[xmca] Fwd: Activity Molar Non-Additive Unit of Life

From: Varnom Soopand <haidizulfay who-is-at yahoo.com>
Date: Wed Apr 16 2008 - 07:51:44 PDT

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Dear Michael,
  By no means could I remove the (spam) out of the box . Besides , due to this problem , I didn't have a (bulk) box ; worst of all , my horizontal column of the sender ID (From:) had also been removed . Therefore I had to resign up for a new ID inserting little changes in letters . Hence the delay in sending . Excuse me if now it's far more distanced from the main discussion . Not usable , please delete . However , I hope no more problem will be detected .
  Dear Michael Glassman,
  Regarding the exchanges between you and Peter Moxhay , I have something to say
  which might hopefully be relevant .
  If we take into account Leontyev's reference to *activity* as a molar non-additive *unit of
  life" and the following quote from him at the end of which he , in turn , refers to Hegel's saying ,
  [First of all, in both cases it is very clear that purposes are not contrived, are not posed by the subject arbitrarily. They are given in objective circumstances. Besides, isolation and perception of goals by no means occurs automatically, nor is it an instantaneous act but a relatively long process of approbation of the goals by action and by their objective filing, if this can be expressed in such a way. The individual, justly notes Hegel, “cannot determine the goal of his acting as long as he has not acted. ...”] ,
  then we might find their contents being at odds with the inference we can get from your sentence as to the effect that you take the "understandings of the object" something prior to the use of them in one activity .
  This inference is strengthened again by your emphasizing that knowledge to act could be separate from the act itself , the same jargon *knowing that...* , *knowing how..." dichotomy that was innovated years ago to combat the absolute biologically-inspired contention of Chomsky's as knowing (earlier , syntax of a language) being some quasi-cartesian idea of a priori premises without any resort to experience (product or trace of activity) .
  Arguing this way , we figure out that no knowledge precedes an activity proper as being contingent/component to it . What instigates an activity is first and most of all its due object which appears and acts as its *motive*. In this respect , we read even life needs , desires , drives do not act directly as *motives* of activities ; for them to act as *motives* , they should meet the condition of being selected and appear as activity's object , let alone some stagnated knowledge related to the realm of consciousness .
  I don't know if Andy , Sasha ... could support the idea that *idealism" as referring to *pure subjectivism* could differ from the *idealism* as believing in a second plane of the *world of ideality/ideals* avoiding the counterposing of *material* to *ideal* and apparently contradictory contention that *ideals* can *also* be *material* . I suppose the riddle here could also be solved by reference to Ilyenko/Marx's ? taking of *talers* once as use-values , the other time as (exchange) values .
  With all respect !

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Received on Wed Apr 16 07:54 PDT 2008

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