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[xmca] Hakkarainen's extension of ZPD beyond learning

I have been thinking about the recommendations in Pentii Hakkarainen and
Milda Bredikyte's article [which I re-posted if others want to read the
article but it was was missed when Mike posted it]

On page 3 Pentii and Milda quote Vygotsky who wrote,

The relationship of play TO development should be compared with that of
teaching-learning TO development. Changes of NEEDS and consciousness of a
more general kind lie behind the play. Play is the resource of development
and it creates the ZPD.  Action in the IMAGINARY FIELD, in the IMAGINED
situation, building of VOLUNTARY INTENTION, the construction of life-plan,
MOTIVES OF WILLING - all this emerges in play.

Pentii and Milda cited this extract to emphasize that imitation is NOT the
basis of Vygotsky's ZPD.  For Vygotsky, [and Pentii and Milda] the question
is how the ZPD

 "....is connected to the development of imagination, INTENTIONS,
life-plans, MOTIVATION, and WILL. Traditionally these aspects of development
are not discussed in the analysis of learning. If we take literally
Vygotsky's advice we have problems in juxtaposing the relation between
learning and development on the one hand and play and development on the
other [p. 3 Pentti & Milda]

>From these extracts, the concepts of "motivation" "will"  "motives of will"
"voluntary intention" and the term I often use "agentic capacity" are
central concepts to understanding ZPD.  [The concept of "imagination" is
also central but that is for another conversation]  Therefore I intend to
elaborate the notion of "intentionality" by bringing in another author
Andres A. Haye's who wrote an article: "Living Being and Speaking Being:
Toward a Dialogical Approach to Intentionality" in the journal [Integr Psych
Behav (2008) 42: p 157-163]

Hayes suggests that confusion arises because the concept "intentionality"
has multiple meanings, and in his article he elaborates on 3 distinct groups
of meanings.

1) Intentionality as "will" - intention or motivation in action - A sense of
intention as the inner tension driving behavior from the inside

2)Intentionality as "aboutness" - to concern an object - The fact that
mental states or linquistic FORMS make REFERENCE TO some object.
Intentionality is a specific property of mental and symbolic entities.
These entities are CAUSALLY connected as REPRESENTATIONS  following logical
or psychological laws of association AS ABOUTNESS.

3)Intentionality as "meaning" - the understanding of an action or object as
EXPRESSION of a point of view - For Hayes, meaning is NOT a theory of making
reference TO an object but the act of TAKING A POSITION TOWARD OTHER
PERSPECTIVES within a dialogical field of REPLIES.  As Haye states,
"I reserve the term 'meaning' for the position assumed or or the point made
in each act WITHIN a chain of discursive acts, that is, of acts capable of
being CONTESTED as false, bad, inconvenient, limited, shameful,
aesthetically poor, unjust, etc. Intentionality as aboutness has to do with
semantics, whereas intentionality as meaning is related to ideological (or
evaluative) significance in SOCIAL action... Intentionality as meaning does
NOT EXCLUDE representation or motivation.  Rather, it seems to suppose both
aboutness and will. However, self-motivation in action and symbolic
representation are INSUFFICIENT to account for the dialogical nature of
meaning, both considering the powers of will and representation alone, and
considering them in combination....representation in discourse depends upon
dialogical rather than merely semantic properties of language." (p.159)

Hayes, in reflecting on the role of "propositions" in discourse says we
never observe propositions, but rather we observe utterances.  Utterances,
for Hayes are more general than TALK or ORAL communication. but of discourse
in general. Each utterance is a taking of a position of the SUBJECTIVE
speaker, in which alternative positions are possible. [utterances are
contestible]  For Hayes a proposition is not contestable BECAUSE IT LACKS
THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE.  Hayes, citing  Peirce,  quotes

"A PROPOSITION as I use that term, is a dicent symbol. A dicent is not an
assertion, but a sign capable of being asserted."

Hayes gives this example - noboby could REPLY to 'A is to B' without KNOWING
whether the speaker is endorsing it negating it, making fun of it, asking
about it, etcetera. Utterances are semiotic structures (whether propositions
like 'A is B' or a single word like "uff")  PLUS a subjective attitude in a
particular discursive situation.  Utterances are LINKED not by REASON of
logical or syntactic relations but BY DIALOGICAL RELATIONS such as
complicity, vindication, rivalry, support, indiffernce, and so on.  Hayes
states, "from the theoretical view of Voloshinov and Bakhtin, the speaking
being is not a linquistic COMPOSER but an ideological CONTESTANT." (p.161)
Meaning is the contestable position taken by a speaker in a given social

Returning to Pentii and Milda's elaboration on the need to expand our notion
of the ZPD and give intentionality a cental place in our theories of
development,  Hayes article may add to the elaboration of our notions of ZPD
as "containers" in which to develop intentionality [or agentic capacity]


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