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Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation



Martin, surely we two (of the many) meanings of "objectify" here.

(1) In "objectifying action has its dangers, such as treating it as the output of a decision-making system" you are using the word in the meaning it took on I think in the 1970s as "treating a subject as an object" following the idea of Kant that one ought to treat all people as ends not means.

(2) In "action is fleeting it must be fixed in some manner, and although objectifying action transforms it" you are using the word in its Hegelian sense of making a thought into a material thing for others, a meaning which carries no implication of being unethical.

But Derek uses the word in yet a third sense, i.e., of being "objective" which inheres in the action of the recipient of action not the actor, i.e., objectify means (3) to regard the thing as something objective, independently of one's own subjectivity.

Isn't this so?

Andy

Martin Packer wrote:
Derek,

This is indeed such a huge topic that I hesitate to take it up. But equally
important; so here goes.

Techniques of objectifying are certainly part of any science, but surely not
the whole story. And I don't see that objectifying people reduces them to
biological phenomena, and their action to biological processes, any more
than objectifying biological entities reduces them to physical phenomena,
and their processes to physical ones. Certainly objectifying action has its
dangers, such as treating it as the output of a decision-making system, or
as a collection of factual events which can described without
interpretation. But Paul Ricoeur (below) has argued convincingly that since
action is fleeting it must be fixed in some manner, and although
objectifying action transforms it, these transformations can serve important
functions. The analysis of conversational action took steps forward when
recording technology became widely available (without treating conversation
as a biological phenomenon.

This is not to say that figuring out an appropriate science of action is
easy. But surely it's easier to study action scientifically than it is to
study a personal, private, inner mind to which by definition one can only
have first-person access!

Ricoeur, P. (1971). The model of the text: Meaningful action considered as a
text. Social Research, 38(3), 529-562.

Martin

On 1/17/09 6:09 PM, "Derek Melser" <derek.melser@gmail.com> wrote:

Martin, Steve:

This is a big issue. I have written a bit about it. Chapter 11 ('Our
knowledge of actions') in *The Act of Thinking* is about it. And so are the
last three paragraphs of the essay at
http://www.derekmelser.org/essays/essayverbal.html

The primary interpersonal attitude is the side-by-side one, the attitude of
fellow-participants in some shared activity. Our perception of others'
actions occurs under the aegis of this fellow-participant (or would-be
fellow-participant, empathic) attitude; it is the light in which we see
actions. Now and then we defect into an objective (distancing, reifying,
alienating) attitude towards others. Rigorously maintained, this objective
attitude reduces a person to a biological phenomenon. But biological
phenomena don't perform *actions*, they merely exhibit derivative biological
phenomena.

Science is the rigorous maintenance of objective attitudes and observation
methods. My paradigm examples of 'science' are the physical sciences:
chemistry, physics, biology... There are disciplined academic studies ­ of
history, law, fine arts, literature, education ­ in which the topic is
people's actions and in which objectivity and empathy alternate, in roughly
equal measure. But these disciplined academic studies are not normally
thought of as sciences. The thing about sciences is that they stick
rigorously to objective methods. Why would you want to put psychology
alongside biology, rather than alongside, say, history or education? Of
course, you could call any disciplined academic investigation a 'science'.

Anyway, it is impossible to write briefly on such a large topic without
pontificating, so I'll stop here.

Derek

*http://www.derekmelser.org*




2009/1/16 Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>

Derek, I have been wanting to ask you about your thoughts about how aspects
of human behavior that can only be comprehended through empathy are
therefore inaccessible to science.  Assuming, for the sake of discussion,
that you are right, that empathy is a necessary component of accurate
observation and understanding, why does employing empathy exclude doing
science?  Marx said (something like) "nothing human is alien to me."  That
attitude isn't "empathy," strictly speaking, but it is certainly on the way.
 Not that it is an easy or automatic thing to do, but why do you seem to
feel that we **can't** learn how to use our powers of empathy in social
science?

- Steve



On Jan 15, 2009, at 4:20 PM, Martin Packer wrote:

 Derek,
It depends of course on what one means by empathy. I've been arguing for
years that all the social sciences draw implicitly on our human capacity
for
*understanding* the actions of others (Einfühlung?), and that our
investigations can and should be interpretive, hermeneutic. Of course many
others have made similar points. To say that genuine science is not
interpretive would be in my mind simply a false claim.

Martin


On 1/14/09 4:20 PM, "Derek Melser" <derek.melser@gmail.com> wrote:

 Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, if mind/consciousness/thinking is
an
action, then, because our perception of others' actions always requires
empathy, and because empathy is not an acceptable observation method in
the
sciences, there will never be a genuine science of
mind/consciousness/thinking. But at least we'll no longer be bamboozled
by
the mind/body problem...


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Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
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