> One ardent non-poster on the list has been known to define identity as
> stories
> people tell about themselves. Others (I see a note from Wolff-Michael
> waiting
> a little down the queue) talk about identities as related to selves and
> still others relate this to individual subjectivities and get unhappy
> about
> activity theory because it presumably does not allow for analysis of
> individual subjectivities.
Mike,
this is exactly what we can get to when we take both the Holzkamp ()
and Engeström (Il'enkov) positions as dialectics, then we get both the
individual subjectivity and the socially constructed one... We need to
keep in mind that even my own individual subjectivity, I can only know
as mediated by the collective; this dialectic of self and other is tied
to the fact that I have a material body that is not only body among
bodies (material) but also mine opposite to the material other. It is
exactly those relations between self and other, the different forms of
identity (idem, ipse), the body and mind, that I am attempting to
capture in the chapter earlier referred to, which is particularly
grounded in Holzkamp, Ricœur, Mikhailov, but also in Leont'ev.
Michael
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