developing activity of
reflection. Cdgnitive reflection, object-related historical activity
and qommunication are regarded in their dialectical unity.
&quot;Idea, image, and consequently, consciousness and thought
in general,'' writes S. L. Rubinstein, &quot;cannot be accepted
as an independent term of the epistemological relation.
Behind the relation of an idea or image to a thing, of
consciousness or cognition to being, there is another
relation, the relation of man, in whose cognitive activity
the image or idea arise, to being which he cognizes.''^^1^^ The
epistemology of dialectical materialism contains a key to
the real facts of cognition and consciousness which
metaphysical-materialistic and idealistic conceptions have been
unable to explain scientifically. Moreover, Marxist-Leninist
philosophy opens up fundamentally new horizons of
epistemological inquiry, posing problems that have not
been discussed in previous epistemological conceptions.
It radically changes the nature of epistemology, its
methods and relation to the special sciences.</p>


<b>Chapter 1</b>



<p>     To begin with let us state that the results (``traces'') of
the action of an object on human sense organs, though
constituting a reflection of an external object, in no way
represent knowledge: they are not directly included in the
cognitive relation and, being merely its necessary premise,
cannot be characterised as <em>cognitive</em> images (they are
physical images). &quot;It is a mistake to consider psychical
formations as completely identical to the nervous
physiological mechanisms. The subjective image is undoubtedly
specific and irreducible to the nervous model. &quot;^^2^^</p>

<p>     Indeed, these ``traces'' carry obviously redundant
information, which cannot, because of its redundancy, be a
reference point for the subject in an objective situation.
For instance, if we should allow that the visual system
does not in some way transform or organise retinal images
(i. e., the ``traces'' of the action of light rays on the retina)
but merely transfers them from one place to another
recording them in some storage mechanism, this system will
conduct about a million counts of brightness in 0.1 sec.
In a few minutes the number of such counts would reach
a magnitude of the order of several thousand million,
exceeding the number of neurons in&quot;the cortex.^^3^^</p>

<p>     Therefore a sensory system which has no methods for
transforming the information received, for transforming
the result of the action of an external object on it, remains
blind, having no criteria for discerning useful signals against
the background of noise.^^4^^ The cognitive image carrying
knowledge about an object contains precisely that
information, and only that information, which is vitally
necessary tc the subject as a concrete individual and a
representative of society.</p>

<p>     But the relation between objective knowledge specific
for cognition and, in particular, sense perception, on the
one hand, and sensory information, on the other, is not


reduced merely to discarding a certain part of the latter
with the aid of a system of filters. Objective knowledge
is by no means poorer on the content plane than sensory
impressions, and in some respects is essentially richer, for
we perceive objects in terms of properties the knowledge
of which is not directly contained in the sense data.</p>

<p>     As Marx pointed out, a most important feature of
perception is that it does not carry information about
excitation in the nervous apparatus as a result of the action of
the object on the sense organs but about the really existing
<em>object</em> itself, the object that is outside the perceiving
subject. For example, &quot;the light from an object is perceived
by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve,
but as the objective form of something outside the eye

<p>     ``To perceive a chair,'' says Pierre Janet, &quot;means to see
an object in which.one may sit, and to perceive a house,
as von Weizsacker put it even more forcefully, does not
mean to see an image that the eye caught but, on the
contrary, to recognise an object that can be entered!~&quot;^^6^^
V. S. Tyukhtin indicates that on the one hand, the image
is connected with the material substratum, and on the
other, what is given in the image is the content of the object
and not of the nervous substratum. &quot;The paradox of the
unity of these two aspects is insoluble merely on the basis
of the principles of physical causality, but it can be
explained if the features of objectness and anticipation are
viewed as a special <em>functional</em> property of highly organised
living systems.... That means that the content of the
signal is separated from its form (the material substratum)
functionally rather than in an anatomical, physiological,
physical or chemical way.''^^7^^</p>

<p>     The mutual relations of the subject and the object
perceived by him change almost continually, both as a result
of changes in the position of the object and of man's
movements. Naturally, this cannot fail to lead to constant
changes in the character and configuration of the ``traces''
of the object's action on the sensory system. If the image
of the object were entirely determined by these ``traces'',
we simply would be unable to single out that object as
an independent reality. In ordinary conditions, however,
the object is perceived as independent from the concrete
conditions of perception and from the act itself (the
phenomenon of &quot;constancy of perception&quot; known in
psychology). Human speech is also perceived in this way. The
following observation was made in the attempts at
artificial reproduction of speech. When speech is transformed
into light impulses in a special apparatus, it turns out that


speech sounds appearing as identical under ordinary
conditions, prove to be different in their physical
characteristics, whereas others, which we perceive as different,
leave identical visible traces.^^8^^</p>

<p>     Thus cognition is object-oriented and determined from
the very outset, in its most elementary manifestations.
The attempts of representatives of classical empiricism as
well as modern &quot;sense data &quot;-oriented theoreticians, to
present certain elementary subjective experiences
uncorrelated with material objects as the initial elements and at
the same time units of knowledge, lead to insoluble
paradoxes in epistemology and, moreover, directly contradict
the available results of scientific psychology.</p>

<p>     Of course, knowledge of objects does not emerge at
once in the course of ontogenetic and phylogenetic
development. It is important, however, in this connection to
bear in mind the following two circumstances. First, where
there is no objective knowledge, sense perception'does not
exist either, and consequently, neither does knowledge
in the proper sense of the word: in this case, sensory
information, among other things, serves as the basis for
behaviour orientation. Second, the emergence of perception,
that is, of objective knowledge, cannot be understood only
on the basis of sensory information or of any other kinds
of reflection which do not reproduce the objective
characteristics of reality.</p>

<p>     James Gibson, a prominent American psychologist,
distinguishes two kinds of vision, only one of which is
perception, that is, knowledge in the proper sense. &quot;If
you look out of the window,'' he writes, &quot;there beyond
is an extended environment of ground and buildings or,
if you are lucky, `scenery'. This is what we call the <em>visual
world</em>. It is the familiar, ordinary scene of daily life, in
which solid objects look solid, square objects look square,
horizontal surfaces look horizontal, and the book across
the room looks as big as the book lying in front of you...
Next look at the room not as a room but, insofar as you
can, as if it consisted of areas or patches of coloured
surface, divided up by contours... If you persist, the scene
comes to approximate the appearance of a picture. You
may observe that it has characteristics somewhat different
from the former scene. This is what will here be called the
<em>visual field</em>. It is less familiar than the visual world and it
cannot be observed except with some kind of special

<p>     In analysing the differences between the visual field
and the visual world, Gibson observes that the visual
field is limited (approximately 150&deg; to 180&deg;) and is


oval-shaped, whereas the visual world has no boundaries
and stretches behind one's head as well as before the eyes.</p>

<p>     The visual field is clear and distinct in the centre, its
indeterminateness growing towards the boundaries. The
visual field shifts as the eyes pass on from one point of
fixation to another, whereas the visual world is stable.</p>

<p>     The visual world is always oriented along the
gravitational vertical, whereas the visual field is oriented in
relation to its boundaries. Changing the position of the
observer, e. g., his inclination by 90&deg;, changes nothing
in the orientation of his visual world, while in the visual
field the horizontals will now become verticals. The visual
world is constant. In the visual field, projection relations
obtain. In the visual world, the three-dimensional depth
forms of objects are perceived, while in the visual field,
projection forms. At the same time, although the visual
field is projectional, in the words of Gibson &quot;it is never
flat, like a surface on which a picture is painted or
projected; that is, it is never wholly depthless. Nor is it lacking
in the character of being <em>outside</em> of us, in externality.''^^10^^</p>

<p>     According to Gibson, the visual field does not underlie
the visual world at all. The two kinds of vision are
alternative, emerging as a result of two different attitudes of
consciousness. With the ordinary consciousness attitude in
perception, the subject confronts the visual objective world.
The other attitude is artificial in nature, expressing the
civilised man's chronic habit of regarding the world as a

<p>     A group of Soviet psychologists, who studied under
A. N. Leontyev the formation of perception under unusual
conditions, gave a somewhat different interpretation of
these facts.^^11^^</p>

<p>     In a series of experiments, retinal images were distorted
by means of special optical devices (using the pseudoscope,
inverting the retinal projections). As a result, the objective
image of perception and its sensuous texture were brought
completely apart. These experiments showed that under
definite conditions the sensuous texture of the image
without an objective interpretation may be directly
presented to the subject (true, under these conditions the
subject, strictly speaking, does not have a knowledge of
the world, he is almost incapable of orientation in it);
moreover, they have showed that the formation of the
perceptual image necessarily presupposes a certain
activity with the sensuous texture. But there are certain grounds
to believe that the sensuous texture is close to what
Gibson called the visual field.</p>

<p>     Gibson's rejection of the connection between the


sensory field, sensation and perception is entirely unjustified.
At the same time his opinion about a qualitative difference
between perception and the sensory field is quite correct.</p>

<p>     Under ordinary conditions the sensuous texture of the
perceptual image (corresponding to the visual field) is
not realised by the subject. At the stage of ontogenesis
when an adequate objective vision of the external world
has not yet been formed, the visual world is not yet
present in the subject's experience and, more than that, the
visual field does not exist for his consciousness either.
The qualities pertaining to the visual field (colours and
their shades, the mutual arrangement of various contours,
etc.) are realised only to the extent in which they are
included in the visual world, that is, the world of real objects.</p>

<p>     John Ruskin, the outstanding art critic and
theoretician, anticipated the findings of the impressionists as he
wrote: &quot;The whole technical power of painting depends
on our recovery of what may be called the <em>innocence of
the eye;</em> that is to say, of a sort of childish perception of
these flat stains of colour, merely as such, without
consciousness of what they signify,---as a blind man would
see them if suddenly gifted with sight.''^^12^^ But under
ordinary conditions the stains of colour cannot be realised
as such, outside their objective interpretation and
correlation. A blind person suddenly recovering sight after a
successful operation (and cases like that are well
authenticated in modern science) cannot see anything at first, for
he can only see in a conscious, objective manner, and that
has to be learnt.</p>

<p>     A grown-up person to whom the sensuous texture of
the visual image becomes accessible (as a result of a special
kind of reflective attitude of consciousness or through
application of special technical devices distorting the usual
retinal projection of an object) always realises the
unnaturalness of such a situation and cannot get rid of the
feeling <em>of irreality</em> of the picture given to his consciousness.</p>

<p>     The experiments of Soviet psychologists permit yet
another conclusion of great importance for understanding
the cognitive specificity of perception. The perceptual
image of an object is not only constant in relation to the
continually changing conditions of perception and to a
certain extent independent of the sensuous texture: it
carries in its content structure the conception of the world
as existing amodally, that is, <em>objectively</em>, independently
of our sensory modalities-^visual, tactile, etc. As became
particularly clear in the studies of perceptive activity
through inversion of the visual image, the formation of
the perception image assumes existence in consciousness,


as an element of the latter, of an amodal, objective <em>world
scheme</em>, which may exist in the texture of any modality
or in the form of certain mnemonic schemes. The perceived
world is a form of the existence of the world scheme
in a certain modality. It is essential that the world scheme
also includes <em>the body scheme</em> as its component, and the
perceptual image is formed only through the correlation
of the perceived world with the amodal world scheme
through the body scheme.^^13^^</p>

<p>     Perception as a kind of cognition thus assumes
comprehension, understanding, interpretation of what is seen.
This interpretation is a certain kind of activity. Indeed,
identical sensory data may correspond to extremely
diverse real objects.</p>

<p>     The process of perception always presupposes choosing
(the choice being in a sense debatable) of an interpretation
of sensory data which appears most probable in a world
of real objects. Perception builds something like <em>
objecthypotheses</em>. I act in accordance with my perception of
the properties of the physical object, a table, rather than
with the sensation of a brown spot that is in my eye when
I look at the surface of the table.</p>

<p>     The object is perceived as a result of a complex process
of comparing sensory information with those standards
of objects that are recorded in memory. This process
may involve errors.^^14^^</p>

<p>     The process of perception is continual solution of tasks
of a special kind, a special kind of thinking, &quot;visual
thinking'', as specialists in the psychology of perception now
describe it.^^15^^</p>

<p>     Let us formulate the epistemological significance of
what has been said above in clearer terms.</p>

<p>     We should take into account, first of all, that from the
standpoint of Marxist epistemology, the difference
between perception and thinking does not at all consist in
that the former is purely direct while the latter, a
mediated kind of knowledge, as was traditionally accepted in
philosophical empiricism. Cognition is oriented from the
outset towards objects, and the singling out in the external
world of objects, of real things assumes cognitive activity,
adopting certain assumptions and hypotheses which are
later verified in sensory and real activity. The development
of modern psychology gives concreteness to these
fundamental philosophical assumptions.</p>

<p>     Sense perception or, as Lenin referred to it, &quot;living
perception&quot;^^16^^, differs, of course, from abstract reasoning.
Under ordinary conditions, what is consciously realised by
the subject is merely the result of perceptual activity, the


object image, while the activity of construction of this
image is not given, it is reduced and concealed from
consciousness. But thinking, which deals in abstractions,
implies detailing of the activity of constructing the object
image and a conscious control of its realisation (although
by no means everything is realised in abstract thinking,
but that is a separate problem). To the subject himself,
perception therefore appears as direct givenness of the
object and is distinguished from thinking precisely by
that criterion. Another important distinction is that
knowledge provided by perception assumes existence of
objective meaning in a given sensuous texture or sensory
modality. Both the number of sensory modalities and their
characteristics, just as, to a considerable degree, the properties
of the sensuous texture, are determined by the concrete
historical circumstances of the emergence and
development of the biological species <em>Homo sapiens</em>. This
determination is not, of course, accidental: the receptive
organs, both in number and capacity, have always coped
with providing the <em>Homo sapiens</em> with the information
which was initially required for orientation in the
environment, in the world of relatively stable macrobodies, in a
definite narrow circle of activity. But man's specificity
consists precisely in going beyond the biologically
determined kinds of activity.</p>

<p>     This entails the emergence of cognition in the precise
sense of the word just as the appearance of the need for
cognizing such real objects, their properties and relations,
which cannot in general affect man's receptive system.
Cognition of this kind became possible owing to the
development of thinking which uses a system of special
artificially constructed objects: symbols, signs, diagrams,
schemes, models, etc., for establishing the properties of
those objects which exist independently of the subject.
(Let us note that thinking need not necessarily be
expressed in the form of verbal signs: it may also be realised
through a special kind of operation upon objects.)</p>

<p>     As we have seen, the referential meaning of the
perceptual image does not stand in a one-to-one relation to
sensory information, it is in some respects poorer than that
information, and in others, considerably richer. This
circumstance is explained by the fact that the objective
meaning of the image and, consequently, the specifically
human cognition, as distinct from sensory information,
does not emerge in biological evolution but in socio--
historical development through practical activity. The subject
can perceive those aspects of objects which do not act on
his sense organs. At the same time there are object


meanings which cannot in principle be incorporated in a
sensuo'us texture and cannot therefore be sensually perceived.
These referential meanings are reconstructed by a special
type of thinking, one that consciously operates with

<p>     The limitations of- perception arising from its distinctive
properties (the subjective immediacy, the unconscious
nature of interpretation) are the source of possible
contradictions between perception and understanding of the
object (it would be more precise to say, between two
different levels of understanding---in terms of perception
and of abstract thinking). Thus the moon is perceived as
a disc some 30 cm in diameter at a distance of about a
kilometre and a half. All humans apparently perceive the
size of and distance to the moon in an approximately the
same way, erring by a factor of one million. Such examples
are numerous.</p>

<p>     In this context, however, it is more important to stress
the similarities rather than the differences between
perception and thinking, those similarities which permit to refer
to the former as a kind of &quot;visual thinking'', an activity
of solving tasks in object recognition.</p>

<p>     The Marxist epistemological position is opposed to both
metaphysical materialism and gnoseological empiricism,
which in its fully developed form inevitably becomes
subjectivist and idealistic. It is at the same time interesting
to compare this position with the transcendentalist
interpretation of cognition.</p>

<p>     We recall that, according to Kant and Husserl, cognition
never deals with subjective perceptions but with objects
(it is a different question how the objects themselves are
understood, what ontological status is ascribed to them by
these philosophers). Let us note, though, that for Husserl,
the intentional object, which may in certain cases coincide
with the real one, is given immediately, with apodictic
certainty, and knowledge of that object cannot in
principle be a result of the subject's constructive activity (the act
of intentional orientation at the object is, according to
Husserl, the act of grasping some certainty). The
theoretical objects with which science deals are not, in fact,
genuine from the standpoint of phenomenology, they do not
characterise adequate knowledge but merely play the role
of auxiliary conceptual constructions. Kant's position on
this point appears at first glance essentially different. Kant
insists that the object given in experience, and knowledge
of that object, are in fact a result of the creative activity
of the Transcendental Subject, a product or synthesis of
perceptions. Let us observe, however, that for Kant, too,


a referential meaning can exist in the form of knowledge
only insofar as it is incorporated or included in some
sensuous texture. The subject possesses knowledge, Kant
points out, only insofar as the object of knowledge is given
in sensory experience (for this reason, experience and
knowledge essentially coincide, in Kant's view).
Knowledge and thinking are therefore sharply contrasted: Kant
believes that attempts to acquire knowledge through
thinking, that is, knowledge of those objects that cannot be
given in experience, inevitably lead to insoluble
antinomies. That does not mean that one cannot cogitate of the
given objects. However, one cannot know anything
definite of them, Kant believes, for any knowledge is a
synthesis of a manifold, and that synthesis is in his view only
possible in experience.</p>

<p>     In reality, the relation between the referential meaning
and the sensuous texture is not at all reducible to a mere
``synthesis'' of varied sensations by means of objective
content: many sensations are discarded, contradictions
may arise between objective content and certain sensory
impressions, and in this case the latter are not noticed,
they are not realised. The main point is, however, that a
referential meaning can be included in the system of
knowledge also in such cases when it is not directly
incorporated in sensory experience. In other words, pure
knowledge is also possible of such objects which cannot be
directly given in human experience. Modern microphysics,
on the one hand, and cosmology, on the other^ deal with
such objects (which, according to Kant, cannot in
principle be the subject-matter of knowledge).</p>

<p>     In classical epistemology, substantiation of knowledge
involved postulating such kinds of knowledge which
themselves do not require substantiation, those in which
the object is grasped more or less directly. This is true not
only of the various systems of empiricism, which found
such knowledge in metaphysically interpreted sensations
or &quot;sensory data'', but also of transcendentalist philosophy.
Therefore the search for the &quot;immediately given&quot; and its
differentiation from deduced and constructed knowledge
have always been one of the most important tasks of
preMarxian and non-Marxist theories of knowledge.</p>

<p>     Dialectical materialism emphasises that it is not any
knowledge that can be objective, or object-related,
asserting at the same time that different levels of knowledge
deal with real objects, although at different levels different
types of objects and their aspects are reflected (the
development of modern psychology and theoretical natural
science confirms and specifies this thesis). &quot;Cognition is


the eternal endless approximation of thought to the
object,'' V. I. Lenin writes. &quot;The <em>reflection</em> of nature in
man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly,' not
'abstractly,' not devoid of movement, not
without contradictions, but in the eternal
process ,of movement, the arising of contradictions
and their solution.''^^17^^ Of course, not all theoretical
objects with which scientific thinking deals, can be
correlated with actually existing objects directly and
unambiguously. Real objects exist, however, which can only
be reflected through abstract reasoning and cannot be
directly given to the subject in sensory experience.</p>

<p>     But that means that the classical problem of pre--
Marxian epistemology, the problem of substantiation of
knowledge, must not only be solved in a new manner but
it must also be formulated in a new way. That means that
the most important task of scientific epistemology is not
the singling out of immediately given entities, the
certainties of knowledge, but the discovery of universal
referential meanings and norms of the objectiveness of knowledge,
the study of the modes of formation, development, and
change of these norms and, solution on this path, of the
problem of interrelation of knowledge and the objectively
existing reality.</p>


<p>     The view that the true properties of reality are grasped
as a result of direct impact of the object on the subject, or
in the form of some kind of ``fusion'' of the subject and
the object, and that the distortions, errors, and illusions
are wholly explained by the fact that the subject is not
passive enough in following the &quot;objective givenness'',
introducing something of himself in the cognitive process
(either of his physical and physiological nature or of the
activeness of consciousness), was deeply rooted in
preMarxian epistemology. It was of course a long established
fact that perception may be deceptive, that it can lead to
error in understanding the meaning of certain objective
situations, yet it was never doubted that from the practical
viewpoint it in most cases yielded correct knowledge. At
the same time attaining truth through abstract thinking
was in one way or another linked up in classical
philosophy with the act of direct, passive grasping (Plato's &quot;
intelligent vision&quot; of ideas, intellectual intuition of the
rationalist philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries;
Husserl's direct &quot;insight into the essences'', etc.), that is, it


was understood on the analogy of passively interpreted
perception. Thus the question of the subject's activeness
and passiveness in the cognitive process was closely linked
with one of the focal philosophical problems widely
debated since antiquity-^he problem of the relation between
reality and appearance or illusion.</p>

<p>     The modern psychology of perception provides a wealth
of material to support the philosophically important
proposition that the results (``traces'') of the impact of the
external object on the sense organs are not at all enough
to distinguish between reality and illusion, for, as we have
said already, different configurations of these traces may
correspond to most diverse real objects. The singling out
of real objects from the sensory information through
imposing certain object-hypotheses on the latter is ensured
not only by the subject's cognitive activity but also by the
object-hypotheses themselves having been tested in
practical activity (collective or individual) and indicating those
aspects of the real objects which are essential precisely
for that activity. When the subject encounters some objects
previously unknown to him in his practical activity, or
familiar objects in unusual situations, objects viewed from
unusual angles, an <em>illusion</em> arises: one perceives something
that does not actually exist. (We ignore here those
perception distortions which result from sensory receptors being
tired or from their adaptation to prolonged or intense
stimulation.) Although in this case sensory information
coming from the object may be completely undistorted
and can be fully taken into account, it may prove entirely
insufficient for eliminating the illusion and establishing the
real object. In other words, illusion is in this case by no
means the result of the subject's activity but merely a
consequence of the activity being inadequate to the
objective situation.</p>

<p>     Adalbert Ames, an American psychologist, has
performed the following experiment. Three peepholes are
made in a screen through which one can look with one eye
at each of the three objects displayed in the distance. Each
of them is perceived under the given conditions as a chair.
But when we look at the three objects from another
angle, we discover that only one of the objects is indeed
a chair. The other two are extremely strange objects which
can nevertheless produce from a certain angle the same
projection on the retina as a real chair. (One of the objects
is not even one coherent object but a variety of wires
extended in front of a backdrop on which is painted what
we took to be the seat of the chair.) Thus only one of the
chairs which we see in this experiment is a real chair, while


the other two are illusions.^^18^^</p>

<p>     The illusion arises because of all the interpretations
possible -(of all the object-hypotheses) corresponding to
the given retinal patterns, the subject unconsciously
chooses the one which accords best of all with his
practical experience. Man continually handles chairs and does
not as a rule encounter those strange objects which Ames
demonstrated. All kinds of illusions are as a rule quickly
dispersed in common practice: as distinct from the
artificial conditions of laboratory experiment, in real life the
subject does not just look at a given object from one
position, and with one eye at that, but continually shifts
his position, moving and acting vigorously, practically
using various objects and creating new ones. All of this
ensures quite sufficient conditions for correlating
knowledge with real objects, singling out a fleeting perceptual
image as an illusion and separating it from impressions
corresponding to real objects. A stick immersed in water
seems broken. The illusion in this case is not due to
distortion of sensory information: the objective circumstances
are such that the physical image of the stick on the retina
cannot be different here; we know that the light refraction
angles are different in the air and in water. The impression
of the unusual arises here because in ordinary practice we
do not deal with objects in two mediums simultaneously,
in water and in air, so that our object-hypothesis cannot
correct the distortion of the projection of the stick on the
retina, as it is done by the subject perceiving the size
and form of objects seen from different angles (``
constancy of perception''). But once one starts handling that same
stick (and that usually happens when it is not half in the
air and half under water), one perceives it as straight,
i. e., as it actually is.</p>

<p>     Thus the objective properties of objects perceived are
singled -out in practical activity in accordance with the
tasks of that activity. E. H. Gombrich, the well-known
art critic and specialist in the psychology of the perception
of painting, remarks in his account of the Ames
experiments with chairs that a hypothetical man from Mars who
is used to furniture of the same kind as the strange objects
demonstrated by Ames rather than our ordinary chairs,
would perceive the latter as the familiar arrangements of
wires (in any case, that would be his original perception,
until he found out that chairs are real objects of our
world).^^19^^ But it is exactly this circumstance, that is, the
intimate links between perception and the immediate
practical needs, that conditions not only the strong but also
the weak points of perception. Practice does not simply



compel us to perceive the real characteristics of objects.
The narrow limitations of practice may be the source of
stable mass illusions that cannot be eliminated, such as the
impression of the immobility of the Earth and the motion
of the Sun. The conscious reflective cognition operating
with abstractions ignores the urgent needs of practice
and endeavours to discover the essential characteristics
of objects irrespective of their appearance in a concrete
situation. That does not mean that theoretical thinking in
general isolates itself from the tasks of practice, opposing
itself to the latter: it only means that thinking is an
instrument for finding out the necessary characteristics of
objects and at the same time the essential dimensions of
practice itself. This ensures the possibility of action under
conditions which appear unusual and unfamiliar in terms
of available experience. When scientific astronomy
dispelled the illusion of the Sun's movement and immobility
of the Earth (this illusion nevertheless persists in the
perception of a person as long as that person remains on the
Earth, for it fully accords with the ordinary practice of
taking the Earth for a frame of reference), the possibility
was thereby established, in the most abstract form, of
future unusual and novel practice-^that of space flights,
which provides a fresh view of the mutual motions of the
Sun and the Earth.</p>

<p>     Although in principle theoretical thinking is capable
of establishing the object's proper, real characteristics,
it may under certain conditions persist in reproducing
stable illusions. Theoretical thinking (mostly in the social
sciences) may be closely linked with a narrow, restricted
practice of a definite kind persistently thrusting on the
subjects the perception of apparent aspects of reality only.
Of this nature is, for instance, the well-known
phenomenon of &quot;commodity fetishism&quot; discovered by Marx, which
is a mass objective illusion inevitably shared by the
proponents of the capitalist system of social relations and
reproduced by the vulgar bourgeois political economy.</p>

<p>     Marx was able to overcome this illusion theoretically
only because he accepted the position of the proletariat's
revolutionary practice, which went beyond the activity
in the framework of the bourgeois mode of production,
assuming as it did a radical transformation of the latter.</p>

<p>     Of special interest are the perception illusions in which
the perceptive image to some extent or other <em>directly
contradicts</em> sensory data, partially rejecting them. This
happens when the image of an object corresponding to
sensory data is too extraordinary and deviates from
common practice. A suitable example here is the perception


of the image of a head turned inside out, e. g., of the inner
surface of a casting mould or of a plaster mask. Such an
illusion expresses not only the weakness but also the
strength of perception. The perception hypothesis in
principle behaves in the same way with regard to sensory
``facts'' as theory with regard to the facts of science.</p>

<p>     However, the replacement of one perception hypothesis
by another, is, as a rule, a more difficult matter, than the
replacement of scientific theories or even paradigms, for
perception object-hypotheses are too intimately
connected with ordinary human practice. In this connection, the
problem of perception of unusual objects arises, which is
particularly acute <SUB>N</SUB>today when man has created a world
of supercomplex technical apparatus often behaving
differently from the ordinary bodies of everyday
experience. Let us emphasise once again one of the most
important features of the cognitive relation. On the one
hand, what is given to the subject in the act of cognition is
the really existing object and not his own subjective
sensations. The objective image is not realised as a specific
thing requiring special activity of objectif ication or
projecting for its correlation with the external object. On the
other hand, cognition necessarily assumes a realisation of
the difference between the subject and the object cognized
and, consequently, a realisation of the <em>difference</em> between
the objective image belonging to the subject and the actual
object itself. True, under ordinary conditions, when
cognition is directed at the external object rather than the
subjective world, the realisation of the subjective
relevance of the objective image belonging to the subject is, as it
were, at the periphery of consciousness, while the centre
of the consciousness field is occupied by the real world of
external objects. In this case, the objective image is ``
transparent'', as it were, to the object presented in it. However,
even when consciousness is oriented at the world of one's
own inner experiences (and that orientation is secondary,
derivative from the orientation at the external world), the
object (in this case the state of consciousness) and the
subject of cognition do not merge, being separate from one

<p>     The subject may be involved in cognizing objects of
at least three kinds: objects external not only with regard
to his consciousness but also to his body; his own body
(reference here is to my body only, and not to the body
of another subject); and finally, his consciousness.
Cognition which deals with the objects of the first kind is
primary, basic, and determining all the other types of
knowledge. This cognition necessarily presupposes the presence


in consciousness of an objective world scheme
incorporating also the scheme of the subject's body as occupying a
definite objective spatial-temporal position in the world
among other objects. (If the subject does not realise the
objective position of this body in the world, he cannot
orient himself in the objective medium.) Cognition of
one's own body, on the one hand, assumes that some of
its states are given to the subject &quot;from within&quot; (through
proprioceptive reception), and on the other hand, it is
based on the realisation of the body being incorporated in
the objective network of the world's connections in which
the subject's body itself acts as one of the objects.</p>

<p>     Thus the objective knowledge that I can pass on or
communicate to other persons presupposes the existence of
objects external with regard to my body and independent
of it, and incorporation of my body in an objective network.
As for the knowledge of the states of my consciousness,
it only proves possible because I can view myself as if I
were some other person, which implies not only the
existence of that other person outside myself but also joint
activity with him. (That does not exclude the existence
of such shades in the realisation of my inner experiences
which are rather hard to express externally and to
communicate to someone else.) And that means that the
realisation of the subjective states of consciousness presupposes
objective knowledge as the necessary basis and would be
impossible without it.</p>

<p>     Let us imagine that all objects of cognition are created,
as it were, by the act of consciousness and do not exist
outside cognition. It may appear that this hypothetical
picture corresponds to the world of inner experiences of
a child at the early stages of the development of the
psyche, when objective perception of reality has not yet
been formed and differentiation between the subjective
and the objective is non-existent. But this view is
unfounded. First, the early stages of the development of the psyche
contain the possibility and the necessity of the subject's
subsequent conscious differentiation between his
subjective states and the world of objects; second, the
hypothetical picture of creation of objects by the very act of their
cognition presupposes the realisation and recognition of
the primacy of the subject and the derivative nature of
objects, whereas in fact the baby does not originally realise
even himself as a subject, far from realising the existence
of objects.</p>

<p>     It is not hard to show the impossibility of the situation
assumed here, for even the subjective states of
consciousness cannot be fully determined by the cognitive activity


aimed at them, although the relation between subject
and object in the process of reflexion is characterised by
certain difficulties, which we shall later discuss. The states
of consciousness and the subject's body certainly do not
exist independently of the subject himself. But their
cognition, as we have stressed above, is only made possible
by the subject realising himself as incorporated in the
objective world, that is, a world filled with real objects
and other subjects existing outside and independently
from him. Most of the objects and other subjects are
independent of the given subject both in their origin and
their existence. (Some of them are independent of him
in their existence but dependent on him in their origin:
these include, first, the objects created by man, and
second, his children.) If the objects were ``tied'' to the
subject and ``followed'' his movements and actions, the
cognitive relation would simply be impossible.</p>

<p>     This fundamental characteristic of cognition should
be borne in mind, in particular, in discussing the
philosophical implications of the modern theories of quantum
mechanics. Both in the physical and the philosophical
literature one can come across statements to the effect that
the distinction or boundary between subject and object
is obliterated in cognizing the objects of the microworld,
and that man in this case deals with the cognition of his
own action on the object of knowledge. These arguments
are sometimes linked up with the dialectical materialist
doctrine of the unity of the subject and the object, with
the Marxist thesis of the active, practical nature of
cognition. In reality, the philosophical significance of the
cognitive situation in quantum physics lies in the discovery
of a fundamentally new type of real objects possessing
properties sharply distinguishing them from the ordinary
objects of the macroworld, and in the need for taking into
account the conditions of observation in describing
experimental results. At the same time quantum mechanics
provides no grounds for the assertion that the boundary
between subject and object is eliminated. The point is that
the conditions of observation referred to here are quite
objective. The macro-devices and micro-objects exist
outside the subject. The subject conducting the
experiment and recording the apparatus measurements may in
principle be replaced by an automaton.</p>

<p>     Of course, man also cognizes the products of his own
creativity. But that is only possible insofar as these
products (e. g., the world of technology, cultural artifacts,
scientific theories, works of art, etc., in the form of signs
and symbols) function in the externally objective mode,


that is, outside the subject's body. In any case, the process
of cognition, of conscious reflection of the object, cannot
coincide with the process of creating it. (Cognition itself
is always creative in nature, but we have in mind here only
the reproduction of the cognized object in the system of
knowledge and not its creation.)</p>


<p>     We have already pointed out the role of referential
meanings, cognitive norms, and object-hypotheses in the
process of cognition, stressing the fact that these norms
do not simply emerge in the course of the object affecting
the sense organs but control the choice and
transformation of sensory information in shaping the object's image.
The question naturally arises as to the nature and origin
of these norms. Aren't the transcendentalists right in
asserting that cognitive standards and norms are inherent
in the subject's consciousness and should be understood
as a result of analysis of the latter?</p>

<p>     The philosophy of dialectical materialism posits that
cognition in all its forms, beginning with perception, based
on definite standards and objective norms, is formed in the
subject's practical activity involving material objects. It
is not passive reception but practical transformation of
the objective environment that is the starting point of
man's attitude to the world.</p>

<p>     ``The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of
Feuerbach included),'' wrote Marx, &quot;is that things <em>[
Gegenstand]</em> reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the
form of the <em>object, or of contemplation</em>, but not as <em>
sensuous human activity, practice</em>, not subjectively. Hence,
in contradistinction to materialism, the <em>active</em> side was set
forth abstractly by idealism---which, of course, does not
know real, sensuous activity as such.''^^20^^</p>

<p>     ``... But men do not at all begin with 'standing in this
theoretical relation to the <em>things of the outer world'</em>. As
any animal, they begin with <em>eating, drinking</em>, etc., thus
not with `standing' in some relation but with <em>active
behaviour</em>, with mastering certain things of the outer world
through action and thereby satisfying their needs.''^^21^^</p>

<p>     Lenin stressed repeatedly that Marxism made practice
the basis of its epistemology. &quot;... The world does not
satisfy man and man decides to clange it by his
activity.''^^22^^ &quot;... A full `definition' of an object must include the
whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth


and a practical indicator of its connection with human

<p>     The connection between perception formation and the
subject's activity involving objects is now widely
recognised in psychology.</p>

<p>     Thus, Piaget's studies show the incorporation of
perception in more general schemes of object-directed
activity---sensori-motor schemes, in the case of a baby.</p>

<p>     The first stage in the development of sensori-motor
schemes of behaviour (of sensori-motor intellect) is marked,
according to Piaget, by the use of innate sensori-motor
mechanisms which are adapted to the properties of objects
(their form, size, etc.). At this stage, only a finer
differentiation of stimuli may take place but not perception of

<p>     The second stage (beginning with the second month of
the child's life), or the stage of primary reactions, is
marked by repetition of accidental actions yielding a
positive result. At this stage of development, the object
appears to the child as a direct continuation of an action.</p>

<p>     At the third stage (the stage of secondary circular
reactions, which lasts between the third and the ninth
months), the primary reactions come to be applied to new
objects. A number of new types of behaviour emerge:
visual adaptation to slow movements (the child, following
a moving object, continues to follow the trajectory after
the disappearance of the object), repeated grasping at
one and the same place, recognition of the whole object
from its visible part, overcoming obstacles interfering
with perception (the child pulls away a piece of cloth
thrown over his face) and applying varied actions to
one and the same object.</p>

<p>     However, although the child returns to the original
action directed at an object in a definite place, there is
no searching yet for an object that disappeared except
for continuing an action once begun along the same
trajectory. Although children pull away a piece of cloth from
their face, they never attempt taking it off an object
that was covered in their presence. Piaget believes that
it is at this stage that the objectness of perception

<p>     The fourth stage (between nine months and a year) is
the stage of coordinating the schemes of action already
acquired and their application to new situations.
Systematic investigation of new objects begins, connected as it
were with discovery of their purpose (scrutinising,
swinging, shaking, pressing, sticking into the mouth, throwing,
etc.). The child actively searches for the object which


disappears before his eyes but does not take into account
the object's movements going on right before his eyes.
The object is a reality for the child, but a reality at a
definite place in the presence of a definite action.</p>

<p>     At the fifth stage (between the end of the first and the
middle of the second year) the child discovers new
patterns of action through active experimenting. Actions
are performed involving the use of auxiliary implements,
the simplest instrumental actions. In searching for a
concealed object, the child begins to take into account the
consecutive movements of the visible object, looking for
it in the place where it was hidden last.</p>

<p>     Finally, the sixth stage (beginning with the middle of
the second year) signifies the transition from sensori--
motor experience to imagining the results of the child's own
actions, on the one hand, and to imagining objects and
their movements, on the other. At this stage, the child
learns to take into account several consecutive movements
of the object in searching for it even though the object
is invisible during these movements (after being shown
to the child, it is moved in a closed fist or box).^^24^^</p>

<p>     ``Implicitly, perception models, in a way, reality both
present and future, and also the future states of the object
trasnformed by man,&quot;^^25^^ points out A. M. Korshunov.</p>

<p>     The works of Soviet researchers have shown that
initially perception processes are formed and develop as
integral components of practical activity, and the overall
effect of this activity as a whole consists in establishing
the features of the observed situation. The practical
object-oriented activity develops the operations of
singling out and analysing the features of a thing. As the child's
activity becomes more complex, and he faces more
difficult cognitive tasks, the limitations of a purely practical
study of the object and the need for special perceptive
actions come to fight. However, perceptive actions top are
at the first stages externally similar to actions with things.
This similarity is observed even in the case of distant
receptors which do not come in direct contact with

<p>     At the same time the realisation that cognitive norms
and operations are formed in the subject's practical
activity with material objects is not enough to understand the
nature and modes of functioning of the norms of
cognition. Marxist philosophy posits that practical activity
itself must be understood in its specifically human
characteristics, namely, as joint or collective activity in which
each individual enters into certain relations with other
persons; as mediated activity in which man places between


himself and an external, naturally emerging object other
man-made objects functioning as instruments or
implements of activity; and finally, as historically developing
activity carrying in itself its own history.^^27^^ The socially
functioning man-made objects mediating various kinds of
his activity (beginning with implements of labour,
including objects of everyday use, and ending with sign--
symbolic systems, models, diagrams, schemes, etc.) play not
only an instrumental but also a most important
cognitive role. In the objects cognized, man singles out those
properties that prove to be essential for developing social
practice, and that becomes possible precisely with the aid
of mediating objects carrying in themselves reified
sociohistorical experiences of practical and cognitive
activity.^^28^^ Mastering a socially functioning man-made object,
the child begins to single out in external objects, first,
those features and characteristics which are essential for
the activity with the aid of the given instrument, the
given man-made object, and second, those traits in which
they are similar to the objects accumulated through human
activity. In other words, the instrumental man-made
objects function as objective forms of expression of
cognitive norms, standards, and object-hypotheses existing
outside the given individual. The mastering by the
individual of these norms, social in their genesis, permits their
functioning as structure-forming components of cognition.
It is in the course of this mastering of norms in practical
activity with external objects that the objectness of
perception is formed. This fundamental fact was discounted
by Piaget, who made a great contribution to the study of
the links between the process of perception and the
development of forms of object-oriented activity but viewed
the development of cognitive structures as entirely
dependent on progressive changes in the relations of equilibrium
between the individual and the external environment.</p>

<p>     In studies by Soviet psychologists relying on the basic
tenets of Marxist philosophy about the nature and ways of
formation of cognitive norms, the hypothesis was advanced
and later experimentally confirmed that the instruments
for performing perceptive actions are systems of the
objects' sensuous qualities singled out and recorded in
social experience, which, mastered by the child, function
as standards, or &quot;units of measurement'', in the perception
of the varied phenomena of reality. Systems of sensuous
qualities are singled out in various kinds of human activity
(the colours of the spectrum, geometrical forms, etc.)
which ``quantify'' in a definite manner the corresponding
aspects of reality.^^29^^ That means, for instance, that a clear


perceptual distinction between a circle and an oval (and
a singling out of these forms in the objects of nature) is
derivative from their different functioning in object--
oriented activity. Retinal images of a circle and an oval may
not differ very much, and their perceptual differentiation
is essentially conditioned by the practice of operating
with man-made objects used as standards in perceptive

<p>     As we know, from the standpoint of Gestalt psychology
the singling out of the circle in the objects perceived by
the subject is one of the striking examples of the action
of inner structural (in fact, innate) laws of all cognition.
Gestalt psychologists believe that the main law
determining perception of form is the law of <em>Pragnanz---the</em>
tendency of the image of perception to assume &quot;good form&quot;---
symmetrical, closed, and simple (the circle is an example
of such a symmetrical and simple form). Underlying the
law of <em>Pragnanz</em> is, in the view of these theoreticians, the
trend towards establishing an equilibrium between the
physical processes in the subject and those in the objects
external with regard to the subject. Aware that systems
with a minimum of potential energy are the best balanced
physical systems, Gestalt psychologists endeavour to
show that the most characteristic features of these
systems are simplicity and symmetry.^^30^^ However, in the
case of the singling out of the circle by the perceiving
subject, modern psychology provides grounds for the
assertion that this process is mediated by assimilation of
socially formed perceptual standard. Indeed, the subject is
more inclined to single out such simple forms as the circle
than others in the objects perceived. But this is explained,
first of all, by the special role of such forms in human
object-oriented activity, which is in its turn conditioned
by certain objective properties of these forms.</p>

<p>     As Marx pointed out, &quot;the eye has become a <em>human</em>
eye, just as its <em>object</em> has become a social, <em>human</em>
objecton object made by man for man. The <em>senses</em> have therefore
become directly in their practice <em>theoreticians..</em>. The <em>
forming</em> of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of
the world down to the present.''^^31^^</p>

<p>     Thus the implementation of the act of cognition as a
specifically human reflection or reproduction of the
object's essential characteristics presupposes not only the
subject's handling the object but also man's creation (the
social man rather than a natural individual, that is man in
cooperation with other individuals) of a definite system
of ``artificial'' objects mediating the process of reflection
and carrying cognitive norms and standards in themselves.


These mediating objects, acting as instruments of
cognition, have a certain specificity. On the one hand, their
purpose is to enable the subject to reflect in cognition
the characteristics of objects existing independently from
them. On the other hand, the mediators themselves are
objects with specific features of their own, possessing
internal connections, assuming definite modes of operating
with them and existing originally in an external reified form
(they are only later assimilated by the individual,
becoming his inner attributes). But that means that
implementation of the cognitive act assumes not only the subject's
ability to correlate mediating objects with the object
cognized. The subject must also master the modes of
handling the specific reality constituted by the socially
functioning artificial objects.</p>

<p>     Let us consider in this connection some essential
moments in the general problem of interrelation between
activity and cognition. A short historical-philosophical
excursus is in order here. The conception that there is an
intimate connection between cognition and activity is of
a relatively recent origin. The thinkers of antiquity
characteristically drew a sharp distinction between knowledge
in the proper sense, that is, understanding of the essence
of things, and technical ability to produce or artificially
create a certain object. Art can only imitate nature to
some extent, but it cannot equal it: such was the view of
ancient philosophers. Man cannot produce what is created
by nature. That does not mean, in ancient philosophers'
view, that man cannot cognize the reality of nature. But
knowledge is not identical with ability for technical
reproduction of what is cognized. The thinkers of antiquity
(we ignore here the essential differences between various
schools in philosophy at that time) insisted that, as distinct
from artificial reproduction, knowledge presupposes
neither a change in the given object nor construction of
a new object but passive reception of the content of reality
that is cognized as it is.</p>

<p>     A different conception of the interrelation of
knowledge and activity is developed in the philosophy of the
New Times, a conception directly linked with the
formation of new experimental science. First of all, the activity of
artisans and technicians is re-assessed. The view gains
currency that technical ability to make some thing is
also knowledge, and not just one kind of knowledge, but
knowledge of fundamentally the same sort as theoretical
and, moreover, one that expresses the essence of any
knowledge. Inasmuch as knowledge of the essence of
the object implies cognition of its proximate cause, man


can really know only that which he made himself, that
is, the things whose proximate cause he himself is.
Knowledge is thus identified with creation or construction.^^32^^
Since contemporary technology mostly involved
mechanical processes of assembly and dismantling, knowledge
of nature was reduced to discovery of particular
constructions suitably assembled and dismantled, and nature itself
was viewed as a giant clockwork. The thesis of the
knowability of the world appears in this context as
substantiation of the conception that all natural processes can be
technically reproduced, that human technical art can in
principle attain the same degree of perfection as nature.
From this standpoint, scientific theory is nothing but a
kind of accumulation of the potential modes of technical
activity, for theory mentally dismantles and assembles
that which can later be dismantled and assembled

<p>     It is in this context that statements should be
understood to the effect that knowledge is power, that man is
not only a servant but also the master of nature (Bacon).
Descartes did not draw a fundamental distinction between
mechanisms created by craftsmen and bodies made by

<p>     Thus the thesis, widely discussed in the philosophy of
the New Times, that man can really know only that which
he himself created is closely bound up with the prevailing
mechanism in new experimental science that replaced the
peripatetic medieval physics. For us, however, another
point is more important. This thesis is directly linked with
yet another idea that began to interest many thinkers
precisely at that time, the idea that the subject's
knowledge is only adequate insofar as it is connected with the
subject himself, his state, and actions, that is, the idea
which was expressed most distinctly by Descartes.</p>

<p>     This last circumstance is particularly important, for
the thesis discussed here outlived mechanism exactly
because of it. Indeed, if we do not link up too closely
any activity with material and technical activity, still
less with the work of mechanical assembly and
dismantling; if we assume that the essence of activity is purely
spiritual, the assertion may be retained that cognition
is identical with creation of the object cognized, lending
this thesis distinct subjectivist meaning and at the same
time discarding the obsolete ideas of philosophical
mechanism. That was exactly what was done in German classical
philosophy, in the first place in the systems of Kant and

<p>     Let us also note that if cognition is identical with


creation of the object cognized, all things that cannot be
created by the subject and exist by themselves, turn out
to be unknowable.</p>

<p>     The establishment of fundamental links between
knowledge and activity, theory and practice, and the emphasis
on the subject's active role in cognition, were indubitably
an essential contribution to the development of
epistemology. Marxist philosophy creatively assimilated these ideas,
starting out from their treatment by the German classical
philosophers. Still, the idea, that cognition of the object
is in principle identical to its creation or construction is
unacceptable to scientific epistemology. True, one can
attempt to erase the subjectivist colouring of this thesis
by reformulating^ as the idea that all knowledge is a set
of some potential practical modes of object-oriented
activity, and that these modes themselves express the real
structure of the object and are in this sense objectively
conditioned. But in this formulation, too, the analysed
thesis is hardly acceptable, for its main drawback is
retained: direct equating of knowledge and modes of practical

<p>     The idea that man's knowledge is most adequate where
it concerns objects which he himself has created is quite
untenable, too. It is well known that one may be an
excellent handicraftsman or technician and at the same time
have a vague notion of the processes which objectively
determine the success of certain technical operations.
Today, the laws of physico-chemical processes are known
much better than the laws of such a man-made
phenomenon as language. Man is also far from perfect
understanding of the way in which scientific theories are
constructed and change. And then there is all the work to be
done towards cognizing the phenomena of consciousness.
On the other hand, great masses of quite reliable
knowledge exist which cannot so far be used practically.
Knowledge of this type does not provide modes of practical
artificial reconstruction of the objects to which it refers
(although it may of course be used in the future,
combined with other types of knowledge, for working out new
technologies and new modes of practical activity).
Nevertheless this kind of knowledge is quite correctly described
as knowledge.</p>

<p>     Undoubtedly, cognition grows out of practical activity,
servicing material practice throughout its development. This
proposition is fundamental in dialectical materialism. It is
also true that cognition, being reflection, always appears as
a kind of activity and consequently as construction and
creation, for activity is always reified in certain objects.</p>


<p>     Cognitive activity is directed at reflection, reproduction
of the properties of real objects with the aid of a special
system of artificially created mediator objects. Of course,
cognition may also involve action on an external object
(that happens, e. g., in experimenting), but that action
does not bring about changes (or, still less, construction)
of cognized characteristics of the object but only
production of better conditions for their discovery. (The reference
here is to those properties that appear in the given
situation as the object of cognition, for it goes without
saying that in any material action some objective
properties are always changed and some are even created.) It is
through the activity of using mediator objects that
creation, or construction, of objects enters cognition. Man
constructs new apparatus and measurement instruments,
creating and developing scientific theories, constructing
models, operating with signs and symbols in a definite
manner, etc. But this creative, constructive activity
pertains precisely to the world of mediator objects and does
not imply creation of the object cognized. With the aid
of artificially constructed mediator objects the subject
cognitively reproduces other objects (often getting a better
knowledge of the latter than of the former). It does not
follow from the above that mediator objects themselves
cannot be objects of knowledge. But in this case they cease
to be mediators and assume the construction of a new
system of mediator objects, embodying the knowledge
about them. Importantly, the goal of theory is
reproduction of the essence of an object regardless of a concrete,
particular situation of practical employment of it, as
distinct from perception which includes only referential
meanings directly linked with existing social practice. It
is this feature of theory that forms the basis for the
development and perfection of practical activity, for finding
ways of practical utilisation of new aspects of objects
that have been cognized theoretically but have not yet
become objects of technical activity.</p>

<p>     Thus cognition, an activity that is genetically and
functionally dependent on objective practice, is not at the
same time identical with the latter. In practical activity,
objects are constructed that have immediate value for
society and individual subjects. At the same time practice
assumes the use of implements-yobjects in which the
material activity of mankind is reified. The properties of real
objects may be reproduced in the process of cognition
only through creation of a whole world of special mediator
objects subject to specific social laws of functioning and
carrying social cognitive experiences. Mediator objects


used in the process of cognition do not have a value as
such but merely as carriers of knowledge about other
objects. Creativity and cognition are thus linked in a most
intimate manner and assume each other. But in its very
essence the act of cognition cannot coincide with the act
of creating the object cognized, otherwise we would have
no grounds at all for any discussion of cognition and

<p>     The idea of the identity of knowledge and creation of
the object cognized, developed in the philosophy of the
New Times, appears to be diametrically opposed to the
ancient view of knowledge as passive reception. Let us
note, however, that both of these ideas have one point in
common, the conception of knowledge as direct grasping---
of the external object in the first case and of the activity
of the subject himself, in the second. In both cases there
is a failure to understand that the characteristics of a real
object may be reproduced in the process of cogjnition only
through construction of another system of objects, a
special world of mediator objects constituting social reality
of a particular kind. In other words, the mediated nature
of all knowledge is not understood.</p>

<p>     Let us consider Gaston Bachelard's conception as an
example of consistent development of the idea about the
identity of knowledge and constructing the cognized
object in modern Western philosophy. Pointing to the
artificial nature of most of the realities which constitute
the practical world of modern man and owe their origin to
technical creativity, the French philosopher concludes that
science more and more ceases to be knowledge of natural
phenomena, becoming a process of constructing
phenomena, a kind of factory for their production. Bachelard
believes that the phenomena which a physicist or
chemist studies are to a considerable extent his own creations.
It is not nature that provides the chemist with ``pure''
substances: he prepares them in his laboratory starting
from a theoretical construction. In the end Bachelard
comes to the conclusion that the essence of science does
not in general lie in comprehending natural reality but in
constructing artificial objects; that it consists in
technology and not in knowledge (thus he believes that the
electron, the positron, the proton, the neutron pertain to
the technical aspects of electric phenomena).^^33^^ As we see,
constructive activity of creating the world of artificial
mediator objects is here confused with creation of the
object itself that is to be cognized.</p>



<p>     So far we have concentrated on cognitive activity being
most intimately linked with the existence and
functioning of a special socio-cultural world of mediator objects.
A question, however, may naturally arise here: does not
this approach ignore the indubitable fact that cognition
is not only realised by separate individuals but as often
as not takes place ``within'' consciousness, without any
immediate external manifestation? One is not obliged to
inform anyone about the results of one's perception of
some object, not to mention the fact that this perception
may contain shadings of emotion that are hard to express
objectively. Although the process of thinking is apparently
impossible without some instruments of objectification
(signs of the natural language pronounced or recorded on
paper, mathematical symbols, etc.), we mostly think
without speaking.</p>

<p>     Interesting ideas usually emerge from the depths of
consciousness, and their verbal formulation often requires
hard work. Generally speaking, the existence of the
subjective world of one's own consciousness is obvious to
anyone: it is an inalienable attribute of the subject and
differs not only from the world of real objects but also
from the external object-directed and objectively
expressed actions of the subject.</p>

<p>     These indubitable facts cannot of course be negated.
We have already pointed out that the implementation of
the act of cognition assumes the subject distinguishing
himself from the object cognized, which implies, among
other things, distinguishing real objects from the
subjective states of consciousness. But to make this
differentiation possible, the subjective world must be present, it must
exist. The fact is, however, that the subjective world, the
world of consciousness, is by no means given from the
very outset. At the early stages of individual development
of the psyche the subject is not yet given the world of
objective things distinct from himself and leading a life
of their own. And for this reason the subject himself
and the world of his consciousness do not exist for the
subject. There is no subjective world at this stage of
development. The outstanding Soviet psychologist
L. S. Vygotsky, who relied on the fundamental
propositions of Marxist philosophy, expressed an idea'^^34^^ that
later became the basis of numerous theoretical and
practical developments and was, in particular, realised in the


studies of A. N. Leontyev,^^35^^ A. R. Luriya,^^36^^ P. Ya.
Galperin,^^37^^ A. V. Zaporozhets,^^38^^ V. V. Davydov,^^39^^
V. P. Zinchenko,~^^40^^ and others: the idea that internal
psychical processes are a result of ``interiorisation'', that
is, &quot;growing in&quot; or transposition onto the inner plane of
those actions of the subject which are originally performed
externally and directed at external objects.
Implemented in external forms, activity assumes cooperation with
other individuals and utilisation of socio-historically shaped
instruments and modes embodied in a system of mediator
objects. In the process of interiorisation external actions
are subjected to a specific transformation---they are
generalised, verbalised, reduced, and at the same time
become capable of further development going beyond
the possibilities of external activity.^^41^^ &quot;In other words,
the higher specifically human psychological processes can
only emerge in the interaction between men,'' writes
A. N. Leontyev &quot;that is, they can only be
intrapsychplogical, and only later are they performed by the individual
independently, some of them losing their initial external
form, becoming interpsychological processes...
Consciousness is not given initially and neither is-it generated by
nature: consciousness is generated by society, it is

<p>     That means that external activity in the form of
operating with certain objects, signs, schemes, etc., is not just
one of the means of objectifying the ``true'' activity of
thinking performed in one's brain but its real basis and
the starting point of formation.</p>

<p>     Therefore, all ideas appear in some objectified form,
although the latter need not be verbal: an idea may appear
in the shape of conception about activity involving some
object, or even simply as a visual image of some situation;
in the latter case the activity itself is given to the subject
in- hidden form and is included in the conception. The
translation of a verbally unformed idea (that is, unformed
even in terms of inner speech) is not simply the activity
of expressing some ready-made content in a different
material but development of the content itself. In
general, any form of reification or objectification of some
cognitive content signifies a certain change in the latter.</p>

<p>     That means that the process of perception is not purely
subjective, being mediated by mastering a socially formed
world of objects which may be viewed as reified
perceptions, just as scientific texts (although not only scientific
texts, of course) are reifications of thinking. Man looks at
the world through the eyes of society.</p>

<p>     The subjective world of consciousness presents itself to


the individual in the first place as a stream of visual images
and notions replacing one another. Let us note, however,
that any visual image (including the image of memory) not
only expresses a certain experience but always refers to
some real object (an ensemble of objects, a process, an
objective situation, etc.). And that presupposes
differentiating between the object and the image itself, interpreting
the object of representation (in varying degrees of activity)
in some network of objective relations: spatio-temporal
coordinates, certain dependences on other objects, etc.
The existence of visual images assumes, of course, the
ability of the brain to retain traces of previous impressions.
However, human notions are by no means identical with
these traces, for they are always objectively interpreted
in nature. That is why animals do not have either notions
or subjective memory: the ``revived'' traces of previous
impressions, first, are not included in this case in temporal
connections existing only in the present (that is, there
is neither the past nor the future for the animal,
subjectively), and second, they do not characterise the objective
world, connecting the information received from the
outside directly with some situation reaction. Pierre Janet, a
well-known French psychologist, underlines the
distinction between simple repetition and human memory. In
the repetition of something learnt earlier, the past is
retained in the present (here belongs the entire area of
skills). In a socially conditioned act of memory (in Janet's
terminology, in the act of &quot;true memory'') we have a
narrative, an account of what happened in the past, that is,
a fundamentally new action in the present, in which the
past is expressed symbolically. Because of this, an aspect
of personality is formed that differs from the realisation of
skills---the individual's self-consciousness.</p>

<p>     The same facts are played up and subjectively
interpreted in modern existentialist psychiatry. J. Zutta writes that
when someone, forgetting where he put some object, asks,
&quot;Where has it got to? '', and thinks it over in inactivity,
he does something that no other living being can do, for
he mentally translates a possibility into reality. The essence
of amnesias, according to existentialist psychiatry, is
above all the impossibility of going beyond the experienced
situation and of memorising in a human manner.^^43^^ The
visual image as an elementary ``quantum'' of the subjective
stream of consciousness is always objectively interpreted,
and this interpretedness emerges in the formation of the
processes of consciousness themselves, that is, in the
course of interiorisation of external activity in the world
of socially created objects embodying social--


historical experience. It may be imagined that under different
socio-cultural conditions, that is, in different contexts of
social practice, the referential meanings implemented in
external objective activity and later in the subjective world
of consciousness will vary somewhat, for their content is
determined not only by the world of real objects but also
by the degree of their assimilation in the historically
developing social practice. That means that under these
conditions the subjectively experienced worlds of
consciousness may differ in some respects in experiencing time, in
the perception of the nature of replacement of some states
of consciousness by others and of their mutual relations,

<p>     The visual image has no cognitive content different
from the content of the external object represented in it,
although the existence of the image itself and some of its
characteristics that do not pertain to its referential
meaning (its vividness or dimness, the length of the act itself
of image perception, etc.) are realised as belonging to the
subjective world different from the world of external
objects. Visual representation always points to a real
object, being devoid of any content or meaning outside
this indicative function. It is therefore impossible to
separate in consciousness the content of visual image from
the content of the object presented in it (although the
image itself is realised as different from the object). When
consciousness attempts to make the content of a given
visual image its object, it discovers that it deals with the
content of the real object itself presented in this image.</p>

<p>     The referential interpretation of the content of
consciousness emerging in the process of the formation of the
latter, that is, in the course of external activity with
socially created objects permeates all of its components,
including the conscious perception 'of the most
elementary units of psychical life. In this connection let us consider
the experience of pain. It is beyond question (and has
been studied thoroughly) that the basis and function of
pain sensations are physiological---they serve as a kind of
signal informing the individual about the need for
eliminating certain external actions constituting a threat to the
organism. The specifically human feeling of pain implies
the realisation of this feeling as differing from all the
others, its inclusion in the context of other states of
psychical life, localisation of pain sensations in the body of
the given subject (we do not feel pain in general but pain
in the given spot of the arm, toothache, headache, etc.),
realisation of the fact that pain is always <em>my</em> pain and is
not therefore inherent in objects different from my body,


and finally, a certain attitude to pain itself. In other words,
although the elementary sensation of pain in itself, as
distinct from perception or visual representation, expresses
experience rather than knowledge, it is also included in
certain meaningful structures, including cognitive ones,
relating, on the one hand, to external objects, and on the
other, to the subjective world. These meaningful
structures are assimilated by the individual only along with the
formation of his consciousness, and it therefore should
be assumed that the feeling of pain itself at the early
stages of development differs from what we have just described.
A newborn baby cannot in principle localise the feeling
of pain, for its body does not yet exist for it as an object.
It therefore merges, as it were, with its pain. Inasmuch
as the domain of external objects is not consciously given
it either, it may be said that when painfully stimulated,
the baby perceives the whole world as filled with the
sensation of pain. Supposedly, even this elementary
sensation (as a .consciously realised one) will vary with
cultural-historical conditions, in any case as far as attitude to
pain, the modes of external expression of this sensation,
etc., are concerned.</p>

<p>     This reference to the socially and culturally conditioned
character of the processes and functions of
consciousness does not of course mean that we negate the fact
that the subjective world of each individual is unique and
original, that I can know something about the states of
my consciousness that is not known to anyone else.
(At the same time someone else may know some things
about myself, about my personality and even about my
psychical life of which I am not aware myself.) The way
I perceive, experience things, think, etc., characterises
myself and no one but myself. The whole point is that the
process of interiorisation in which the subjective world
is formed occurs each time under a unique set of
conditions: the given human organism is unlike any others
even at the starting point of the development of the
psyche; the individual development of consciousness
itself occurs each time under specific conditions and in
unique relations with other men; each person occupies a
unique position not only in the system of interpersonal
socio-cultural connections but even in the network of
spatio-temporal relations. When I perceive a given object,
I do it from a certain angle which at this moment is
inaccessible to anyone else---simply because it is I who
occupy this position; moreover, the act itself of my
perception includes <em>my</em> individual experiences which compels
me to single out some aspects of the object over others.


(A great number of psychological studies deal with the
influence of personality characteristics on the process of

<p>     And yet I realise at this moment that I perceive the
same objective thing which is perceived (from positions
differing from mine and in somewhat different shadings)
by other individuals as well. In other words, the
fundamental jneaningfxil connections of consciousness, and in
particularvthe system of referential meanings, have general
validity, however varied their individual content. Thus
socio-cultural mediation takes place both in the formation
of unique individual features of the given subject and in
the course of assimilation of universal semantic structures
underlying cognitive activity as well as other specifically
human kinds of activity. The difference is that in the
former case universal norms and standards are transformed
in the realisation of activity under concrete unique
conditions, while in the latter it is a matter of the individual
assimilating of the norms themselves.</p>

<p>     Thus Marxist philosophy emphasises the proposition
(now underlying concrete psychological studies) that the
fundamental characteristics of cognitive activity and the
properties of knowledge cannot be understood correctly
if one proceeds from analysis of consciousness as such;
that was precisely what philosophical transcendentalism
tried to achieve. Consciousness itself is by no means
something ready-made and given a priori: it is formed and
develops in the process of interiorisation of external
practical activity mediated by objects created by man and
for man and embodying mankind's socio-historical
experiences. Marx wrote that the objective being itself of
human activity appears before us as &quot;the perceptibly
existing human <em>psychology &quot;.^^</em></p>

<p>     It should be said that the classical German philosophy,
and in the first place the systems of Fichte and Hegel,
placed considerable emphasis on the analysis of the
significance of the activity of external objectification or
reification for the development of consciousness, self--
consciousness, and cognition. As we remember, the necessary
condition of the formation of the ego, of the subject, is,
according to Fichte, alienation and objectification by the
Absolute Subject of its own activity in the form of
nonego. Hegel goes even farther, indicating the role of social,
inter-individual activity in the process of self-comprehension
of the Absolute Spirit, that is, in the process of its
formation as the Absolute Subject---activity that is directed not
only at reification of certain representations pertaining to
the sphere of spiritual culture but also at transformation


of the external natural environment, that is, labour
activity. However, not only for Fichte but even for Hegel it is
ultimately a matter of objectification, of external
objective expression of the content which is potentially inherent
in the depths of the Absolute interpreted as a primordially
spiritual entity (the Absolute Ego in Fichte, the Absolute
Spirit in Hegel). For this reason what is meant here is not,
strictly speaking, generation of subjectivity, of the world
of consciousness, but merely its spontaneous self--
development from the depth of the Absolute, its unfolding, which
is merely mediated by the activity of external
objectification. In other words, first there is movement from within,
and only then comes the reverse movement- the
penetration of consciousness into itself, and formation of
adequate self-consciousness mediated by external reification.
The direction of reasoning in Marxist philosophy is
diametrically opposed to that: first there is movement from
without or interiorisation, &quot;growing in'', assimilation
by the individual subject of various socially developed
modes of activity and in this connection the formation
of individual consciousness and self-consciousness. At the
same time this assimilation is achieved in the individual
subject's object-directed activity in such a way that the
movement from without expresses the transition of the
subject's activity from the external plane to the internal
one, rather than elementary causal action of an external
object on the subject. Then, the subject's activity is
directed originally not so much at the external objectification
of the content that is already inherent in the &quot;inner plane&quot;
as at the formation of the latter. Only on this basis is later
the second process implemented (which, once it emerges,
begins to interact with the first) the exteriorisation,
external objectification, reification of the inner content of
consciousness, which is a necessary component of any

<p>     The Marxist conception of nature, of the ways of
formation and modes of functioning of consciousness is in
principle opposed also to modern psychological
behaviourism, which, on the one hand, practically rejects the
possibility of scientific study of consciousness, and, on
the other, interprets the subject's external actions (
behaviour) as elementary organic reactions rather than as
socio-culturally mediated.</p>

<p>     Another important conclusion follows from this. Three
kinds of activity are linked together at the outset of the
formation of consciousness: external practical activity,
the process of cognition, and communication. In
performing one and the same objective action, the subject


simultaneously carries out a number of functions: he changes
the form of the external object, performs the act of
cognitive orientation, and assimilates the socially formed
modes of practical and cognitive activity implemented in
the object which he uses as an instrument of mediation.
The act of communicating a message from one subject to
another must not be understood simply as assimilation by
the subject of social experiences reified in the given
instrument or the act of ``de-reification'' of the ``hidden''
modes of activity performed by the subject, a process of
decoding the messages sent by the previous generations. In
actual fact the assimilation itself of adequate modes of
activity involving a socially functioning object is only
possible on condition that the subject, in this case the
child, is included in the living communicative connection
with other persons existing at present, with adults teaching
him the human modes of using man-made objects and
thereby developing his cultural attitudes and norms,
including the standards of cognitive activity. Before the
child learns to act on his own, he acts in direct cooperation
with an adult (the so-called ``joint-but-separate'' activity).
Thus the relation to the object of activity is here explicitly
and visually mediated by the relation to another person.</p>

<p>     This process is manifested especially clearly when access
to sensory information is sharply limited, as happens,
e. g., in the psychical development of blind deaf-and-mute
children. Where distant receptors are at work,
communication between adult and child involves a considerable
amount of the child's imitative actions which may
outwardly appear as manifestations of the child's spontaneous
activity rather than the product and form of communication.
In the case of blind deaf-and-mutes, it becomes obvious
that psychical processes and functions are modelled or
created in the process of joint-but-separate activity of
child and adults, an activity in which the social experience
of using man-made objects is transmitted to the child.
The development of this activity is characterised by a
gradual, decrease in the share of the adult's participation and
correspondingly by a growing share of participation and
activity of the child, so that ultimately the processes of
assimilation of socially developed modes of activity and
creative transformation of the objective world begin to
function jointly.^^45^^</p>

<p>     Later, at the stage when consciousness has been formed,
the direct links between practical activity, cognition, and
communication are broken. We have already mentioned
that it is not every cognition that is directly connected
with discovery of the modes of practical transformation


of the object, although a profound inner connection
between cognition and practical activity is retained at all
levels of knowledge. It is also obvious that a well--
developed process of cognition does not at all coincide with the
process of communication: the latter is singled out as a
separate sphere of activity governed by special laws.
Indeed, when I think in my mind, many obvious and
customary mental moves are omitted, ``swallowed'', as
it were, some premises are not formulated explicitly,
some search procedures are applied in hidden form, etc.
Communication of the results of my cognitive activity
implies explicit formulation of many implicit elements
(although not all of them, for the possibility of
communication presupposes a number of common implicit
premises in different individuals), as well as taking into
account the interlocutor's standpoint, the level of his
knowledge in the given area, etc.</p>

<p>     At the same time it follows from the above that any
cognitive activity, whatever the form of its direct
subjective givenness, is socially mediated in character as regards
the fundamental mechanisms of its implementation;
consequently, it always contains the potential for
communication, i. e., it is performed not only for oneself but
also for any other person included in the given system of
socially cultural norms. As we have already noted, that is
also true of the cognitive ideas which emerge in
consciousness without verbal mediation, for side by side with
verbal communication there also exist the more elementary
levels of human communication, including such a basic
kind of communication as object-oriented activity itself.
On the other hand, it is in the process of communication
that the inner norms governing the cognitive process
appear in the most explicit and developed form. Marx
wrote: &quot;But also when I am active <em>scientifically</em>, etc.---
an activity which I can seldom perform in direct
community with others---then my activity is <em>social</em>, because I
perform it as a <em>man</em>. Not only is the material of my activity
given to me as a social product (as is even the language
in which the thinker is active): my <em>own</em> existence is social
activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I
make of myself for society and with the consciousness
of myself as a social being. &quot;4 6</p>

<p>     For this reason, as far as epistemological inquiry is
concerned, that is, the discovery of universal referential
meanings, norms, and standards used for production of
knowledge, the most suitable material for analysis proves
to be the processes, means, and products of
communicative activity, in which cognition is expressed in reified,


objectified form, rather than the phenomena of
consciousness taken by themselves, in which these referential
meanings and standards appear transformed, in hidden form, as
it were, and are not always sufficiently apparent for the
subject himself. This idea should be explained in some
detail. Let us note first of all that in epistemological
analysis the process of communication is not studied in
all its complexity and multidimensionality: this task can
only be solved through coordination of the efforts of a
number of sciences, including information theory,
semiotics, psychology, psycholinguistics, social psychology,
sociology, etc. In communicative activity, epistemology
singles out only that aspect which has a direct bearing on
it: reified, objectified, universal norms and standards of
production and evaluation of knowledge. Strictly speaking,
epistemology does not therefore study the living process
of communication itself but some universal conditions of
its possibility relative to transmission of knowledge.
Inasmuch as these conditions are implemented in the
process of transmission itself, the latter provides empirical
data for epistemological analysis (that assumes, rather
than excludes, interaction between epistemology and the
specialised sciences studying both communicative
processes and the mechanisms of cognition).</p>

<p>     Let us further note that in the light of Marxist
philosophy communication of knowledge presupposes
objectification of knowledge not only in the form of texts or
utterances but also of man-made objects carrying socio-cultural
meaning. Epistemology therefore must analyse
objectoriented activity in the unity of its practical--
transformative, cognitive and communicative functions, as the
basis of the entire cognitive process. At the same time
epistemology must consider, without fail, the givenness of
referential meanings in consciousness, if only because
object-related activity corresponding to some of the
deeplying cognitive standards (in particular, perceptive
objecthypotheses) has so far been quite inadequately studied
in science, and we have no modes of establishing the
content of these meanings other than through the data of

<p>     Thus Marxist-Leninist epistemology radically re--
orientates the traditional epistemological range of problems,
fundamentally changing the mode itself of specifying
and investigating them. The starting point of analysis of
cognition is understood as investigation of functioning
and development of systems of collective, inter--
subjective activity, and not as the study of the relation of an
individual subject (whether organism or consciousness) to


the opposing object. The inter-subjective activity is based
on practical transformation of external objects.
Cognitive reflection and communication are realised in close
unity with transformation of objects. Transformative and
cognitive activity assumes the creation of a whole world
of socially functioning ``artificial'' mediator objects in
which the social experience of transformative and
cognitive activity is objectified. The individual subject himself
as the subject of consciousness and cognition emerges only
insofar as he functions as the agent of that activity, i. e.
is included in a definite objective system of relations to
other subjects, mastering the social modes of activity
objectified in the mediator objects. In this sense, both the
specifically human cognition, and its subject may be said
to be ``artificial'' products. That does not mean that
cognition deals with man's own creations only and does not
reflect the characteristics of real objects existing
independently of consciousness, or that the subject is a chimera
of the imagination. What is meant here is the fact,
fundamental from the positions of Marxist-Leninist
epistemology, that the cognitive process, the production of
knowledge assumes a breaking away from the organism's
natural relation to the environment and the use of standards
that have socio-cultural (and in this sense ``artificial'')

<p>     In the following chapters we shall consider those
elements of the cognitive relation the study of which is of
special interest in connection with the recent results of
the science of science and the methodological analysis of


<b>Chapter 2</b>


<br /> OBJECTS</b>

<p>     We have already given a critical analysis of
phenomenalist epistemology which presents acquisition of knowledge
as combining of subjective &quot;sensory data''. Another, more
sophisticated variety of philosophical subjectivism has
much greater currency in present-day Western works on
the philosophy of science. Until recently, the view
prevailed amongst West European and American specialists
in the logic and methodology of science that only
cognition at the pre-scientific level (perception and knowledge
recorded in terms of everyday language) may deal with
actually existing objects. From this standpoint, scientific
theoretical knowledge is different in character: it merely
records in a special schematic form the regularly
recurring dependences existing between the objects of
prescientific experience. Of course, account is taken of the
fact that acquisition of scientific knowledge implies
employment of artificially created objects, in particular,
apparatus, measurement instruments, etc.</p>

<p>     The actual existence of the latter is by no means
rejected. Moreover, it is believed that natural and artificial
objects are equally objects of cognition. To be more precise,
cognition is thought to be concerned with establishing
definite relations between various combinations of
sensuously perceived natural and artificial objects, for that is
exactly what the process of measurement consists in, and
scientific cognition is in this case limited to performing
various measurement operations. In terms of this
conception, for instance, the object studied by the microphysicist
is not the processes in which electrons, positrons, and
other objects inaccessible to the senses are involved but
the behaviour of the corresponding devices: oscillations of
their indicators, appearance of light spots on displays, etc.
In other words, it is assumed that apparatus and
measurement devices do not at all mediate the cognitive relation


to the objects that are not given to the subject in pre--
scientific experience but appear themselves as the objects of
knowledge (the adherents of this view insist that naturally
created things become objects of scientific cognition only
in their relation to the apparatus and measurement
instruments). Only that is regarded as real which can be directly
observable. Everything else, including objects that are
specified at the theoretical level only, are regarded as
certain subjective fictions which, although playing a
certain role in the cognitive process, do not by themselves
have real objects as referents. As we have seen, these are
the characteristic arguments of the operationalist doctrine.</p>

<p>     This trend of thinking is based on the opposition of
knowledge as a record of the directly observable to
knowledge resulting from a whole ensemble of assumptions,
suppositions, and arguments. Indeed, to make judgements
about the behaviour of microobjects from instrument
readings, one must be acquainted both with the theory of the
domain of reality under study and with the theory
describing the work of the device itself, enabling us to correlate
the instrument readings with the corresponding
characteristics of the phenomena studied. The adherents of this
conception believe that the objects for which concepts are
introduced in these complicated arguments and
assumptions cannot be real in the same degree as the artificial
and natural objects of our everyday experience--stones,
trees, tables, chairs, machines, apparatus, etc. But it is
easy to show a lack of logic in this argument.</p>

<p>     In ordinary life we have to use all kinds of mediator
objects all the time for the simplest observations----
spectacles, the magnifying glass, or, say, simple window glass.
In the same way, the surgeon uses the probe in examining
a wound. In all these cases man studies those objects the
relation to which is mediated by artificially constructed
devices rather than the mediators themselves. To be
consistent, one must also recognise that even in cases of
elementary observation the subject's relation to the object
is mediated by the environment filling the space between
the two. The singling out of a real object implies in all
instances a reliance (usually unconscious) on a number
of assumptions concerning the behaviour of the mediator
object. But that is not all. As we have tried to show in the
previous chapter, even those man-made objects which do
not function directly as mediators in observation (labour
implements, the objects of everyday life, etc.), are
actually instrumental in the social mediation of perception, for
it is in the objects of the &quot;artificial environment&quot; that the
historically accumulated experiences of object--


transforming and cognitive activity, are objectified, and in particular,
the Standards and norms of perception are reified. The
knowledge of the real object can only be singled out of
the varied sensory information with the help of such
norms and standards. Any perception is, as we have
endeavoured to show, a complex mediating activity implying
assumptions, hypotheses, schematisation, etc.</p>

<p>     Supporters of this variety of subjectivism do not doubt
the actual existence of the objects of ordinary pre--
scientific experience. Moreover, in their view, those infinitesimal
or extra-large objects that can only be studied with the aid
of special scientific apparatus (microscopes and telescopes),
also really exist. But in this case interpretation of the
results of observation requires conscious use of a number
of branches of theoretical physics covering, in particular,
the propagation of light waves in outer space, in the
Earth's atmosphere, a system of lenses, the eye, etc. Does
it not mean that knowledge acquired through of a number
of assumptions, suppositions, and theoretical reasoning,
can also relate to real objects? Why must we then negate
the existence of actual referents, e.g., of the objects of
modern microphysics? The adherents of this view reply
that observable and non-observable objects must be
distinguished. The knowledge of observable objects, they
believe, relates to actual referents although it may imply
certain assumptions, hypotheses, and arguments. As for
non-observable objects, their existence is fictitious.</p>

<p>     Indeed, not all objects, magnitudes, and parameters with
which a certain scientific theory is concerned, are
actually observable. Let us ask ourselves this question, however:
does that mean that a certain object, now non-observable
and studied at the given moment on the theoretical level
only, will never become observable at all? Apparently not.
For example, although the theory of molecular structure
of matter was originally merely a theoretical hypothesis
and there was no way of observing molecules in direct
experience, the molecules of many substances can now be
observed through electronic microscopes.</p>

<p>     The justice of this is recognised by the scholars holding
the view here criticised. But they point to the essential
difference between molecules and such subatomic objects
as the electron. The knowledge of many objects that are
studied purely theoretically does not cancel the
possibility of their eventual fixation in experience by some
instruments of experimental inquiry. But there are
theoretical objects (the electron included) which cannot in
principle be observed. Only that is real which can be observed
actually or potentially. Objects that are non-observable


in principle do not exist as real objects---that is the
conclusion drawn by the adherents of the system of views
considered here.</p>

<p>     The objects with which modern microphysics deals are
indeed regarded as non-observable in principle. But what
does observability or non-observability of objects and their
characteristics that are studied in scientific theory mean?</p>

<p>     Of course, only those objects can be observable which
are in some way or other included in the process of
acquiring sensory information. However, we have endeavoured
to show in the previous chapter that already at the level
of ordinary pre-scientific perception, the knowledge of the
characteristics of observed phenomena is not identical to
the information received through sensory channels, being
determined by specific referential meanings. It is these
referential meanings, object-hypotheses, the standards of
perception rather than sensory information by itself, that
determine <em>what</em> precisely is observed or perceived. In
scientific theoretical thinking, theory rather than sensory
information by itself determines which of the objects,
magnitudes, or parameters studied in the theory can be
actually or potentially observable. Theory has to take into
account such circumstances, accidental relative to the
objects studied, as the size of man's body and the specific
traits of his perceptual system. The fact that men as
physical bodies belong to the class of macro-objects and that
man as the subject of perception can therefore use only
macro-objects as apparatus proves to be essential for

<p>     These circumstances determine the possibility of
including certain objects in the very process of acquiring
sensory information, i. e., in the act of experiential
observation. However, only within the framework of a definite
scientific theory can it be established what specific objects
studied by science may or may not be included in the
process of observation and for what reasons, what the
meaningful characteristics of objects of both kinds are, and
what precisely is observed. The properties of the subject's
perceptual system are also considered in terms of the given
theory. In any case, the observability or non-observability
of the given objects of scientific knowledge depends in
principle on definite characteristics of these objects,
assumed or established in the theory, and does not directly
coincide with their existence or non-existence. The objects
that are not in principle observable by man can actually
exist. (That means that if observations were carried out by
an intelligent being strongly differing from man in its
natural properties, e.g., if it were comparable in size with


micro-objects, it might record in an experimental way
.many of the objects that cannot in principle be observed
by man. On the other hand, a radical revision of a given
scientific theory and a different choice of the basic
assumptions will inevitably affect the notions of the
observability or non-observability as a matter of principle.)</p>

<p>     Grover Maxwell, a modern American specialist in the
philosophy of science, considers the following purely
hypothetical case as an illustration of the thesis of the
possibility of actual existence of objects unobservable in

<p>     Suppose, he argues, that new types of micro-objects are
discovered by science that are at present unknown and
which interact with electrons under certain circumstances
in such a way that the interaction does not disturb their
eigenstate. Suppose also that a drug is discovered which
alters the human perceptual apparatus---perhaps even
activates latent capacities so that a new sense modality
emerges. Finally, suppose that with our altered perceptual
system we are able to perceive (not necessarily visually) by
means of the newly discovered type of micro-objects in
a manner roughly analogous to visual perception in which,
as is well known, photons participate. Under certain
additional conditions which we shall not characterise here,
we might be able to &quot;observe directly&quot; the position and
other characteristics of some electrons. It would follow
of course, that quantum theory would have to be altered
in some respects, since the newly discovered type of
microobjects does not conform to all its principles. At the same
time the revision of the theory does not in this case
provide any grounds for concluding that the electrons
observed are not the same objects that were regarded as
nonobservable in principle from the standpoint of old
theoretical notions. No one will doubt the reality of the electrons
observed. But if these are the same objects that were not
observed earlier, it is obvious that we had no right to
doubt their actual existence before that either. However
improbable the hypothetical case considered here might
seem, it does not involve any logical or conceptual
absurdity, concludes Maxwell.^^47^^</p>

<p>     In a conversation with Werner Heisenberg Einstein said
once: &quot;From the principled positions it is absolutely
incorrect to desire that a theory should be founded on
observable magnitudes only. For in reality it is all precisely
the other way round. Only theory decides what one can
observe... Your assertion that you introduce only
observable magnitudes is actually an assumption about a
property of the theory on which you are working.''^^48^^</p>


<p>     Thus the experimenter does not observe absolutely the
same objects that are the objects of perception at the
prescientific level. The scientist records in experience (one
may even say &quot;sees directly'') objects, processes and
situations which are not ordinarily perceived at all: changes
in electric voltage, a drop in strength of current in the
circuit, etc. The main point here is not, of course, a change
in the sensitivity of the perceptual system but the
emergence of new referential meanings determined by the
accepted scientific theory.</p>

<p>     In this respect, observation aided by theory is in
principle similar to ordinary perception: in both cases the
referential content of what is observed is determined by
a system of object-hypotheses and not by sensory
information itself. It would be <em>a</em> mistake, however, to slur over
the differences between the two processes, as Kuhn is
inclined to do, for instance. The American scientist
correctly stated the extremely important fact that theoretical
concepts do not serve simply for interpreting the results
of ordinary perception obtained regardless of their
utilisation but are included in the act of scientific observation
itself determining its nature and results. Yet Kuhn is
hardly justified in going still further and insisting that
scientific observation is of the same subjective and direct
nature as ordinary perception, that in both cases there is
no conscious interpretation or extended subjective
reflexion.^^49^^ This notion of Kuhn is closely linked with the
main idea developed in his book---the view that successive
replacement of scientific paradigms is similar to changes
in the structure of the perceptive field resulting from a
&quot;switch in visual gestalt''. But the ability to &quot;see directly'',
through the medium of apparatus readings, the objective
processes indicated by the devices assumes an extensive
education in which the behaviour of the devices is
consciously correlated with the behaviour of the object
studied. Even when this education is completed and the
scientist sees directly, as it were, those objective processes
which are for him meaningfully defined by a system of
theoretical concepts, fixation of observed objects also
assumes the functioning of ordinary pre-scientific
perception: in order to observe the strength of current in a
circuit from ampermeter readings, the subject must be able
to perceive the ampermeter itself and the motion of its
needle as objects of ordinary experience. Thus the ``
givenness'' of the objects of scientific research in experience
includes observation of two objects simultaneously: of
the object of everyday experience and of that thing whose
referential meaning is grasped by the subject in terms of


the concepts of some theory (both of these things exist
objectively and actually, although on different levels of
reality, so to speak). When a person becomes a scientist, he
does not cease to be the subject of ordinary pre-scientific
experience and of practical activity associated with it.
For this reason, the system of referential meanings which
serve to maintain this activity, being included in the
mechanism of ordinary perception, cannot in principle be
replaced by the referential meanings defined at the level
of scientific cognition (though Paul Feyerabend suggests
the opposite). The higher levels of cognitive activity do
not cancel the functioning of the mechanisms of ordinary
perception but are in a specific manner superimposed on
these mechanisms incorporating them in more complex
syntheses. It would therefore be wrong to insist, for
instance, that the referential meanings perceived in
language study are generated by language, although mastering
it signifies a new stage in the interpretation of
perceptions: in actual fact they are basically formed already at
the pre-linguistic level of cognition, in the course of
practical object-oriented activity, although language does
introduce something new in them. Observation in scientific
cognition does not exclude the functioning of the
mechanisms of ordinary perception. The astronomer observing the
Sun as a cosmic body at a certain distance from the Earth
and subject in its movements to theoretically formulated
laws, cannot at the same time get rid of the impression,
shown to be illusory by science, that the Sun moves
relative to the immobile Earth.</p>

<p>     The development of science eliminates the illusions of
pre-scientific cognition. But a scientific theoretical picture
of reality does not at all imply a negation of the objective
reality of those objects (as well as of their aspects and
relations) with which man deals at the pre-scientific level, and
neither does it negate the truth (relative truth, of course)
of many assertions of the so-called common sense. This
applies not only to such objects of ordinary experience as
tables, trees, stones, etc., but also to properties of these
objects which are commonly referred to in philosophy as
secondary: colour, smell, etc. It would be inconsistent to
assert that only electromagnetic waves of definite length
and not colours and smells exist objectively and really,
and at the same time to recognise the objective reality of
the objects of ordinary pre-scientific experience, that is
exactly the view held by those who divide the perceived
qualities of objects into primary and secondary. Physical
theories do not include the concepts of secondary qualities
but, more than that, they do not include the concepts of



the objects of ordinary pre-scientific experience. If we
were to regard as real only those objects to which physical
theories directly refer, we should conclude that in actual
fact only definite combinations of atoms and molecules
rather than trees, rocks, and tables exist in reality.</p>

<p>     In actual fact, cognition at different levels deals with
real objects and real characteristics of these objects.
However, objective reality itself is multidimensional, it has
many levels, and different objects may belong to different
levels of reality. Ordinary macro-objects and the secondary
qualities inherent in them exist at that level of objective
reality to which ordinary pre-scientific experiences belong.
Scientific cognition, physics in particular, penetrates into
a deeper level of objective reality, whose existence does
not cancel the reality of the objects of ordinary

<p>     A system of theoretical concepts reflects the
characteristics of actually existing objects, including those that
are actually or essentially non-observable. The meaning of
these concepts is thus not reducible to an ensemble of
the laboratory operations of measurement, as
operationalists believe. On the contrary, the measurement itself only
becomes possible when we know what to measure, that is,
when the general characteristics of the objects measured
are theoretically specified. It is exactly scientific theory
that makes it possible to select from the entire diversity of
experience those facts and dependences between them the
investigation of which will permit the scientist to single
out the essential characteristics of the objects under study.
Measurements that are performed outside the context of
a well-developed theoretical system formulating the
essential dependences between objects, including non--
observable ones, turn out to be absolutely meaningless, as a rule.
And it is not just the fact that measurement results are
subsequently theoretically interpreted that is important
here. Well-developed theoretical conceptions are a
necessary premise of meaningful measurements themselves, for
only the former indicate the object and the mode of
measurement itself. The measurements performed outside
of a correlation with the essential dependences of a
definite type of objects do not express, strictly speaking, an
act of cognition, just as acquisition of information from
the environment uncorrelated with objects is not yet

<p>     ``We often hear,'' writes Kuhn, &quot;that they [the laws
expressing quantitative dependences] are found by
examining measurements undertaken for their own sake and
without theoretical commitment. But history offers no


support for so excessively Baconian a method. Boyle's
experiments were not conceivable (and if conceived would
have received another interpretation or none at all) until
air was recognized as an elastic fluid to which all the
elaborate concepts of hydrostatics could be applied.
Coulomb's success depended upon his constructing special
apparatus to measure the force between point charges.
(Those who had previously measured electrical forces
using ordinary pan balances, etc., had found no consistent
or simple regularity at all.) But that design, in turn,
depended upon the previous recognition that every particle
of electric fluid acts upon every other at a distance. It was
for the force between such particles---the only force which
might safely be assumed a simple function of
distancethat Coulomb was looking. Joule's experiments could also
be used to illustrate how quantitative laws emerge through
paradigm articulation. In fact, so general and close is
the relation between qualitative paradigm and quantitative
law that, since Galileo, such laws have often been correctly
guessed with the aid of a paradigm years before apparatus
could be designed for their experimental

<p>     Using as an example the revolution in chemistry carried
out by Dalton, Kuhn shows that one and the same
operation applied to nature through different paradigms may
indicate quite different aspects of the patterns of nature.
Moreover, an old measurement operation in a new role
may produce other experimental results.^^5^^ *</p>

<p>     Einstein's analysis of the procedures for measuring time
(we may recall here that it was this analysis that was the
starting point of Bridgman's formulation of the doctrine
of operationalism) is far from being a mere description of a
&quot;directly given&quot; operation, implying in actual fact a
number of theoretical premises. Simultaneity can only be
defined if we postulate that the velocity of light in vacuum
is the same in all directions and invariant relative to the
motions of source and receiver. This, postulate is logically
prior in the special theory of relativity to any experimental
measurement of the velocity of light, because it is used in
the very definition of the time scale at distant points.^^52^^</p>

<p>     Even the simplest prescriptions for measurement
operations used in science usually follow from theoretical
considerations. True, instructions for laboratory operations
may be formulated in such a way that their theoretical
foundations will be camouflaged, but that does not mean
at all that these foundations do not actually exist.</p>

<p>     Thus scientific theories determining the meaning and
character of experimental procedures contain as often as


not knowledge of such objects and parameters which are
not observed and are not measured directly. Let us now
note that there are also scientific theories, the most
fundamental ones, actually, (usually referred to as
substantive in the literature on the methodology of science) which
are not applied directly to interpretation of observation
data at all but are only correlated with the empirical world
in combination with other theories (the latter are
commonly referred to as ``observational'' or ``interpretative'')
and on condition that a number of additional
assumptions are made. Generally speaking, the question of
experimental application of a fundamental scientific theory (and,
in this connection, of its experimental verification) proves
to be far from simple, and usually the search for methods
of experimental application of such a theory requires
considerable efforts for further elaboration of the theory
itself and the construction of a number of additional
theories, hypotheses, etc..</p>

<p>     An isolated theory is never directly linked up with an
experiment: an act of such association implies the use of
a whole hierarchy of theories and hypotheses including
those from other domains of knowledge, the theory of
experimental devices, a number of hypotheses linking up
the non-observable with the observable, certain idealisation
assumptions, etc. The experimental data themselves are
formulated in terms of a definite (``interpretative'', or
``observational'') theory.</p>

<p>     We shall not consider in detail the important problem of
the interrelation ef the empirical and theoretical
components in scientific knowledge. In the context of the
problems of immediate interest to us, it is important to stress
the relative independence of knowledge recorded in theory
from various (potentially infinite) ways of empirical or
experimental application of that knowledge. Of course,
theory must be experimentally tested, that is to say, it
must be linked up through a whole chain of mediations
with experimental results. The question as to how this
verification is carried out is fairly complicated and is now
intensively studied in the literature on the
methodology of science. At the same time the meaning, the
content of theoretical knowledge, is not directly
determined by the modes of its association with experimental

<p>     In the Western philosophy of science, the conception of
logical positivism has until recently prevailed; it regarded
a scientific theory as an uninterpreted formal calculus
given meaningful, empirical interpretation in terms of the
so-called correspondence rules connecting the terms of


the theoretical language with those used in the sentences
of observation allegedly recording only direct sensory data.
The rules of correspondence must, from this standpoint,
be necessarily included in the structure of the scientific
theory itself, for only these rules transform an
uninterpreted formal calculus, which refers to nothing, into a
theory that is, knowledge about a definite class of
objects.53 in reality, however, the meaning or content of
a theory is not determined directly by its empirical
applications, for meaning is specified &quot;from above&quot; rather
than &quot;from below'', through a model interpretation of
theoretical assertions. The number of potential modes of
empirical application of the given theory is in actual fact
infinite (and all possible applications cannot be foreseen in
advance), whereas the number of &quot;correspondence rules&quot;
used in the given theory is strictly limited, according to
logical positivism. And finally, the most important point
is this. Assertions linking the given theory with
experimental results do not simply correlate theoretical and
non-theoretical, &quot;purely observational&quot; terms but
themselves belong to an auxiliary theory (auxiliary relative to
the given one). Thus these statements (it would be
imprecise to call them &quot;correspondence rules'', in any
positivist sense) are not included in the structure of the given
theory itself, which is relatively independent from various
possible modes of its empirical application. Knowledge
recorded in a theory reflects the essential dependences
between real objects, far from being a set of prescriptions
for carrying out laboratory operations; neither is it
restricted to listing the ways of direct practical
transformation of objects.</p>

<p>     Here we would like to draw a far-reaching analogy
between theoretical knowledge and knowledge recorded in
ordinary perception. One may recall that the referential
meaning of the perceptual image is amodal, that is,
relatively independent from the type of modality (visual,
auditory, tactile, etc.) in which perception is implemented.
This is apparently a general property of the cognitive
relation---relative independence of knowledge from the
modes of its correlation with actual sensory information
(the independence is indeed relative, for knowledge is
impossible in the absence of any mode of such

<p>     Thus cognition may be a reflection of real objects
both in ordinary perception and in scientific thinking---
at both the empirical and theoretical levels of the



<p>     The interrelation of theory and its objects poses yet
another problem, one that we have not touched on so far.
Implementation of theoretical cognition involves the
adoption of a whole series of idealisations, i.e., of assumptions
or suppositions which essentially do not correspond and
even sometimes contradict what can be directly observed.</p>

<p>     For instance, the abstraction of actual infinity that was
widely used in classical mathematics is based on the
assumption that we can count the entire natural number
series, although that is clearly impossible in experience.
In constructing his geometry, Euclid assumed that any
section of a straight line, however short or long it might
be, may be divided into two with the aid of ruler and
dividers. In classical physics, it is assumed that we can
measure velocity at any given point of the path, that is,
that we can measure instantaneous velocity.</p>

<p>     The laws formulated in scientific theory also refer to
certain ideal cases. Therefore their employment for the
description of actual experience and for predicting future
empirical facts is only possible if a whole series of
additional factors are taken into account, those which are
ignored by theory revealing the law &quot;in pure form''.
Inasmuch as it is impossible to consider all these factors
theoretically, there will always be a kind of gap between
the flow of empirical events predicted by the given theory
and that which we directly observe in experience, although
this gap becomes smaller and smaller as science develops.
Lenin pointed out the role of idealising assumptions in
Marx's development of the scientific theory of political
economy: '&quot;Concretely impossible' is not only realisation
as put forward by Marx, but also land rent as put forward
by him, and average profit, and the equality between
wages and the value of labour-power, and much more
besides. But the impossibility of something being realised
in a pure form is not a refutation.''^^54^^</p>

<p>     Idealisation means not only adoption of some
assumptions in formulating theoretical laws but also in
constructing idealised objects. The &quot;material point'', a concept
widely used in classical mechanics, is an example of such
an idealised object. It is assumed that such an object,
which exists in time and space, has mass (as all real bodies)
and at the same time it has no extension, that is, coincides
in fact with the mathematical point in this respect.
Another example of an idealised object is &quot;incompressible
liquid&quot; studied in hydrodynamics. Clearly, idealised
objects have no real referents; they are constructions of


theoretical thinking (sometimes called ``intratheoretical'',
distinct from ``extratheoretical'' objects, that is, those
which exist independently of theory). The question
naturally arises, what is the reason for such fictitious objects?</p>

<p>     Constructing idealised objects is a way of formulating
idealised assumptions and a method for establishing, &quot;in
a pure form'', certain dependences expressed in theoretical
laws. For example, if a real body moves under the action
of a force applied to its centre of gravity, the motion of
that centre does not depend on either the geometrical
form of the body or the distribution of mass in it but only
on the overall quantity of mass. The centre of gravity
moves as if the entire mass were concentrated in it, i.e.,
like the idealised object known as &quot;material point''.
Establishing with the aid of the idealised object the
dependences obtaining in the motion of bodies under the impact
of a force applied to the centre of gravity, we get a key to
the whole of the complex system of dependences existing
in the diverse cases of real mechanical motions.</p>

<p>     What is the nature of the dependences formulated in a
theory on the basis of a number of idealising assumptions?
Should they be regarded as mere subjective ``
simplifications'' or ``schematisations'' of actual empirical
situations (this interpretation of the idealisation procedure is
not at all rare)?</p>

<p>     It appears that idealisation cannot be reduced to ``
simplification'' of that which is given in experience. In
idealisation one not only ignores certain factors given in
experience but also formulates in some cases assumptions which
cannot be realised in experience. Idealisation can therefore
serve to establish essential, objective and real
dependences, for revealing various connections &quot;in pure form&quot; is
exactly the discovery of actual substantive relations which
do not directly coincide with dependences characterising
the phenomenon and registered in experience. However,
one may accept that a theory formulating definite
dependences in a system of scientific laws reflects objective,
real substantive relations, while believing at the same time
that all theoretical objects constructed with the aid of
theory have no real referents, that is, are idealised,
fictitious objects playing a purely auxiliary role in
formulating definite dependences. It will have to be recognised in
this case that only those objects are real that are fixed at
the pre-scientific level, that is, through ordinary
perception and in terms of everyday language. Those who hold
this view argue that knowledge of any theoretical object is
always introduced through a number of idealisations. That
means that the object itself is always an idealisation, that


is to say, it has no real referent leading ``intratheoretical''
existence, so to speak.^^55^^</p>

<p>     Let us note, however, that the knowledge, recorded in
ordinary perception, about objects the reality of which
does not occasion any doubts, also implies a whole series
of assumptions and hypotheses; we considered this point
in the previous section. True, the assumptions on which
perception is founded, as distinct from the idealisations
used in science, are implemented in the sense experience
itself and are therefore not even consciously realised, as
a rule. It is important in any case that, far from excluding
the possibility of correlating knowledge and real objects,
adopting a number of assumptions and suppositions is a
necessary condition of such correlation. Where there are
no definite assumptions, it is impossible to separate a
real object from a subjective illusion. Let us note further
that dependences formulated by science &quot;in pure form&quot;
(their establishment naturally assumes the adoption of
a number of idealisations) need not necessarily have only
&quot;theoretical objects&quot; as referents, that is, objects the
knowledge of which is only possible at the theoretical
level. They may also be objects fixed in ordinary
experience, the reality of which causes no doubts. For
instance, Marx's <em>Capital</em> establishes the laws of the capitalist
mode of production &quot;in pure form&quot; treating exclusively
of real objects---commodities, men, their activity,
machines, etc. Of course, the objects themselves are considered
from a definite standpoint carefully formulated in
theoretical assumptions, the elaboration of the theoretical
system involving consistent analysis of those factors that
had to be ignored at the initial stage (the famous method
of ascending from the abstract to the concrete).^^56^^ Let us
note, finally, that science does not at all identify
theoretical objects with idealised ones. That means that at least
some of the objects the knowledge of which is introduced
at the theoretical level are accepted as existing objectively
and really: molecules, atoms, electrons, positrons, virtual
particles, events in the four-dimensional spatio-temporal
continuum, the field, quarks, etc. This point is extremely
important, for the very distinction between idealised and
non-idealised objects, that is, real ones, is only possible and
meaningful if we know which objects are real and what
their characteristics are.</p>

<p>     This knowledge is specified not only extra-theoretically
(e.g., with the aid of ordinary perception). The scientific
theory itself introduces notions of such actually existing
objects which may not coincide with the objects fixed in
ordinary, pre-scientific experience or may even be


non-observable (actually or in principle). Importantly, the
assumption concerning the existence of a number of real
objects the knowledge of which is specified only at the
theoretical level is usually connected with formulating
the so-called nucleus of a research programme which serves
as a foundation for subsequent development of a series of
scientific theories; it determines to a considerable degree
the heuristic possibilities of the given programme. Idealised
theoretical objects are constructed only relative to real
ones; they thus lack certain characteristics of real
objects or, on the contrary, possess properties impossible
in real objects.^^57^^ It follows from this, among other things,
that idealised objects may be idealisations not only of the
real objects which are given at the extra-theoretical or even
extra-scientific level (as a rule, the actual prototypes of
idealised objects are interpreted in exactly this way),
but also of the real objects knowledge of which can only
be acquired theoretically. It is essential at the same time
that the objects which are assumed at the given stage of
the development of science to be actually existing, may be
either rejected as completely fictitious in the course of
changes in scientific conceptions (that was the destiny,
e.g., of such a theoretical object of classical physics as
ether) or relegated to the status of idealised objects (the
atoms of classical physics as compared to the actual atoms
with which modern physics deals).</p>

<p>     If the structure of theory should be considered purely
formally, without regard for its various meaningful layers,
and if the meaning of the theoretical system should be
reduced to a set of prescriptions for measurement
operations, the difference disappears, of course, between
idealised and real theoretical objects: all objects specified at
the theoretical level will seem mere auxiliary constructs.</p>

<p>     However, we shall try to demonstrate that the content
aspect, the referential meaning of theoretical constructions
cannot be ignored.</p>

<p>     The procedure usually referred to in logic and the
methodology of science as idealisation includes in actual
fact a number of different procedures. Along with
idealisation proper, aimed at establishing the substantive
dependences of the processes under study, and thus
permitting to study a definite system of connections &quot;in pure
form'', procedures are usually included here which are not
in actual fact idealisations but might more precisely be
referred to as ``simplifications''. The latter are widely used
for convenience of calculations (e.g., representing the
electron orbit as circular, application of geometrical optics
as a convenient simplification for purely practical


purposes, etc.). It appears that the reduction of the entire
range of devices used in constructing knowledge about
theoretical objects to idealisation only greatly impedes the
analysis of the nature and structure of scientific theory.</p>

<p>     Thus the application of the idealisation procedure as a
necessary element of constructing a scientific theory does
not eliminate the possibility of studying such real objects
the knowledge of which is obtained only at the theoretical

<p>     Finally, let us consider yet another argument used in
contemporary Western literature on &quot;the philosophy of
science&quot;: the assertion of the impossibility of obtaining
adequate knowledge about real objects studied at the
theoretical level.</p>

<p>     We are dealing here with representing theoretical
statements as an ensemble of the so-called Ramsay
propositions. For this, the given theory must first be axiomatised,
and then a conjunction formed of all the axioms of the
given theory and of the &quot;correspondence rules&quot; linking
theoretical terms with those of observation. This
conjunction may tentatively be represented as------p---------q---
<br /> ------..., where <em>p</em> and <em>q</em> are theoretical terms and dashes
<br /> signify those propositions of the given conjunction of
which <em>p</em> and <em>q</em> are terms. Then <em>p</em> and <em>q</em> are replaced in this
conjunction by the variables connected with the existential
quantifier. As a result, the so-called Ramsay propositions
<br /> are obtained: (3 f) (3g)... (---------f---------g---------...) On
<br /> the content plane, the Ramsay method of eliminating
terms pertaining to theoretical objects may be illustrated
as follows. If, for instance, the theory originally contained
the assertion that there exist atoms with such and such
characteristics, and that the processes in which they
participate are associated in such and such a manner with
what is observed in experience, after eliminating the terms
pertaining to the theoretical objects by means of the
Ramsay propositions, we shall obtain the proposition that, if
there exist certain non-observable objects (of indefinite
nature) connected in a definite manner with what is
observed in experience, we shall empirically state such and
such facts. It is easy to show that after the terms
pertaining to theoretical objects are eliminated by the
Ramsay propositions, the theory will yield the same
observation propositions as were yielded by the original
axiomatised theory. This is taken as proof that a theory rewritten
in Ramsay propositions has the same content as the
original version of the theory. But the new variant of the
theory does not contain direct knowledge of the
theoretical objects. They appear as something unknown, as an <em>x</em>


which, though recognised as existing, is not an immediate
object of knowledge. Grover Maxwell, mentioned above,
infers from this that theoretically fixed real objects, as
distinct from empirical ones, may only be cognized in an
oblique, symbolic way, that is, knowledge of these objects
cannot be regarded as adequate.^^58^^</p>

<p>     It is easy to show, though, that this conclusion is
untenable. Let us point out, first of 'all, the inadequacy of
presenting the very structure of the theory in this case.
We have already commented on the unjustifiability of
presenting a theory in terms of an axiomatised calculus
which is given a meaningful interpretation exclusively in
terms of &quot;correspondence rules&quot; linking theoretical terms
with those of observation. In actual fact, science describes
experimental data in theoretical terms, and ``purely''
observational non-theoretical terms are not employed in
the production of scientific knowledge. For this reason
&quot;correspondence rules&quot; in their positivist interpretation
are non-existent, strictly speaking. It is therefore
impossible to outline the potential empirical applications of
this theory (through the mediation of other, ``auxiliary''
theories, as a rule) beforehand: they are not fixed, and are
discovered gradually, along with the elaboration of the
given and other theories. It is therefore difficult to
compare two theories (or two versions of a given theory) in
terms of the possibilities of their application in experience.
Yet even if we accept that the presentation of the
structure of a theory used in the above argument about the
elimination of theoretical terms is justifiable, the very
possibility of rewriting the theory in terms of the Ramsay
propositions arises only when this theory has already been
formulated. It is easy to see that if the task was, from the
outset, to construct a theory in which the terms
pertaining to theoretical objects were eliminated according to
Ramsay's rules, we could hardly have a single theoretical
system. The assertions regarding the connections in which
theoretical objects are included are determined by the
meaning, the content ascribed to these objects. If the
nature of the theoretical objects is unknown to us (and
rewriting a theory in terms of the Ramsay propositions
compels us to recognise precisely that), it is not clear why
these x's, the existence of which we postulate according
to the Ramsay rules, must be connected by such and such
relations. Rewriting a theory in terms of the Ramsay
propositions looks like a clever trick which does not
express real connections between theoretical assertions and
which itself only becomes possible on the basis of the
unfolding of the content of the theory, assuming as it does a


knowledge of the meaningful dependences between
theoretical objects. The possibility of obtaining knowledge about
certain real objects only on the theoretical level does not
at all make this knowledge inadequate or defective. It may
be assumed that the experimental observability of the
object facilitates acquisition of knowledge about it, but
this fact has no direct relevance to the substantive
meaningful characteristic of this knowledge. The fact that a
non-observable object becomes observable (which
sometimes happens, as we pointed out above) does not prove
that our previous knowledge of this object was ``symbolic''
and that only now does it become genuine. On the
contrary, the justifiability and adequacy of knowledge
obtained at the theoretical level is here confirmed.</p>

<p>     Of course, many essentially non-observable objects
with which theory is concerned radically differ in their
characteristics from ordinary observed bodies. (For
instance, the particles differing in their position in space but
identical in the rest of their properties, are regarded as
identical in quantum mechanics.) However, the
fundamental difference between objects of different types does
not follow from their observability or non-observability
but from their different real nature, for it is the latter that
determines the possibility or impossibility of their

<p>     In conclusion, let us touch on some general points.</p>

<p>     In pre-Marxian philosophy, it was usual to interpret
knowledge of real objects (strictly speaking, knowledge
can only relate to real objects, for otherwise it is not
knowledge but spmething else) as something more or less
immediately given. Our analysis of some methodological
problems involved in the study of the structure and
content of scientific knowledge proceeded from the
fundamental propositions of Marxist philosophy about the
dialectically mediated nature of any knowledge. We have
endeavoured to show that the existence of definite
assumptions does not at all exclude the possibility of relating
knowledge to an object existing in reality, independently
of an act of cognition; on the contrary.the characteristics
of real objects can only be established on the basis of a
number of premises, assumptions, hypotheses, etc. (of
course, on condition that these assumptions and
hypotheses are in one way or another justified in practice, however
complicated the justification might be).</p>

<p>     Marxist-Leninist philosophy emphasises the genetic
and functional dependence of cognition on practical
activity with objects directed at transformation of natural
and social reality. It is also pointed out that cognition


differs essentially from practical activity on a number of
vital points. Cognition is also a definite form of the
subject's activity, but this activity is aimed, at any level and
in any form, at revealing the substantive content of a
system of real objects. The subject's activity is only possible
in the framework of definite assumptions about the
content of these objects and cannot therefore be viewed as
simple constructing or creation of a certain ensemble of
artificial structures without real referents. In this case,
cognition can deal with real objects even if they are not
in principle given in experience. Cognition is an activity
of a special kind which assumes the use of definite
referential meanings, object-hypotheses, norms, etc., and aims
at reconstructing a system of substantive relations between
real objects. The operations included in cognitive activity,
both experimental ones and the operations of
measurement, have meaning only in the context of definite
assumptions about the real nature of the objects studied.</p>


<b>Chapter 3</b>

<br /> EXPERIENCE</b>


<p>     In our analysis of the Kantian conception of the
cognitive relation between subject and object (see Part One)
we have noted that the continuity of experience or, as
Kant puts it, its unity, is an important indication of the
objectiveness of knowledge. For Kant, this is even the
only indication. And yet, a type of experience is
imaginable that would be internally cohesive, continuous and
consistent and at the same time entirely subjective.
Something of this kind probably happens in the case of the
illusory worlds which some mental patients create and live
in. The events occurring in these worlds are subject to a
definite inner logic, but it does not correspond to the real
connections of the real objective world, which becomes
clear from the patient's behaviour and his relation to
reality and to other people. A most important condition of
objectiveness of experience, as shown in Marxist
philosophy, is therefore its connection with practical
objectoriented activity, for it is this connection that allows man
to correct experience itself, to separate illusions in it from
that which corresponds to the objective real state of
affairs. The latter in its turn assumes the inclusion of the
subject in a system of adequate social communications.
As for mental cases, they are evidently incapable of any of
these things.</p>

<p>     However, as far as socially accepted norms rather than
morbid deviations are concerned, the unity or continuity
of experience and its correction through practice appear
to be inseparable to the subject himself. In this connection
it becomes clear that Kant touched on a very important
problem indeed. Consider this: if experience is discrete,
if its subsequent stage does not follow from the previous
one and is not conditioned by it, we have no grounds at
all for regarding it as objective. Of course, I cannot observe
one and the same object continuously and infinitely long.


Different things keep intruding on the field of my
perception and passing beyond it. Objects may be given in
the experience of other men with whom I communicate
which are not given in my own experience. All these
facts, however, do not prove discreteness of experience.
Incorporated in the very mechanism of my perception is
the realisation that the object's existence is not
discontinued simply because I cease looking at it. The
objects of experience of one subject may simultaneously
or after some time become part of the experience of

<p>     Objects which are not perceived by any subject at the
given moment also exist in reality. If some object
disappears, if it ceases to exist, that happens only due to certain
events at a previous stage of experience. At the same time,
the disappearing object always leaves some trace, which
is expressed in the transformation of some objects into
others, so that there is a definite continuity of events and
processes relating to different stages of experience. The
realisation of the continuity of the objective processes to
which experience relates is not merely a product of
interpretative reflexion, a result of reasoning, but a direct
condition of the givenness of experience itself as a kind of
knowledge. In other words, the process of perception
assumes the action of an amodal objective scheme of the
world, which makes possible the realisation of the
independence of the objects from the act of their cognition
(see Chapter 1 of Part One). This scheme also underlies
scientific theoretical thinking which starts from the
premise that the world of objects is independent from the
subject's cognitive activity. If there are gaps in experience,
we have every right to doubt its objectiveness, to suspect
that we deal with hallucinations, illusions, etc.</p>

<p>     The question arises, however, whether we might not
assume the existence of experience distinctly different from
ours, that is, one that would relate to objects of an
essentially different kind, so that there would be no direct
transition from one type of experience to another. That
would mean a gap between these two kinds of experience.
At the same time this experience of an unusual kind would
be quite normal and objective, that is, not only internally
cohesive and continuous but also included in a definite
type of object-related practical activity-true, an activity
different from ours. Such experience might be
characteristic of beings different from man (e.g., the inhabitants of
other cosmic worlds). Kant accepted this possibility, but
he believed this question to be insoluble, for any answer
to it involves going beyond the domain of human


experience, and this step is absolutely inadmissible, in his

<p>     Even a very preliminary contemplation of this problem
compels one to doubt the justifiability of posing it.
Indeed, if there is only one objectively real world, there can
hardly exist types of experience pertaining to this world
that are so different that there are no transitions between
them and that are at the same time objective. Of course,
the experiences of every subject are unique and different
from those of other subjects. At the same time the
existence of my experience includes the possibility of
understanding the statements of other individuals about the
data of their experiences, for our different experiences
objectively belong to one and the same world and,
moreover, they subjectively comprise one and the same world
of objects. I can know less about this world than another
subject, or more, but the types of objects themselves
remain the same for both of us. Those objects that are
comprised in the experiences of another subject can also
be included in my experience. In other words, our
different experiences are essentially commensurable: the overall
system of objects ensures continuity between them. It is
quite another matter when different types of objects are
subjectively present in experiences objectively belonging to
the same world. If that were possible, a gap would
obviously exist between these different types of experience.
Inasmuch as cognition is reflection or reproduction of
reality, gaps are impossible not only in the framework
of the given type of experience but also in the relations
between experiences of different types (and consequently,
the existence of fundamentally incommensurable
experiences is also impossible). It would therefore appear
that if we encountered such fundamentally
incommensurable cognitive experiences (although it is not quite
clear how that is possible), we would have to admit, first,
that all of them could not equally be referred to
cognition and, second, that some of them are apparently only a
subjective illusion. Kant could accept (albeit only as a
hypothetical possibility) the existence of different types
of cognitive experiences only because, in his view, the
substantive structure of experience is constituted by
consciousness and, consequently, the existence of different
types of consciousness determines different types of
experience. If we reject this subjectivist premise of Kant's
philosophy, we have no right to argue the possibility of
different types of experience.</p>

<p>     This line of reasoning appears to be well substantiated.
However, scientists in different fields have now


encountered facts which they deem it necessary to explain in
terms of hypotheses of the existence of different types of
cognitive experience, different perceptive and conceptual

<p>     'Let us begin our exposition and analysis of these
conceptions with a reminder that, according to Piaget's
theory, there are different stages in the development of
perceptive structures, so that at the early stages of this
development the continuity of experience is as yet
nonexistent for the child (the object that passes beyond his
field of vision disappears for him in an absolute sense)
and there are gaps of a certain kind between different
stages of perceptive and intellectual development, each
stage being characterised by its own structures and the
subsequent stages replacing the previous ones. At the same
time all these stages, in Piaget's view, express different
phases of the development of cognition in the intellectual

<p>     True, Piaget deals with perceptive and intellectual
structures which characterise only different stages in the
genesis of the adult's cognitive activity rather than the
activity itself.</p>

<p>     And yet Kuhn, the well-known specialist in the theory
and history of science, in his <em>The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions</em> substantiates the existence in science of
fundamentally different ``paradigms'' replacing one another
in the course of historical development of scientific
knowledge. Kuhn points out extremely important facts: the
impossibility of presenting the structure of scientific theories
as a system of purely formal relations between language
constructions (that was the interpretation of scientific
theory by logical positivists); the immersion of theoretical
systems in certain meaningful cognitive schemes
determining both the character and the paths of further
development of the theory as well as the mode of setting up and
interpreting experiments; the existence of continuous
links between the descriptive function of the paradigm
(it is the paradigm that determines the ontology of the
theory, that is, the type of real objects to which the given
theory or a whole system of theories relates) and its
normative, methodological, and heuristic functions. Kuhn
indicates that paradigms may be viewed as definite systems
of prescriptions shared by the scientific community that
accepts a given paradigm. These prescriptions are not
usually formulated as a system of clear-cut rules or formal
algorithms.(apparently, such a kind of formulation of the
prescriptions is even impossible), being incorporated, as
it were, in the content structure of the paradigm itself.


It is the paradigm, Kuhn insists, that determines the
cohesion of a scientific study at all of its levels, its inclusion
in a definite semantic context. The mode of organisation
of the given integral whole is reminiscent not so much of
formal mathematical or logical structures as of the
structures of perception, the perceptive ``gestalts''. The
transition from one paradigm to another may be regarded as
a kind of switching to a different ``gestalt''.</p>

<p>     We shall not consider in detail the characteristics which
Kuhn ascribes to a paradigm, or his conception as a whole.
Let us note merely that he has drawn the attention of
specialists in the theory, methodology, and history of
science to a whole series of problems which have mostly
been overshadowed by others but are nevertheless quite
real and, moreover, essential for understanding the
structure and functions of scientific knowledge, for an
understanding of the actual historical process of the
development of science.</p>

<p>     It is important here to single out only one aspect of
Kuhn's conception, namely that which provoked
accusations of subjectivism. It is also a point that has caused the
greatest amount of argument. The transition from one
paradigm to another (that is what a scientific revolution is
about, according to Kuhn) is regarded as passing into a
different conceptual and perceptual world in which the
scientist works. What the scientist observes in experience is
determined by the content of his theoretical paradigm,
states Kuhn. At the same time the paradigms being integral
wholes similar to perceptive gestalts are different from one
another, there are no transitions between them. After
a scientific revolution, the scientist sees the world in a
different way: he observes those objects which previously
did not exist for him, while that which previously seemed
self-obvious and directly given no longer forms part of
his experience. The new paradigm may use the same terms
as the old one, and it usually includes most of the
symbolic generalisations present in the old paradigm (
formulations of scientific principles and laws) as well as the
procedures of measurement, the rules for using apparatus,
etc. However, in the context of a new meaningful whole,
these terms, formulations, and rules are given a
qualitatively new meaning.^^60^^ &quot;...During revolutions scientists see
new and different things when looking with familiar
instruments in places where they have looked before. It is
rather as if the professional community has been suddenly
transported to another planet where familiar objects are
seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones
as well. Of course, nothing of quite that sort does occur:


there is no geographical transplantation; outside the
laboratory everyday affairs usually continue as before.
Nevertheless, paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the
world of their research-engagement differently. In so far
as their only recourse to that world is through what they
see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution
scientists are responding to a different world.''^^61^^
Different paradigms are mutually intranslatable and
incommensurable with each other, asserts Kuhn. Adequate
communication between representatives of different
paradigms is impossible: the same words are given different
meanings. There exists a gap between the paradigms.^^62^^</p>

<p>     To substantiate the thesis of the possibility of different
conceptual and perceptive worlds, some theoreticians go
even farther than Kuhn in some respects, linking up these
worlds not only with certain theoretical systems but also
with the modes of dissecting the world which are
embodied in everyday language. The American linguists Edward
Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, generalising the results of
ethnolinguistic studies (in particular, Whorf's studies in the
language of the Hopis, an Indian tribe) came to the
conclusions formulated as the so-called hypothesis of linguistic
relativity, or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. (Kuhn mentioned
the influence of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis on the shaping
of his own conception.) According to this hypothesis, the
world we perceive and interpret is unconsciously built on
the basis of definite language norms. We break up reality
into elements in accordance with classification rules
(embodied in lexical units) and grammatical structures
inherent in the given language. Inasmuch as there are no
two similar languages, different societies may be said to
exist in different worlds. &quot;We dissect nature along lines
laid down by our native languages,'' writes Whorf. &quot;The
categories and types that we isolate from the world of
phenomena we do not find there because they stare
every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is
presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has
to be organized by our minds---and this means largely by
the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up,
organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we
do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to
organize it in this way... We are thus introduced to a new
principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are
not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture
of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are
similar, or can in some way be calibrated.''^^6^^3 According
to the hypothesis of linguistic relativity, different language
pictures of the world can implement different categorical


structures, thereby affecting the norms of thinking and,
in a mediated way, the norms of behaviour of the given
collective. In modern European languages of the
IndoEuropean family, there is a division of words into nouns
and verbs, into subjects and predicates. Whorf believes that
this circumstance determines the ontology shared by the
speakers of these languages-^the division of the world into
objects and their actions, processes. In Whorf's view, in
the Hopi language there is no division into subject and
predicate, and in that of the Nootka tribe, no division
even into verbs and nouns. In this latter case, the habitual
division of the world into objects and processes is

<p>     The Hopi language does not categorise time the way
European languages do. &quot;...It will be found that it is not
possible to define 'event, thing, object, relationship', and
so on, from nature, but that to define them always
involves a circuitous return to the grammatical categories of
the definer's language.''^^65^^</p>

<p>     The most radical and at the same time logically
polished formulation of the possibility of alternative
conceptual worlds has been suggested by Willard Quine, an
outstanding modern American logician, mathematician, and
philosopher; this formulation is linked with his theory of
the so-called ontological relativity.</p>


<p>     Quine started out from the fact that there are
alternative, i.e., logically incompatible, interpretations of a
formal system.</p>

<p>     For example, to define what kind of objects are
numbers, we must give an interpretation of the formal system
of arithmetic that would satisfy the arithmetical
operations and laws; in particular, the primitive term O must be
defined and the operation S the application of which to
any element of the given system generates the next
element Sn. Two versions of number are known. Ernst
Zermelo chose the empty class X as O and the singular class
{*} for every <em>x</em> as S<sub>x</sub>. The numbers 0, 1, 2, 3,... become
respectively X, { <em>\]</em> , <em>{{ \}\</em>, {{{ \}}j , etc.</p>

<p>     In Neumann's version, the empty class X is chosen as O
and the natural number is defined as the class of all
preceding numbers, that is, <em>S<sub>x</sub></em> appears as <em>x V{x}</em> .In this
case, the number 1 will be { X j , the number 2- { 0,1] ,
i.e., (X{X]} , the number 3- (0,1, 2,) or (x,{Xj,
UMH etc.^^66^^</p>


<p>     Both versions satisfy arithmetical laws and operations.
But they are alternative. To demonstrate that, let us ask
this question: does the number 3 belong to the number 5?
According to Zermelo, the answer must be negative, and
according to Neumann, positive. &quot;Indeed, according to
Neumann's theory, for any two numbers <em>x</em> and <em>y</em>, the
number <em>x</em> is smaller than the number <em>y</em>, if and only if
<em>x</em> belongs to <em>y</em> and * is a proper subset of y.
Symbolically: <em>x &lt;y = x</em> e <em>y</em>. Since the number 3 is smaller than the
number 5, the number 3 belongs to the number 5.
According to Zermelo, this argumentation leads to an incorrect
conclusion, inasmuch, as one number, <em>x</em>, belongs to
another, <em>y</em>, if, and only if, <em>y</em> is the number following the
number <em>x</em>. Symbolically: <em>x</em> e <em>y</em> = y = S<sub>x</sub>. Since the number
5 is not the number following the number 3, the number
3 does not belong to the number 5. Thus we come to
contradictory assertions.''^^67^^ This contradiction is
explained by the fact that the concept of the number
following some <em>x</em> differs in the two theories.</p>

<p>     In considering objects to which a theory relates, we
must give an interpretation of the corresponding formal
system, that is, we must translate the terms and
propositions of the given system into the terms and propositions
of another. At the same time, we have seen that a given
formal system admits of different translations
characterised by alternative ontologies. &quot;We may accept that
translation of a theory entails a change in ontology: e.g., one
may go on from a universe of numbers to a universe of
sets. The new objects must satisfy the laws of the old
theory, and it becomes necessary to explain in what way
translation of the theory can yield incompatible systems
with different ontologies. It might be asserted that the
new object is an explanation of the old in the sense that
the ontological status of the former is clearer than the
status of the latter, so that the latter is reducible to the
former. But how is one to understand that the old object
is also reducible to another, new object included in an
alternative theory?''^^68^^</p>

<p>     Quine attempts to explain these facts in a
philosophicallogical conception touching on a wider range of problems
than the logical foundations of mathematics only.</p>

<p>     He asks: what is, in general, translation from one
language into another? Imagine that a researcher in
anthropology has discovered a tribe absolutely unknown to science
and is trying to learn its language. To do that, the
researcher must translate the terms and other 4inguistic
constructions of a foreign language into his native one. Each
language, as Quine sees it, is an ensemble of terms and


grammatical forms that are not only connected with one
another by definite dependence relations but also ``
attached'' at some points to the objects and phenomena of
extralinguistic reality. It is exactly this latter circumstance
that permits us to use the language as an instrument for
the description of what occurs in the world. It is important
to understand the manner in which the language
constructions are ``attached'' to what happens in the real world,
Quine continues. Man can know something about reality
first of all because he gets certain information about it
through his sense organs. But sensory information by itself
does not yet carry a definite division of the world into a
system of objects of a certain type. This dissection, Quine
believes, is given by language, by the entire totality of its
lexical and grammatical means. Different languages can
apparently solve this task in different ways. For example,
in order that different objects might be discovered in the
world, standing in definite spatio-temporal relations to one
another and subject to definite processes, there must be
more in the language than the division of words into nouns
and verbs. Subjects and predicates must also be
differentiated in the utterance, and there must be linguistic methods
of distinguishing between and identifying objects: ``this'',
&quot;that which'', &quot;the same'', expressions of the singular and
plural number, etc. A language is possible in which all
these linguistic means are absent. For carriers of such a
language, external objects do not exist in the same manner
as those to which speakers of European languages are
accustomed (the character of these languages is doubtless
connected with a definite type of culture). Each language
is characterised by its own system of dissecting the world
and by the type of meanings which are ascribed to these
objects-(Quine believes that meanings are the dependences
in a given linguistic system). For this reason, not only
meanings but also objects or referents of linguistic
expressions cannot be given extralinguistically.</p>

<p>     Quine tries to assert a behaviourist, naturalist view of
the psyche and language. He believes consciousness to be
a kind of fiction. All psychical phenomena may and must
be described, in principle, in terms of the physiology of
higher nervous activity. Meanings as phenomena of the
world of consciousness or of a supra-individual ideal world
do not exist. There are only rules for ``attaching'' definite
language expressions to stimuli of the given sort and
methods for transforming some language expressions into
others. It would be inaccurate, however, to draw the
conclusion that Quine interprets language as a purely formal
system. Quine believes it to be fundamentally erroneous


to divide language expressions into those which describe
experience (meaningful or synthetic propositions) and
those which record purely linguistic relations (analytical
propositions, that is, propositions empty of meaning).
All elements of a language system are mutually connected,
he believes, and this system as a whole serves as an
instrument of describing experience. It is this ``attachment'' of
the language system to experience that makes it impossible
to single out those relations within the language that
would be purely formal and have no definite semantic
meaning. In actual fact, any relation between the elements
of a given language system may be regarded both as a
relation between meanings (it is important to bear in mind
that meaning, according to Quine, is not an extralinguistic
entity but belongs to the given language and expresses the
mutual relations between its elements) and a fixation of
a definite extralinguistic content, that is, knowledge of
the world. The meanings of language elements do not
exist outside knowledge of the world. In its turn,
knowledge of the world can only exist through internal relations
of the elements of the linguistic system, that is, through
their meanings. Choosing the angle from which to consider
the relations of language expressions to the knowledge of
the world which they carry is purely conventional: the
choice is determined by the goals of analysis. (True, taking
into account that meanings are neither extralinguistic
nor intralinguistic entities---we shall touch on this
point below---^Quine thinks it best to stop all discussion of
meanings and discuss only the relations within the
language and the relations of the language to the world of
objects or referents). Thus any language system is at the same
time a definite system of knowledge about the world,
a definite theory with an inherent ontology. In particular,
a natural language is also a kind of theory.</p>

<p>     The need is sometimes asserted for distinguishing
between language and theory in view of the following facts:
first, different theories may be formulated with the aid
of identical language means, and even at the pre-thepretical
level the carriers of the given language may hold different
views on a number of questions; second, it is well known
that one and the same theory may be expressed in
different languages, the term ``language'' being applied not only
to the natural languages (English, French, etc.) but also to
artificial ones, as the language of mathematics.</p>

<p>     In his reply to these arguments Quine deems it
necessary to stress the conventional nature of the division into
language and theory: every language is a kind of theory,
and any theory may be presented as a language. One must


only remember that the theories themselves (and,
correspondingly, the languages) may belong to different levels,
they may possess a different degree of generality, etc. An
everyday natural language expresses the broadest theory
possible, embodying certain general orientations of &quot;
common sense''. One may agree with these general orientations
and at the same time differ in the understanding of
relatively more special problems. It is therefore possible to
formulate in terms of one and the same natural language
different systems of views, among other things, different
scientific theories. As for the translation of the given
theory from one language into another, it may be
regarded as practically realisable only in some cases, but
theoretically, that is, in the proper sense of the term, it is
unattainable, Quine believes, for theoretical content unrelated
to the language means of its expression does not exist.
Any translation changes the content of a theory to some
extent or other, and in some cases the change may be
rather significant, affecting its ontology. Quine's
proposition concerning the impossibility of &quot;radical
translation&quot; will be considered in detail somewhat later.</p>

<p>     The question of the types of objects presupposed by the
given language is not a purely formal one for Quine, it is
not merely a question of conventionally adopting a certain
mode of expression, as in Rudolf Carnap's theory. (The
latter assumed that ontological questions, being ``external''
relative to the language system, do not admit of
theoretical solution and are merely identical with accepting or
rejecting the given modes of expression.) Quine insists
that accepting a given theory (viz. language) signifies
adopting not only certain modes of expression but also a
conception of the world, or an ontology. He therefore
regards ontological problems as extremely important and
belonging to the content of a theory (or language). If a
theory is logically formalised, the objects permitted by
it are the values of its variables. (For theories of this kind,
Quine formulates his famous thesis: &quot;The ontology to
which one's use of language commits him comprises simply
the objects that he treats as falling within the subject
matter of his quantifiers---within the range of values of his
variables.''^^69^^ In this case &quot;to exist&quot; means &quot;to be a value
of a bound variable&quot;.)</p>

<p>     Let us go back to the above example with an
anthropologist. If this researcher observing the life of an unknown
tribe speaking an entirely unfamiliar language attempts
at the very beginning to translate into his tongue
expressions unrelated directly with what is given in experience,
he will hardly succeed: that much is obvious. Indeed, he


has no instruments for establishing the meaning of these
expressions. He should obviously first of all try to
establish the meanings of those words and expressions which
are closest to experience, recording what is given directly.
In doing so, he will apparently assume that he observes
the same objects of the environment as the natives whom
he studies. Further, the anthropologist will bear in mind
that the neurophysiological apparatus responsible for
receiving information from the external world is common
to all men. He will thus conclude that stimulus meanings
of words and expressions and, consequently, those
meanings which directly characterise the ``attachment'' of the
language to the objects of the external world (the
referents) and which differ from meanings as a system of
intralinguistic relations, can be relatively easily singled out
and must be common to different languages. (True, they
will pertain only to those expressions which are more or
less directly correlated with experience.)</p>

<p>     The anthropologist will here start from the premise that
referents are extralinguistic entities, namely, the objects
of the external world.</p>

<p>     Our researcher will endeavour to apply his theoretical
orientation in practice. Supposing that he observes that
each time a rabbit scurries by, the native emits the sound
sequence ``Gavagai''. The anthropologist surmises that
``Gavagai'' denotes, in the language of that tribe, the same
thing that is denoted by the word ``rabbit'' (or rather the
expression &quot;Lo, a rabbit'') in his native language. Our
researcher is not fully confident that the surmise is correct.
Could it be that ``Gavagai'' relates not to rabbits at all but
to all rapidly moving objects? Or it may be that ``Gavagai''
is a rabbit but not any kind of rabbit---only a fast-running
rabbit. To test his conjecture, the anthropologist continues
his studies. On the one hand, he extends the range of
observation, and on the other, establishes contact with the
natives: pointing to a rabbit sitting still and pronouncing
the sounds ``Gavagai'', the researcher observes the reaction
of the members of the tribe and tries to establish whether
they regard the pronunciation of this sound combination
appropriate to the given situation. Observing for some time
the behaviour of the natives and communicating with them
through gestures, the researcher will settle on ``rabbit'' (or,
to be more precise, the short phrase &quot;Lo, a rabbit'') as a
translation of ``Gavagai''. In this way the anthropologist,
Quine states, can translate a series of words and
expressions of an unfamiliar language directly correlated with the
experientially perceived events.</p>

<p>     Translation of language constructions correlated with


experience in a more mediated fashion is a more
complicated matter. In translating these constructions, says
Quine, the anthropologist will take into account, first, the
connection between them and those expressions that he
can translate already, second, their inclusion in &quot;verbal
behaviour&quot; which stands, in its turn, in definite relations
with objective, experientially fixed situations, and third,
certain fundamental features of such a specific object as
``language'' with which he is familiar from his mastery
of his own language. In this way the anthropologist will
finally solve the task of formulating the instruments of
translation from the natives' language into his own.</p>

<p>     The model for formulating a scheme of translation
described here is, of course, extremely general and idealised.
Still, Quine believes it to be a sufficiently precise
expression of the main traits of the current practice of
ethnolinguistic studies and, more broadly, the practice of
translation from any language to any other in general. Quine has
no intention at all of criticising this practice, for in his
view it is impossible in any other form. However, he tries
to show the theoretical untenability of those precepts
which are usually associated with it and without which
this practice can and must do, in Quine's opinion.</p>

<p>     Indeed, Quine argues, what proves that the referents,
the objects to which linguistic expressions refer, are
extralinguistic entities? It is true, of course, that stimulus
meanings are common to all men. But objects are by no
means identical to stimulus meanings (whereas the
anthropological researcher discussed above identifies the
two). Different objective dissections may correspond to
one and the same stimulus meaning, these dissections
being determined by the properties of the language. When
the anthropologist establishes that the sound sequence
``Gavagai'' refers to the same stimulus meaning as the word
``rabbit'', that does not mean that both these linguistic
units have identical referents. Pointing to a rabbit and
pronouncing ``Gavagai'', a native may mean a rabbit in a
sense different from ours, e.g., those aspects of the rabbit
which are at the given moment within his field of vision
rather than a separate integral object characterised also
by aspects that are not perceived at the given moment.
``Gavagai'' may be used in the natives' language to denote
something different from a kind of objects that are similar
to each other in their &quot;general rabbity&quot; characteristics,
each of them being at the same time unique; it may rather
denote the phenomenon of some general ``rabbitness'' in
the given area of space and at the given moment (in this
case, the language will not possess any means of expressing


the grammatical form of number or a division of nouns
into abstract and concrete).^^70^^ Generally speaking, there
are many modes of objective interpretation of the stimulus
meaning corresponding to our word ``rabbit'', and
enumerating them all is not the main thing. The main thing is,
according to Quine, that it is impossible to establish from
observation of the natives' behaviour what types of objects
are the referents of a given unknown language. (Let us
recall once again that Quine strictly distinguishes between
objects and stimulus meanings. It is not too difficult to
establish the latter.) One and the same group of stimulus
meanings, one and the same external behaviour may be
reflected in different language systems characterised by
different dissections of the world of objects. But if that is
so, it is in general impossible to establish unambiguously
the system of objects to which the foreign language
refers. It also means that there is no unambiguously
correct (Quine calls it ``radical'') translation from one
language to another. In practice the anthropologist studying
a foreign language will take into account the coincidence
of objects as referents of language expressions. As for the
translation of those expressions which have no direct
stimulus meanings, it will be attained, first, only by taking
into account the connections between these expressions
and those that have stimulus meaning, and second, on the
analogy with grammatical and lexical constructions of the
translator's native language. Quine believes that even if one
assumes that the ontology of the translator's language is
common to both languages (though this assumption
cannot be substantiated at all, in his view), different
analytical schemes are possible of the correlation of separate
language expressions in the two languages, that is to say,
different variants of translation exist. In other words,
radical translation is indeterminate. As a rule, the
translator does not fully realise this fact, considering the
analytical scheme of translation of his choosing the only possible
one. As for the mutual relations of those languages that
have a sufficiently firmly established tradition of
translation (e.g., translation from German into French or from
English into Russian), the existence of an analytical
scheme of translation may not be realised at all, for there
is no question of searching for such a scheme: it was found
a long time ago in the work of previous generations of
translators, and the possibility of a fundamentally
different scheme does not even occur to translators.</p>

<p>     In this connection, Quine asks this question: how can
we determine the ontology of a given language or theory,
that is, the system of objects to which this language or


theory refers? For the carriers of the given system, the
language modes of expression and the ontological content
are inseparable from each other: the world is given them
through a system of meanings, and meanings embody
knowledge of the world. To separate that which belongs
to language from that which pertains to the world itself,
we must go beyond the framework of the given language
system and compare it with the world. Quine believes,
however, that we have no way of penetrating the world
as such, for the world as an ensemble of objects is always
given to us only through some language system or other.
(Quine does not negate the objective and real existence of
the world, that is, its being independent of man and
language, but he insists that the world is given to man only
through some linguistic or theoretical system.) We cannot
therefore speak of absolute ontology of the given language
system but only of its relative ontology. When we ask what
are in reality the objects of the given language or
theoretical system, the role of the &quot;world of objects&quot; with
which the system under study is compared is played by
another language or theoretical system and not the world
as such. The ontology of such a system is not discussed
here: the system itself and the world of its objects are
given as something undifferentiated. In other words, in
defining the ontology of the given linguistic or theoretical
system, we perform in actual fact translation from one
language into another. The language into which we
translate defines the world of objects of the language from
which we translate (that is to say, the object to which the
word ``Gavagai'' refers, to recur to the above example,
is a rabbit, i.e. that which is denoted by the appropriate
word of our language). We should not forget, however,
that depending on the language into which a text in the
given language will be translated, the latter will be ascribed
different ontologies, in Quine's opinion. But even if we
refer to two given languages only, here again one may
accept different analytical schemes of translation (let us
recall Quine's thesis about the indeterminate character
of radical translation).^^71^^ In this case, when the question
arises about the ontology of the language into which we
translate, here again we run into the same problem: we
can say something about this ontology only in relation to
some other language. Quine concludes that there can be no
answer of absolute value to the question of what the
objects of a given theory are. The ontology of a given theory
can only be established in relation to some other theory.
If we want to know, for instance, what kind of objects are
in fact numbers, we must translate the system of


arithmetic into some other mathematical system, e.g., set
theory, and one of the theories (Zermelo's) will provide
one answer to this question, while Neumann's will give
another. As a matter of fact, the reverse procedure is also
possible. To answer the question about the kind of objects
sets really are, we may try to translate the propositions
of set theory into the language of arithmetic. On the
analogy with the relativist theory of space and time, Quine
believes it possible to speak of a relativist theory of the
objects of theory, or of ontological relativity.^^72^^</p>

<p>     An impcJrtant point of Quine's conception is that each
language has its own mode of dissecting the objective
world. This assertion, however, does not entail, in Quine's
view, that each language has its own ontology, into which
we cannot penentrate from the outside, being therefore
compelled to interpret it on the analogy of the ontology
of our own language. Quine believes that one cannot
discuss the ontology of the given language as long as it is
considered by itself: although a language carries a definite
world picture in itself, the interrelation between language
and the world of objects is not singled out in it. To find
out in what way language expressions are correlated with
objects, i.e., to single out the ontology of the given
language, we have to speak about it in some other language,
the ontology of which is not discussed in the context of
this discourse. The problem of ontology is one of mutual
relation or mutual translatability of different languages or
theories. We therefore do not know the ontology of our
own language, says Quine.</p>

<p>     The ontology of the latter can only be discussed in some
other language (and the ontology itself will look
differently depending on the language into which the texts in our
own tongue are translated). True, one may attempt to
reveal the ontology of our language while remaining within
its boundaries, and such attempts are made both in
everyday life and especially in logic and philosophy. In this case,
however, our language must figure twice, in different
capacities: once as an object language (that is, the language
whose ontology is elucidated), and another time as the
language in which we discuss the ontology of the object
language. Here we translate the sentences of our language
into sentences of the same language. The sentences we
translate need not be equivalent to those that result from
translation. Generally speaking, even in this case, according
to Quine, we can choose different analytical schemes of
translation. And that means that the ontologies ascribed
to our language will differ depending on the scheme of


<p>     When we communicate with another person speaking
the same language as we do, we are convinced that we
refer to one and the same world of objects. We believe that
in this case, at any rate, our own object dissection of the
world and that of our partner must coincide.</p>

<p>     But why are we so confident about it? Quine asks. Is it
solely because our interlocutor pronounces approximately
the same sounds as we do in similar situations? How can
we make judgements about the meaningful world picture
which our partner associates with these sounds? We ascribe
to his words a relation to definite objective referents only
because we translate his speech into the language which we
use ourselves. From Quine's standpoint, our language as
a system of predispositions to definite verbal behaviour
appears to us in quite a different light than any other
language which we always treat as an object language: that is
true not only of the language of a foreign people but also
of that of our countrymen.</p>

<p>     Quine believes that the conception of ontological
relativity is applicable to all language systems or theories:
not only to natural, ordinary (national) languages but also
to theories in mathematics and other sciences. True, we
should bear in mind the following important factor. In
mathematics, we can do more than translate the theory of
arithmetic into the language of set theory: we can also
perform retranslation. Each of these theories may
appear as an object one (the theory whose ontology is
established) or the one that functions as the premise (the
theory specifying the ontology of the object theory).
The reason for this freedom of action is equal mastery
of both theories. The situation with natural languages is
different. Only one of them is our native or mother tongue.
We therefore usually judge of the ontology of other
languages on the basis of translating them into our own: it is
the latter that specifies the object dissection of the world
in ternis of which we understand and interpret other

<p>     In natural scientific knowledge the problems of
ontology are settled, in Quine's view, in the same way, i.e.,
through translation of the terms and propositions of one
theory into the language of another. For instance, if we
ask ourselves the question what really is the object referred
to in physical theory as the atom, we must translate
this theory into the language of another, e.g., that which
operates with the &quot;sense datum&quot; terms, or uses the
terminology of laboratory operations, or else applies terms
referring to non-observable objects: it will be shown in the
last case that such and such substantive processes of


objective reality correspond to the word ``atom''. The
process of translation may reveal that some language
expression of the object theory does not correspond to
any real entity from the standpoint of the premise theory:
that is the position, e.g., with the term ``ether'' if we try to
translate the theory of classical physics into the language
of modern science. It may also happen that we shall be
unable to find any modes of translating one theory into
another. In this case, Quine thinks, we cannot make
judgments about the ontology of the given theory. Yet,
Quine believes, the attempts to reduce the content of
natural scientific knowledge to the content of &quot;sense data&quot;
and protocol statements (something that was intensely
practiced by logical positivists) are untenable. At the same
time he regards conceptual theoretical gaps, the emergence
of fundamentally new systems of knowledge, and scientific
revolutions as a rare and undesirable phenomenon in the
development of natural science. Here he differs strongly
with Kuhn, as we see. In Quine's view, natural sciences
develop through gradual changes and restructuring of
theoretical constructions, so that questions of ontology
arise here fairly rarely. (Quine believes that even
metamathematical studies, dealing with problems of
interpretation of formal systems, can in some cases do without
solution of ontological problems.)</p>

<p>     According to Quine, the experiences of each group of
subjects that are carriers of a given language or theory are
more or less continuous, and the experiences of each
individual subject are even more so. Everything that appears
in the field of his experience, including other languages
or theories, is interpreted in terms of the world picture
embodied in this experience. The question of how other
subjects that are carriers of other languages or theories see
and understand the world is meaningless, according to
Quine: one ascribes a certain ontology to other languages
proceeding from the properties of one's own. At the same
time, this conception starts put from the premise that
different language or theoretical systems implement
different object dissections of reality. And that means that,
although experience is continuous within the group of
carriers of the given language, it is discrete in the
relations between different groups using different languages
(or theories).^^73^^ Groups of carriers of different languages
or theories live in different worlds. Accepting this thesis,
Quine concurs with Sapir and Whorf as well as Kuhn. A
substantive addition Quine makes to this thesis is his
assertion that the subjects themselves that are carriers of
different languages or theories usually do not notice that


they live in different worlds, as they interpret other worlds
on the analogy of their own. They can learn another
language (translating it into their own) and even communicate
with the carriers of another language and yet remain
outside this other world. Different worlds exist in different
dimensions and do not therefore come into contact or
interact. The carriers of different languages or theories in
Quine's interpretation remind one of Leibnitz's monads
which reflect the whole world, yet &quot;have no windows&quot;
and do not actually interact with other monads, although
they have the impression that they do participate in such

<p>     That does not, of course, mean that a person cannot
master another language so that it will become his second
native language (that is only possible when a person is
included in a different cultural system). The subject will
in this case master the mode of object dissection of the
world which is characteristic of the new language.
However, for Quine the main point is that one cannot
simultaneously use two languages. When the given subject
speaks the new language and thinks in it, his native
language functions as an object one, and vice versa. Two
languages (and correspondingly two world pictures) cannot
come into contact in one experience field. The transition
from one language to another as the basis of conversation
and thinking may in this case be viewed in the same light
as transposition into a different dimension.</p>

<p>     Kuhn and Feyerabend, as we recall, insist that different
paradigms and major scientific theories carrying different
visions of the world come into conflict with one another;
it even happens in the consciousness of an individual
subject, as a result of which one of the paradigms replaces
others. According to Quine, however, different language
or theoretical conceptions characterised by different
object dissections of the world cannot come into this kind of
conflict, lying as they do in different dimensions:
whenever the interrelation of two theoretical systems is
elucidated and their ontologies are established, one of them
acts as an object theory and the other, as a premise theory.</p>

<p>     Quine does not specially consider the problems of
scientific revolutions. His assertion, however, that
conceptual changes in the development of science can only
be gradual shows that he does not accept the existence of
such revolutions. Reasoning <em>in abstracto</em>, we can, of
course, imagine an attempt at describing successive
replacement of paradigms in the language of Quine's
conception of ontological relativity. In this case, however,
we would, first, have to reject the assertion of the gradual


character of conceptual changes in science and, second,
give an interpretation of the paradigms themselves and the
process of their successive replacement that would be
essentially different from Kuhn's.</p>


<p>     Let us begin a critical analysis of the conceptions of
alternative worlds with Quine's theory. That is all the more
convenient since the latter sets this problem against the
broadest philosophical background.</p>

<p>     Let us note from the start that the existence of
alternative theories in metamathematics, which was the premise
of Quine's theory, is in itself indubitable and requires
serious philosophical study. Quine is also right when he
says that the problem of substantiation of scientific theory
cannot be solved through ontological and epistemological
reduction (thus, it is impossible to reduce the theory of
arithmetic to set theory; the problem of substantiation of
mathematics cannot be formulated or solved within the
framework of reductionism). But we are first of all
interested in the analysis of the conception of ontological
relativity in its general epistemological significance.</p>

<p>     It is easy to show, however, that its basic propositions
can hardly be regarded as acceptable. Indeed, Quine notes
that sensory information (that is precisely what his term
&quot;stimulus meanings&quot; refers to) does not carry in itself any
object dissection of the world. He is, of course, right here.
But he errs on another score, namely, in asserting that the
existence of objects is not inherent in the world outside
man, and that the subject singles out external objects only
at the language level, the grouping of &quot;stimulus meanings&quot;
in the objects of a definite type being entirely determined
by the structure of the given language system, so that it
must be fundamentally different in different languages.
According to Quine, the initial content information about
reality is restricted to an ensemble of &quot;stimulus meanings'',
and human behaviour is determined by this information
rather than the objective properties of the objects
themselves. As a matter of fact, what we have here is a kind of
revival of the subjectivist empirical theory of &quot;sense data'',
hard as Quine might try to dissociate himself from it. He is
also close to the subjectivism of logical positivism (although
he believes to have overcome the latter) at another point
of his conception---in rejecting the existence in objective
reality of objects that are referents of the given language
expressions. For Quine, just as for Carnap, the subject

1/4 7---763


cannot in a certain sense break away beyond the confines
of language to the objective world itself: the meanings
through the relations of which the world is given to the
subject are, in their view, only a system of intralinguistic
relations. Therefore the world itself as an ensemble of
objects is only the product of language.</p>

<p>     This line of reasoning, consistently and logically
implemented, inevitably leads to conclusions which are in
themselves enough to make one doubt such conceptions. (For
instance, it is exactly that interpretation which Quine
gives of subjective &quot;stimulus meanings'', taken as the
starting point of cognition, that determines the emergence
in this conception, in a new variant, of the difficulty which
subjective empiricism would never solve: the imaginary
impossibility to cognize the state of consciousness of
another person.) The main point, however, is that Quine's
conception cannot provide an adequate explanation of
a whole series of important facts which the modern
sciences of cognition cannot ignore.</p>

<p>     The basic fact is that the subject is capable of singling
out the objects of the external world before he masters
the language, though Quine asserts the opposite. The modes
of singling out objects are directly correlated with
definite forms of object&gt;related practical activity worked out
by society; assimilating these forms, man assimilates the
specifically human cognitive relation to reality, that is,
that relation which assumes the givenness of the world
of objects to consciousness and differentiation of the
latter from the inner world of the subject, his consciousness.
The assimilation of language itself implies that the subject
has mastered definite &quot;reference mechanisms'', that is,
the modes of referring knowledge to reality: these
mechanisms are included in the basic perceptive structures. The
main types of referents and systems of meaning are not
constructed by the language system but are its premises.</p>

<p>     That is why expressions of different languages may have
common referents and, moreover, common meanings in
a narrow sense of the term, i.e., they may be synonymous.
Quine's conception compels one to reject the possibility
of synonymy, which contradicts elementary language
intuition. These fundamental facts are recognised in all more
or less serious theories inquiring into cognitive activity in
general and perception in particular.</p>

<p>     Inasmuch as perception structures are linked with
definite forms of object-related practical activity, one may
make judgments, from the knowledge of the given
subject's mastery of these forms, about the character of these
structures and the degree in which they are formed, i.e.,


judgements about the form in which the object dissection
of the world appears to the subject. That is the method of
inquiry used by Piaget, among others. (We ignore here
the fact that Piaget deals with spontaneous development
of structures and actions in the child and not with
mastering socially evolved forms of object-related activity.)
Piaget draws conclusions about the forms in which
external objects appear to the subject from the child's behaviour,
e.g., from its searching for an object that passed beyond
its field of vision. It is through external object-related
activity that knowledge which the subject has is actually
combined with the real objects. The forms of this activity
are of course determined not only by the objects but
also by the historical traits of social practice: those aspects
are singled out in the object which became particularly
significant for the given types of object-related activity.
At the same time it is essential that, first, we are dealing
here with the real aspects of the objective things
themselves, and second, that the essential structure of human
practical activity remains invariable, however diverse and
historically changeable types of practice may be.
Therefore, the principal types of objects with which humans
deal in ordinary life are the same regardless of the
languages they speak and the stage of cultural-historical
development. (Only we must not confuse the types of
objects given in knowledge with what the subject knows
about these objects.)</p>

<p>     If we break the real ties between systems of knowledge
and forms of practical object-oriented activity, it is, of
course, impossible to assess the extent to which the object
dissection of the world given in knowledge corresponds
to what exists independently of cognition and
consciousness. But that is exactly what Quine does, insisting that
judgments cannot be made from behaviour about the
system of referents to which the given language expressions
relate, and that different systems of object dissection of
the world implemented in different languages can be
associated with one and the same type of behaviour, the
latter being, in Quine's view, oriented at an ensemble of
&quot;stimulus meanings&quot; and not at a system of objects.</p>

<p>     It is obvious, however, that the most meaningful and
essential connections of reality are implemented precisely
in the object picture of the world. The knowledge of an
object assumes cognitive mastery of a whole system of
substantive connections in their complex mutual
dependences, the connections being not only actual but also
potential. If man's activity were directed at an ensemble
of &quot;stimulus meanings&quot; rather than at objects and their


mutual relations, his behaviour would hardly differ much
from the behaviour of animals. It should be assumed that
if a rabbit were perceived as a set of actually given aspects
or as a phenomenon of ``rabbitness'' (to use Quine's
example), this would affect in one way or another the
behaviour of the carriers of this kind of perception. True,
Quine himself underlines that the anthropologist trying
to translate a text from one language into another must
deal with relatively short stretches of &quot;stimulus meanings&quot;
and correspondingly with relatively small fragments of
natives' behaviour. But this restriction is hardly justified.
It may be assumed that it is this restriction that makes it
hard to define the object referents of some language
expressions and that, consequently, its elimination does
away with a whole series of imaginary difficulties to which
Quine refers in substantiating the thesis that radical
translation is indeterminate.</p>

<p>     Further, Quine's conception of language itself also gives
cause to certain objections. In Quine's view, language is a
definite ensemble of purely conventional (associative, in
his terminology) links between separate sound complexes,
some of which stand in conventional (associative) relations
with &quot;stimulus meanings''. Language is definite more or
less stable connections of verbal behaviour, or
predisposition to verbal behaviour of a definite kind. Alterations in
verbal behaviour change language too, in Quine's opinion.
He believes that the relations of different sound complexes
to one another and to external stimuli in the framework of
the given language system are not determined by the
object dissection o.f the world. Meanings are only mutual
relations of language expressions. For Quine, it is
therefore quite natural to infer that the existence of a common
object environment, of a common neurophysiological
apparatus in carriers of different languages, and even the
substantive community of different kinds of practice
associated with different languages are no indications at all
of the existence of essentially common structures in
different languages.</p>

<p>     However, the conception of language which becomes
more and more firmly rooted in modern linguistics is
based on fundamentally different notions. The point is
that a language system is not determined simply by a set of
sentences similar in certain respects and produced within
a given time interval, that is, by verbal behaviour. This
set will always be finite. Yet any language system
contains the possibility of generation of an infinite set of
acts of verbal behaviour, including those that do not
reproduce any of the past acts. Generation of new


sentences does not .necessarily entail changes in the essential
characteristics of the given language system (whereas,
if language is a set of conventional connections between
sentences the emergence of new sentences must change
the language itself). An essential feature of language is the
phenomenon of synonymy---that very phenomenon which
Quine treats as a pseudoproblem. Modern linguistics works
out theoretical models of generative grammar proceeding
from the fundamental, premise that language serves to
express a system of definite meanings and that this system
is basically common to all the different languages (having
an extralinguistic nature). Apparently, such grammatical
categories are universal as names of objects (nouns and
nominal phrases), names of situations-ysentences, and the
so-called transformers, that is, linguistic objects changing
linguistic objects of one class into other linguistic objects
of the same or different class.^^74^^ And that means, for
instance, that singling out objects in reality and
distinguishing them from processes and actions, that is, from
situations, is common to all languages, being determined
by extralinguistic circumstances which inevitably affect
all languages.^^75^^ The existence of invariant grammatical
structures in all languages is also an argument against the
universalist claims of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The
grammatical structure of a given language assumes a
definite object dissection of the world specifying a definite
very general sense of each sentence generated by the given
system of grammatical rules. Therefore, if lexical
semantic connections in a sentence are disrupted but the
sentence itself is constructed grammatically, it is meaningful
in a wider sense, though properly speaking nonsensical;
at any rate, it is understandable. Noam Chomsky cites in
this connection the sentence &quot;Colorless green ideas sleep

<p>     But even if we deal with a completely foreign language,
the grammar of which is not known to us and may prove
to be quite different from the grammar of our native tongue,
the existence of language universals does not permit
us to interpret that language as a simple set of sounds
conventionally connected with stimuli from the external
environment and allowing an almost unlimited spectrum
of incompatible interpretations. Quine makes a universal
and an absolute out of a definite procedure that is
justified in metamathematical studies. In the latter, the need
indeed arises to view a given theoretical system as a purely
formal structure (a set of symbols on paper) functioning
as an object language meaningfully discussed in
metalanguage. Under ordinary circumstances, however, the



attitude to natural language and even those languages which
express the content of theories in the factual sciences,
i.e., those that differ from mathematics, is different. If
I come across a language spoken by beings physically
similar to me and interacting with the external world in
a basically similar way (and that is expressed in their
behaviour), I must assume at once that the semantic fields
of our different languages have essential features in

<p>     According to Quine's conception, only those acts of
verbal behaviour are ultimately given to me on the
semantic plane whose agent I myself am. A dissected picture of
the object world is given to me by the language which
characterises my predisposition to definite verbal
behaviour. As for the language of any other subjects, including
those that speak apparently the same language as myself,
this language functions, according to Quine, merely as
an object language, i.e., a set of sounds allowing different
interpretations. However, an individual that merely receives
from the external world a set of impacts in the form of
&quot;stimulus meanings'', holding other individuals and their
actions also to be mere external stimuli, cannot be the
starting point of epistemological or even psychological
and psycholinguistic study. Such a study must have for
a starting point the subject included from the outset into
real connections of communication with other subjects
representing society and the accumulated social-historical
experiences. From the very first days of its life, the child
is involved in a meaningful interaction with an adult. At
first, the ties of semantic communication are established
directly through practical activity with external real
objects (and not at all with a set of &quot;stimulus meanings&quot;! )
and later through the use of language, too. The latter thus
actually expresses not only a definite relation of sound
complexes to external objects but also the relation of the
subjects using it to one another. The types of objects to
which the expressions of the given language and the
principal types of relations between these objects, i.e., the
principal systems of meanings, relate are therefore
common to all the carriers of the given language. The question,
discussed by Quine, of what the ontology of the language
is which my compatriot speaks cannot for this reason arise
in reality and is a typical pseudoproblem.</p>

<p>     The difference between the object dissection of the
world given to me through the language I speak and the
ontology of this language does not have the character
ascribed to it by Quine. Of course, this differentiation has
some sense in formal analysis, when we have to discuss


an object language in terms of a metalanguage, but it can
hardly be so essential in all the other cases. As far as
natural languages and the languages of the theories of
factual sciences are concerned, their ontology is
substantively determined by the object dissection of the world
given in them and cannot be viewed as something
determined only by the relation of the given language or theory
to another arbitrarily chosen language or theory. Therefore
in non-formal contexts the ontology of a theoretical
system may be regarded as inbuilt.</p>

<p>     That does not, of course, mean that all semantic
shadings included in the perception of the given object by
myself and another subject are absolutely identical. Indeed,
if two subjects look at the same object, the latter will
present to them its different aspects if only because their
angles of vision may not coincide, as they occupy
different positions in space. That means that the backgrounds
against which the given object will be perceived will be
different, to say nothing of the differences in perception
determined by the specific traits of the personality and the
life story of each of the subjects. The situation is
essentially the same with their utterances. One and the same word
necessarily calls forth different associations in them
conditioned by their unique life experiences. For this reason,
if we accept that understanding another person assumes
complete and absolute comprehension of the entire
system of the subjective M-mantle shadings of behaviour and
speech essential for that person, we may conclude that
such an understanding is in general impossible and that,
consequently, semantic interaction or meaningful
dialogue between two subjects are in general nonexistent.
That is the conclusion to which Quine comes. But, as we
have tried to show, the difference in semantic shadings
characterising the experiences of different subjects is itself
possible only against the background of essentially common
semantic structures underlying real practical,
objectdirected and language communication. Real understanding
and dialogue do not at all rule out certain semantic
differences in the details and shadings that are inessential for
the needs of communication. Moreover, communication
presupposes these differences, for no subject can cease
being himself or transplant himself into the body and
consciousness of another.</p>

<p>     Therefore, if we interpret understanding another person
as complete coincidence of semantic fields, as absolute
merging with the subjective states of another through a
kind of direct empathy, we may deduce that any
understanding is in actual fact non-understanding. It is another


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matter that this interpretation of understanding is
untenable. To distinguish between the general structure of
semantic fields essential for communication and the
subjective system of semantic connections in which this structure
is implemented in the consciousness of each individual
subject, A. N. Leontyev draws a distinction between the
categories of &quot;meaning&quot; and &quot;personal sense&quot;.^^77^^ It does
not follow from the above that the access to another
subject's system of personal senses is absolutely closed to
me, and that I cannot to some &laquo;xtent assimilate his
characteristic mode of interpreting the system of general
meanings. Every real dialogue performs this task, enabling
one to see the world through the eyes of another person
and to allow the possibility of a standpoint different from
mine. As for the perception of the object from the same
angle of vision as it presents itself to another, it is enough
to take up the same spatial position which was earlier
occupied by another subject. It is a different matter that
absolute merging of the systems of personal senses of two
subjects is impossible, since they remain different.</p>

<p>     The situation is much more complicated, of course, in
trying to understand the behaviour and speech of the
carriers of a foreign language absolutely unknown to us. We
have touched on the existence of grammatical universals
common to different languages. But a great deal in the
grammatical structures of different languages is indeed
different, and this fact, though raised to an absolute by
Sapir, Whorf, and Quine, cannot be ignored. For instance,
there are three cases in Arabic, fifteen in Estonian, and
no declension in some languages at all. Systems of lexical
meanings vary particularly strongly from language to
language. If we recognise the community of different types
of objects assumed by different languages, we shall have to
consider the fact that the ways of grouping these objects
in classificatory systems (and it is the latter that are
expressed in the lexical units of the given language)
distinguish one language system from another and are
determined by the specific traits of that kind of practice which
is characteristic of the carriers of the given language. &quot;As
studies in most diverse languages have shown, the visible
spectrum is 'distributed' in different ways by different
languages. Let us consider the designation of colours:
'green', 'dark-blue', 'light-blue', 'grey', 'brown'. In Welsh,
three words correspond to this part of the colour
spectrum: <em>qwyrdd, glas</em>, and <em>elwyd</em>. The last word denotes that
part of the spectrum which is termed in English 'brown'
and 'grey' or, to be more precise, 'dark grey'. The word
<em>glas</em> covers the part named in English 'light-grey', 'blue',


and 'green'. The word <em>qwyrdd</em> also refers to that part
of the spectrum which we call 'green'... And in the
language of one of the Negro peoples living in Liberia, all
colours of the rainbow are designated by two words only:
one refers to the colours which painters call 'warm' (red,
orange, yellow, etc.), and the other, 'cold' (blue, violet,
etc.).&quot;^^78^^ Inasmuch as language is directly connected with
thought, not only serving as a means of expressing
cognitive structures evolved in object-related practical activity
before language but also creating for the first time the
possibility of the emergence of new cognitive structures,
it may be assumed that the difference between the
grammatical and lexical means indicates a difference in definite
cognitive schemes (although these differences do not
involve the principal schemes of reasoning expressed in
language universals). One may even go still further,
assuming that the difference in language structures
determines to some extent the difference in perception. It is,
for instance, possible that the Negro tribe living in Liberia
referred to above perceives colours in a different manner
from the carriers of modern European languages.</p>

<p>     To evaluate this line of reasoning, let us consider some
facts. A difference in the grammatical structure of two
given languages does not by itself predetermine the
possibilities of rendering certain senses with their aid. It is well
known, for instance, that the category of
determinationindetermination is very essential for Romance and
Germanic languages and is expressed in them grammatically,
through definite and indefinite articles. There is no system
of articles in Russian, but the category of
determinationindetermination can be expressed in this language too---by
lexical rather than grammatical means (through the
pronouns <em>etot, tot</em> in one case and <em>kakoy-to, nekotoriy</em> in
the other). Generally speaking, identical senses are
expressed in different ways in different languages: in some the
sense is expressed grammatically, in others, lexically (the
phenomenon of lexico-grammatical synonymy). The
vocabulary, being continually renovated, is the most
flexible and dynamic part of the language system, a kind of
complement to grammar. Inasmuch as there are no
essential obstacles to the development of the vocabulary, one
may keep introducing new senses and types of senses while
remaining within the framework of the given grammatical
structure, which is the most conservative part of the
language system. It would therefore be rash, to say the least,
to infer the characteristic world picture of a language and
the cognitive schemes specific for its carriers directly from
the grammatical structure, neglecting the study of lexical


systems. The study of actually existing natural languages
rather provides arguments in favour of recognising the
community of their semantic fields in their basic essential

<p>     As for the undoubtedly existing differences in
vocabulary, and consequently in certain classificatory and
semantic systems, their influence on the perception of the world
needs careful investigation. In any case one must bear in
mind that the main perceptive structures take shape
already before language is mastered. Therefore the absence
in the given language of words for certain objects and their
aspects does not necessarily mean that the latter are not
perceived at all. Indubitably, language also affects the
semantic characteristics of perception structures, although
the nature and extent of this influence have been quite
insufficiently studied.^^7^^~^^9^^</p>

<p>     Let us note, finally, that the social-historical changes
and the actually growing affinity between the cultures of
different regions necessarily lead to the addition of words
to the vocabulary of the given language which allow the
expression of new systems of meanings, which results in
the affinity of the semantic fields of different languages
thus growing.</p>

<p>     However, as long as differences between cultures and
the underlying types of practical activity continue to exist,
certain differences between the semantic fields of language
systems continue to exist, too. All of this creates actual
difficulties both for translation and for understanding.
True, these difficulties are not at all insurmountable, being
eliminated in the course of social progress and cultural
interaction. At certain stages in history, however, they still
exist and have to be taken into account.</p>

<p>     One-to-one translation from one language into another
is in general impossible. Separate elementary meanings of
one language often have no equivalents in another. But
combinations or systems of meanings of different
languages may on the whole correspond to each other. If the
languages are very dissimilar (owing to the difference in
cultures), translation of some meanings at a given stage of
social, cultural and language development is sometimes
simply impossible, but that does not mean that this
possibility cannot arise in the future. Thus the actual
difficulties of translation are quite different from those
outlined by Quine in his theory of the impossibility of radical
translation and, which is the main thing, they do not
warrant Quine's philosophical conclusions.</p>

<p>     Let us now imagine that we have to deal with a
reasonable being whose physical make-up, the modes of


obtaining and processing information from the surrounding
environment, and the type of interaction with the world
are essentially different from the human (extraterrestrials
are favourite characters in science fiction, as we know).
Assumedly, it will be extremely difficult to understand the
language of this being. It is this case, rather than what
we usually observe in ethnolinguistic studies, that is closest
to Quine's view of the situation of an anthropologist
studying the language of an unknown tribe. Yet even this
case does not fully answer Quine's interpretation. Assume
that the extraterrestrial's system of perception of the
world was formed under conditions essentially different
from terrestrial ones, that his environment did not include
solid bodies, that is to say, it was something like liquid or
gas. (Of course, this assumption is highly hypothetical if
not improbable. We temporarily accept it entirely as a
kind of &quot;mental experiment&quot;.) In this case, the
extraterrestrial will either have no means of perceiving the world
of objects with which we deal or will perceive these objects
in a specific manner different from ours. If we observe,
however, that our guest out of space fairly successfully
orients himself in our terrestrial world, we must conclude
that he perceives, in one way or another, our system of
objects. And if we consider as well that object dissection
of the world characterises definite systems of
dependences of reality itself, far from merely expressing the
properties of our language (and we tried to show the
necessity of exactly this interpretation of the facts), we
inevitably come to the conclusion that a reasonable being
different from ourselves perceives, under terrestrial
conditions, essentially the same types of objects as we do. This
conclusion may serve as the basis for the search for the
modes of understanding the language of extraterrestrials.
It also allows the assumption that we shall be able to
translate a certain part of this language, though this apparently
does not obtain with reference to the extraterrestrials'
language as a whole, for the modes of existence of the
Earth's inhabitants and of the guests from space differ too
greatly. Success is more likely if we deal with messages
containing scientific information: it is through science that
we acquire knowledge about real objects and their
dependences regardless of their being included in some form
or other in direct practical activity at the given historical
stage. It is not accidental that it is hoped to establish
communication with extraterrestrial civilisations (if they
exist! ) through transmitting scientific texts.</p>

<p>     We recall, however, that Thomas Kuhn believes that in
science itself the assertions about laws assume essentially


different senses in different paradigms, so that adherents
of such paradigms in science do not understand one
another. So, if the inhabitants of the Earth engaged in one
and the same undertaking---scientific study of the given
phenomenal domain, accepting a whole series of assertions
as true, and using the same apparatus, still do not fully
understand one another, according to Kuhn, how is
science to ensure understanding between ourselves and the
hypothetical reasonable inhabitants of remote worlds
differing from ours?</p>

<p>     Can we accept Kuhn's thesis about the
incommensurability of different paradigms?</p>

<p>     To answer this question, we shall have to do a certain
amount of analytical work.</p>

<p>     Let us start by stating that the existence, at different
stages of the development of science, of various ways of
semantic organisation of systems of knowledge
implemented in different paradigms appears quite likely. The
irreducibility of one paradigm to another is expressed not
only in that identical formulas are given different meanings
in them, as emphasised by Kuhn himself. Even if we ignore
the problem of semantic interpretation of assertions
expressed in symbolic form and forming scientific theories,
it is apparently impossible to perform the operation of
formal deduction of all propositions of one theory from
the propositions of that theory which came to replace it
and which, it would appear, must fully supplant the
previous one. (We have in mind here sufficiently global theories,
that is, close to what is termed paradigms by Kuhn.)
Reduction of one theory to another mostly proves impossible
not only on the content plane but also on the formal one.</p>

<p>     Mario Bunge shows that even thermodynamics is not
fully reducible to classical mechanics, although the relation
between these two theories is often cited in philosophical
literature as a striking example of reduction. &quot;In fact, no
rigorous derivation of the second principle of
thermodynamics is known: only the thermodynamics of the
ideal gas---a very special case---has so far been reduced to
molecular dynamics. As to rigid bodies, particle mechanics
cannot account for their existence, since the 'particles'
concerned are quantum-mechanical systems and they are
glued by fields, which are extraneous to particle
mechanics. Nor does quantum mechanics yield classical
mechanics in some limit: it retrieves only some formulas of
particle mechanics, none of continuum mechanics, which
is the bulk of classical mechanics. Finally, some relativistic
theories have no nonrelativistic limits while others have
more than one.&quot;^^80^^</p>


<p>     Does that mean that communities of scientists adhering
to different paradigms live in different worlds and cannot
adequately communicate?</p>

<p>     The fact itself of the existence of paradigms hardly
proves that the mode of vision of the world is entirely
restructured in their successive replacement. Of course, the
framework of what is observed in scientific experiment is
determined by the content of the theory adopted. But the
principal structures of perception, just as interpretation of
the world in terms of natural everyday language, take
shape at the pre-scientific level and hardly change to any
essential degree throughout successive scientific theories.
One may rather assume that many semantic systems
characteristic of pre-scientific knowledge constitute, in
a transformed shape, part of science essentially
determining its content aspects. The replacement of fundamental
scientific theories or paradigms thus takes place against
the background of definite constant strata of knowledge
implemented, at any rate, in the structures of perception
and in the propositions of the so-called common sense
expressed in ordinary language.</p>

<p>     Let us note further that in the actual practice of
scientific research theory is not, as a rule, applied directly to
experience but through the mediation of another (&quot;
interpretant&quot;) theory, as has been indicated above. The
replacement of one substantive theory by another does not,
as a rule, coincide with the replacement of interpretant
theories. Besides, as we have just noted, new theories never
fully oust out old ones. The actual multilevel structure of
scientific knowledge, the existence in it of a number of
systems (not a single one!) at each given stage, changing
in different ways and at different rates, and finally the
&quot;immersion&quot; of scientific theories in everyday pre--
scientific knowledge, allow actual comparison and assessment
of different paradigms in terms of external criteria, so that
the assertion of their incommensurability has no basis
at all.</p>

<p>     The existence of a common background for different
paradigms makes it possible to apply common measuring
rods or standards to them. That does not mean that they
are mutually fully translatable, since that would imply
the existence of common referent systems and common
meanings. But paradigms are characterised precisely by
different contents, by giving different interpretations to
identical formulas and sometimes even by different
referents. Even if we assume that there is no complete semantic
break between paradigms but merely a certain difference
(we shall touch on this point somewhat later), complete


mutual translatability of different paradigms is impossible.
Under criticism, Kuhn gave a less rigid formulation of the
thesis about that draws a parallel between paradigms and
&quot;alternative worlds&quot;, asserting in the &quot;Postscript-1969&quot;
that, although different paradigms are mutually
translatable, they are still incommensurable.^^81^^ In actual fact, the
reverse is true, as we have tried to show: paradigms are
commensurable but not mutually translatable.</p>

<p>     Recently, specialists in Scientology have been greatly
interested in the so-called thematic analysis of scientific
theories, that is, the study of those content components
of theoretical constructions which are passed on from one
stage in the history of scientific thought to another,
linking up different paradigms and ensuring continuity of
development of scientific cognition. For example, the
concept of force has certain characteristics invariant both
with regard to the Aristotelian and Newtonian paradigms.
The theme of conservation (of matter, motion, electricity,
etc.) is passed on from one paradigm to the next. Some
themes, accompanying scientific thought from its
inception, are grouped in relations of antithetical couples:
atomism vs continualism, holism vs reductionism, etc.^^82^^ The
existence of such common themes would be clearly
impossible if different paradigms indeed implemented &quot;
alternative worlds&quot;.</p>

<p>     The emergence of a new paradigm certainly changes the
semantic interpretation of a number of scientific
concepts. However, this change should hardly be understood
as complete replacement of the old meaning. If we
recognise the existence of common themes in the history of
cognition, this kind of replacement is apparently
impossible. Besides, the changes obviously do not involve all
concepts. In general, it is not any appearance of a given
concept in a new context that entails the replacement
of one meaning by another or others, otherwise we would
be unable to communicate and to understand one another,
since language involves, among other things, generation of
utterances which cannot have been made previously. In the
theory of relativity, the interpretation of mass differs in
several important points from that of classical mechanics.
It does not follow, however, that two paradigms using one
and the same word operate with different concepts, as
Kuhn asserts. The systems of objects to which these
paradigms refer are sometimes common for the two.</p>

<p>     Finally, we must not forget that a new paradigm may
only be adopted if, apart from everything else, it
explains why the paradigm that is replaced could
function successfully, until a certain moment, in a domain


that is common to both.</p>

<p>     This explanation is only possible if there exists a
meaningful interpretation of the old paradigm, which is ensured
by the fact that some sense units and separate senses of
the old paradigm are immersed or form part of the new
content structure expressing the new paradigm. Kuhn's
error stems from his failure to distinguish between
paradigm as an integral structure and the separate semantic
systems that form part of it. In his view, destruction of a
paradigm is tantamount to completely discarding all
systems of old meanings. In reality, it is the comprehensive
incorporation of the semantic systems of one paradigm
in the integral structure constituted by the new paradigm
that makes mutual understanding and real communication
between their representatives possible at an inter--
paradigmal level. Importantly, not all the systems of meanings
which are ascribed to identical terms and formulas
coincide: that is excluded since different paradigms cannot be
fully translatable into each other's languages. It is
sufficient for inter-paradigmal understanding and
communication that meanings forming part of different paradigms
should coincide in certain essential components. The
existence of a common constant background of knowledge
allows the comparison of different paradigms and a choice
between them.</p>

<p>     Therefore a scientist studying the history of physics can
understand not only the Newtonian but also Aristotelian
paradigm. To do that, it is not at all required to forget the
theory of relativity and quantum mechanics and, through
a kind of mystic empathy, to grasp precisely the same
meaning of all the concepts in these paradigms as was
attributed to them in times long gone. On the contrary,
it is in the light of modern scientific theories that the
historian can see that content in the old paradigms of which
their carriers themselves were not aware (e.g., to establish
the fact that Newton did not distinguish between
inertial and gravitational masses). The psychologist studying
the stages of the formation of perceptive structures
undoubtedly cannot see the world in the way a small child
sees it. The researcher does not only describe the child's
external behaviour but also surmises how the world looks
to the child. The psychologist has the right to formulate
these surmises (and they are of considerable significance
to him) because the child's perceptual structures,
different as they are from the corresponding structures of
an adult, are not discarded in psychical development but,
after restructuring, become components of mature
perception structures. The psychiatrist' in an interview with


a mental patient attempts to reconstruct his subjective
world from the latter's behaviour and speech. The success
of these attempts does not at all mean that the doctor
must in some way assume a condition similar to that of
the patient. That is impossible as long as the doctor
remains a sane person, and as soon as he ceases to be one,
he can no longer be a doctor. The point is that the
difference between a sane person and one with abnormal
mentality does not exclude the existence of common
psychical structures and functions in the two. Here the
doctor apparently understands the patient better than the
patient the doctor, and then the doctor understands
himself better than the patient understands himself.</p>

<p>     Thus, the problem of continuity of cognitive
experiences proved to be more complicated than Kant once
believed. In the course of the development of cognition
conceptual structures emerge which cannot be reduced to
each other, and that means that that process really
includes semantic gaps.</p>

<p>     Even ordinary natural languages express systems of
meaning somehow differing from one another. Therefore,
there is no unambiguously determined translatability in
this case either. On the whole,, however, translation from
one natural language into another is fully realisable, and
it is all the easier the closer the cultures of the carriers of
these languages. The explanation lies in the basic
community of the conditions of life and practical activity of
communities employing ordinary national languages. As
for the relations of different theories emerging in the
development of scientific knowledge, the situation here
is quite different. A new scientific theory, and, still more
so, a fundamentally novel paradigm emerge precisely
because they carry substantively different content
inexpressible in terms of old conceptual instruments.
Naturally there can be no complete translatability in this case. As
we have seen, it is even absent where special attempts are
made to express one theory in the language of another to
attain greater precision in expressing the content of the
former (e.g., in putting the theory of arithmetic in the
language of set theory).</p>

<p>     At the same time there are relations of continuity and
cohesion of definite meanings between different theories
and paradigms, a general background of knowledge, so that
paradigms cannot be equated with absolutely different
&quot;alternative worlds&quot;. Being mutually intranslatable,
different paradigms are nevertheless commensurable.</p>

<p>     The problem of continuity and alterations in the
meanings of concepts in the course of the development of


science has so far been but little studied. However, the
understanding of the meaningful side of scientific
theoretical knowledge largely depends precisely on the solution
of this problem. It should be recognised that, although
there are certain gaps in the development of the
conceptual systems of science, they can hardly exist in
perception structures---at least in adults. True, if we should
believe, as Sartre does, that a cognitive orientation does not
underlie experience, and that the latter is not marked by
the division into subject and object, we shall have to
admit that there are complete gaps not only between the
experiences of any two subjects but also in the experience
of each of them. The subject continually manifests
himself in unique situations, Sartre believes, and separate
situations have nothing in common. The subject, too,
is each time unlike himself. This interpretation can only be
accepted if one agrees with Sartre's general philosophical
and epistemological conception. We showed its
untenability in the second chapter of Part One of the present work.
Abstractly speaking, certain perception structures (though
by far not all!) could, of course, change if the type of
man's object environment should radically change, or the
type of his practice, or the set of sensory modalities
inherent in his perceptual system. In this case gaps could
appear in the structures of direct experience. We may
recall that Gregory admits the theoretical possibility of
man creating a supercomplex artificial environment that
will demand the formation of new ways of perceiving
objects. If man does not solve this task, he will be unable
to see. And if he solves it successfully, gaps will emerge
between old and new experience.</p>

<p>     As for the results of changing the set of modalities,
they can be assessed by the results of actual successful
operations of removing cataracts owing to which men begin
to see. The perception of the world in such individuals is
originally formed on the basis of the tactile sense. At the
same time, an amodal objective scheme of the world was
built in the system of perception of the formerly blind
person. The blind man is confidently and correctly
oriented in the system of objects, but the appearance of a new
(visual) modality disrupts the well-formed system of
orientation: the formerly blind person cannot at first
correlate the visual information with the tactile perceptive
images he has, and the earlier developed modes of tactile
orientation cannot function as successfully as before.
Only gradually new perceptive structures are developed
which link up visual and tactile information. Apparently
there is a gap (though not complete here either) between


old and new experience. The amodal objective scheme of
the world -remains constant, and the new experience
structure is formed on its basis.</p>

<p>     The development of cognition is thus characterised by
extension and deepening of the content of knowledge, the
emergence of new semantic systems and the singling out
of new types of objects. In this process, the
characteristics of objective reality itself existing independently of
cognition and consciousness are reflected and reproduced
in more and more precise and differentiated ways; that is
to say, objectively true knowledge is produced. As we see,
the complex dialectical interrelations between
discreteness and continuity in the development of cognition are
one of the modes of concrete expression of the dialectics
of absolute, relative, and objective truth, a classical
philosophical analysis of which was given by Lenin.^^83^^</p>


<p>     We have noted earlier that most kinds of knowledge are,
in one way or another, objectified and consolidated in a
system of specific mediator objects---implements,
instruments, symbols of oral and written language, scientific
texts, schemes, diagrams, drawings, etc. There are also
kinds of knowledge that exist in a subjective and not
objectified form, such as perception. But, as we have
tried to show, they are also genetically and functionally
mediated by the man-made world of artificial objects
embodying social-historical experience. Qualitative changes
in the content of systems of knowledge are not necessarily
expressed in the successive replacement of the means of
their objectification: as a rule, that is exactly what does
not happen.</p>

<p>     Reading a text (if &quot;text&quot; is taken to mean any mode of
objectification of knowledge, and &quot;reading&quot;---any form of
its interpretation by the subject) always implies
differentiation between the semantic content embodied in it
and those specific traits of the material of implementation
which do not have the function of differentiating meaning.
In practice, this differentiation is usually subconscious, so
that what is directly given to the subject is the semantic
content of knowledge, that is, what the text says about the
real objects themselves. Modern linguistics draws a clear
distinction between the value of a language unit and the
material of which it is built. The material of different units


may vary while their values expressed in interrelations are
constant. When a person hears someone's speech (and this
case may be included in reading a text in the broad sense
accepted here), only the content rendered by that speech
is given to consciousness and not the way sounds are
pronounced or the separate sounds themselves. (That is, on
condition, of course, that all the existing variations in
pronunciation do not go beyond the limits where the
meaning will be distorted.) In reading a printed text, I
do not notice separate letters, the kind of paper on which
the text is printed, I can miss a misprint, for consciousness
is at that moment directed at reproduction of semantic
connections. If my task is searching for misprints, however,
the perception of the given text is quite different: working
as proof-reader, I cannot grasp the meaning of the
semantic phrases reified in the text. Basically the same thing
happens on decoding any semantic content objectified
in some form or other. For example, if I perceive a work
of art, I do not see the canvas or the paint spots but the
content expressed with their help. Even &quot;reading&quot;
photographs, which at times appear as good as &quot;natural replicas&quot;
of the real objects, is only possible if one ignores the
quality of paper, the fact that the picture exists in two
dimensions, unlike the three-dimensional real objects, and
that the objects in the picture are motionless while in the
world of real objects all kinds of changes continually take
place, etc.</p>

<p>     Singling out the properties which have the function of
sense differentiation in the means of objectification of
knowledge, and distinguishing them from the
characteristics indifferent to meaning, are not determined by any
physical properties of these objects directly given in their
bodily form. This singling out is entirely determined by
the culture in which the given objects function. If one has
not assimilated this culture and has not mastered the
modes of communication accepted in it, one is incapable
of expressing the semantic content objectified in the
mediator objects. Speech in an unfamiliar language is
perceived as a jumble of sounds, a scientific text in which
unknown terms and systems of symbols are used appears
as an agglomeration of incomprehensible signs, etc. Even
works of art and sculpture that are aimed at presenting
reality in the form in which it is ordinarily perceived, can
be correctly &quot;read&quot; only if we have mastered the language
of art, that is, in particular, if we take into account the
specificity of the given style, the modes of presentation
accepted in it, etc.</p>

<p>     However, the fact that the physical properties of the


mediator objects do not directly determine the functional
role they play as instruments of objectification of
knowledge, does not at all mean that the former are completely
indifferent to the latter. They are independent of each
other only within certain limits. The need for expressing
basically new cognitive content may in some cases produce
the requirement for other types of mediator objects,
those whose physical properties would be more adequate
to the solution of the given task. These mediators make it
possible to express in knowledge a new system of objective
meanings,of such aspects of the real world which it would
be hard to grasp and express in terms of the existing
means. The discovery of new types of mediators
signifies the rising of cognition to a new content level. Of this
nature is, for instance, the transition from gesture language
directly linked with object-related activity to sound
language, or the transition from oral to written speech.^^84^^
(Written speech creates new possibilities for reconstructing
the object in its entirety. The development of science is
obviously impossible without writing.)</p>

<p>     Absolutely identical content cannot be rendered in
terms of different types of objectification of knowledge.
We have already noted that verbal formulation of the
content of perception introduces something new in
knowledge. This kind of alteration of content happens even
where there is apparently nothing but mere copying. If
an artist paints from life, he is compelled to take into
account the properties of the material in which he
embodies his work, the specific properties of paints (which
are always different from the colour characteristics of the
real world), and the modes of artificially creating an
impression which would recall in some important aspects
the impression in ordinary perception (which is an
important condition of realistic art) and at the same time
essentially deepen the latter. Ordinary perception and a
work of art represent two different systems of content
rendering. The content itself cannot therefore be
absolutely identical. The potential of painting is not
indifferent to the specific features of the material which is
used in it as a means of content objectification. The
history of this art is among other things also the history
of experimenting with the material itself for establishing
its representational potential, it is a search for the modes
of reflection which are not directly prompted by mere
perception of the object painted. A person that cannot
draw cannot represent a familiar object on paper. The
ability itself is not attained through spontaneous
development but through learning in which cultural-historical


experience is transmitted. The latter varies in different
cultural Tegions and at different stages of the artistic and
cognitive development of mankind. The possibility of
&quot;drawing from nature&quot; thus assumes that the subject is
included in a specific, system of mediator objects, that is,
he can operate with them according to definite rules. It
is therefore extremely difficult to draw an object for
which no modes of representation have been worked out
in the give^cultural tradition. E. H. Gombrich
convincingly illustrates this point citing a mass of data from the
history of art.^^85^^</p>

<p>     Thus, the emergence of new systems of mediator objects
also marks the appearance of new cognitive possibilities,
of other worlds, in a sense. In this case, too, however,
there is no complete disruption of continuity of cognitive
experience, there are no alternative worlds absolutely
excluding one another and mutually impermeable: it is
rather a matter of enriching experience with qualitatively
new content expressing previously unknown aspects of
objective reality.</p>


<b>Chapter 4</b>



<p>     According to Kant, the continuity and unity of
experience are conditioned by the transcendental unity of
apperception, that is, the unity of the Transcendental
Subject himself. Kant believes that the proposition &quot;I
think&quot; is the supreme foundation of knowledge. In
critically analysing the German philosopher's conception, we
have pointed out that the actual dependence is of a
different kind. It is true that the knowledge of external objects
assumes self-consciousness,but the latter in its turn assumes
the former. Both knowledge and self-consciousness are
ultimately conditioned by the subject's practical
object-related activity in the world of real objects, an activity
that is social in its very nature, including as it does the
relation of the given subject to others.</p>

<p>     Thus Kant erroneously interpreted the actual facts of
cognition. Still, we have to admit that self-consciousness
indeed plays a special role in the acquisition of knowledge.
This fact merits a more careful analysis.</p>

<p>     Let us note, first of all, that self-consciousness is always
knowledge of a special kind.</p>

<p>     True, Kant draws a basic distinction between knowledge
and self-consciousness, emphasising that the Transcendental
Subject can only be consciously realised but it cannot be
the object of knowledge. It is the attempt to think of this
Subject as an object of experience that leads to one of the
antinomies of pure reason, Kant believes. Sartre also
separates consciousness and knowledge as a matter of
principle, pointing out that consciousness does not necessarily
deal with the world of objects, whereas knowledge
obligatorily implies an object to which it refers. The world that
is external with regard to consciousness, different and
independent from it (the world in itself) does not initially
appear as a world of objects, according to Sartre, and is
not therefore an object of knowledge. Consciousness is


not reflective in its very nature and therefore does not
initially know itself, let alone the world of external objects.
However, it immediately realises itself as different from
the world in itself (therefore Sartre names consciousness
&quot;Being For-Itself&quot;). In this way the philosopher separates
self-consciousness and knowledge of self (reflexion).</p>

<p>     Let us note that both Kant and Sartre believe that under
ordinary conditions there exists a relation of the subject to
himself which appears as knowledge of himself. It is a
different matter that, according to these philosophers, the
individual empirical subject's exponentially given
knowledge of self is not the same as grasping the true deep
nature of this subject (the latter appears as the
Transcendental Subject, according to Kant, and as &quot;pure&quot;
consciousness, Being For-Itself, according to Sartre).</p>

<p>     Inasmuch as we begin our analysis with the study of
individual empirical subjects and their mutual relations,
the statement that a certain kind of knowledge is given in
ordinary self-consciousness can hardly raise any
objections. Later we shall also try to explain the facts
interpreted by Kant and Sartre as a fundamental difference between
consciousness (self-consciousness) and knowledge. We
have noted the very important circumstance, recorded in
modern psychology, that the objective amodal scheme of
the world underlying all types and kinds of perception also
assumes the incorporation of a scheme of the subject's
body in it. The knowledge of the position of one's body in the
objective network of spatio-temporal connections, the
knowledge of the difference between the objective changes
in the real world and the succession of the subjective states
of consciousness, the knowledge of the connection
between the perspectives of experience and the objective
position of the subject's body---all of these varied kinds
of knowledge are included in a compressed form in an
elementary act of consciousness, the act which is indeed
assumed by any cognitive process.^^86^^ Without self--
consciousness, the subject cannot determine the objective state of
affairs in the world. In the specific and supreme form of
reflection termed cognition, the subject does not simply
know something---he also realises that he knows it, that is,
he always stands in a certain relation to knowledge and
himself. If that were not so, cognition could not exist.
As Marx stated: &quot;The animal is immediately one with its
life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is
<em>its life activity</em>. Man makes his life activity itself the
object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious
life activity. It is not a determination with which he
directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man


immediately from animal life activity.&quot;^^87^^</p>

<p>     Since all this is quite true, a situation emerges which
appears quite paradoxical and even impossible. Indeed, if
I cognize some object, can I simultaneously also cognize
my cognizing self and the act of my cognition? Does not
accepting the thesis that knowledge of an object also
assumes knowledge of the cognizing subject and the act of
his cognition lead to an insoluble logical paradox? Is not
the latter similar to the paradoxes which arise when an
utterance has itself for a referent? (These paradoxes, along
with some others, were discovered early in this century in
set theory and stimulated intense studies in the
foundations of mathematics.) Consider these facts. My eyes can
see everything that surrounds me. They also see certain
parts of my own body. They see other subjects looking at
certain objects. But my eyes cannot in principle see
themselves and the process of their vision. (It can be objected
that the eyes see themselves in the mirror. But what we see
in the mirror is not the eyes themselves but only their
reflection. Of course, the reflection in the mirror has a
likeness to my eyes, and I can imagine with the aid of the
mirror the way I myself, my face and my eyes look to an
external observer. However, when I look in the mirror, it is
not my eyes that are the object of my experience but only
their physical reflection on the surface of a certain body.
The fact that this reflection resembles the picture my eyes
present to a stranger is not at all evident and not known
at the early stages of the development of the psyche.)</p>

<p>     Keith Gunderson, a modern American philosopher,
points out that the cognizing subject cannot be the object
of his own experience, an object of his knowledge.
Experience is directed at the world of external objects. I can
know the states and relations of physical objects. I also
know other individuals, both at the level of everyday
knowledge and through special scientific inquiry (e.g.,
physiology, psychology, sociology, etc.). In his turn,
another subject may study me, and in this case I shall be
the object of this other subject. But I cannot know myself,
the subject, as an object of my own experience. Otherwise,
Gunderson believes, we would get lost in an insoluble
paradox similar to the paradoxes of set theory. It has to be
recognised, states the American philosopher, that the
subject himself, the carrier and generator of knowledge,
drops out of the domain to which his knowledge refers.
There is nothing surprising about it, he continues, since
this fact is characteristic not only of man but in general of
all systems, including artificially constructed technical
mechanisms, which have to do with receiving information


from the environment. Any such system gathers
information about objects different from the system itself, but it
cannot obtain information concerning the process itself of
gathering information. Periscope lenses reflect everything
that happens around, but they cannot reflect

<p>     We may agree with Gunderson that the situation where
cognition of the world of objects also implies the subject's
cognition of himself and the process of such cognition
indeed appears rather paradoxical.^^89^^ At the same time,
we cannot discard the real and basic fact of human
cognition really involving self-consciousness. The examples
cited by the American philosopher do not contradict that
fact. The point is that artificial mechanisms gathering
information do not implement the process of cognition,
they do not have self-consciousness or consciously realise
the world of objects. The information gathered by these
mechanisms only becomes a fact of cognition when it is
assimilated by man. A submarine's periscope by itself does
not see anything: the man using it does. Man's perception
of the external world presupposes an elementary act of
self-consciousness, otherwise it will not see anything even
with the aid of a periscope (self-consciousness thus
pertains to the man using the periscope rather than the
periscope itself).</p>

<p>     What is the way out of this paradox? Let us describe
the solution in the briefest outline, with the intention of
later recurring to this problem. The point here is that
although self-consciousness is knowledge, it is knowledge
of a special kind. So far we have assumed that knowledge
presents to the subject the world of objects that are
realised as such. This is true both of perception, which is a
kind of knowledge associated with the individual subject,
and of scientific theories, which are objectified forms of
knowledge. However, the object of self-consciousness is
not given to it (self-consciousness should not be confused
with reflexion). When I perceive a group of objects, I
realise at the same time the difference between my
consciousness and these objects, I realise the spatio-temporal
position of my body, etc. But all these facts of
consciousness are in the background or on the periphery and not in
the focus of consciousness. Directly, my consciousness is
aimed at external objects that are the object of knowledge.
My body, my consciousness, my cognitive process do not
in this case form part of the objects of experience and
knowledge. Thus knowledge of self implied by any
experience and expressed in the form of self-consciousness is
knowledge of a special kind. It might be somewhat



tentatively called &quot;implicit knowledge&quot;, as distinct from
explicit knowledge with which we are usually concerned. The
goal of the cognitive process is acquisition of explicit
knowledge. Implicit knowledge acts as a tool or method of
acquiring explicit knowledge.</p>

<p>     When I touch a thing with my hand, I feel the object
itself and not my hand. The tactile sense speaks of the
external object and not of myself. Only in the background
of my consciousness do I realise the act of touching,
localising the action of the object on myself at my fingertips.
If I touch the object with a stick, not with my hand, the
tactile impression is again connected with the object
itself, not with the tool I use (the stick). The latter is no
longer in the focus of consciousness but on its periphery,
and is experienced as a direct continuation of my body.
In this case, the sensation of the action of the object (we
have already pointed out that this is not the same as the
tactile image of objects) is experienced as localised at the
end of the stick and not at my fingertips.</p>

<br /> OF KNOWLEDGE</b>

<p>     Many philosophers argued that, inasmuch as a most
important and probably the only task of epistemological
analysis is substantiation of knowledge, it should
obviously single out and dissect all premises of knowledge,
including those connected with self-consciousness.
Epistemological research must explicate what is implicit, thus
implementing absolute reflexion.</p>

<p>     We may recall that one of the solutions to the problem
offered in the past consisted in the assertion that the
reflexive relation of &quot;I&quot; to itself constitutes the supreme
foundation of any knowledge. The proposition formulating
this reflexive relation was taken to be absolutely
indubitable and irrefutable. The epistemological reflexion about
knowledge was interpreted as reflexion of &quot;I&quot; about

<p>     We have endeavoured to show the <em>cul-de-sacs</em> and the
insoluble difficulties to which the acceptance of this
orientation in epistemology leads. In particular, we have tried to
show that any knowledge, and in the first place the
knowledge of the world of external objects, though it assumes
the subject's self-consciousness, cannot as a matter of
principle be reduced to the subject's reflexion about himself.
And insofar as knowledge about external objects can
never be absolutely unquestionable (such as not to allow


any further specifications and corrections), however
reliable it may be in practice, natural doubts arise about
the need for searching for absolute principles and
absolutely indisputable foundations of knowledge.</p>

<p>     These doubts are redoubled as we take into account the
experiences of modern science in substantiating certain
special kinds of scientific knowledge. We have already
noted, for instance, the impossibility of completely reducing
arithmetic to set theory or of one physical theory to
another, as well as the impossibility of reducing theoretical
knowledge to a set of protocol utterances, propositions
about &quot;sense data&quot; or laboratory operations. Different
structures of knowledge are linked in ways other than
reduction. This circumstance has to be taken into account
in substantiating knowledge.</p>

<p>     The question remains, however: to what extent is
absolute completeness of reflexion possible? To what
degree can the premises of knowledge be singled out,
elucidated, and dissected?</p>

<p>     In attempting to answer this question, let us recall
Quine's arguments about the problem of radical
translation. Quine points out that the language in which we speak
is given to us in a different manner than a strange language
which we study. With regard to the latter, we consider the
relation of its expressions to the real objects and actual
situation, that is to say, we reflect about this language. As
for our own language, it directly presents to us the picture
of the world and not its own structure. We know our own
language in the sense that we can use it for rendering some
objective content. But that is not explicit knowledge. The
language is inseparable for us from that objective
knowledge which we obtain with its help, so that we do not even
notice it, as it were: it is in the background of
consciousness. (That does not rule out the possibility of reflexion
about our own language, but we have to split our language
into two in this case. One of them will be the object
language, the one that is studied, that is, it will play a
different role than before, functioning as an ensemble of
theoretical hypotheses, idealisations, etc., rather than as
implicit knowledge naturally given to consciousness. The second
language, used as a tool for studying the first, retains the
properties of implicit knowledge.) Assume that we study
the structure of the theory of arithmetic trying to
establish its ontology, thus performing an act of theoretical
reflexion about this conceptual system. In this case, we
use set theory as an instrument of reflexion. In the
context of this study, set theory is not an object of reflexion
and is accepted as something familiar and clear. The


reverse task is also possible: translation of the propositions
of set theory into the language of the theory of arithmetic.
Here set theory itself will be the object of reflexion and
the theory of arithmetic will be accepted as something not
subject to reflexion in the given context.</p>

<p>     In studying the history of various proofs of the
stereometrical theorem concerning the correlation of the
numbers of sides, apices.and faces of a polyhedron, Imre
Lakatos showed that finding the weak points of arguments,
that is, increasing their rigour, always assumes the
existence of &quot;foundational&quot; knowledge. The latter serves as
an instrument of analysis itself, that is,a mode of reflexion
about proofs, taken as an intuitively clear and unreflected
guarantee of rigour. &quot;By each 'revolution of rigour'
proofanalysis penetrated deeper into the proofs down to the
<em>foundational layer</em> of 'familiar background knowledge' ...
where crystal-clear intuition ... reigned supreme and
criticism was banned.&quot;^^90^^ At the same time reflexion about the
&quot;foundational layer&quot;, i.e., knowledge assumed to be
immediately clear (implicit knowledge, in our terminology)
reveals the problematic character and even falsity of a
whole series of its components.^^91^^ &quot;The amount of
assumed familiarity decreases as criticism turns
background knowledge into knowledge.&quot;^^92^^</p>

<p>     Reflexion about the &quot;foundational layer&quot; assumes
adopting some other type of knowledge as not subject to
reflexion in the given context of the means of analysis.</p>

<p>     Thus even in such a science as mathematics, where the
problem of substantiating knowledge figures prominently,
and reflexion about the existing systems of knowledge
plays an enormous role, every procedure of reflective
analysis implies a framework of implicit &quot;foundational&quot;
knowledge that is not reflected upon in the given context.
Implicit knowledge plays a much more important role in
factual sciences, that is, in the disciplines dealing with
explanation of empirical facts. In these sciences, research
activity is, as a rule, aimed at the world of real external
objects rather than at the theory itself. The elaboration
and development of a theoretical system and its
application to empirical data (the two are usually inseparable)
are perceived by the researcher as establishment of the
objective connections of reality itself.</p>

<p>     The theoretical conceptual system is not in this case
considered separately from the knowledge about real
objects formulated in its terms. In such disciplines,
theories are usually left unformalised and often unaxiomatised.
The rules for processing empirical data, the norms and
standards of discourse, and the modes of selecting


significant problems are not formulated explicitly but are
specified along with the basic paradigmal content premises
of the theory, i.e., as implicit knowledge. Michael Polanyi
and Thomas Kuhn, modern specialists in the history and
theory of science, pointed out the importance of implicit
knowledge (&quot;tacit knowledge&quot; in their terminology) for
the development of natural science.^^93^^ That does not mean
that theoretical reflexion plays no role in the development
of natural scientific knowledge (although the theoreticians
mentioned here are inclined to belittle this role in every
way, distorting the actual state of affairs).</p>

<p>     The property of reflexion indicated here (the
dialectical connection between reflected and unreflected
knowledge) is fully manifested with regard to those kinds of
knowledge which exist in unobjectified form, i.e., belong
to the individual subject (perception, recall, etc.), and also
with regard to individual consciousness itself. As we have
stressed, each act of individual cognition assumes self--
consciousness, that is, implicit knowledge of the subject about
himself. One may try to transform this implicit knowledge
into explicit one, that is, to translate self-consciousness
into reflexion. In this case, the subject analyses his own
mental experiences, observing the flow of his psychical
life, endeavouring to find out the nature of his &quot;I&quot;, etc.
It appears that in this act of reflexion, &quot;I&quot; simply merges
with itself. In actual fact that is not so. Every act of
reflexion is an act of conscious realisation or understanding.
The latter always assumes definite means of understanding,
a kind of framework of semantic connections. Outside
this framework, reflexion is impossible. At the same time,
the semantic framework presupposed by the act of
reflexion is not subject to reflexion in the act itself; &quot;dropping
out&quot; of it, it is taken as an instrument of such an act,
that is, as implicit knowledge. The dissection of the flow
of psychical life and meaningful definiteness of the images
coming to the surface of consciousness, the spatio--
temporal reference of memories---all of this is given to
consciousness in the act of individual reflexion. However, the modes
themselves of semantic formation of this givenness are not
reflected upon. Therefore, the question does not arise in
subjective reflexion about the basic possibility of other
semantic characteristics of psychical life, that is, of the
possibility of the content and structure of psychical life
other than that which is given in self-observation. &quot;I&quot;
itself also drops out of the act of reflexion, at least
partially, for if it makes itself the object of its reflexion, it must
also perform this as the subject. And that means that &quot;I&quot;
as the subject of reflexion is not reflected upon as long as


we remain within the framework of individual

<p>     This circumstance served as the basis for Kant's and
Sartre's view that the true nature of the subject cannot be the
object of knowledge or reflexion, being given to non--
reflecting consciousness only. Ludwig Wittgenstein follows a
similar pattern of argument: &quot;5.631. The thinking,
presenting subject; there is no such thing. If I wrote a book <em>The
World as I Found It</em>, I should also have therein to report
on my body and say which members obey my will and
which do not, etc. This then would be a method of
isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important
sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this
book mention could <em>not</em> be made. 5.632. The subject does
ndt belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.
5.633. <em>Where in</em> the world is a metaphysical subject to be
noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the
eye and the field of sight. But you do <em>not</em> really see the
eye. And from nothing in <em>the field of sight</em> can it be
concluded that it is seen from an eye... 5.641. ...The
philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human
soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical
subject, the limit---not a part of the world.&quot;^^94^^ The English
philosopher Gilbert Ryle believes that the &quot;systematic
elusiveness of &quot;I&quot; in the course of reflexive analysis indicates
the fictitious nature of the object of reflexion itself, i.e.,
of &quot;I &quot;as a specific structure irreducible to the physical,
bodily characteristics of man.^^95^^</p>

<p>     Does all of this mean that unreflected implicit
knowledge cannot in general be regarded as an object of
reflexion being doomed to remain forever on the periphery of
consciousness, unamenable to analysis in principle? Not at
all. The instrument of reflexion, that is, its semantic
framework; can itself become the object of reflexive analysis,
but for this purpose it must be interpreted in another
semantic framework which will not be reflected upon in
the new context. Implicit knowledge should not be
understood as something irrational or as an arbitrary assumption
unrelated to reality. In actual fact, this kind of knowledge
always reflects, with a definite degree of precision,
objective dependences, and in many cases practical and
cognitive activity does not need special analysis of at least some
of the cognitive premises on which they are constructed.
There are situations, however, when this kind of analysis
proves a necessity. As we have noted, such a situation
exists, e.g., in the study of the foundations of

<p>     Let us consider the following very important point.


Where implicit knowledge becomes explicit, thus
becoming the object of reflexion, it undergoes certain changes.
Theoretical reflexion about a system of objectified
knowledge means its dissection, formulation of a number
of assumptions and idealisations and at the same time
(which is particularly essential) specification of the
knowledge itself, rejection of certain implicitly accepted premises
(the procedure of reflexion is prompted exactly by the
need for revising some premises of knowledge). What
previously appeared clear, intuitively understandable and
simple, proves to be complicated enough as a result of
reflexion, and often problematic, sometimes even simply
erroneous. The result of reflexion is not therefore some
simple and self-obvious truths or a set of absolutely
indisputable assertions forming an &quot;absolute foundation&quot;
of the system of knowledge to which different kinds of
knowledge can be reduced in one way or another. The
result of reflexion is a theoretical system which is a relatively
genuine reflexion of some real dependences in a definite
context and which at the same time implies a whole series
of assumptions, a certain implicit knowledge as a premise.</p>

<p>     Reflexion thus takes one beyond the framework of the
existing system of knowledge, generating new knowledge,
both explicit and implicit. What originally seemed (e.g., in
mathematics) a purely substantiating procedure, is in
reality a mode of development of the content of knowledge
itself and one of the important ways of theoretical
development. This procedure results in increasingly more
precise reflection of the objective dependences of reality and
exact reproduction of the structure and content of the
scientific theories themselves. A study whose immediate
goal was merely increasing the rigour of an argument
generated in fact greater theoretical content in the given
scientific field. Summing up his investigation of the
history of proofs of the stereometrical theorem, Imre Lakatos
writes: &quot; 'Certainty' is never achieved (the reference here
is to metaphysical absolute certainty.---<em>V.L.</em>), '
foundations' are never found---but the 'cunning of reason' turns
each increase in <em>rigour</em> into an increase in <em>content</em>, in the
scope of mathematics.&quot;~^^96^^</p>

<p>     As for the factual sciences, the links between the
procedure of substantiating knowledge and the development
of theoretical content are here even more explicit. We have
noted already that in these sciences the problem of
substantiation does not usually figure as an independent one.
To the extent in which the existing system of theoretical
notions allows the solution of scientific problems arising
in this system, permitting at the same time definite


practical applications, this system is regarded as sufficiently
well founded. The emergence of a substantively novel
theoretical system and adoption of new paradigmal research
premises reveal that the conviction of the adequacy of
the old paradigm's foundations was not quite justified.
The new paradigm is not adopted through analysing the
structure of theoretical knowledge within the framework
of theoretical reflexion about science but in studying the
real objects themselves, that is, it is accepted as a tool for
a more adequate theoretical reproduction of the real
dependences. At the same time, the adoption of a new
paradigm implies a procedure for correlating it with an old
paradigm. The latter figures in this case as an object of
reflexion. Its postulates, concepts, and semantic
connections are reconstructed and compared with the real objects
and actual connections with the aim of retaining all that
has objective real content in the old paradigm, and of
eliminating everything that has no such content, that is,
proves to be fictitious. Here, the new paradigm functions
as an instrument for presenting the real objects and
dependences. Thus, theoretical reflexion acts as an important
element of transition from one paradigm to another
(though Polanyi and Kuhn reject this), albeit it does not
exhaust the content of the transition. This reflexion
essentially means reconstruction' of and inquiry into the
old paradigm in the light and by means of the new one.
Thus the theory of relativity allowed a clarification of the
latent premises of classical mechanics which were not
(and could not be) clear to its creators themselves. Galileo,
in his turn, had to subject the system of premises and
assumptions of Aristotelian physics to theoretical reflexion
in laying the foundations of classical mechanics. But he
could only solve this task successfully insofar as he went
beyond the framework of the conceptual system of
Aristotelian physics. Theoretical reflexion is the result
of going beyond the limits of a given conceptual system
and at the same time the means of such a step. As we see,
in any case it proves to be closely linked with the
development of the content of theoretical knowledge.</p>

<p>     In this connection, one should consider the
untenability of one interpretation of the special theory of
relativity. This interpretation, which gained currency thanks
to Bridgman, reduces the entire significance of the special
theory of relativity to reflective analysis of primary
concepts of physics (such as the concept of simultaneity).
From this standpoint, Einstein created not so much a
physical theory as a metatheory which deals with the
problem of the meaning of physical concepts. The


laboratory operations of measurement referred to in the
special theory of relativity are viewed as an absolutely reliable
basis of science, the foundation on which physics must
be built. In actual fact, the operations of measurement
used in the special theory of relativity, in their turn,
assume a number of theoretical premises that are not
operational in nature. The task of this theory is by no means
solution to the problem of meaning of scientific
concepts but the discovery of new content dependences in
actual reality. Reflective analysis, that is, discussion of
the problems of the nature and meaning of the concepts
of physics, indeed played an important role in the
elaboration of the principles of this theory. But this analysis
is intimately linked with comparing the old and new
paradigms---classical mechanics and Einstein's conception.
Besides, theoretical reflexion was not and could not be
the only tool of substantiating the new theory.</p>

<p>     Reflexion about knowledge thus proves to be closely
linked with the development of its content and with going
beyond the limits of the existing conceptual system.
(That does not mean, however, that the reverse
proposition is also true, that is, that any development of the
content of knowledge appears as reflexion. For instance,
the development of a theoretical system within the given
paradigmal premises obviously cannot be taken as an
example of reflexion.)</p>

<p>     If that is how things stand, the question arises, does
the problem of substantiation of knowledge have any
meaning at all? Classical philosophy and science presented
the solution to the task of substantiating knowledge as
finding a set of assertions which would be absolutely
indisputable and unshakeable, assertions to which all
other kinds and types of knowledge could be reduced in
one way or another. Since such a task cannot be solved
(and we have tried to show that that is so), should we
not recognise that the problem of substantiating
knowledge does not exist at aU? Many Western specialists in the
foundations of mathematics, logic, methodology, and
philosophy of science, in the theory and history of natural
science come to this conclusion.^^9^^~^^7^^</p>

<p>     One can hardly agree with this view. What is the
meaning of the task itself of substantiating knowledge?
Apparently, it is the establishment of the sphere of application
of the given system of knowledge and separating that
which is true knowledge from that which only lays an
empty claim to this title. On the general epistemological
plane, it is a question of finding general criteria for the
solution of this task, which may be applied to different


cases, to various concrete systems of knowledge. If we
assume that this task has lost all meaning, the conclusion
will have to be accepted that there are no criteria in
general which allow to draw a boundary line between
knowledge and absence of it.</p>

<p>     In reality, the evolution of cognition is a dialectical
process of delimitation of knowledge from absence of
knowledge and at the same time a process of increasingly
more precise demarcation of the objective sphere of
application of the existing systems of knowledge.
Substantiation of knowledge implies, first of all, correlating it
with real objects through practical object-oriented activity.
At the same time, not all kinds of knowledge can be
directly included in practical activity. Besides, practice
itself is always limited by the given concrete historical level
of its development. Therefore, even the practical
application of the given system of knowledge is not tantamount
to full substantiation of the latter. Practice assumes the
development of the systems of knowledge themselves.
It is in the course of this joint development of mutually
connected practical activity involving objects and cognitive
activity that knowledge is substantiated. Substantiation
must not thus be understood as an ensemble of
procedures enabling one to provide an unshakeable basis for
knowledge once and for all but rather as historical
development of cognition, as emergence of new theoretical systems,
discarding some old conceptions, establishment of new
links between theories, revision of old theories, etc.
Substantiating a given theoretical system means going
beyond its framework, including it in a deeper context,
and considering it against a broader background.</p>

<p>     Thus, those procedures which were considered in the
history of philosophy and science as methods for
resolving the problem of substantiation are indeed relevant to
the solution of this problem but in a sense different from
the previously assumed. These procedures do not at all
provide &quot;absolute&quot; substantiation, being merely elements
in the historical process of substantiation coinciding with
the development of knowledge itself. Substantiation as
it actually takes place therefore includes elements of
scientific research which classical pre-Marxian and
nonMarxist philosophical and methodological literature did
not consider in the context of the given problem (e.g.,
the origin of new theories). If substantiation of knowledge
coincides with its development, and theoretical reflexion
is only one of the elements of the latter, that means
that actual substantiation is not reducible to reflexion,
being much broader in scope.</p>



<p>     We have already pointed out that reflexion brings about
not only a transcending of the existing system of
knowledge but also its transformation. Implicit premises,
becoming explicit ones, are not merely singled out, dissected
and reconstructed, though even this procedure by itself
changes the nature of knowledge that is the object of
reflexion. Some premises are specified or entirely
discarded. In itself, this is quite understandable: the need for
reflexion arises only when doubts appear about the
substantiation of the basic premises. The task of theoretical
analysis lies in revising these premises, and the attainment
of this task is impossible without changing, be it
partially, what is critically studied. But that means that the
very object changes as a result of theoretical reflexion.
Let us dwell on this circumstance in somewhat greater

<p>     When theoretical knowledge reproduces the
dependences between the real objects existing independently
of knowledge, as often as not one has to go beyond the
limits of the given conceptual system, including the
objects under study in new relations, introducing new
idealisations, constructing new systems of abstract objects, etc.
None of these processes, characterising the development of
theoretical knowledge about real objects, changes the
objects themselves to which knowledge refers. The relation
between reflexion and its object is different. Through
reflexion, its object, the system of knowledge, is not only
included in new relations but is also completed and rebuilt,
that is, it becomes different from what it was before
reflexion. The process of inquiry proves to be intimately
linked with creatively reshaping the very object under
study. This peculiar relation between cognition and changes
in the object arises because in this case we do not deal
with an object existing independently from cognition and
consciousness but with cognitive reproduction of
cognition itself and of consciousness, directing cognition towards

<p>     The peculiar relation between reflexion and its object
indicated here is found not only in systems of objectified
knowledge but also in individual consciousness. The point
is that reflexion about the state of consciousness, about
the properties of a concrete personal &quot;I&quot; emerges in
the context of the task (whether realised or not) of
restructuring the system of consciousness and personality.
When I realise myself as &quot;I&quot; with such and such traits, I


do not merely objectify certain moments of my psychical
life that were previously fluid or scattered, as it were
(thereby introducing definite changes in the state of my
consciousness). I also reflexively analyse myself in the light
of some ideal which I accept, an ideal which expresses a
type of relation to other persons and thus socially
mediates my relation to myself. When I analyse myself, trying
to realise my qualities, contemplating my attitude to life,
and looking into the deep secret places of my own
consciousness, I thereby wish to &quot;substantiate&quot; myself, as
it were, to find a solid basis for the frame of reference,
giving up some things for good and taking an even firmer
hold of others. My individual &quot;ego&quot; thus changes and
develops in the process and as a result of reflexion.</p>

<p>     But does it not follow from the above that reflexion
simply creates its own object, actually reflecting nothing?
Many modern bourgeois philosophers and some Western
specialists in the theory of science accept this view, to
some extent .or another. As we recall, according to Quine's
&quot;ontological relativity&quot; principle we must not speak of
the ontology of a given theory as long as we remain within
its framework: a given theoretical system will have some
ontology (and different ontologies ascribed to the theory
may be mutually exclusive), depending on the language
of the system into which we are going to translate it. It
so appears that the arbitrarily chosen &quot;angle of view&quot;
determines in the process of reflexion its ontology and
content. Polanyi develops a conception according to which
any attempt at a theoretical reflexion about the norms and
rules of theoretical thinking and standards of scientific
quality adopted by a given community of natural
scientists in the form of implicit knowledge is inevitably doomed
to failure, as these norms and rules are not in principle
amenable to rational analysis. He believes that what is
formulated as a result of such reflexion is merely the
product of reflexion itself, having no relevance to the real
norms of theoretical thinking which are forever doomed
to remain implicit knowledge.^^98^^ The latter thus assumes
quite an irrational colouring. Finally, Sartre insists that
the individual &quot;I&quot; is entirely the product of reflexion
itself. Cognition attempting to cognize itself has the
impression that it faces a certain definite object termed
&quot;I&quot;, while in actual fact the &quot;I&quot; had not existed before the
process of reflexion began. Therefore &quot;I&quot;, in Sartre's
view, does not express the true nature of consciousness.</p>

<p>     To answer the question whether reflexion creates its
own experience in its entirety, let us continue our analysis.</p>

<p>     It is not any reflexion that is concerned with science.


If reflexion is intimately connected with the development
of a system of theoretical knowledge, only that kind of
reflexive analysis accords with the task it faces which
facilitates the augmenting and enrichment of knowledge.
In other words', theoretical reflexion can restructure its
object, the system of scientific knowledge, only to the
extent in which this restructuring serves to establish
conceptual structures which express more precisely objective
real processes reproduced in scientific theory and at the
same time agree with the objective norms of development
of knowledge itself. If this condition is not satisfied,
reflexion proves to be false. This means that the image of
knowledge reconstructed in reflexion and real scientific
knowledge itself may not correspond to each other. There
are many such examples in the history of science. Thus,
the analysis of the theoretical premises and the logical
structure of classical mechanics performed by Ernst Mach
in the late 19th century on the whole proved to be a false
reflexive image, and could not serve as a basis for
constructing a new physical theory. Sometimes the reflexive image
is inadequate in some important respects, capturing at the
same time certain real dependences of knowledge. For
example, the reflexion about the foundations of
mathematics in the framework of intuitionism contributed to the
development of scientific thought, being unable at the
same time to reconstruct some important propositions of
mathematical theory, which could not be sacrificed without
going beyond the limits of mathematics itself.&quot; All of
this shows that reflexion combines, in a specific manner,
a reflection or reconstruction of its object, a system of
knowledge, with its critical restructuring.</p>

<p>     Reflexion and its object may also fail to agree in the
framework of individual consciousness. The image of &quot;I&quot;
is not always adequate to the real &quot;I&quot;.</p>

<p>     The starting point of classical pre-Marxian philosophy
and psychology was that the subject has a special inner
access to himself and a better knowledge of himself and
of the states of his consciousness than anyone else.
Moreover, it is this individual subjective reflexion that was
regarded as perfect and infallible knowledge as distinct from
knowledge of external objects. It must be conceded that
indeed I know something about myself that can be
unknown to others. Images of memories and subjective
associations which surface as I perceive some object
are my personal property, something directly given to my
consciousness.^^1^^ &deg; &quot; True, many of my individual experiences
are usually objectified, being accompanied by external
actions---bodily motions, facial expressions, exclamations,


so that other individuals can make judgments about the
inner states of my consciousness. At the same time, I
can suppress by an effort of will external expression of any
given experience, even of pain. In this case, I alone will
know about this experience.</p>

<p>     Let us recall, however, that reflexion is a kind of
cognition. And cognition is not simply passive absorption of
information from without but the establishment of
definite links, the singling out of semantic dependences, an
activity of interpretation. There is no sense in speaking
of errors where information is simply passed on from one
system to another (what occurs here are merely losses and
distortions of information but not errors). The
possibility of errors only arises where cognition appears.</p>

<p>     What could be more indisputable than an elementary
statement &quot;I feel pain&quot;? Let us note, however, that the
realisation of one's pain is associated with localisation of
this experience, and the localisation may be erroneous
(a fact everyone is familiar with who had toothache).
The awareness that &quot;I feel pain&quot; includes not only
knowledge of the difference between &quot;I&quot; and &quot;not-I&quot; but also
a certain semantic interpretation of the experience of pain
itself: singling it put among other experiences, knowledge
of its being conditioned by the state of my body,
distinguishing between my pain and that of another subject, etc.</p>

<p>     The life of consciousness cannot flow uninterpreted.
If an image comes to the surface of my consciousness, I
try to define it, that is, to find out what it stands for, and
to what concrete person or event of my life it refers. I
often err in interpreting separate images; for instance, I
may erroneously localise in space and time the object
of memory, mistakenly correlate a given image with some
person or other, etc.</p>

<p>     When I have some emotional experience, e.g., joy,
reflexive realisation of this experience is inseparable from
the feeling itself. It may so happen that in reality I am not
so joyful as it appears to me in the act of subjective
reflexion. (I appear joyful to myself because for certain
reasons which I do not realise I wish to be so.) In this case,
a stranger may judge my emotional state better than I
myself, although that stranger may also be mistaken, of

<p>     The possibility of error grows if I try to realise
reflexively the properties of my personality, to cogitate on my
concrete &quot;I&quot; as a whole. The thing is that my personality,
my &quot;I&quot;, is not open to me fully in the act of individual
reflexion but most comprehensively manifested in my
relations with other persons and can be most precisely


understood by the latter. Another subject observing me
from the outside can evaluate my &quot;I&quot; better than I myself.
Of course, to the extent I take into account this evaluation
of myself by others, I can assess myself more or less
correctly, too. If I am subject to mental disorder, I find
it hard to define the states of my consciousness. Another
person, a psychiatrist, will be better suited to untangle
my subjective experiences.</p>

<p>     It is also important to bear in mind the following
circumstance. As we have indicated, reflexion as a special
kind of cognition assumes a definite semantic framework
which is not reflected upon in the given act itself.
Therefore, when I consciously interpret even those states of
mine which are kno.wn to me alone, being given only from
within, I use a system of semantic connections
transcending the boundaries of my individual consciousness and
connecting me with other subjects. I view the subjective states
of my consciousness through another person's eyes, as
it were. That means that if that &quot;other&quot; moved into my
body, had the same life story as myself, and occupied the
same spatio-temporal position as myself, he would
reflexively realise the same subjective states. As we have
already remarked, the framework of semantic connections
assumed by subjective reflexion emerges in the course of
joint interpersonal activity and is assimilated by each
individual in his development, in the communication with
other individuals through the medium of man-made
objects embodying the experience of social-cultural
development. That means that reflexion about the frame itself,
and in the first place reflexion about such an important
element of this frame as the reflecting &quot;I&quot;, is only possible
if we leave the limits of individual consciousness,
considering a different, more comprehensive and fundamental
system of relations. We refer to the system of inter--
personal activity, in which practical transformation of the
world of objects, communication and cognition exist in
a direct unity. It is in the process of this social activity
that the norms of cognition are worked out. The
interiorisation of the standards of this activity produces the
individual &quot;I&quot; itself, which will thus remain incompletely
reflected as long as we remain within the individual's
consciousness, and can only become the object of
reflexion when we study a broader system of relations.</p>

<p>     Thus, the source of norms and standards of cognition
should be sought for exactly in collective forms of
activity. It so appears that those kinds of knowledge which
exist in intimate association with the subject (perceptions,
images of memories, etc.) are, as it were, side by side with


knowledge existing in objectified form as the property
of everyone (knowledge reified in implements of labour,
objects of everyday life, scientific apparatus, theory, etc.).
As we have attempted to show in the first chapter of this
part, it is the study of objectified forms of knowledge and
the collective forms of activity producing them that enable
one to understand the cognitive processes performed by
the individual.</p>


<p>     So far we have paid attention to the far-reaching
similarity between the objectified kinds of knowledge and that
knowledge which is inseparable from the individual
subject. In both cases there exists, along with explicit
knowledge, implicit knowledge which is only made explicit
through reflexion. As for the latter, both reflexion about
objectified knowledge (let us tentatively name it objective)
and reflexion about knowledge inseparable from the
individual subject (let us call it subjective) reveal basically
identical relations to their object.</p>

<p>     In calling reflexion &quot;objective&quot; we merely refer to the
fact that it belongs to the objectified forms of knowledge,
ignoring the extent to which it adequately reproduces its
object. Objective reflexion may fail to accord with the
thing, being in this sense subjective in its content.
Reflexion that is subjective in form can also be both
objective and subjective in content. Thus, the designations
&quot;objective&quot; and &quot;subjective&quot; reflexion as applied here
refer only to form, not content.</p>

<p>     Let us point out that objectified knowledge differs in a
number of important aspects from the individual's
knowledge. If an individual subject possesses some implicit
knowledge (e.g., the knowledge of the language he speaks,
the knowledge of self, etc.), he realises it in one way or
another, although he does not have that knowledge in
dissected and reflected form. As for objectified knowledge,
elements can coexist in it which are not at the given
moment realised by any individual subject. Supposing, for
instance, that some scientist established hitherto unknown
dependences and wrote an article about them. The article
was accepted and published in a scientific journal. It was
read by several dozen persons specialising in this field. But
the article failed to affect the subsequent course of
research and was soon forgotten. About a century passed.
During that time the author of the article died, as well as


the few persons (editors and readers) who once knew its
content. At present, no one knows what the article was
about, and, moreover, no one even suspects its existence.
Does that mean that knowledge objectified in the article
does not exist at all? We would hardly dare to assert this,
for the article has not disappeared: it rests in libraries
among files of old journals, being only temporarily absent
from the actual cognitive process. It is quite possible,
however, that a researcher in the history of science will
discover it, read it, and conclude that its ideas are very
much in the spirit of these times. Thereupon knowledge
objectified in the article will get a new lease on life: it will
become the object of discussion and argument, references
to it will be made in scientific journals, and scientists will
ponder the ideas expressed in it.</p>

<p>     Let us consider another example. Suppose that at a
given moment no one thinks about the content of
Newton's theory. Does that mean that at a given moment
knowledge objectified in this theory does not exist and
that it will begin to exist again only when someone thinks
about this theory? That would be hard to accept.</p>

<p>     Let us further take into account that in any objectified
knowledge there is, as a rule, content which is not known
to anyone who is using this knowledge. This content
may remain unrealised by the producer of this objectified
knowledge---creator of a scientific theory or author of a
work of art. This content is manifested only in the
historical development of cognition. For example,
thermodynamics and the atomic-molecular theory were originally
developed independently from each other. But that does
not mean that the links between the theories had not
existed objectively until they were established and consciously
realised. Further, when Cantor formulated his set theory,
he was not yet aware of the paradoxes inherent in it,
although the paradoxes already existed in the content of
the theory itself. In analysing Leo Tolstoy's works, Lenin
showed that they were the &quot;mirror of the Russian
revolution&quot;, although neither the great writer himself nor his
numerous readers had realised before Lenin's works this
exceptionally important aspect of the content of the
works by the classic of Russian literature. An important
point here is that realisation of the content inherent in
objectified knowledge does not imply introducing
subjective views but only the establishment of the links
objectively inherent (though previously unrealised) in the given

<p>     That is also true of the so-called interpretation of
texts---scientific, philosophical, literary, etc. Of course, any


such interpretation inevitably carries an element of
subjectivity. But it can claim to interpret the text only insofar as
it brings out the content actually inherent in this text
without introducing into the latter something that is not
(and cannot be) present in it.</p>

<p>     Delimitating what the author of some system of ideas
wanted to say from the objective content of the latter is
one of the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist
philosophy in the study of science as well as of other
phenomena of social consciousness and culture.</p>

<p>     Thus, certain elements of objectified knowledge may
not be realised at the given moment by any of the
individual subjects of which society consists.</p>

<p>     Let us further note another important circumstance.
Knowledge that is inseparable from the individual subject
is given to the latter as directly coinciding with its object
(if it does not coincide with the latter, it is illusion, not
knowledge). In other words, knowledge of this kind appears
as something static and complete, while the objectified
knowledge produced by scientific research is in principle
incomplete. Scientific knowledge necessarily implies
unsolved problems: the very concept of such knowledge
includes the need for further research involving formulation
and discussion of new hypotheses, their evaluation
according to certain standards, etc.That, in its turn, is only
possible under division of research work and organisation of a
special system of scientific communication---publications
in journals, debates, and other forms of contacts between
researchers. Knowledge, inseparable from the individual
subject, appears as personally addressed to him, while
objectified knowledge explicitly includes its being intended
for all subjects concerned with the study of these problems.
In other words, the modes of treatment of objectified
knowledge are collective in their nature. For this reason, the
study of scientific knowledge and cognition associated
with it is impossible without an analysis of communication
systems functioning in collectives of a special type called
scientific communities. The modern science of science is
more and more inclined towards this conclusion.^^101^^</p>

<p>     But does it not follow from the above that objectified
knowledge is knowledge without a subject, i.e., that it
exists independently of any subject and must be understood
outside of a relation to the latter? That is the conclusion
to which Karl Popper, one of the major modern
bourgeois philosophers and methodologists of science, is

<p>     Let us consider his arguments on the subject in greater


<p>     Popper sharply distinguishes between &quot;subjective
knowledge&quot;, i.e., knowledge intimately linked with the
individual subject, and &quot;objective knowledge&quot;. The latter
includes the content of journals, books, libraries, etc. This
content is expressed in the form of theoretical systems,
problems and problem situations, critical arguments, and
also of certain &quot;states of discussion&quot;.</p>

<p>     Popper insists on the independence of the content
referred to here from subjective opinions and views,
including this content in a special sphere of reality, a
&quot;third world&quot;, the world of the objective spirit (this world
also comprises the content of belles-lettres and works of
art). The &quot;third world&quot; exists, according to Popper, side
by side with the &quot;first world&quot;, the world of real physical
objects, and the &quot;second world&quot;, the world of individual

<p>     The &quot;third world&quot; is, of course, the product of man, the
British philosopher admits. But, being produced by man,
this world nevertheless became autonomous and
independent. In any case, it is impossible to understand the
characteristics and logic of the development of the &quot;third world&quot;
from an analysis of individual human consciousness.
The reverse procedure is more fruitful, in Popper's view:
many important features of individual consciousness may
be correctly understood if one takes into account its
continual interaction with the world of the objective
spirit independent of it.</p>

<p>     To show more clearly the independence of the &quot;third
world&quot; from man and his consciousness, the philosopher
suggests the following mental experiments.</p>

<p>     Supposing all our machines and tools are destroyed in
some catastrophe, and simultaneously all our subjective
learning of using them is lost, and only libraries and man's
capacity to learn from them survive. In this case, after
a historically necessary period, the world of culture and
technology will be reconstructed and so will the
specifically human mode of life associated with it.</p>

<p>     Let us now imagine that not only machines and tools
are destroyed and the subjective knowledge of how to use
them is lost, but all libraries are destroyed too(though
man's capacity to read books may have survived). This
time, there will be no re-emergence of our civilisation for
many millennia.^^102^^</p>

<p>     The independence of the &quot;third world&quot; is expressed,
according to Popper, not only in that man may not realise
some of its fragments. Although that which pertains to the
kingdom of the objective spirit is usually created by man,
there exists as a matter of principle the possibility of


generation of some elements of this world by automata
and not man, Popper believes. A series of books of
logarithms may be produced and printed by a computer, the
logarithms in these books being more exact than in books
written by men. The books produced by the computer
may lie about in a library for years unused by any person.
Nevertheless, these books, of which no subject knows or
has ever known, contain indubitably objective
knowledge.* 0 3</p>

<p>     True, Popper admits, for the signs contained on the
pages of books to be regarded as the carriers of &quot;objective
knowledge&quot;, the books must have a special
characteristic---the possibility of being read and understood. He
believes, however, that this possibility need not be realised.
It is not impossible that the books will be read by beings
other than man. (Suppose that mankind perishes but
libraries survive. Visitors from outer space may discover our
books, decode and read them.)</p>

<p>     Popper regards the biological approach as quite fruitful
in the study of the &quot;third world&quot;. A biologist studying the
behaviour of animals must take into account that they
produce &quot;non-living structures&quot; that are vital for them.
Spiders spin webs, birds build nests, wasps build nests,
beavers construct dams, animals make paths in forests, etc.
Although the &quot;non-living structures&quot; are produced by
animals, they exist quite objectively and independently of
their creators, once they emerge. Popper distinguishes
between two main categories of problems arising from the
study of these structures. The first category pertains to the
method used by animals when constructing these
structures and the animals' relations to their products. The
second category of problems is concerned with the
characteristics of the structures themselves: the chemistry of the
materials used in the structure, their geometrical and
physical properties, their dependence upon special
environmental conditions, etc. In analysing these problems we
cannot do without studying the structures in terms of their
biological functions. Popper believes that problems of the
second category are more fundamental, for one may draw
conclusions about the possible modes of their production
from the knowledge of the objective structures themselves.</p>

<p>     The same principle is applicable, according to Popper, to
the study of the products of human activity: houses,
implements, works of art. This approach proves to be
particularly significant in the study of science. Popper
asserts that genuine scientific epistemology must be
concerned with the study of the &quot;third world&quot;, in the first
place the content of scientific theories, problems,


scientific arguments, etc., rather than with the analysis of the
subject, his consciousness, and cognitive activity. That will
be epistemology without the cognizing subject.</p>

<p>     Popper is undoubtedly right in noting that separate
fragments of objectified knowledge may not be realised at
the given moment by a single individual, that the laws of
development of this knowledge cannot be reduced to the
laws of individual 'consciousness, and that the latter itself
must be understood as connected with the world of
objectified knowledge. We have already touched on these
important properties of cognition. Popper's critique of the
traditional approach to epistemological problems in
bourgeois philosophy is also to a great extent correct.</p>

<p>     But does it follow from all this that the world of
objectified knowledge must and can be understood irrespective
of the subject?</p>

<p>     There are no grounds for such a conclusion. Although
objectified knowledge is not the same as conscious
knowledge, that is, knowledge possessed by an individual
subject, the two kinds of knowledge are closely bound up.
Only man, a concrete individual subject, may be the
creator of objectified knowledge. And that means that any
objectified knowledge must, at least at the time of its
emergence, be to some extent consciously realised, that is,
be the property of a subject. This is not at all contradicted
by the possibility of production by a computer of separate
fragments of objectified knowledge. The results of
computer activity can be regarded as knowledge only
insofar as behind the programme we discern man setting it
down and capable of interpreting its output. For the
computer itself, there is no knowledge.</p>

<p>     Still less can knowledge exist &quot;in itself&quot;, regardless of its
being used in the cognitive activity of concrete individuals.
The utilisation may, of course, be potential, but it is
important that the potential should exist. Its preservation is
ensured by the fact that the product in which knowledge is
objectified, even if it is not actually a part of the ongoing
cognitive process, remains included in social-cultural links
which make it possible for concrete subjects to use it in
their activity at any moment. And that means that even
those fragments of objectified knowledge which are not at
present realised retain close links with what is realised and
used in actual activity. If the connection between the
fragments of knowledge that are included in the cognitive
process and those that are not, is disrupted, the latter
ceases to be any kind of knowledge at all.</p>

<p>     Assume that a civilisation is dead and no one knows the
language once spoken by its subjects. Although the books


written in that extinct language survive, no one is capable
of decoding them and the connection is thus lost between
the defunct culture and the actual social-cultural process,
including the cognitive one. And that means that the
books preserved no longer contain any knowledge.
Properly speaking, they are not even books but simply
objects with strange strokes in them.</p>

<p>     Cognition is implemented by real persons, by concrete
individual subjects. Knowledge in subjective or objectified
form exists only inasmuch as it is directly or indirectly
correlated with that activity. At the same time, the cognitive
activity itself should be regarded on the social-historical
plane, as activity of interconnected subjects---past, present,
and future. For this reason, if certain fragments of
objectified knowledge are not consciously realised by a single
existing subject,&quot; that does not mean that these fragments
are in general outside the subjects' consciousness, for these
fragments may be associated both with the subjects of the
past and those of the future (association with the past is
obligatory, for only man can produce knowledge).</p>

<p>     The social-historical and collective nature of the
cognitive process is expressed not only in its being implemented
by an ensemble of interacting individuals. The interaction
itself assumes the existence of specific laws of the
development of knowledge, laws that are different from those
which characterise individual knowledge. Thus, the
individual subject is not the carrier of the collective
cognitive process, and neither is a mere agglomeration of
subjects. The collective subject may be regarded as such a
carrier, to be taken in the sense of a social system
irreducible to the agglomeration of individuals constituting
it. Let us note that there are many collective subjects of
cognition connected by definite relations. For example,
the study of the functioning of a given paradigm of
theoretical knowledge assumes an analysis of some community;
the latter appears in this case as a collective subject of a
definite kind of cognitive activity. Different paradigms
apparently determine different collective subjects
associated with them. At the same time, paradigms are
included in a general process of development of scientific
knowledge, with its characteristic common standards and
norms. And that means that the given scientific
community is a sub-system of a more extensive system---
the community of all specialists in the given area of
knowledge and the community of all individuals engaged in
scientific activity. The scientist uses in his activity some
national language or other, and that means that he is
included in the society speaking the given language. This


community, which obviously comprises also those
ihdividuals who are not concerned with science, is again a
definite collective subject of cognition. The functioning
and development of knowledge is determined by the
processes in a broader social system than the community of
scientists. The social sciences are directly linked with the
social position, interests, and practical activity of definite
social classes. That means that it is the latter that appear as
collective subjects of the cognition of social processes. The
type of social practice characteristic of a given class
determines the horizon of the cognitive possibilities open to its
members. As is well known, the Marxist theory of society
expressing the interests of the proletariat provides, for the
first time, a scientific basis for the study of the social
processes. A person not involved in science is
nevertheless involved in cognition and, consequently,
connected with various collective subjects.</p>

<p>     At the same time if not only the diversity but also the
unity of the socio-historical development of cognition is
taken into account, society should also be regarded as a
collective subject including a great number of subjects
both collective and individual. It is the existence of
definite connections between different collective subjects
that ensures the unity of the cognitive process. The
difference between these subjects is responsible for different
conceptions of what should be regarded as cognition.</p>

<p>     A complete disruption of connections between
collective subjects would result in a disintegration of cognition
as a unified process implemented by mankind. In this case,
society as a whole would cease to be the subject of
cognitive activity.</p>

<p>     Each individual subject is simultaneously included in
different collective subjects. Different systems of cognitive
activity, with their diverse standards and norms, are
integrated in the individual into a whole. The existence of
the latter is the necessary condition of the unity of &quot;I&quot;.
The disruption of links between different collective
subjects or the impossibility of integration within the
framework of the given individual of those systems of
cognitive activity which are associated with different
collective subjects, would entail the disintegration of the
individual subject.</p>

<p>     Thus Marxist-Leninist philosophy asserts that cognition
can only be correctly understood if it is considered in
connection with the forms of life activity of concrete
historical subjects on the basis of studying object-related
practical and communicative activities of collective and
individual subjects. &quot;If one considers the relation of subject to


object in logic, one must take into account also the general
premisses of being of the <em>concrete</em> subject (= <emmm>life of
man</emmm>) in the objective surroundings&quot;J &deg; <em></em>* stated Lenin.</p>

<p>     The individual subject, his consciousness and cognition
must be understood in terms of their incorporation in
different systems of collective practical and cognitive activity.
But that does not mean that the individual subject is in
some way dissolved in the collective. First, the collective
subject itself does not exist outside concrete persons, real
individuals interacting among themselves according to
the specific laws of collective activity. The collective
subject cannot be regarded in the same light as the individual
one. The former is not a personality in its own right, it has
no individuality of its own and does not perform any acts
of cognition other than those performed by the separate
members. Second, cognition, which is inseparable from the
individual subject, does not directly coincide with the
objectified systems of knowledge, though it is closely
linked with and ultimately determined by them. The
individual traits of my perception, my memories and
subjective associations constitute knowledge that is
important for me personally and is accessible to me alone.
They do not form part of the system of objectified
knowledge that is the property of all individuals and is included
in the structure of the collective subject. And that means
that the types of knowledge intrinsically characteristic of
the individual and the collective subjects do not fully
coincide with or dissolve in each other but rather mutually
imply each other.</p>

<p>     We may recall that Kant, Fichte, and Husserl posit, along
with the individual subject, the transcendental one. The
latter expresses the inner community of the various
empirical individuals; in this respect, it may appear similar to the
collective subject. Indeed, the conceptions of these
philosophers include some steps towards the collective subject
idea. But these are merely initial steps, and they could
only be discerned after the Marxist doctrine of the
sociohistorical nature of the process of cognition was formed.
In more concrete terms, the Transcendental Subject as
conceived in philosophical transcendentalism is basically
different from the collective subject as a concrete socio--
historical community. The Transcendental Subject, as
transcendentalists believe, is an individual of a special kind, the
supra-individual &quot;I&quot;. At the same time, it is supra--
empirical, existing outside time and space. But the collective
subject, though different from the individual one, is quite
empirical and set in definite spatio-temporal limits. The
Transcendental Subject is accessible only from within,


from the inside of individual consciousness, being in fact a
deep layer of the latter. As for the collective subject,
though non-existent outside a system of interacting
individuals, it exists at the same time outside each separate
individual subject, in a sense. The collective subject
manifests itself and the laws of its functioning not so much
through the inner structures of the individual's
consciousness as through external practical activity involving objects
and through collective cognitive activity with systems of
objectified knowledge. Finally, the collective subject is not
singular. A great many such subjects are in a state of
change: some collective subjects and the inherent forms of
their activity emerge while others die out. The relations
between different collective subjects may be complicated

<p>     Let us undertake in this connection an analysis of
Popper's thesis concerning the importance of the &quot;biological
approach&quot; to the study of the relation between man and
the &quot;third world&quot; and the assumption that the analysis of
the structure of the products of scientific activity
determines the study of the modes of their production.</p>

<p>     The English philosopher's principal error lies in his
failure to understand that the man-made objects of the
&quot;second nature&quot;, i.e., objects implementing a specifically
socio-cultural content, beginning with labour implements
and buildings and ending with scientific theories, are
radically different from those changes in the external
environment which animals produce, since man's practical
activity involving objects is social in its very nature and
assumes the use of labour implements and communicative
links between individual subjects. The specific features of
this activity also determine its spontaneous development
and continual reaching beyond the established confines.
Applying the &quot;biological approach&quot; to its study is
absolutely fruitless. &quot;In creating a <em>world of objects</em> by his
practical activity, in his <em>work upon</em> inorganic nature, man proves
himself a conscious species-being, i.e., a being that treats
the species as its own essential being, or that treats itself as
a species-being,&quot; wrote Marx. &quot;Admittedly animals also
produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the
bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces
what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It
produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It
produces only under the dominion of immediate physical
need, whilst man produces even when he is free from
physical need and only truly produces in freedom
therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man
reproduces the whole of nature. An animal's product belongs


immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely
confronts his product. An animal forms objects only in
accordance with the standard and the need of the species to
which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in
accordance with the standards of every species, and knows
how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the
object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance
with the laws of beauty.&quot;^^106^^</p>

<p>     Of course, books and other man-made objects in which
knowledge is reified exist objectively. If they are to be
considered from the standpoint of the chemical
composition of the materials, their physical structure and
geometrical form, they dp not differ basically from natural objects,
including &quot;non-living structures&quot; created by animals. They
exist as carriers of knowledge only as long as they are
included in the human cognitive activity. Outside the
latter, these objects have no structure at all, if the
reference is to the structure of knowledge objectified in
them and not chemical and physical structure. To
understand a book means to reproduce a definite structure of
cognitive activity. To assimilate a theory reified in a book
means to accept the need for further activity in this field,
an activity patterned on a definite model, for a scientific
theory is not so much ready-made knowledge as the
activity of problem solving. If a definite kind of cognitive
activity is inadequately decoded, we cannot say that we
have this knowledge.</p>

<p>     Supposing that a book is read not by men but by some
visitors from outer space, non-human reasonable beings
(that is the example discussed by Popper). These beings
will be able to master the knowledge reified in the book
only if they decode its language, i.e., when they are able
to reproduce the socio-cultural communicative and
cognitive system of connections in which the book was once
included. And that is only possible to the extent in which
the visitors from outer space will become reincarnated as
human beings, as it were, assimilating the real properties
of human cognitive activity.</p>

<p>     Cognition and knowledge exist only as long as the
specific activity of the collective subject is maintained and
consequently the activity of the individual subjects
included in it.</p>

<p>     If elementary perception implies not only a relation to
an external object but also the self-consciousness of an
individual subject, the obligatory conditions of scientific
activity are not only the movement of cognition through
the domain of objects but also the conscious realisation
(not necessarily in the form of reflexion, i.e., explicit


knowledge) of the modes and norms of cognitive activity
and the standards of assessing its results intrinsically
characteristic of the collective subject, for it is only
through these modes and norms that the problem field of
research can be specified.</p>

<p>     Epistemology proves to be impossible without the
cognizing subject.</p>

<p>     The role of objectified systems of knowledge in the
development of cognition, just as all the other questions of
understanding the cognitive relation between subject and
object, were given a much more precise and profound
treatment than Popper's by Hegel, the greatest
representative of the German classical idealist philosophy. 1^7 Of all
the pre-Marxian and non-Marxist philosophers Hegel came
closest to understanding many of the essential features
of the problem analysed here, though at the same time
strongly mystifying it.</p>

<p>     Hegel asserts that individual consciousness and
selfconsciousness cannot be understood from within. Although
each individual is given his &quot;I&quot; and the unity of self--
consciousness as immediate certainty, this unity is actually
mediated by the individual's relation to other individual
subjects. The individual consciousness recognises something
different in the other self-consciousnesses and at the same
time something that is internally identical to it. The
individual subject exists for himself as an &quot;I&quot; only through
a relation to others. &quot;Everyone is the mean for the other,
through which each mediates and links up with himself,
and each [is] for himself and for the other immediately
given being existing for itself, which is at the same time
thus for itself only through this mediation. They <em>recognise</em>
themselves as <em>mutually recognising one another</em>. &quot;108</p>

<p>     The &quot;substance&quot; of the individual, his &quot;inorganic
nature&quot;, are forms of the objective spirit, that is, essentially
collective modes of activity, reified products of human
culture. Assimilating the latter and taking up these forms
of activity (the objective spirit exists only insofar as it is an
activity), the individual becomes a subject.^^109^^</p>

<p>     Reflexion implies going beyond the limit of individual
consciousness: recognition of oneself in the other
individuals constituting society and at the same time
objectification of man in the artifacts of the world of culture
created by him.</p>

<p>     But reflexion is not simply a relation to the individual
&quot;I&quot;. The essence of reflexion consists, according to Hegel,
in cognition of the objective spirit itself, in the process of
dialectical development of knowledge. This development
is substantiation of knowledge, reflexion upon it and


deepening in itself. A real foundation emerges at the end
and as a result of development, not at the beginning. The
movement ahead and development of the content of
objective knowledge is at the same time a movement
backwards, a discovery of the true hidden basis of the
whole process.</p>

<p>     ``Consciousness is, on the one hand, a realisation of the
object, and on the other, consciousness of oneself: the
conscious realisation of what is true for it and the
realisation of one's knowledge about it.&quot;^^110^^ The object appears
to the consciousness only in the shape in which it knows
that object. The consciousness compares its knowledge of
the object with the object itself. &quot;If in this comparison the
two do not correspond to one another, the consciousness
seems to be obliged to change its knowledge, to bring it in
accord with the object; but in this change of knowledge
the object itself actually changes for it, for the available
knowledge was essentially the knowledge of the object;
along with the knowledge, the object too becomes
different, for it belonged in fact to this knowledge.&quot;^^111^^ The
consciousness makes it clear that what previously appeared
as being-in-itself, i.e., independently from the given
consciousness is in actual fact merely being for the given
consciousness. At the same time, it is not only the
consciousness and its object that change but also the
standards and criteria of verifying the agreement between
knowledge and its object. &quot;The criterion of testing is
changed, when that of which it was to have been the
criterion does not stand the test; and the test is not only a test
of knowledge but also of its own criterion.&quot;^^112^^</p>

<p>     Hegel points out that the new object of knowledge
comes into being &quot;through <em>conversion (Umkehrung</em>) of
<em>consciousness</em> itself&quot;.^^113^^ At the same time, individual
consciousness does not know how that occurs, for the
emergence of the new object &quot;takes place behind its back, as it

<p>     Therefore, reflexion of knowledge about itself at each
stage of its development (the latter being incomplete) is
&quot;untrue&quot;, imperfect reflexion, implying the existence of
unreflected movements of consciousness &quot;behind its
back&quot;. Knowledge in some form or other is not yet that
which is cognized, Hegel insists.</p>

<p>     According to Hegel, cognition is a world-historical
dialectical process in which both subject and object change.
The subject is not some ideal object, it is not something
primordially equal to itself but eternal motion, becoming,
development, sublation of all established boundaries and
positing new ones. The subject is inseparable from


restlessness and activeness, expressing that activeness in the purest
form. He is inconceivable outside a relation with the object
he cognizes and changes. At the same time, the object
itself is transformed along with the development of
consciousness, ^.e., it changes in the historical process of
cognitive activity. The conception of subject and object as
entities isolated from and metaphysically opposed to each
other is quite untenable and can only lead into
philosophical <em>eul-de-sacs</em>.</p>

<p>     However, Hegel sees reflexion, the self-consciousness of
the Absolute Spirit, the Absolute Subject, as the essence of
the cognitive process, and that is where idealistic
mystification of the whole problem starts.</p>

<p>     The Absolute Subject, according to Hegel, underlies the
whole of reality in general. The substance is to be thought
of as the subject, Hegel insists. What appears to the
individual consciousness as an object independent from and
cognized by it is in actual fact the product of the Absolute
Spirit. Hegel tries to show that the development of
cognition leads to a sublation of the independence of the
cognized object from the cognizing subject, if the latter is to
be understood as the Absolute Subject and not an
individual one. The Absolute is ultimately the SubjeckObject,
thinking about thinking, the cognition of self.</p>

<p>     Hegel's attempt to interpret cognition as self-cognition
is also connected with the above thesis. Starting out from
the real facts of interaction between consciousness and
self-consciousness, cognition and reflexion, Hegel,
following Fichte, endeavours to present all knowledge as
reducible, in the final analysis, to self-cognition. True, Hegel
speaks of the self-cognition of the Absolute Subject and
not of that of an individual &quot;I&quot; or even of a
Transcendental &quot;I&quot;.</p>

<p>     Hegel's analysis of the concrete historical development
of cognition went far beyond the limits of philosophical
transcendentalism, showing the collective nature of
cognition, the development of its forms and norms in time, and
revealing the dialectics of reflexive and unreflected content
of knowledge. At the same time, according to Hegel,
fully adequate cognition, that is, cognition that really
deserves its name, is only attained when absolute
completeness of reflexion is achieved, when the subject (the
Absolute Subject) becomes, as it were, absolutely
transparent for itself and reflects on itself without going beyond
its own limits. It is in this act of coincidence of the
cognizing subject with itself that the process of substantiation
of knowledge is completed.</p>

<p>     Hegel believes that the foundation of knowledge should


not be sought for at the source of the cognitive process.
This foundation is not given, it is moulded and takes shape
in the development of cognition. In this point, Hegel
opposes the metaphysical view of the problem of
substantiating knowledge, widespread in Western bourgeois
philosophy. At the same time, though the foundation of
knowledge lies, according to Hegel, at the end rather than
at the beginning of the cognitive process, substantiation is
interpreted in his system as coinciding with absolute
reflexion, with the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit.</p>

<p>     Just like Descartes, Kant and Fichte, Hegel believes that
only the self-cognition of the spirit, its knowledge of itself,
can reach absolute adequacy. It is in the act of absolute
reflexion that the absolute foundation of knowledge is
found. Thus Hegel essentially reproduces the traditions of
philosophical transcendentalism at this basic point of his
epistemological conception. True, Hegel speaks of some
supra-individual, Absolute Subject. But Hegel believes that
the individual, too, inasmuch as he became part of the
motion of the Absolute Spirit and assumed the standpoint
of &quot;absolute knowledge&quot;, does not merely comprehend
the Absolute adequately but grasps at the same time his
own deep essence, i.e., cognizes himself. The individual's
self-cognition coincides in this case with absolute

<p>     Hegel's philosophy ultimately explains the development
of cognition by the self-cognition of the Absolute. The
Absolute, which exists at the beginning of development in
itself only, must eventually also become being for itself.
And that means that all the historical vicissitudes of the
real cognitive process are predetermined in the
suprahumani spheres. The real persons, the individual subjects of
practical and cognitive activity are merely disappearing
elements in the development of the supra-individual forces.
The relations between individuals, human
communication, the real practical activity, man's reification of himself
in the works of culture, and the unfolding of the social
process, which Hegel includes in the sphere of the
objective spirit, all of these elements mediating the spirit's
relation to itself are ultimately sublated; the spirit returns
to itself as to the &quot;inner&quot;. It is in the relation to itself as
the &quot;inner&quot;, in the existence for itself rather than for
others, that the spirit appears in the most adequate

<p>     Hegel believes that external object-related activity
cannot produce consciousness. This kind of activity
achieves merely objectification of consciousness, as a result
of which consciousness itself is enriched. But the crux of


the matter is that any external mediation of
consciousness must be sublated in the unity of the immediate and
the mediated, in a dialectical identity of consciousness
with itself.</p>

<p>     Purely immediate consciousness (whether this is taken
to mean empirical knowledge or intellectual intuition)
does not exist, Hegel insists. Immediate certainty,
inasmuch as it is merely immediate, is not knowledge. The
latter implies mediation. Only that knowledge is adequate
in which unity is attained of the immediate and the
mediated in the form of the new dialectically mediated. In
the immedia.te, which exists at the beginning of the
development of cognition, the possibility and necessity of
mediation are embedded, and the nature of the latter is
predetermined. The result of the development of
cognition and mediation is a return to the immediate on a
new basis, Hegel believes. &quot;Mediation is nothing but
equality to itself in motion, or else it is reflexion in itself...
The T or becoming in general is, owing to its simplicity,
precisely the immediate in the process of becoming and
the immediate itself.&quot;^^116^^ (In real cognition, however,
there is always, in a definite sense, a unity of the
immediate and the mediating elements in knowledge. This
unity does not in itself guarantee the truth of knowledge.)</p>

<p>     In the final analysis, Hegel reduces the essence of any
cognition to reflexion. Insofar as the object of reflexion
changes in the course of the latter, Hegel concludes that
cognition deals with an object which is a product of the
Absolute Spirit itself. Hegel<em>'s Phenomenology of the Spirit</em>
is the story of the struggle of self-consciousness with the
object, as a result of which the object proves to be a
proper moment of Absolute self-consciousness. &quot;As it
drives itself towards true existence, it will reach a point
where it will discard the appearance of being encumbered
with the foreign which exists only for and in the capacity
of another, or where appearance will be equal to the
essence, its presentation coincides thereby with precisely
this point of the science of the spirit properly speaking;
and finally, as it captures this its being itself, it will express
the nature of absolute knowledge itself.&quot;^^11^^'</p>

<p>     ``The main point is,&quot; wrote Marx, &quot;that the <em>object of
consciousness</em> is nothing else but <em>self-consciousness</em>, or
that the object is only <em>objectified self-consciousness---</em>
self-consciousness as object. (Positing of man= self--

<p>     ``The issue, therefore, is to surmount <em>the object of
consciousness. Objectivity</em> as such is regarded as an <em>estranged</em>
human relationship which does not correspond to the


<em>essence of man</em>, to self-consciousness. The <em>reappropriation</em>
of the objective essence of man, produced within the orbit
of estrangement as something alien, therefore denotes not
only the annulment of <em>estrangement</em>, but of <em>objectivity</em> as
well. Man, that is to say, is regarded as a <em>non-objective</em>,
<em>spiritual</em> being.&quot;^^118^^</p>

<p>     As Lenin wrote: &quot;Hegel seriously 'believed', thought,
that materialism as a philosophy was impossible, for
philosophy is a science of thinking, of the <em>universal</em>, but
the universal is a thought. Here he repeated the error of
the same subjective idealism that he always called 'bad'

<p>     Thus, although Hegelian philosophy grasps a number of
important moments of the real cognitive process, on many
fundamental issues it reveals an affinity to the
epistemological position of philosophical transcendentalism;
remaining within the limitations of idealism, it cannot give
an adequate picture of cognition.</p>

<br /> POSSIBLE?</b>

<p>     In the light of what has been said here let us attempt to
answer the following question: what are the
properties of epistemological reflexion? In other words, what is
the nature and character of research which has cognition
itself for its object?</p>

<p>     We have already analysed some conceptions, widely
spread in bourgeois philosophy, according to which
epistemology does not assume any premises, as the very
possibility of any knowledge, including scientific knowledge,
must be substantiated in its framework. Substantiation is
in this case understood as finding types of knowledge that
would be absolutely reliable and directly given in their
content. The adherents of these conceptions searched for
this knowledge in individual consciousness. We may recall
that it was this course of reasoning that was
characteristic of epistemological transcendentalism, in particular of
Descartes, Fichte, and Husserl. In this conception, &quot;
absolute&quot;, transcendental reflexion about the content of the
subject's consciousness becomes a method of
epistemological research, and &quot;absolute knowledge&quot;, its result.
Absolute knowledge can only be obtained within the
framework of epistemplogy. All other kinds of knowledge,
both everyday and scientific, are relative and conditional
from the standpoint of transcendentalism.</p>

<p>     But that means that epistemology becomes a rather


specific discipline basically different from the particular
scientific theories. (Some transcendentalists, such as
Husserl, believe that epistemology, being the foundation of
scientific knowledge, is not itself a theory in the precise
meaning of the term, but a kind of pre-thepretical
description of the immediately given obvious entities.)</p>

<p>     The supporters of this approach to epistemological
problems differ in their understanding of the very nature
and content of the obvious entities which are, in their
view, directly given to the subject's consciousness. This
general type of understanding of epistemological problems
also includes some trends of subjectivist empiricism, in
particular, such schools of bourgeois philosophy as
neorealism and critical realism.</p>

<p>     The situation is somewhat more complicated in the case
of the epistemological conceptions of such philosophers as
Kant and particularly Hegel, who go beyond the limits of
this approach in some essential aspects.</p>

<p>     However, in the view of Kant and Hegel, too,
philosophical epistemological reflexion is concerned with obtaining
&quot;absolute&quot; knowledge, unlike studies in the special
scientific disciplines and reflexion in these areas.</p>

<p>     As a reaction to the breakdown of the attempts to solve
the problem of substantiating knowledge in its
metaphysical (and as a rule, subjectivist) interpretation, the view now
gains currency in bourgeois philosophy that this problem
has no meaning at all, and that epistemology therefore
loses its right to exist as a special philosophical discipline.
All real problems pertaining to understanding the
mechanisms and character of the cognitive processes are studied,
from this point of view, by the special scientific
disciplines. Thus, according to Quine, cognition is the
subjectmatter of scientific inquiry in the framework of the
physiology of higher nervous activity, psychology, which uses
the apparatus of information theory, and a number of
other special scientific disciplines. A scientific
epistemology (which in Quine's view has not yet been created)
is only conceivable as a generalisation of the results of
these special disciplines. This future science must take a
naturalistic and biological approach to man and his
cognitive process (the so-called naturalised epistemology).^^120^^
Jean Piaget believes that the genetic epistemology he has
constructed is a generalisation, on the one hand, of the
empirical and theoretical data of psychology (mostly of
Piaget's own psychological theory) and, on the other hand,
of the data of the history of science.^^1^^21 In this
conception, epistemology actually appears as a special scientific
discipline of a certain kind: first, a rather general


discipline, and second, one dependent on other, more special
sciences of cognition. (We ignore here the fact that
psychology itself may be treated in quite different ways: both as
an empirical science of the facts of consciousness and as
a science of behaviour---in the spirit of behaviourism.)</p>

<p>     From the standpoint of early Wittgenstein, the
traditional theory of knowledge was merely an inadequate
interpretation of psychological data in terms of
philosophy. As distinct from psychology, Wittgenstein believed,
genuine philosophy must be concerned with the study of
language and not cognition: &quot;4.1121 Psychology is no
nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural
science. The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of

<p>     The school of linguistic analysis, which is dominant in
the modern bourgeois philosophy of England, the
formation of which was strongly affected by the later
works of Wittgenstein, adheres to a special position in the
interpretation of the nature of epistemological research,
one that is intermediate between the reduction of this
research to empirical generalisation of certain objectified
data and the position, analysed above, which posits the
task of epistemology to be the analysis of the premises of
any knowledge, including scientific knowledge. The
philosophy of linguistic analysis insists, on the one hand, on the
possibility and necessity of solving the philosophical
problems of cognition through studying the entirely
objective and generally accepted facts of the usage of words of
the ordinary language. This study is only made possible
by painstaking collective effort of many specialists, each
of whom specifies and particularises the empirical results
already obtained by applying special technical procedures.
The work of an analytical philosopher reminds one, in
many respects, of the work of a researcher engaged in
some special science. This philosophy declares most
problems of traditional epistemology, the problem of
substantiating knowledge among them, to be pseudoproblems.
On the other hand, the philosophy of linguistic analysis
emphasises that it is the usage of everyday language that
determines the semantic, or content, aspects of all the
special scientific theories, in particular the theories of
those sciences which study the processes of cognition.
These sciences, psychology included, cannot in
principle solve a single philosophical question pertaining to the
understanding of knowledge and cognition, analytical
philosophers believe. Epistemological problems are solved
in analytical activity which in itself is not scientific, for it
encompasses issues that are involved in all the sciences, and


is basically a-theoretical. The results of analysis, these
philosophers insist, cannot be juxtaposed with experience
in the same way as special scientific theories, for analysis
deals with the structure of experience itself. Everyday
language, which is the object of activity of an analytical
philosopher, appears as a kind of primary givenness
determining the content of all the types and modes of
cognition. It is therefore not surprising that the activity of
analytical philosophers manifests a certain affinity with
philosophical transcendentalism, in particular phenomenology
and Kantian philosophy, an affinity that is often realised
by the analytical philosophers themselves.^^123^^ Several
Soviet philosophers have criticised the epistemological
conception of the philosophy of linguistic analysis.^^12^^*</p>

<p>     However, is it possible to reveal the true nature of
knowledge and cognition through simple inductive
generalisation and systematisation of the conceptions of
cognition formed in everyday life and in the separate sciences?
The notions of the character of cognition, of the
standards, criteria, and norms of knowledge, considerably vary
not only in the transition from pre-scientific knowledge to
scientific and from science to science: they also vary
within the framework of a single scientific discipline in its
historical development. Indeed, one of the essential tasks
of epistemology is separating knowledge from absence of
knowledge and establishing the standards of knowledge
and cognition. It proves to be impossible to solve this task
through elementary accumulation and systematisation of
the varied facts of cognition, including those studied by
psychology. Epistemology does not simply study the
cognitive process in its actual implementation but sets
down the general norms of cognitive activity.</p>

<p>     Pointing out this fundamental fact, Popper rejects in his
book <em>The Logic of Scientific Discovery</em> the naive
naturalistic epistemology (which he also calls an &quot;inductive theory
of science&quot;) trying to describe the empirical behaviour of
scientists. In actual fact, Popper says, epistemology is a
general methodology of cognition. It does not describe
what actually takes place in cognition but rather stipulates
what requirements cognition must satisfy to agree with
certain norms and ideals. According to Popper, a specialist
in epistemology formulates the general norms of cognitive,
and in the first place scientific, activity, and formulates
certain proposals which are accepted purely
conventionally. What cognition is, and what science is, is settled by
agreement and not by empirical study. The character of
the agreement determines the boundary between
statements which express knowledge and those that do not. In


Popper's view, the specialist in epistemology (or
methodology) formulates certain &quot;absolute&quot; prescriptions in the
sense that their content is not prompted by empirical
experience. These prescriptions, however, do not describe
any specific supra-empirical reality, as transcendentalist
philosophers believed, and neither do they express any
absolute truths. They are not assertions in the strict sense,
and therefore they cannot be either true or false. Some
epistemological conventions can be replaced by others.
Epistemology reveals connections between different
epistemological (methodological) norms, resembling in this
respect a scientific theory. Strictly speaking, however,
epistemology (methodology) is not a theory, according to
Popper, for it does not reflect any object.125</p>

<p>     What is one to be guided by, then, in accepting some
epistemological (methodological) system or other? If the
choice is not determined either by empirical experience or
the structure of transcendental consciousness,
epistemological conventions can be absolutely arbitrary. In what way
is then one epistemological system better than another? Or
must they all be recognised as acceptable? In this case, all
argument in epistemology is meaningless, all
epistemological problems cease to be real problems, while their
different solutions prove to be simply camouflaged proposals
for rules of some sort of a game which we call cognition.
Popper rejects these subjectivist and relativistic
conclusions which follow from his epistemological
conceptions.^^126^^ He believes that there are certain criteria which
compel the choice of one epistemological system over
another. Among these criteria Popper includes the absence
of contradictions in the system of epistemology and the
extent to which the given system proves to be fruitful,
facilitating the understanding of cognition as it actually
occurs.127 It is easy to see, however, that these criteria
are, on the one hand, quite inadequate (even a most
arbitrary and fantastic construction may be internally
noncontradictory) and indefinite, and, on the other, they may
contradict the basic principles of Popper's conception (an
epistemological system has to be correlated, in one way or
another, with actually existing cognition).</p>

<p>     Still, how is the question of the nature and character
of epistemological research solved? In searching for an
answer to this question that would conform to the
principles of dialectical materalist philosophy, let us note, first
of all, that scientific epistemology is a theory which deals
with actual empirical facts of cognition and attempts to
study the varied forms, kinds, and types of cognition and
knowledge (both scientific and pre-scientific) in terms of


their inherent standards and norms. In the first place,
epistemology is oriented at analysing objectified kinds of
knowledge and collective forms of cognitive activity, for
it is these kinds of knowledge and cognition that reflect
the cognitive norms in the most pure form. That means
that scientific epistemology appears mostly as a form of
objective reflexion. At the same time, epistemology also
has to take into account, to some extent, the facts of
individual consciousness (here the cognitive norms appear in
a &quot;transmuted form&quot;), inasmuch as other empirically
accessible paths of the reconstruction of certain cognitive
standards are often absent.</p>

<p>     A scientific theory of knowledge must thus necessarily
be compared with the empirical data of cognition. But,
just as any scientific theory, it does not merely passively
reproduce or describe these empirical data but endeavours
to reveal the essence of the process considered. For
epistemology that means the singling out of such cognitive
standards and norms which express deep characteristics of
cognition and may not directly coincide with the way
these norms are in certain cases understood in everyday
cognition or in a concrete scientific study.</p>

<p>     Epistemology must therefore take into account, in the
first place, the real cognitive processes, correcting its
propositions and specifying and developing them in the
light of the real facts of cognition. The basic principles of
dialectical materialist epistemology (the principle of
reflexion, the principle of unity of practical activity and
cognition, the principle of unity of dialectics, logic, and
epistemology, etc.) do not at all express &quot;absolute&quot; and final
solution to all possible epistemological problems or the
creation of a closed epistemological construction incapable
of development. These principles specify the necessary
conditions of fruitful scientific study of epistemological
problems, a study that never stands still but formulates
and solves new questions and makes more precise certain
propositions through the development of real cognition
itself and the special sciences about it (psychology, the
history of science, the science of science, etc.). At the
same time, scientific epistemology, just as any scientific
discipline, constructs a kind of idealised model of the
process under study, later gradually specifying and
particularising that model, comparing it with the empirical
data of cognition. Thus epistemology is not a product of
direct grasping of certain subjective certainties, and neither
is it a simple description of the diverse facts of cognition.
Still less can epistemology coincide with some special
science of cognition, whether it be psychology or the


science of science.</p>

<p>     Although epistemology is in some basic aspects similar
to all the other scientific theories, it differs in some points
from most theories. We must not forget that epistemology
is a reflective theory.</p>

<p>     Most scientific theories deal with objects of which they
have no previous knowledge. No science can ignore the
data of everyday experience, of course, but the
development of scientific knowledge means going beyond the
limits of this experience. The latter says nothing of the
nature of those objects with which, for instance, modern
physics deals. The knowledge of these objects is only
acquired in the process of scientific research itself. A
reflective theory, however, has, as we have noted, some
preliminary, implicit knowledge of the object about which
it formulates explicit knowledge. Epistemology as a
reflective theory proceeds from an implicit knowledge of
what knowledge and cognition are and what the basic
cognitive norms are, i.e., it begins with implicit knowledge
which is contained in individual consciousness, in everyday
language, and in the paradigmal premises of scientific

<p>     At the same time reflexion about knowledge, translation
of the latter from its implicit into explicit form, and its
theoretical formulation, involve certain changes of the very
object of reflexion, revealing the imaginary character of
some formations which were included in knowledge
without proper foundation before the implementation of
the procedure itself. We have already cited examples of
reformulation of the object of reflexion as a result of this
procedure in the special sciences. Epistemology differs
from reflexion in the special sciences in that it tries to
establish the necessary conditions for any cognition and
universal cognitive norms. The links between an
epistemological system and a certain particular theory of a special
science are therefore rather mediated. Nevertheless,
formulation of an epistemological conception is always an
attempt not merely to state the existing practice of
cognition but also to change this practice, to reject certain
established canons of cognitive activity as distracting
cognition from the attainment of its goal, and at the same
time to introduce new standards of this activity. The
general image of cognition and science created by epistemology
is itself included in the real course of cognition and in
certain respects restructures it. Therefore any serious,
influential epistemological conceptions are not only an
interpretation of the existing practice of cognition but also
a critique of some aspects of this practice in the light of


some ideals of knowledge and science.</p>

<p>     Thus, a certain gap between the model of knowledge
constructed in epistemology and the actual cognitive
practice is explained not only by the differences between any
scientific theory and its empirical basis. As far as these
differences are concerned, epistemology should strive
for a greater assimilation of empirical data, it must be
revised and made more precise. At the same time, the
differences between epistemology and the corresponding
empirical practices of cognition may mark a gap between
the specified ideal of knowledge and the practice of its
realisation. In the latter case, practice, the empirical
givenness of cognition, must be restructured and brought
to the level of the ideal.</p>

<p>     The above does not mean that all epistemological
systems (and there have been quite a number of these in the
history of philosophy) could affect the actual course of
cognition. We must not assume either, that this influence
was necessarily fruitful wherever it occurred. Situations
were not infrequent in the history of philosophical and
scientific thought where a given epistemological
conception specified a reference frame for the production of
special scientific theories of a definite type and at the same
time an entirely erroneous conception of the nature of
cognition, knowledge and science, which resulted in an
insoluble collision in the construction of a general
epistemological conception, essentially limiting at the same time
the possibilities of science itself. For instance, the
epistemological empiricism of Bacon played a very progressive
role at the time of the formation of experimental science.
At the same time, it did not accord with the actual
practice of contemporary natural science and later became
a drag on its development. We have already discussed
some substantive defects of Descartes' epistemological
conception. It cannot be ignored, however, that Descartes'
epistemology serves as a basis of his metaphysics, while the
latter is the nucleus of a research programme in physics
and in psychology. Some historically important results
were attained in Cartesian physics. Considerable factual
material was accumulated within the framework of
empirical psychology, though this psychology outlived its
usefulness as a scientific discipline by the beginning of the
20th century. The epistemology of Kant, a critic of which
was given above, did not merely formulate a general
research strategy in several theoretical disciplines (for
example, Kant's epistemology posits the impossibility of
rationalist ontology, a special status of psychology as a
non-mathematised science, the need for


complementing biological descriptions with teleological ones, etc.).
Kant's conception (along with Husserl's phenomenology)
was used by Brouwer and Heyting in constructing the
intuitionist programme for the foundations of
mathematics. Some important results were obtained in
mathematical intuitionism, although on the whole this trend failed
to solve the task it set itself. It is well known, however,
that Kant's aprioristic interpretation of the basic principles
of classical science came into a sharp collision with the
development of cognition.</p>

<p>     There are other instances, too, of the influence of
epistemological conceptions on the development of
science. An epistemological system may be completely
inadequate as reflexion about scientific knowledge,
offering an entirely false image of science and being quite
untenable on the general philosophical plane. At the same
time, such a system is used for the production of some
local special scientific theories which retain a certain value
even after their philosophical interpretation is rejected.
That is possible because some aspects of the real cognitive
process are usually grasped even in false epistemological
constructions. But the special scientific theories produced
in such cases are usually of very limited significance. At
the same time, the main paths of scientific development
are here obstructed by false epistemological constructions,
and the development of theoretical thought in this area
is on the whole deflected. That was the situation, e.g., with
the epistemology of operationalism and the physical
theories constructed according to operationalist prescriptions.</p>

<p>     The epistemology of dialectical materialism is specific
in that it provides, for the first time, an adequate picture
of cognition, knowledge, and science. And that means that
the impact of this image of cognition on the actual
development of science must result in extremely
significant results. The history of Marxist philosophy and
its relationships with the natural and social sciences
confirms this idea. Marx's <em>Capital</em>, which embodies the
scientific theory of political economy, was created on the
basis of conscious application of the dialectical materialist
epistemology and methodology of science.</p>

<p>     Relying on a scientific conception of the nature of
theoretical thinking and consciously employing the
philosophically substantiated method of ascending from
the abstract to the concrete, Marx constructed a scientific
economic theory, formulating in detail the methodological
problems arising in theoretical research and consistently
solving them on the basis of general epistemological
principles. Marx criticised bourgeois political economy not


just by comparing the content of a scientific theory with
distorted interpretations of the same subject-matter, but
through consistent refutation of basically erroneous
methodological approaches. The main defect of bourgeois
political economy, which predetermined its basically
unscientific quality and was directly linked with its social
function, was, as Marx showed, a false interpretation of
both the nature of the object cognized and of the ways
and methods of scientific cognition. Therefore a change in
methodological and epistemological orientation is a
necessary condition of creating a scientific political

<p>     The epistemological ideas worked out by Lenin in his
<em>Materialism and Empirio-Criticism</em> (the entire complex of
ideas of the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection, the
scientific conception of matter, of image, the dialectics of
relative and absolute truth, the thesis of the
inexhaustibility of matter &quot;in depth&quot;, the thesis of reflection as a
property of all matter, etc.) were adopted by modern
science (physics, biology, physiology, psychology,
cybernetics, etc.), and proved to be exceptionally fruitful. One
of the traits of the modern stage in the development of
science is the consciously realised need for including
general epistemological ideas (of which the scientific basis is
Marxist-Leninist epistemology) into the production of
theories in the special areas of knowledge. Modern science
has reached a stage in its development when its further
advance demands the weaving of self-reflexion into the
very fabric of scientific research. That is the basis for an
ever increasing interaction between philosophical, in
particular epistemological, and special scientific knowledge.</p>



<p>     The approaches to the analysis of the cognitive relation,
characteristic of pre-Marxian and non-Marxist philosophy,
prove to be internally untenable and contradict the
practice of modern cognition. Whether cognition is interpreted
as mere interaction of two natural systems or as determined
by the structure of individual consciousness, in both
cases the very mode of formulating and discussing the
problem under consideration predetermines the
fruitlessness of the researcher's thinking, leading to false results.</p>

<p>     Within the framework of the first approach, correct
materialist premises (the subject and the object being
considered as definite material systems with real material
links between them) go side by side with implications
which lead the study of some basic epistemological
questions into a blind alley, and compel metaphysical
materialists to make serious concessions to subjectivism on a
number of points.</p>

<p>     Idealistic conceptions which assume that cognition is
conditioned by the structure of individual consciousness,
exploit for their own ends the problem of substantiating
knowledge and the need for establishing norms which serve
as criteria for separating knowledge from absence of it. In
discussing the problem of substantiation of knowledge, the
upholders of this approach proceed from two false
assumptions which predetermine the subjectivist nature of
their epistemological conceptions. The first is the
metaphysical notion about the existence of standards
permitting one to draw a distinct boundary between knowledge
and absence of knowledge and to single out &quot;absolute
knowledge&quot; in pure form which could be used as the
foundation of the entire system of scientific theories. The
second is that the adherents of the idealistic conceptions
considered here, assuming that raising the problem of
substantiation implies a critical attitude to the various
kinds of existing knowledge, arrive at the conclusion that
the philosophical analysis of the cognitive relation should
reject any reliance on the results of the special sciences or
the propositions of the pre-scientific &quot;common sense&quot;.</p>

<p>     The dialectical materialist conception of the cognitive
relation, apart from answering the questions which confuse


non-Marxist epistemology, sets tasks and problems before
epistemology which do not exist for traditional bourgeois
philosophy. Marxist-Leninist epistemology makes its
starting point the recognition of the unity of reflection,
of practical object-oriented activity and communication,
and the conception of cognition as a socially mediated and
historically developing activity of reflection.</p>

<p>     Marxist philosophy asserts that cognition is founded on
practical activity and that the latter must be understood in
its specifically human characteristics, to wit, as collective
or joint activity, in which the individual enters upon
definite relations with other persons, as mediated activity in
which man places between himself and an external
naturally emerging object other man-made objects functioning as
the implements of activity; and finally, as a historically
developing activity carrying in itself its own history. In
the objects that are cognized, man singles out those
features that prove to be essential for the developing social
practice, and that is only possible through mediator
objects implementing socio-historical experiences.
Man-made instruments act as the forms of expressing
objective norms, standards, and object-hypotheses existing
outside a given individual. The assimilation of these norms,
social in their origin, by the individual, makes possible
their functioning as structure-forming components of

<p>     The internal processes of consciousness emerge as the
consequence of their interiorisation, that is, &quot;growing in&quot;
or transposition onto the inner plane of those actions of
the subject which are originally implemented in an
external form and directed at external objects. At the start
of the formation of consciousness, three kinds of activity
emerge as linked together: external practical activity, the
process of cognition, and communication. In
implementing one and the same object-oriented action, the subject
simultaneously performs a number of functions---he
changes the form of the external object, performs the
act of cognitive orientation and assimilates the socially
moulded ways of practical and cognitive activity
embodied in the object which he uses as a mediator object. The
assimilation of adequate modes of manipulating a socially
functioning object is only possible if the subject is
included in the living communicative connections with
other persons, who teach him methods of using man-made
things and thereby shape his cultural orientations and
norms, including the standards of cognitive activity. At
the stage of well-formed consciousness, the direct links
between practical activity, cognition and communication


are disrupted. At the same time, any cognitive activity,
whatever the form of its direct subjective givenness, is
socially mediated in the basic mechanisms of its
realisation, and consequently always carries the potential of
communicating. Therefore, as far as epistemological
research, i.e., the discovery of universal referential
meanings, norms and standards, is concerned, the most
suitable material for analysis is precisely the processes,
means, and products of communicative activity, in which
cognition is reified and objectified, and not the
phenomena of consciousness taken as such, in which these
referential meanings and standards appear in &quot;converted&quot;
or &quot;folded&quot; form, so to speak, and are not always
sufficiently. clear to the subject himself. In the Marxist
philosophical conception, the process of transmission of
knowledge implies objectification of knowledge not only
in the form of texts or utterances but also in the form of
man-made objects carrying socio-cultural meaning.</p>

<p>     Marxist-Leninist epistemology radically reorientates the
traditional epistemological problems and fundamentally
changes the very manner of positing and studying them.
The starting point of analysis of knowledge is not taken to
be the study of the relation of the individual subject
(whether it be organism or consciousness) to the opposing
object but the study of the functioning and development
of systems of collective, inter-subject activity based on
practical transformation of external objects.</p>

<p>     The Marxist-Leninist conception of the nature of
cognition entails a number of propositions important for further
study of problems in scientific epistemology and at the
same time opening up the possibility of scientific
interpretation of numerous questions widely discussed in
modern works on the methodology of science, Scientology,
and the psychology of cognition.</p>

<p>     The task of epistemology does not at all consist in the
solution of a metaphysically interpreted problem of &quot;
absolute&quot; substantiation of knowledge. The real substantiation
of knowledge is attained in the process of actual
development of cognition itself in its union with practical activity.
The development of cognition involves a complicated
dialectical interaction of discreteness and continuity or
cohesion. This mutual relation is one of the aspects of the
connection between absolute and relative moments in
objective truth, which was analysed in classical form by
Lenin. Scientific epistemology is an integral and special
part of cognition. Neither the individual nor the collective
subjects of cognition are the supreme guarantors of this
substantiation. It may be said, of course, that scientific


epistemology is objective reflexion about the collective
cognizing subject. The latter, however, is not a complete
entity equal to itself, not a world of consciousness closed
in itsell, but a System of constantly developing collective
cognitive activity closely linked with practical object--
oriented activity. Therefore, the proper field of
study is, first of all, the development of cognitive norms
the phflogenesis and ontogenesis of cognition in their
dialectical unity. The development of cognition implies also
changes in the cognizing subjects, both collective and
individual, and in the range of cognized objects. At the
same time, it encompasses the development of certain
cognitive standards, and consequently the development of
some characteristics of cognition itself.</p>



<p>     <em>Introduction</em></p>

<p>~^^1^^ See, e.g., B. M. Kedrov, <em>Lenin and the Dialectics of the Natural
Science of the 20th Century</em>, Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^2^^ See P. S. Dyshleviy, <em>Materialist Dialectics and Physical Relativism</em>,
Kiev, 1972, pp. 22--23 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Niels Bohr, &quot;Quantum Physics and Philosophy. Causality and
Complementarity&quot;, <em>Philosophy in the Mid-Century. A Survey</em>, ed.
by Raymond Klibansky, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1958,
p. 311.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ V. A. Fok, <em>Quantum Physics and the Structure of Matter</em>,
Leningrad, 1965, p. 11 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     6 Stephen Cole Kleene, <em>Introduction to Metamathematics</em>,
NorthHolland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1952, p. 48.</p>

<p>~^^6^^ Ibid., p. 51.</p>

<p>~^^7^^ <em>SeeMathematischesZeitschrift,No</em>. 10,1921.</p>

<p>~^^8^^ See W V. O. Quine, <em>Ontological Relativity and Other Essays</em>,
New York, 1969.</p>

<p>~^^9^^ See N. Chomsky, <em>Cartesian Linguistics</em>, New York, 1966; idem,
&quot;Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas&quot;, <em>Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science</em>, Vol. Ill, Dordrecht, 1967.</p>

<p>~^^10^^ See Th. Kuhn, <em>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</em>, Chicago,

<p>~^^11^^ <em>Lenin's Theory of Reflection and Modern Science</em> in 3 Vols,
Sofia 1973 (ed. by T. Pavlov); S. L. Rubinstein, <em>Being and
Consciousness</em>, Moscow, 1957; idem, &quot;Man and the World &quot;, in <em>Problems
of General Psychology</em>, Moscow, 1976; P. V. Kopnin, <em>Dialectics as
Logic,'</em> Kiev, 1961; idem, <em>Introduction into Marxist Epistemology</em>,
Kiev, 1966; idem, <em>Dialectics, Logic, Science</em>, Moscow, 1973; idem,
<em>Dialectics as Logic and Epistemology</em>, Moscow, 1973; B. M. Kedrov,
<em>The Unity of Dialectics, Logic, and Epistemology</em>, Moscow, 1963;
idem, <em>Lenin and the Dialectics of Natural Science in the 20th
Century;</em> idem, <em>From the Laboratory of Lenin's Thought</em>, Moscow,
1972; E V. Ilyenkov, <em>On Idols and Ideals</em>, Moscow, 1968; idem,
<em>Dialectical Logic</em>, Moscow, 1974; A. M. Korshunov, <em>The Theory of
Reflection and Creativity</em>, Moscow, 1971; idem, <em>Cognition and
Activity</em>, Moscow, 1967; A. M. Korshunov, V. V. Mantatov, <em>The
Theory of Reflection and the Heuristic Role of Signs</em>, Moscow,
1974; V. S. Tyukhtin, <em>On the Nature of the Image (Psychical
Reflection in the Light of Cybernetic Ideas</em>), Moscow, 1963; idem, <em>
Reflection, Systems, Cybernetics: The Theory of Reflection in the Light of
Cybernetics and the Systems Approach</em>, Moscow, 1972; A. G.
Spirkin, <em>The Origin of Consciousness</em>, Moscow, 1960; idem, <em>
Consciousness and Self-Consciousness</em>, Moscow, 1972; V. I. Shinkaruk, <em>The
Unity of Dialectics, Logic, and Epistemology. An Introduction into
Dialectical Logic</em>, Kiev, 1977; Zh. M. Abdildin, A. S. Balgimbayev,
<em>The Dialectics of the Subject's Activeness in Scientific Cognition</em>,


Alma-Ata, 1977; L. K. Naumenko, <em>Monism as a Principle of
Dialectical Logic</em>, Alma-Ata, 1968; N. V. Duchenko, <em>The Problem of the
Object in the Marxist-Leninist Epistemology</em>, Precis of a doctoral
dissertation, Kiev, 1970; A. P. Sheptulin, <em>A System of the Categories
of Dialectics</em>, Moscow, 1967; F. T. Arkhiptsev, &quot;The Topical Aspects
of the Relationship Between Subject and Object&quot;, <em>The
Methodological Aspects of the Study of the Biosphere</em>, Moscow, 1975;
V. F. Kuzmin, <em>The Objective and the Subjective (Analysis of the
Process of Cognition</em>), Moscow, 1976; Z. M. Orudzhev, <em>Dialectics as
a System</em>, Moscow, 1973; V. N. Tipukhin, <em>The Logical Formation of
the Subject</em>, Omsk, 1971; V. S. Bibler, <em>Thinking as Creativity, (
Introduction into the Logic of Mental Dialogue</em>), Moscow, 1975;
K. N. Lyubutin, <em>The Problem of the Subject and Object in
Classical German and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy</em>, Sverdlovsk, 1973;
A. S. Karmin, L A. Maizel, &quot;On the Analysis of the Subject-Object
Relation in Scientific Cognition&quot;, <em>Problems in Epistemology and the
Methodology of Scientific Research</em>, Leningrad, 1969; Yu. F.
Kukhalov, &quot;On the Correlation of the Subjective and the Objective in
the Cognitive Image&quot;, <em>Vpprosy filosofii</em>, No. 5, 1961; <em>The Problem
of the Subject and Object in the History of Philosophy and in
Modern Science</em> (ed. by B. Ya. Pakhomov), Voronezh, 1974;
Sychov N. I., <em>The Objective and the Subjective in Scientific
Cognition</em>, Rostov-on-the-Don, 1974; V. S. Shvyrev, E. G. Yudin, <em>The
Worldview Evaluation of Science: Critique of the Bourgeois
Conceptions of Scientism and Antiscientism</em>, Moscow, 1973; D. P. Gorsky,
<em>Problems in the General Methodology of Sciences and Dialectical
Logic</em>, Moscow, 1966 (all in Russian); E. V. Ilyenkov, <em>The Dialectics
of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's &quot;Capital</em>&quot;, Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1982; F. T. Mikhailov, <em>The Riddle of the Self</em>,
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, etc.</p>

<p>~^^12^^M. E. Omelyanovsky, &quot;On Physical Reality&quot;, <em>Voprosy filosofii</em>,
No. 10, 1971; idem, &quot;The Objective and the Subjective in Quantum
Theory&quot;, <em>Voprosy filosofii</em>, No. 6, 1974; idem, &quot;Philosophical
Debate in Modern Physics Around the Problem of the Objective and
the Subjective&quot;, <em>Voprosy filosofii</em>, No. 2, 1976; P. S. Dyshleviy,
<em>Materialist Dialectics and Physical Relativism;</em> idem, &quot;The
Dialectics of the Correlation of the Object and Subject of Cognition in
Modern Physics&quot;, <em>Voprosy filosofii</em>, No. 6, 1969; V. V. Bazhan,
P. S. Dyshleviy et al.. <em>Dialectical Materialism and the Problem of
Reality in Modem Physics</em>, Kiev, 1974; V. S. Stepin, L. M.
Tomilchik, <em>The Practical Nature of Cognition and the Methodological
Problems of Modem Physics</em>, Minsk, 1970; V. S. Stepin, <em>The
Formation of Scientific Theory</em>, Minsk, 1976; idem, &quot;The Problem of
Subject and Object in Experimental Science&quot;, Voprosy <em>filosofii</em>,
No. 1, 1970; V. V. Kazyutinsky, G. N. Naan, &quot;Epistemology and the
Problems of Modern Astronomy&quot;, <em>Problems in Epistemology</em>,
Issue 1, Moscow, 1969; L. G. Antipenko, <em>The Problem of Physical
Reality. Logico-Epistemological Analysis</em>, Moscow, 1973; V. P. Htitt,
<em>The Conception of Complementarity and the Problem of the
Objectiveness of Physical Knowledge</em>, Tallinn, 1977; V. I. Kuptsov, &quot;The
Problem of Reality of Macroscopic Spontaneous Fluctuations&quot;,
<em>Man, Creativity, Science</em>, Moscow, 1967 (all in Russian); M. E.
Omelyanovsky, <em>Dialectics in Modem Physics</em>, Progress Publishers,


Moscow, 1979, and other works.</p>

<p>~^^13^^ S. L. Rubinstein, <em>The Principles and Paths of the Development of
Psychology</em>, Moscow, 1959; idem, <em>Problems of General Psychology;</em>
A. N. Leontyev, <em>Activity. Consciousness. Personality</em>, Moscow,
1975; P. Ya. Galperin, &quot;The Development of Studies in the
Formation of Mental Actions&quot;, <em>Psychological Science in the USSR</em>, Vol. 1,
Moscow, 1959; idem, &quot;Towards the Study of the Child's
Intellectual Development&quot;, Voprosy <em>psikhologii</em>, No. 1, 1969; idem, <em>
Introduction into Psychology</em>, Moscow, 1976; V. V. Davydov, <em>Types of
Generalisation in Learning</em>, Moscow, 1972; idem, &quot;Analysis of the
Structure of the Cognitive Act&quot;, <em>Doklady APN RSFSR</em>, No. 2,1960;
idem, &quot;The Categories of Logic and Pedagogics&quot;, <em>Problems in
Dialectical Logic: Materials for a Symposium</em>, Alma-Ata, 1968;
A. R. Luriya, <em>On the Historical Development of Cognitive Processes:
An Experimental-Psychological Study</em>, Moscow, 1974; A. V.
Zaporozhets, L. A. Venger, V. P. Zinchenko, A. G. Ruzskaya, <em>
Perception and Action</em>, Moscow, 1967; Ye. V. Shorokhova, <em>The Problem
of Consciousness in Philosophy and Natural Science</em>, Moscow, 1961;
K. A. Abulkhanova, <em>On the Subject of Psychical Activity</em>, Moscow,
1973; idem, <em>The Dialectics of Human Life: The Correlation of the
Philosophical, Methodological, and Concrete Scientific Approaches
to the Problem of the Individual</em>, Moscow, 1977; A. V.
Brushlinsky, <em>A Cultural-Historical Theory of Thinking (Philosophical
Problems of Psychology</em>), Moscow, 1968; M. S. Rogovin, <em>Introduction
into Psychology</em>, Moscow, 1969; M. S. Rogovin, A. B. Solovyov,
L. P. Urvantsev, Sh. Sh. Shotemor, &quot;The Structure of the Psyche and
the Problem of Cognition&quot;, Voprosy <em>filosofii</em>, No. 4, 1977 (all in
Russian); A. N. Leontyev, <em>Problems of the Development of the
Mind</em>, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981; A. I. Meshcheryakov,
<em>Awakening to Life. Forming Behaviour and the Mind in Deaf-Blind
Children</em>, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, and other works.</p>

<p>~^^14^^ V. A. Lektorsky, <em>The Problem of the Subject and Object in
Classical and Modern Bourgeois Philosophy</em>, Moscow, 1965; idem,
&quot;The Subject-Object Problem in Epistemology&quot;, Voprosy <em>filosofii</em>,
No. 5, 1964; idem, &quot;The Principles of Reproduction of the Object
in Knowledge&quot;, Voprosy <em>filosofii</em>, No. 4, 1967; idem, &quot;Lenin's
Conception of the Dialectics of Subject and Object&quot;, <em>Kommunist</em>,
No. 6, 1967; idem, &quot;The Unity of the Empirical and Theoretical in
Scientific Cognition&quot;, <em>Dialectics as Epistemology. Problems in
Scientific Method</em>, Moscow, 1964; the articles on &quot;Experience&quot; &quot;Object&quot;,
&quot;Subject&quot;, &quot;Subjective&quot;, Epistemology&quot; in the <em>Philosophical
Encyclopedia</em>, Moscow, Vol. 4, 1967, Vol. 5, 1970; idem, &quot;Materialist
Dialectics as the Methodological Basis of Scientific Cognition&quot;,
<em>Kommunist</em>, No. 7, 1971, (jointly with P. V. Kopnin); idem. &quot;The
Methodological Analysis of Science (Types and Levels)&quot;, <em>
Philosophy, Methodology, Science</em>, Moscow, 1972 (jointly with V. S.
Shvyrev), idem, &quot;Philosophy and the Scientific Method&quot;, <em>Philosophy in
the Modem World. Philosophy and Science</em>, Moscow, 1972; idem,
&quot;On the Subjective and the Objective&quot;, Some <em>Problems of
Dialectics</em>, Issue VII, Moscow, 1973; idem, &quot;The Problem of the Subject
and Object in the Epistemology of Hegel and Marx&quot;, <em>The Philosophy
of Hegel and Modern Times</em>, Moscow, 1973; idem, &quot;Lenin's
Development of Dialectics as Logic and Epistemology&quot;, <em>The History of</em>


<em>Marxist Dialectics: The Leninist Stage</em>, Moscow, 1973 (jointly with
A. Kh. Kasymjanov); idem, &quot;Philosophy, Science, 'The Philosophy
of Science' &quot;, Voprosy <em>filosofii</em>, No. 4,1973; idem, &quot;Philosophy and
Science in the Light of the Scientific and Technological
Revolution&quot;, <em>Man---Science---Technology</em>, Moscow, 1973, and other works. 
~^^15^^ The history of the formulation and discussion of the problem of
subject and object is considered in our works <em>The Problem of the
Subject and Object in Classical and Modern Bourgeois Philosophy;</em>
&quot;Epistemology&quot;, <em>Philosophical Encyclopedia</em>, Vol. 5.</p>

<p>     Part <em>One</em></p>

<p>~^^1^^ J. Locke, <em>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</em>, The
Harvester Press, Sussex, 1978, p. 288.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ For a critique of representationism see also S. L. Rubinstein,
<em>Being and Consciousness</em>, p. 34; A. N. Leontyev, <em>Activity.
Consciousness. Personality</em>, pp. 60, 130; idem, &quot;The Image and the
Model&quot;, Voprosy <em>psikhologii</em>, No. 2, 1970; V. A. Lektorsky, <em>The
Problem of the Subject and Object in Classical and Modem
Bourgeois Philosophy</em> pp. 84--94; A. V. Brushlinsky, &quot;On Some Methods
of Modelling in Psychology&quot;, <em>Methodological and Theoretical
Problems of Psychology</em>, Moscow, 1969, pp. 148--254; A. M. Korshunov,
<em>The Theory of Reflection and Creativity</em>, Moscow, 1971, pp. 89--118;
idem, &quot;The Problem of Correlation of the So-Called Primary and
Secondary Properties&quot;, <em>Man, Creativity, Science. Philosophical
Problems</em>, Moscow, 1967 (all in Russian); F. T. Mikhailov, <em>The Riddle
of the Self</em>.</p>

<p>     <em>^^3^^</em> Bertrand Russell, <em>Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits</em>, George
Allen and Unwin LTD, London, 1951, p. 245.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ Jean Piaget, <em>The Psychology of Intelligence</em>, Routledge &amp; Kegan
Paul Limited, London, 1947, p. 4.</p>

<p>~^^5^^ Ibid., p. 8.</p>

<p>~^^6^^ Ibid.</p>

<p>~^^7^^ Ibid., p. 9.</p>

<p>~^^8^^ Ibid., p. 10.</p>

<p>~^^9^^ Ibid., p. 11.</p>

<p>~^^10^^ In outlining the stages in intellect formation we draw mostly on
the work by J. Piaget, B. Inhelder &quot;Die Psychologic der friihen
Kindheit. Die geistige Entwicklung von der Geburt bis zum 7.
Lebensjahr&quot;, <em>Handbuch der Psychologic</em>, Hrsg. D. und R. Katz,
BaselStuttgart, 1960, pp. 275--314.</p>

<p>~^^11^^ Ibid p. 285.</p>

<p>~^^12^^ See Jean Piaget, <em>Introduction a I'epistemologie genetique</em>, Vols.
I-III, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1950.</p>

<p>~^^13^^ See Jean Piaget, &quot;The Role of Action in the Formation of
Thinking&quot;, Voprosy <em>psikhologii</em>, No. 6,1965, p. 43 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     1^^4^^ Max Born, <em>Physics in My Generation</em>, Pergamon Press, London,
1956, p. 163.</p>

<p>~^^15^^ Ibid., p. 157.</p>

<p>~^^16^^ For a more detailed discussion of invariance as an indicator of
objective knowledge see S. L. Rubinstein, <em>Being and Consciousness</em>,
pp. 125--126; M. E. Omelyanovsky, <em>V. I. Lenin and the Philosophical</em>


<em>Problems of Modem Physics</em>, Moscow, 1958; idem, &quot;Dialectical
Materialism as the Methodological Basis of Modern Physics&quot;, <em>
Filosofskiye nauki</em>, No. 1, 1965; V. A. Lektorsky, <em>The. Problem of the
Subject and Object in Classical and Modem Bourgeois Philosophy</em>,
pp. 66--84; idem, &quot;On the Subjective and the Objective&quot;, <em>Some
Problems of Dialectics</em>, Issue VII; V. S. Tyukhtin, <em>Reflection, Systems,
Cybernetics..., pp</em>. 107--112 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^17^^ See Jean Piaget, <em>Introduction a repistemologie genetique</em>, Vol. I.</p>

<p>~^^18^^ See L. Apostel, B. Mandelbrot et J. Piaget, <em>Logique et equilibre</em>,
Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1957, p. 44.</p>

<p>~^^19^^ Jean Piaget, <em>Introduction a repistemologie genetique</em>, Vol.11,
p. 42.</p>

<p>     20 p. w. Bridgman, <em>The Logic of Modern Physics</em>, The Macmillan
Company, New York, 1954, p. 1.</p>

<p>~^^21^^ Ibid., p. 5.</p>

<p>~^^22^^ Ibid., pp. 5, 6.</p>

<p>~^^23^^ Ibid., p. 10.</p>

<p>~^^24^^ A. Cornelius Benjamin, <em>Operationism</em>, Charles C. Thomas,
Publisher Springfield, 1955, p. 67.</p>

<p>     25 p. w. Bridgman, &quot;Some General Principles of Operational
Analysis&quot;, <em>Psychological Review</em>, Vol. 52, No. 5. September 1945, p. 248.</p>

<p>     26 &quot;From the operational point of view it is meaningless to attempt
to separate 'nature' from 'knowledge of nature'.&quot; (P. W. Bridgman,
<em>The Logic of Modern Physics</em>, p. 62.)</p>

<p>~^^27^^ P. W. Bridgman, <em>The Nature of Physical Theory</em>, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1936, pp. 13--14, 15.</p>

<p>~^^28^^ P. W. Bridgman <em>The Intelligent Individual and Society</em>, The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1938, p. 80.</p>

<p>~^^29^^ See V. Lenzen, &quot;Operational Theory in Elementary Physics&quot;,
<em>American Physical Teacher</em>, Vol. 7,1939, p. 367.</p>

<p>     30 &quot;The Present State of Operationalism&quot;, <em>The Scientific Monthly</em>,
Vol. 79, No. 4, October 1954, pp. 209--231.</p>

<p>~^^31^^ Adolf Griinbaum, &quot;Operationism and Relativity&quot;, <em>The Scientific
Monthly</em>, Vol. 79, No. 4, October 1954, p. 230.</p>

<p>~^^32^^ D. P. Gorsky, &quot;On the Kinds of Definitions and Their
Significance in Science&quot;, <em>Problems in the Logic of Scientific Cognition</em>,
Moscow, 1964, p. 308 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^33^^ V. S. Shvyrev, &quot;Some Problems in the Logico-Methodological
Analysis of the Relation Between the Theoretical and Empirical
Levels of Scientific Cognition&quot;, <em>Problems in the Logic of Scientific
Cognition</em>, p. 74 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^34^^ Rene Descartes, <em>Oeuvres et lettres</em>, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue
Francaise, Paris, 1937, pp. 97--98.</p>

<p>~^^35^^ Ibid., p. 97.</p>

<p>~^^36^^ Ibid., p. 96.

<p>~^^38^^ Ibid., p. 213.</p>

<p>~^^39^^ Ibid., p. 161.</p>

<p>~^^40^^ Ibid., p. 162.</p>

<p>~^^41^^ Ibid., p. 163.</p>

<p>~^^42^^ Ibid.</p>

<p>~^^43^^ Ibid., p. 167.</p>

<p>~^^44^^ Ibid., p. 435.</p>


<p>~^^45^^ Ibid., p. 436.</p>

<p>~^^46^^ Ibid.</p>

<p>~^^47^^ Ibid.</p>

<p>~^^48^^ Ibid., p. 171.</p>

<p>~^^49^^ Ibid., p. 174.</p>

<p>~^^50^^ Ibid., p. 169.</p>

<p>~^^51^^ Ibid., p. 214.</p>

<p>~^^52^^ Ibid., p. 216.
&quot; Ibid., p. 453.</p>

<p>~^^54^^ Quoted from R. J. Hirst, <em>The Problems of Perception</em>, George
Allen and Unwin LTD, London, 1959, p. 28.</p>

<p>~^^55^^ Ibid., pp. 67--68.</p>

<p>~^^56^^ Ibid., p. 85.</p>

<p>~^^57^^ Ibid., pp. 91--92. 
~^^88^^ Ibid p. 102.</p>

<p>~^^59^^ See Edmund Husserl, <em>Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur
Genealogie der Logik</em>, Academia Verlagsbuchhandlung, Prague,
1939, pp. 12--13.</p>

<p>~^^60^^ Quoted from Z. M. Kakabadze, <em>The Problem of &quot;Existential
Crisis&quot; and Edmund Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology</em>,
Tbilisi, 1966, p. 76 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^61^^ See Quentin Lauer, <em>Phenomenologie de Husserl</em>, Presses
universitaires de France, Paris, 1955, pp. 188, 315; Joseph Kockelmans,
<em>Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology</em>, Duquesm
University Press, Pittsburgh, 1967, pp. 225--231,260, 261.</p>

<p>~^^62^^ For an analysis of the problem of the subject and object in
Fichte's philosophy see also A. M. Deborin, &quot;Dialectics in Fichte&quot;,
<em>Marx and Engels Archives</em>, Book 3, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927;
V. F. Asmus, <em>Essays on the History of Dialectics in the Philosophy
of the New Times</em>, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930; T. I. Oizerman, <em>The
Philosophy of Fichte</em>, Moscow, 1962; M. Bur, <em>Fichte</em>, Moscow,
1965; K. N. Lyubutin, <em>The Problem of the Subject and Object in
Classical German and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, pp</em>. 35--47 (all in

<p>~^^63^^ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, <em>Grundlage der gesamten
Wissenschaftslehre</em>, Fritz Eckardt Verlag, Leipzig, 1911, p. 8.</p>

<p>~^^64^^ Ibid., p. 10. 
~^^66^^ Ibid., p. 17.</p>

<p>~^^66^^ Ibid., p. 16.</p>

<p>~^^67^^ Ibid., p. 104.</p>

<p>~^^68^^ Ibid., p. 105.</p>

<p>~^^69^^ For an analysis of Kant's epistemology see also the following
works: Yu. M. Borodai, <em>Imagination and Epistemology</em>, Moscow,
1966; <em>The Philosophy of Kant and Modern Times</em> (ed. by T. I.
Oizerman), Moscow, 1974; <em>Critical Essays on Kant's Philosophy</em> (ed. by
M. A. Bulatov), Kiev, 1975; T. I. Oizerman, <em>The Philosophy of Kant</em>,
Moscow, 1974; V. F. Asmus, <em>Immanuel Kant</em>, Moscow, 1973;
V. I. Shinkaruk, <em>The Epistemology, Logic, and Dialectics of Kant</em>,
Kiev, 1974; Zh. M. Abdildin, <em>The Dialectics of Kant</em>, Alma-Ata,
1974; N V. Motroshilova, &quot;Husserl and Kant: the Problem of
Transcendental Philosophy'&quot;, in: <em>The Philosophy of Kant and Modern
Times</em>, Moscow, 1974, I. S. Narsky, <em>Kant</em>, Moscow, 1976 (all in


<p>~^^70^^ See Immanuel Kant, <em>Critique of Pure Reason, G</em>. Bell and Sons
LTD., London, 1930, p. 13.</p>

<p>~^^71^^ Ibid., p. 83.</p>

<p>~^^72^^ Ibid., p. 86.</p>

<p>~^^73^^ Ibid., pp. 168--169.</p>

<p>~^^74^^ Ibid., p. 168.</p>

<p>~^^75^^ Ibid., p. 166.</p>

<p>~^^76^^ Ibid., pp. 167--168.</p>

<p>~^^77^^ Ibid., p. 169.</p>

<p>~^^78^^ Ibid., pp. 84--85.</p>

<p>~^^79^^ Ibid., p. 249.</p>

<p>~^^80^^ Ibid., p. 96.</p>

<p>~^^81^^ One may get the impression that what has been said here is
inapplicable at least to the Kantian conception of &quot;pure mathematics&quot;.
The latter is considered in the <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em> as a science
whose subject-matter is determined by the apriori sense
formsspace and time. That means that, from the Kantian standpoint, the
speculative elements play a fundamental role in mathematical
knowledge. However, mathematics as a science assumes, according to
Kant, application of the logical categories of reason to the pure
apriori sense forms. Kant's conception of mathematics is thus
different from Husserl's. It is the latter rather than the former that
underlies that modern trend in the substantiation of mathematics
that became known as intuitionism.</p>

<p>~^^82^^ Quoted in Z. M. Kakabadze, <em>The Problem of &quot;Existential Crisis&quot;
and Edmund Husserl 's Transcendental Phenomenology</em>, p. 87.</p>

<p>~^^83^^ Ibid., p. 90.</p>

<p>~^^84^^ For an analysis of Sartre's philosophical conception see
V. N. Kuznetsov, <em>Jean-Paul Sartre and Existentialism</em>, Moscow,
1969; G. Ya. Streltsova, <em>A Critique of the Existentialist Conception
of Dialectics (Analysis of the Philosophical Views of J.-P. Sartre</em>),
Moscow, 1974; M. A. Kissel, <em>The Philosophical Evolution of
J.-P. Sartre</em>, Leningrad, 1976; L. I. Filippov, <em>The Philosophical
Anthropology of Jean-Paul Sartre</em>, Moscow, 1977 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^85^^ See J.-P. Sartre, <em>L'etre et le neant. Essai d'ontologie
phenomenologique</em>, Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1943, pp. 372, 388, 390.</p>

<p>     se Ibid., pp. 332--333.</p>

<p>~^^87^^ Ibid., pp. 198--202.</p>

<p>~^^88^^ Ibid., pp. 342--343.</p>

<p>~^^89^^ Ibid., pp. 220--240.</p>

<p>~^^90^^ See Jean Piaget, <em>The Language and Thought of the Child</em>, The
New American Library, Inc., New York, 1974; Jean Piaget, &quot;Pensee
egocentrique et pensee sociocentrique&quot;, <em>Cahiers internationaux de
sociologie</em>, Vol. X, 1951, pp. 3449; Jean Piaget, <em>Comments on
Vygotsky's Critical Remarks Concerning &quot;The Language and
Thought of the Child</em>&quot;, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,
Cambridge, 1962; V. A. Lektorsky, V. N. Sadovsky, &quot;The Genesis
and Structure of Intellectual Activity in the Conceptions of Jean
Piaget&quot;, <em>The Main Directions in the Study of the Psychology of
Thought in the Capitalist Countries</em>, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^91^^ Karl Marx, <em>Capital</em>, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974,
p. 59.</p>

<p>~^^92^^ See L. S. Vygotsky, &quot;The Problems of Speech and Thought in the


Theory of J. Piaget&quot; in Jean Piaget, <em>The Language and Thought of
the Child</em>, Moscow-Leningrad, 1932, pp. 3-54; L. S. Vygotsky,
<em>Selected Psychological Studies</em>, Moscow, 1956; idem, <em>The
Development of the Higher Psychical Functions</em>, Moscow, 1960 (all in

<p>~^^93^^ See Jean Piaget, <em>Comments on Vygotsky's Critical Remarks
Concerning &quot;The Language and Thought of the Child</em>&quot;.</p>

<p>~^^94^^ Jean Piaget, &quot;Pensee egocentrique et pensee sociocentrique&quot;,
Op. cit. p. 37.</p>

<p>     95 See A. J. Ayer, <em>The Problem of Knowledge</em>, Macmillan &amp; Co.
LTD., London, 1956, pp. 47,48, 50--52.</p>

<p>     <em>Part Two</em></p>

<p>~^^1^^ S. L. Rubinstein, <em>Problems of General Psychology</em>, Moscow, 1976,
p. 253.</p>

<p>     2 A. M. Korshunov, <em>The Theory of Reflection and Creativity</em>, p. 20
(in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^3^^ See V. D. Glezer, Zuckermann I. L, <em>Information and Vision</em>,
Moscow-Leningrad, 1961, p. 89 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^4^^ See A. V. Zaporozhets, L. A. Venger, V. P. Zinchenko, A. G.
Ruzskaya, <em>Perception and Action</em>, Moscow, 1967, p. 55 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^6^^ Karl Marx, Capita/, Vol. I, Moscow 1974, p. 77.</p>

<p>~^^6^^ Quoted from J. Piaget, B. Inhelder, <em>La genese des structures
logiques elementaires</em>, Paris, 1951.</p>

<p>~^^7^^ V. S. Tyukhtin, <em>On the Nature of the Image</em>, Moscow 1963,
pp. 40, 50 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^8^^ See E. H. Gombrich, <em>Art and Illusion</em>, N.Y., 1961, p. 363.</p>

<p>~^^9^^ J. Gibson, <em>The Perception of the Visual World</em>, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1950, pp. 26, 27.</p>

<p>~^^10^^ Ibid., p. 42.</p>

<p>~^^11^^ See A. N. Leontyev, &quot;On the Ways of Studying Perception&quot;;
V. V. Stolin, &quot;A Study in the Generation of the Visual Spatial
Image&quot;; A. D. Logvinenko &quot;Perceptual Activity under Inversion of
the Retinal Image&quot;; A. A. Puzyrei, &quot;Sense-Formation in the
Processes of Perceptual Activity&quot;, in <em>Perception and Activity</em> (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^12^^ J. Ruskin, <em>The Elements of Drawing</em>, note to para 4; quoted from
E. H. Gombrich, <em>Art and Illusion</em>, p. 296.</p>

<p>~^^13^^ See A. D. Logvinenko, &quot;Perceptual Activity under Inversion of the
Retinal Image&quot;, in <em>Perception and Activity</em>, pp. 252--256.</p>

<p>~^^14^^ See N. Yu. Vergiles, V. P. Zinchenko, &quot;The Problem of the
Adequacy of the Image (with Reference to Visual Perception)&quot;, <em>Voprosy
filosofii</em>, 1967, No. 4 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>     15 See ibid., p. 65.</p>

<p>~^^16^^ See V. I. Lenin, &quot;Conspectus of Hegel's Book <em>The Science of
Logic&quot;, Collected Works</em>, Vol. 38, Moscow 1972, p. 171.</p>

<p>~^^17^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;Conspectus of Hegel's Book <em>The Science of Logic&quot;,
Collected Works</em>, Vol. 38, p. 195.</p>

<p>~^^18^^ For a description of the experiments with the Ames chairs see
E. H. Gombrich, op. cit, pp. 24849.</p>

<p>~^^19^^ E. H. Gombrich, op. cit., p. 249.</p>

<p>~^^20^^ Karl Marx, &quot;Theses on Feuerbach&quot;, in: Karl Marx, Frederick


Engels, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976,
p. 3.</p>

<p>     21 Karl Marx, &quot;Randglossen zu Ado'oh Wagners <em>Lehrbuch der
politischen ORonomie</em>&quot;, Karl Marx,Friedrich Engels, <em>Werke</em>, Band
19, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1962, pp. 362--63.</p>

<p>~^^22^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;Conspectus of Hegel's Book <em>The Science of Logic&quot;,
Collected Works</em>, Vol. 38, p. 213.</p>

<p>~^^23^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current
Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin', <em>Collected Works</em>,
Vol. 32, Moscow 1975, p. 94.</p>

<p>~^^24^^ J. Piaget, <em>La construction du reel chez I 'enfant</em>, Neuchatel-Paris
1937; cited from A. V. Zaporozhets et al., <em>Perception and Action</em>,
pp. 163--165.</p>

<p>     25 A. M. Korshunov, <em>The Theory of Reflection and Creativity</em>,
p. 78.</p>

<p>     26 See N. Yu. Vergiles, V. P. Zinchenko, &quot;The Problem of the
Adequacy of the Image&quot;, Voprosy <em>filosofli</em>, 1967, No. 4, p. 57.</p>

<p>     27 For a philosophical analysis of the Marxist principle of
objectrelated activity see: A. M. Korshunov, <em>Cognition and Activity;</em>
A. P. Ogurtsov, &quot;Practice as a Philosophical Problem&quot;, Voprosy
<em>filosofli</em>, 1967, No. 7; V. A. Lektorsky, &quot;The Principle of
ObjectRelated Activity and Marxist Epistemology&quot;, <em>Ergonomics. The
Methodological Problems of Studying Activity, Trudy VNUTE</em>,
Vol. 10, Moscow, 1976; V. S. Shvyrev, &quot;The Tasks of Studying
the Category of Activity as a Theoretical Concept&quot;, op. cit.;
E. G. Yudin, &quot;The Concept of Activity as a Methodological Problem&quot;,
op. cit.; N. N. Trubnikov, <em>On the Categories of &quot;Goal&quot;, &quot;Means&quot;,
and &quot;Result</em>&quot;, Moscow, 1968; M. A. Bulatov <em>Activity and the
Structure of Philosophical Knowledge</em>, Kiev, 1976; V. P. Ivanov, <em>Human
Activity---Cognition---Art</em>, Kiev, 1977; A. I. Yatsenko, <em>Goal-Setting
and Ideals</em>, Kiev, 1977 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>     For a discussion of the significance of the category of object--
oriented activity for psychological theory see: S. L. <em>Rubinstein, Being and
Consciousness</em>, Moscow, 1957; idem, <em>The Principles and Ways of the
Development of Psychology. On the Place of the Psychical in the
Universal Interconnection of the Phenomena of the Material World</em>,
Moscow, 1959; A. N. Leontyev, <em>Activity. Consciousness.
Personality</em>, Moscow 1975; M. S. Rogovin, A. V. Solovyov, L. P. Urvantsev,
Sh. Sh. Shotemor, &quot;The Structures of the Psyche and the Problem of
Cognition&quot;, <em>Voprosy filosofli</em>, 1977, No. 4 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>     28 See E. V. Ilyenkov, <em>Dialectical Logic</em>, Progress Publishers,
Moscow. 1977.</p>

<p>~^^29^^ See A. V. Zaporozhets et al., <em>Perception and Action</em>, pp. 265,

<p>~^^30^^ See <em>A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology</em>, Keagan Paul, Trench,
Trubner &amp; Co. Ltd., London, 1938, pp. 48, 50, 52--54.</p>

<p>~^^31^^ Karl Marx &quot;Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844&quot; in:
Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 3, Moscow,
1975 pp. 300, 302.</p>

<p>~^^32^^ Ci. the* following arguments of Spinoza about the essence of the
circle. A circle may be &quot;defined as a figure, such that all straight
lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal&quot; (B.
Spinoza, <em>How to Improve Your Mind</em>, Philosophical Library, Inc.,


N.Y., 1956, pp. 79, 80). But this definition, Spinoza believes, &quot;does
not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its
properties&quot; (ibid.), and a derivative, secondary property at that.
That is merely a nominal definition. A real definition must express
the proximate cause of a thing, and that in Spinoza's view is the
same as specifying the mode of constructing the thing. The circle in
this case will &quot;be defined as follows: the figure described by any line
where one end is fixed and the other free&quot; (ibid.).</p>

<p>~^^33^^ See G. Bachelard, <em>L'activite rationaliste de la physique
contemporaine</em>, Presses universitaries de France, Paris 1951, p. 90.</p>

<p>~^^34^^ See L. S. Vygotsky, <em>The Development of the Higher Psychical
Functions</em>, Moscow, 1960 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^35^^ See A. N. Leontyev, <em>Problems of the Development of the Mind</em>,
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981; idem, <em>Activity. Consciousness.
Personality</em> (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^36^^ See A. R. Luriya, <em>On the Historical Development of the Cognitive
Processes. An Experimental-Psychological Study</em>, Moscow 1974
(in Russian).</p>

<p>     a7 See P. Ya. Galperin, <em>The Development of the Studies in the
Formation of Mental Actions;</em> idem, &quot;On the Study of the Child's
Intellectual Development&quot;, Voprosy <em>psichologii</em>, 1969, No. l;idem,
<em>Introduction into Psychology</em>, Moscow, 1976.</p>

<p>~^^38^^ See A. V. Zaporozhets, <em>The Development of Arbitrary
Movements</em>, Moscow, 1960 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^39^^ See V. V. Davydov, Types <em>of Generalisation in Learning</em>, Moscow,
1972; idem, &quot;Analysis of the Structure of the Cognitive Act&quot;,
<em>Doklady APN RSFSR</em>, 1960, No. 2; idem, &quot;The Categories of Logic
and Pedagogics&quot;, in <em>Problems of Dialectical Logic</em>, Alma-Ata, 1968
(in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^4^^&laquo; See N. Yu. Vergiles, V. P. Zinchenko, &quot;The Problem of the
Adequacy of Images&quot;, Voprosy <em>filosofli</em>, 1967, No. 4; A. V. Zaporozhets
et al., <em>Perception and Action</em>.</p>

<p>~^^41^^ See A. N. Leontyev, <em>Activity. Consciousness. Personality</em>, p. 95.</p>

<p>~^^42^^ Ibid pp. 97--98.</p>

<p>~^^43^^ See M. S. Rogovin, <em>Problems in the Theory of Memory</em>, pp. 78--

<p>~^^44^^ Karl Marx, &quot;Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844&quot; in:
Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, <em>Collected Works</em> Vol. 3, p. 302.</p>

<p>~^^45^^ See A. I. Meshcheryakov, <em>Awakening to Life,;</em> G. S. Gurgenidze,
E. V. Dyenkov, &quot;Outstanding Progress of Soviet Science&quot;, Voprosy
<em>filosofli</em>, 1975, No. 6, pp. 69--79; E. V. Ilyenkov, &quot;Personality
Formation: on the Results of a Scientific Experiment&quot;, <em>Kommunist</em>,
1977, No. 2.</p>

<p>~^^46^^ Karl Marx, &quot;Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1944&quot;,</p>

<p>     p. 298.</p>

<p>~^^4^^? G. Maxwell, &quot;The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities&quot;,
<em>Minnesota. Studies in the Philosophy of Science</em>, Vol. Ill,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, p. 10.</p>

<p>~^^48^^ W. Heisenberg,Der <em>Teil und das Game. Gesprache im Umkreis
der Atomphysik</em>, R. Piper &amp; Co. Verlag, Munich, 1971, pp. 92,93.</p>

<p>~^^49^^ Th. S. Kuhn, <em>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</em>, pp. Ill-</p>

<p>     135.</p>

<p>~^^50^^ Ibid., pp. 28--29.</p>


<p>~^^51^^ Ibid., pp. 132--135.</p>

<p>~^^52^^ M. Hesse, &quot;Is There an Independent Observation Language?&quot;,
<em>The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. Essays in
Contemporary Science and Philosophy</em>, ed. by R. G. Colodny, University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1970, p. 47.</p>

<p>~^^53^^ F. Suppe, &quot;The Search for Philosophic Understanding of
Scientific Theories&quot;, <em>The Structure of Scientific Theories</em>, University of
Illinois Press, Urbana, 1974, pp. 104--109.</p>

<p>     See also V. A. Lektorsky, &quot;Positivism&quot;, <em>Philosophical Encyclopedia</em>,
Moscow, 1967, Vol. 4; idem &quot;From Positivism to Neopositivism&quot;,
<em>Bourgeois Philosophy in the20th Century</em>, Moscow, 1974; V. S.
Shvyrev, <em>Neopositivism and the Problems of Empirical
Substantiation of Science;</em> I. S. Narsky, <em>Essays in the History of Positivism</em>,
Moscow, 1960 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^64^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;To A. N. Potresov&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 34,
Moscow, 1977, p. 34.</p>

<p>~^^65^^ See e.g. B. S. Gryaznov, &quot;Theory and Its World&quot;, B. S. Gryaznov
et al., <em>Theory and Its Object</em>, Moscow, 1973, pp. 5-38.</p>

<p>~^^66^^ On Marx's method in <em>Capital</em> see M. M. Rozental, <em>The Dialectics
of Marx's &quot;Capital</em>&quot;, Moscow, 1967; V. P. Kuzmin, <em>The Systems
Principle in Marx's Theory and Methodology</em>, Moscow, 1976; <em>The
History of Marxist Dialectics from the Origin of Marxism to the
Leninist Stage</em> (ed. by M. M. Rozental), Moscow, 1971, (all in
Russian); E. V. Ilyenkov, <em>The Dialectics of the Abstract and the
Concrete in Marx's &quot;Capital</em>&quot;, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982.</p>

<p>~^^67^^ Dudley Shapere formulates the following features inherent in the
real objects with which scientific theoretical thinking is concerned
and which are absent in the idealised objects:</p>

<p>     (1) If object <em>A</em> exists really, it can interact with other real objects,
in particular macroscopic ones (which is not true of idealised

<p>     (2) To say that &quot;<em>A</em> exists&quot; implies that <em>A</em> may have properties which
have not yet been discovered;</p>

<p>     (3) A real object <em>A</em> may be ascribed properties which it does not
actually have, but which may subsequently come to light (it would
obviously be meaningless to refer the features formulated in points
(2} and (3) to idealised objects);</p>

<p>     (4) If <em>A</em> actually exists, there may be different and even competing
theories about it (as is actually the case with the electron); <em>A</em> thus
acquires what amounts to a theory-transcendent status.</p>

<p>     See D. Shapere, &quot;Notes toward a Post-Positivistic Interpretation of
Science&quot; <em>The Legacy of Logical Positivism</em>, ed. by P. Achinsteln and
S. F. Barker, Baltimore, 1969, pp. 155, 156.</p>

<p>     Also: D. Shapere, &quot;Scientific Theories and Their Domains&quot; <em>The
Structure of Scientific Theories</em>, pp. 567--569. We shall point out in
this connection, that the so-called abstract objects studied in
mathematics (numbers, sets, functions etc.) express certain relations
between real objects and not real objects existing in space and time.</p>

<p>~^^58^^ G. Maxwell, &quot;Theories, Perception, and Structural Realism&quot;,
<em>The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories</em>, University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1970, pp. 3-34.</p>

<p>~^^59^^ &quot;Other forms of intuition, besides those of space and time, other
forms of understanding besides the discursive forms of thought, or


of cognition, we can neither imagine nor make intelligible to
ourselves; and even if we could, they would still not belong to experience,
which is the only mode of cognition by which objects are presented
to us. Whether other perceptions besides those which belong to the
total of our possible experience, and consequently whether some
other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to
decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that which
is given&quot; (I. Kant, <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>, London, G. Bell and
Sons, LTD, 1930, pp. 171--72).</p>

<p>~^^60^^ Th. S. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 102.</p>

<p>~^^61^^ Ibid., p. 111.</p>

<p>~^^62^^ True, in his &quot;Postscript-1969&quot; Kuhn gives a less rigid
formulation of the thesis about the existence of a gap between different
paradigms. Taking into account that the everyday world, language,
and most of the world of science are shared by members of different
scientific coummunities, Kuhn now believes it possible to translate
from the language of one paradigm into the language of another
using the common vocabulary of everyday life.</p>

<p>~^^63^^ B. L. Whorf, <em>Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings</em>,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, pp. 27, 213, 214.</p>

<p>~^^64^^ See Vasilyev S. A., <em>A Philosophical Analysis of the Hypothesis
of Linguistic Relativity</em>, Kiev 1974, p. 21 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^65^^ B. L. Whorf, op. cit., p. 215.</p>

<p>~^^66^^ See V. V. Tselishchev, <em>Logical Truth and Empiricism</em>,
Novosibirsk, 1974, p. 13 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^68^^ Ibid'p. 16.</p>

<p>~^^69^^ W. V. Quine, &quot;Notes on Existence and Necessity&quot;. In: <em>The
Journal of Philosophy</em>. Vol. XL, No. 5, March 4,1943, p. 118.</p>

<p>~^^70^^ W. V. Quine, <em>Word and Object</em>, New York and London, 1960,
pp. 29--57.</p>

<p>     71 See W. V. Quine, <em>Ontological Relativity and Other Essays</em>, 1969,
p. 67.</p>

<p>     72 Ibid., p. 50.</p>

<p>~^^73^^ The conception of ontological relativity points to the absurdity
of arguments, current in modem American and British
epistemological literature, concerning the possibility of the existence of a language
(and consequently of reason and of a world picture) in beings
which we ordinarily do not regard as sentient (e.g., tulips). The
authors of these arguments substantiate their positions by assuming
that the language to which they refer may be so different from ours
that we cannot understand its meaning, the more so that the
behaviour of the carriers of this language has nothing in common with
human behaviour. We can even fail to guess that we are dealing with
a language, these authors say. Situations of this kind are possible in
their view in man's contacts with sentient extraterrestrials: the latter
do not have to be similar to man in appearance, they may behave in
a manner completely strange to us and communicate in a manner
quite different from ours. In this case we shall not recognise them as
reasonable beings. Generally speaking, we may be surrounded by a
mass of sentient beings, these authors believe, whose presence we
do not even suspect and whose world is completely impervious to
us. Quine sweeps aside all these arguments pointing out that there


are no experimental data for their refutation or confirmation: our
experience carries in itself the object scheme of world dissection
which is accepted in our language. Here Quine's position is
reminiscent of Kant. See A. G. Geneva, &quot;Kant and Alternative Frameworks
and Possible Worlds&quot;, <em>Akten des 4. Intemationalen Kant--
Kongresses</em>, Mainz, 6-10 April, 1974, Teil II. 2: Sektionen, Berlin-N.Y.,
pp. 834--841; R. Rorty, &quot;The World Well Lost&quot;. In: <em>The Journal of
Philosophy</em>, Vol. LXIX, No. 19, October 26, 1972, pp. 649--665.</p>

<p>~^^74^^ S. A. Vasilyev, <em>A Philosophical Analysis of the Hypothesis of
Linguistic Relativity</em>, p. 96 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^75^^ N. Chomsky, a major modern proponent of the theory of
generative grammars, uses the existence of language universals and the
irreducibility of language to verbal behaviour as a basis for reviving
the Cartesian conception of innate ideas. In reality, the universality
of the primary semantic field, expressed through different language
means in different languages, is determined by the community of
the substantive structure of practical activity characteristic of the
users of different national languages.</p>

<p>~^^76^^ See N. Chomsky, <em>Syntactic Structures</em>, 's-Gravenhage, Mouton,

<p>~^^77^^ See A. N. Leontyev, <em>Activity. Consciousness. Personality</em>, pp.

<p>~^^78^^ S. A. Vasilyev, <em>A Philosophical Analysis of the Hypothesis of
Linguistic Relativity</em>, p. 45.</p>

<p>~^^79^^ The possibilities and ways of experimental research into the
effect of different language systems on the nature of perception are
discussed in M. Cole, S. Scribner, <em>Culture and Thought:
Psychological Introduction</em>, N.Y. 1974.</p>

<p>~^^80^^ M. Bunge, <em>Philosophy of Physics</em>, Dordrecht, 1973, pp. 181--182.</p>

<p>~^^81^^ See Th. S. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 202--204.</p>

<p>~^^82^^ G. Holton, &quot;On the Role of Themata in Scientific Thought';
<em>Science</em>, 25 April, 1975, Vol. 188, No. 4186, pp. 328--334. For an
analysis of continuous lines in the development of science see
<em>Contradictions in the Development of Natural Science</em> (ed. by
B. M. Kedrov), Moscow, 1965; V. S. Stepin, <em>The Formation of a
Scientific Theory</em>, Minsk, 1976; V. S. Bibler, <em>Thinkingas Creativity;</em>
A. V. Akhutin, <em>The History of the Principles of Physical
Experiment</em>, Moscow,1967 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^83^^ See V. A. Lektorsky, &quot;V. I. Lenin and the Principles of
Dialectical Logic&quot;, <em>Leninism as the Philosophy of the Modern Epoch</em>,
Moscow, 1969; idem, &quot;The Development of Epistemology in F.
Engels's Book <em>Anti-Duhring&quot;, F. Engels's &quot;Anti-Duhring&quot; and the
Modem Times</em>, Moscow, 1978; V. A. Lektorsky, Kh. Safari, &quot;On
the Logic of the Development of Theoretical Knowledge&quot;, <em>
Problemy mira i sotsializma</em>, 1976, No. 12 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>     84 &quot;The sign nature of verbal language has that advantage over the
language of gestures that it permits to perform any changes or
transformations with ideal objects implemented in verbal material. Verbal
language, as compared to gesture language, is a more plastic material;
one may reproduce in it all the properties and laws of the objective
world with great precision and differentiation, and these properties
may not coincide with those forms which are reproduced in gestures.
As a crude analogy, one may consider plasticine (the word) and


stone (gestures). Plasticine can precisely assume all kinds of intricate
forms, while stone offers no such possibility. But the trouble is that
the plasticity of the word must be handled very carefully, for it may
produce properties that do not exist in the objective world.&quot; (S.A.
Sirotkin, &quot;What Is Thought Better Armed With---Gesture or Word?&quot;,
<em>Voprosy filosofii</em>, 1977, No. 6, p. 101).</p>

<p>     85 See E. H. Gombrich, op. cit.</p>

<p>~^^86^^ &quot;Knowledge is not identical to any psychical act, it implies man's
singling out of himself from the surrounding world in the process
of its realisation&quot; (P. V. Kopnin, <em>Introduction to Marxist
Epistemology</em>, Kiev, 1966, p. 46, in Russian). &quot;Animals are not aware of
their knowledge while man is: he knows that he <em>knows</em>, that it is <em>he</em>
who knows, and <em>what</em> he knows&quot; (A. G. Spirkin, <em>Consciousness and
Self-Consciousness</em>, Moscow, 1972, p. 142, in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^87^^ Karl Marx, &quot;Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844&quot;,
p. 276.</p>

<p>     88 See Keith Gunderson, &quot;Asymmetries and Mind-Body
Perplexities&quot;. In: <em>Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science</em>, Vol. IV,
ed. by Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur, University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1970, pp. 273--309.</p>

<p>~^^89^^ It was the formulation of this paradox and the search for ways of
its logical solution that stimulated the development of dialectics on
an idealistic basis first in Fichte and later in Schelling and Hegel.</p>

<p>~^^90^^ Imre Lakatos, <em>Proofs and Refutations. The Logic of
Mathematical Discovery</em>, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 56.</p>

<p>~^^91^^ Imre Lakatos thus analyses one of the stages in the history of
proofs of the stereometric theorem: &quot;If you did make conscious
assumptions, they were that a) removing a face always leaves a
connected network and b) any non-triangular face can be dissected into
triangles by diagonals. While they were in your <em>subconscious</em> they
were listed as <em>trivially true---the</em> cylinder however made them
somersault into your conscious list as <em>trivially false</em>&quot; (Ibid., p. 46).</p>

<p>~^^92^^ Ibid p. 45.</p>

<p>~^^93^^ See M. Polanyi, <em>Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical
Philosophy</em>, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958. &quot;...'
Tacit knowledge'... is learned by doing science rather than by acquiring
rules for doing it&quot; (Th. S. Kuhn <em>The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions</em>, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, p. 191).</p>

<p>~^^94^^ Ludwig Wittgenstein, <em>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</em>, Routledge
&amp; Kegan Paul LTD, London, 1949, pp. 151,153.</p>

<p>~^^95^^ Gilbert Ryle, <em>The Concept of Mind</em>, Hutchinson's University
Library, London, 1951, pp. 186,195--198.</p>

<p>~^^96^^ Imre Lakatos, Op. cit., p. 56.</p>

<p>     S. A. Yanovskaya points to the &quot;importance of achievements in the
area of increasing logical rigour for obtaining new results in
mathematics, for solving its most difficult problems, for constructing
novel and revolutionary trends in science. Suffice it to recall that
the greatest achievements in calculus in the 19th century were due
to the increased precision of the basic concepts of calculus attained
in several debates---those of real and complex number, limit,
continuum, function. It may now be said that the image of modem
mathematics, and computer mathematics in the first place, is
increasingly determined by greater rigour and precision introduced in the


concept of algorithm (and the equivalent concept of recursive or
computable function) in the development of the philosophical and
logical foundations of mathematics and the logical theory of
mathematical proof...&quot; (S. A. Yanovskaya, &quot;On Mathematical Rigour&quot;,
<em>Voprosy filosofii</em>, 1966, No. 3, pp. 41, 42,43).</p>

<p>~^^97^^ Noting the impossibility of reducing one conceptual system to
another, Quine believes that the classical epistemological problem of
substantiating knowledge is a pseudoproblem. See e.g., Willard
V. Quine, &quot;Bpistemology Naturalized&quot;. In: <em>The Psychology of
Knowing</em>, ed. by Joseph R. Royce and W. W. Rozeboom, Gordon
and Breach, New York, 1972, pp. 9-23. In Lakatos's view, &quot;
background knowledge is where we assume that we know everything but
in fact know nothing&quot; (Imre Ladatos, op. cit., p. 45). Popper,
Feyerabend, and Kuhn also regard the problem of substantiating
knowledge as meaningless.</p>

<p>~^^98^^ Michael Polanyi, <em>Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical
Philosophy</em>, pp. 63--65.</p>

<p>~^^99^^ Stephen Kleene, <em>Introduction to Metamathematics</em>, North--
Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1952, p. 48.</p>

<p>     100 &laquo;\y<SUB>e</SUB> ^i know about ourselves such things and so many of them
that no one will ever learn about them through any objective
methods&quot; (A. G. Spirkin, <em>Consciousness and Self-Consciousness</em>,
p. 155).</p>

<p>     101 See e.g. Thomas S. Kuhn, Op. cit.; S. R. Mikulinsky, M.G.
Yaroshevsky, &quot;The Socio-Psychological Aspects of Scientific Activity&quot;,
Voprosy <em>filosofii</em>, 1972, No. 12; John M. Ziman, <em>Public Knowledge.
An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science</em>, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1968.</p>

<p>~^^102^^ Karl R. Popper, <em>Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary
Approach</em>, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. 106,107--108.</p>

<p>     103 ibid., p. 115.</p>

<p>~^^104^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;Conspectusof Hegel's Book <em>The Science of Logic&quot;,
Collected Works</em>, Vol. 38,1972, p. 202.</p>

<p>     105 For a discussion of collective and individual subjects see also
P. V. Kopnin, <em>Introduction into Marxist Epistemology</em>, pp. 58--65;
idem. <em>Dialectics as the Logic and Epistemology of Cognition</em>, pp.
106--117; V. A. Lektorsky, <em>The Problem of the Subject and Object
in Classical and Modem Bourgeois Philosophy</em>, pp. 100--113 (all in

<p>     i&deg;^^6^^ Karl Marx, &quot;Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844&quot;,
pp. 276--277.</p>

<p>     107 For an analysis of the Hegelian conception of subject and
object see also T. I. Oizerman, <em>Hegel's Philosophy</em>, Moscow, 1956;
K. S. Bakradze, <em>The System and Method of Hegel's Philosophy</em>,
Tbilisi, 1958; V. I. Shinkaruk, <em>Hegel's Logic, Dialectics, and
Epistemology</em>, Kiev, 1964; B. M. Kedrov, <em>V. I. Lenin and Hegel's
Dialectics</em>, Moscow^ 1975; V. A. Lektorsky, &quot;The Subject-Object
Problem in the Epistemology of Hegel and Marx&quot;. In: <em>The Philosophy
of Hegel and Modern Times;</em> K. N. Lyubutin, <em>The Problem of the
Subject and the Object in German Classical and Marxist-Leninist
Philosophy</em>, pp. 56--57; A. S. Bogomolov, &quot;The Philosophy of Hegel
and the Modern Times&quot;, <em>Kommunist</em>, 1970, No. 14; M. K.
Mamardashvili, <em>The Forms and Content of Thinking</em>, Moscow, 1968;


M. A. Bulatov, <em>Lenin's Analysis of German Classical Philosophy</em>,
Kiev, 1974 (all in Russian); E. V. Ilyenkov, <em>Dialectical Logic</em>.</p>

<p>~^^108^^ G. W. F. Hegel, <em>Phdnomenologie des Geistes</em>, Akademie-Verlag,
Berlin, 1964, p. 142.</p>

<p>     109 &quot;j<SUB>n</SUB> (^is <SUB>res</SUB>p<SUB>ec</SUB>t education consists, if it is considered from the
standpoint of the individual, in that he gains that which is available,
absorbs his inorganic nature and takes possession of it&quot; (Ibid.,
P. 27).</p>

<p>     no Ibid., p. 72.
m Ibid.</p>

<p>~^^112^^ Ibid., pp. 72--73.</p>

<p>~^^113^^ Ibid., pp. 73--74.</p>

<p>~^^114^^ Ibid., p. 74.</p>

<p>     H^^5^^ In Hegel's view, the philosophy of Kant and Fichte &quot;did not
attain the level of concept or spirit as it is <em>in and for itself but</em> only
that of spirit as it is in relation to another&quot; (G. W. F. Hegel, <em>
Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse</em>,
Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1975, p. 345).</p>

<p>~^^116^^ G. W. F. Hegel, <em>Phdnomenologie des Geistes</em> p 21</p>

<p>~^^117^^ Ibid., p. 75.</p>

<p>~^^118^^ Karl Marx, &quot;Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844&quot;,
pp. 333--334.</p>

<p>~^^119^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;Conspectus of Hegel's Book <em>Lectures on the
Historv of Philosophy&quot;, Collected Works</em>, Vol. 38, p. 278.</p>

<p>~^^120^^ See Willard V. Quine, &quot;Epistemology Naturalized&quot;, <em>The
Psychology of Knowing</em>, pp. 9-23.</p>

<p>     ^^121^^i See Jean Piaget, <em>Sagesse el illusions de la philosophic</em>, Presse
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1965; <em>\dem,Epistemologie des
sciences de I'homme</em>, Gallimard, Paris, 1970; idem, <em>Psychology and
Epistemology</em>, Grossman, New York, 1971.</p>

<p>~^^122^^ L. Wittgenstein, Op. cit., p. 77.</p>

<p>~^^123^^ See e.g., Peter F. Strawson, <em>The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason</em>, Methuen, London, 1973; Barry
Stroud, &quot;Transcendental Arguments&quot;, <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em>,
Vol. LXV, No. 9, May 2,1968, pp. 241--256.</p>

<p>     1^^24^^ See e.g., V. A. Lektorsky, &quot;Analytical Philosophy Today&quot;,
<em>Voprosy filosofii</em>, No. 1, 1972; M. S. Kozlova, <em>Philosophy and
Language</em>, Moscow, 1972; A. S. Bogomolov, <em>English Bourgeois
Philosophy of the 20th Century</em>, Moscow, 1973 (all in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^12^^&amp; See Karl R. Popper, <em>The Logic of Scientific Discovery</em>,
Hutchinson, London, 1972, pp. 49--72.</p>

<p>     126 But they are accepted and even reduced to an absurdity by Paul
Feyerabend, a disciple of Popper who has proposed a
substantiation of &quot;anarchism&quot; in epistemology. See Paul Feyerabend, <em>Against
Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge</em>, NLB,
London, 1975.</p>

<p>     1^^27^^ See Karl R. Popper, Op. cit., p. 52.</p>



<p>     Abdildin, Zh. M. - 262, 267
Abulkhanova, K. A.---264
Akhutin, A. V. - 274
Ames, Adalbert---128, 129
Antipenko, L. G.---263
Apostel, L.---266
Arkhiptsev, F. T.---263
Asmus, V. F.---267
Ayer.^A. J. - 114</p>

<p>     B</p>

<p>     Bachelard, Gaston - 143</p>

<p>     Bacon, Francis---139, 255</p>

<p>     Bakradze, K. S.---276</p>

<p>     Balgimbayev, A. S. - 262</p>

<p>     Bazhan, V. V. - 263</p>

<p>     Benjamin, A. Cornelius---42,</p>

<p>     Bibler, V. S. - 263, 274</p>

<p>     Bogomolov, A. S. - 276, 277</p>

<p>     Bohr, Niels - 262</p>

<p>     Born, Max - 33, 34</p>

<p>     Borodai, Yu. M. - 267</p>

<p>     Boyle, Robert---163</p>

<p>     Bridgman, P. W. - 17, 38--45,</p>

<p>     163,224</p>

<p>     Brouwer, L. - 11, 256</p>

<p>     Brushlinsky, A. V.---264, 265</p>

<p>     Bukhalov, Yu. F. - 263</p>

<p>     Bulatov, M. A. - 267, 270, 277</p>

<p>     Bunge, Mario---204</p>

<p>     Bur, M. - 267</p>

<p>     Deborin, A. M.---267
Descartes, Ren6---8, 17, 18,
51-5^. 63, 65, 71, 72, 76, 77,
79, 83, 84, 100, 101, 110,
114, 140, 246, 248, 255, 266
Duchenko, N. V. - 263
Dyshleviy, P. S.---263</p>

<p>     Einstein, Albert---40, 41, 45,
159, 163, 224, 225


Hesse, Mary-27 2</p>

<p>     Heyting, L.---11,256</p>

<p>     Hirst, R. J. - 267</p>

<p>     Holton, Gerald---274</p>

<p>     Husserl, Edmund---17, 18,</p>

<p>     63--77, 79, 83--96, 98, 101, 110,</p>

<p>     113, 114, 125, 127, 240, 248,</p>

<p>     249,256</p>

<p>     Hiitt, V. P.---263</p>

<p>     Lakatos, Imre---223, 275, 276</p>

<p>     Lauer, Quentin---267</p>

<p>     Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm

<p>     Lektorsky, V. A. - 264--66, 268,</p>

<p>     270,274,276,277</p>

<p>     Lenin, V. I.---9, 123, 127,</p>

<p>     134, 166, 210, 233, 240, 248,</p>

<p>     257, 260</p>

<p>     Lenzen, V.---266</p>

<p>     Leontyev, A. N.---121, 145,</p>

<p>     200, 264, 265, 270, 271</p>

<p>     Locke, John - 17, 22, 23, 28,</p>

<p>     Logvinenko, A. D.---269</p>

<p>     Luriya, A. R. - 145, 264, 271</p>

<p>     Lyubutin, K. N.---263, 276</p>

<p>     Ilyenkov, E. V.---262. 263,
270-2, 277</p>

<p>     Inhelder, Barbel---265, 269
Ivanov, V. P.---270</p>

<p>     Feyerabend, Paul---161, 192
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb---17,
18, 76--79, 84--87, 99--101, 110,
114, 140, 149, 150, 240, 245,
246, 275, 277
Filippov, L. I.---268
Fok.V. A.-11,262</p>

<p>     Janet, Pierre---119,146
Joule, James Prescott---163</p>

<p>     M</p>

<p>     Mach, Ernst---229</p>

<p>     Maizel, I. A.---263</p>

<p>     Mamardashvili, M. K.---276</p>

<p>     Mandelbrot, B.---266</p>

<p>     Mantatov, V. V.---262</p>

<p>     Marx, Karl---110, 119, 130,</p>

<p>     134, 138, 149, 152, 166, 168,</p>

<p>     215, 241, 256, 257, 269, 270,</p>

<p>     276, 277</p>

<p>     Maxwell, Grover---159,171</p>

<p>     Meshcheryakov, A. I.---264,</p>

<p>     Mikhailov, F. T. - 263, 265</p>

<p>     Mikulinsky, S. R.---276</p>

<p>     N</p>

<p>     Naan, G. N. - 263
Narsky, I. S.---267
Naumenko, L. K.---263
Newton, Isaac---207, 233</p>

<p>     Kakabadze, Z. M.---268</p>

<p>     Kant, Immanuel---8, 17, 18,</p>

<p>     49, 79--87, 89, 96, 100, 101,</p>

<p>     107, 125, 126, 140, 175, 176,</p>

<p>     208, 214, 215, 222, 240, 246,</p>

<p>     249, 255, 256, 277</p>

<p>     Karmin, A. S.---263</p>

<p>     Kasymjanov, A. Kh.---265</p>

<p>     Kazyutinsky, V. V.---263</p>

<p>     Kedrov, B. M.---262, 276</p>

<p>     Kissel, M. A. - 268</p>

<p>     Kleene, Stephen Cole---262,</p>

<p>     Kockelmans, Joseph J.---267</p>

<p>     Kopnin, P. V.---262, 264, 275,</p>

<p>     Korshunov, A. M.---136, 262,</p>

<p>     265, 269, 270</p>

<p>     Kozlova, M. S.---277</p>

<p>     Kuhn, Thomas---13, 14, 19,</p>

<p>     160, 162, 163, 177--79, 191--93,</p>

<p>     203, 204, 206, 207, 221, 224,</p>

<p>     Kuptsov, V. I.---263</p>

<p>     Kuzmin, V. F.---263</p>

<p>     Kuzmin, V. P. - 272</p>

<p>     Kuznetsov, V. N.---268</p>

<p>     Galilei, Galileo - 163, 224
Galperin, P. Ya. - 145. 264, 271
Genova, A. C.---274
Gibson, James J.---120, 121
Glezer, V. D. - 269
Gombrich, E. H.---2-13, 269
Gorsky, D. P. - 45, 263, 266
Gregory, Richard L.---209
Griinbaum, Adolf---266
Gryaznov, B. S.---272
Gunderson, Keith---216, 217
Gurgenidze, G. S.---271</p>

<p>     Cantor, Georg---233</p>

<p>     Carnap, Rudolf - 184, 193</p>

<p>     Chomsky, Noam - 13, 197, 274</p>

<p>     Cole, Michael---274</p>

<p>     Coulomb, Charles Augustin de---</p>

<p>     H</p>

<p>     Ogurtsov, A. P.---270
Oizerman, T. I.---267, 276
Omelyanovsky, M. E.---263,
265, 266
Orudzhev, Z. M.---263</p>

<p>     Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich---
20, 70, 115, 149, 150, 243--49,</p>

<p>     Heisenberg, Werner---11,159</p>

<p>     Dalton, John---163</p>

<p>     Davydov, V. V. - 145, 264, 271</p>


<p>     Pakhomov, B. Ya.---263</p>

<p>     Pavlov, T.---262</p>

<p>     Piaget, Jean - 13, 14, 17,</p>

<p>     28--38, 107--11, 135, 137, 177,</p>

<p>     195, 249, 269</p>

<p>     Plato - 127</p>

<p>     Polanyi, Michael---221, 224,</p>

<p>     228, 276</p>

<p>     Popper, Karl - 19, 234--37,</p>

<p>     241--43, 251, 252, 276</p>

<p>     Price, H. H.---57</p>

<p>     Prigozhin, I.---35</p>

<p>     Puzyrei, A. A.---269</p>

<p>     Shotemor, Sh. Sh.---264, 270
Shvyrev, V. S.---45, 263, 264,
266, 270, 272
Sirotkin, S. A.---275
Solovyov, A. V. - 264, 270
Spinoza, Baruch---270, 271
Spirkin, A. G. - 262, 275, 276
Stepin, V. S. - 263, 274
Strawson, Peter F.---277
Streltsova, G. Ya.---268
Stroud, Barry---277
Suppe, Frederick---272
Sychov, N. I. - 263</p>

<p>     Quine, Willard V. - 12, 14,
19, 180--200, 202, 203, 219,
228, 249, 276, 277</p>

<p>     Tipukhin, V. N. - 263
Tolstoy, Leo---233
Tomilchik, L. M. - 263
Trubnikov, N. N.---270
Tselishchev, V. V.---273
Tyukhtin, V. S. - 262, 266</p>

<p>     U
Urvantsev, L. P. - 264, 270</p>

<p>     V</p>

<p>     Vasilyev, S. A.---273, 274
Venger, L. A.---264. 269
Vergiles, N. Yu.---269, 270
Vygotsky, L. S. - 110,144</p>

<p>     W</p>

<p>     Whorf, Benjamin Lee - 19,179,
191, 197, 200, 273
Wittgenstein, Ludwig---222,

<p>     Rogovin, M. S.---. 264, 270,</p>

<p>     Rorty, Richard---274</p>

<p>     Rozental, M. M.---272</p>

<p>     Rubinstein, S. L.---117, 262,</p>

<p>     264, 265, 269, 270</p>

<p>     Ruskin, John---122</p>

<p>     Russell, Bertrand---17, 26, 27</p>

<p>     Ruzskaya, A. G.---264, 269</p>

<p>     Ryle, Gilbert---222</p>

<p>     Sadovsky, V. N. - 268</p>

<p>     Safari, Kh.---274</p>

<p>     Sapir, Edward---19, 179, 191,</p>

<p>     197,200</p>

<p>     Sartre, Jean-Paul---18, 95--108,</p>

<p>     111, 112, 209, 214, 215, 222,</p>

<p>     Schelling, Friedrich - 275</p>

<p>     Scribner, Sylvia---274</p>

<p>     Shapere, Dudley---272</p>

<p>     Sheptulin, A. P.---263</p>

<p>     Shinkaruk, V.I.---262, 267,</p>

<p>     Shorokhova, Ye. V.---264</p>

<p>     Yanovskaya, S. A. - 275, 276
Yaroshevsky, M. G.---276
Yatsenko, A. I.---270
Yudin, E. G. - 263, 270</p>

<p>     Zaporozhets, A. V.---145, 264,</p>

<p>     269--71</p>

<p>     Zermelo, Ernst---181,189</p>

<p>     Zinchenko, V. P.---145, 264,</p>

<p>     269,270</p>

<p>     Zuckermann, I. I.---269</p>

<p>     Zutta, J.---146</p>


The End.


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