I actually had in mind THREE sorts of basis for people's views about how
society works and what makes sense: (1) personal experience, (2)
historically-specific folk theories in the culture, and (3) technical
theories based on networks of information that go beyond personal experience.
I agree with Andy that the commodity society is directly experienced
through buying and selling, but this is interpreted in terms of its larger
scale, macrosocial meaning and implications very differently via (2) and
via (3). Most people do not have access to (3) at all, or only as mediated
by the more slowly changing (2), which itself has all sorts of other
functions (which we often call ideological in the large scale, but which
also need to be recognized as face-saving, or hope-generating, etc. on the
personal scale).
Eugene's example of the AmWay (American Way?) scheme is a good one here.
Because he has access to (3), he sees the scheme differently from the guy
who only sees it via (2). I think this is more important than the
difference in cultural values between the Soviet Union and the US. And more
important, too, than just the personal experiences that Eugene may have had
(apart from those that introduced him to #3). Maybe for Eugene, and some of
us, a particular #3 model has already started to take on the character of a
new #2 folk-theory. Eugene and many of us can to some extent reason
informally about judgments without needing to actually check on research or
data or work out the details of a political-economic model to decide about
an AmWay offer.
But our neo-folktheory does not yet seem to have widespread appeal in
competition with the dominant or hegemonic folk-theory about capitalism or
entrepreneurialism or just ambition-for-materialist-success or just the
get-ahead folktheories. (I also smell a certain gender bias in the dominant
folk theories, which means that many women may not have the same version as
the men's version. Different needs, interests, functions.) How come our
view of the world is not able to meet people's experienced needs very well?
It's not just that the hegemonic model fits the economic world as
constructed by capitalism ... when a new folkmodel comes along that really
works for people (emotionally, not just politically and economically), it
can take over very fast.
We've got the "science" right (#3), but there must be something else we've
got really wrong ...
JAY.
At 02:32 PM 12/26/2003 +1100, you wrote:
>Certainly insofar as we can deem Marx to have been the originator of the
>idea of "false consciousness" then very much it was with the idea that
>"false consciousness" was functional, in terms of what I call "real
>illusions", e.g., that money has value. The believe otherwise, a person
>has to "step out of their own times" so to speak.
>
>I agree very much with most of Jaye's comments. Only I think it is very
>much the day-to-day person-to-person experiences in a society which are
>the basis of people's "theories of society". Of course people learn
>"scientific" or abstract theories from sources remote from their personal
>experience. But then the issue is to fill out these abstractions from
>personal experience. Today, those day-to-day experiences are buying and
>selling everything from personal security to dinner to sex. This
>buying-and-selling relation is a particular kind of relation, and one
>which underlays the abstract theories of history taught in Universities or
>via the TV.
>
>Andy
>
>At 10:12 PM 25/12/2003 -0500, you wrote:
>>Dear Judy and everybody-
>>
>>I do not equate irrationality with "false consciousness" but rather other
>>way around namely, for me, "false consciousness" is manifestation of
>>irrationality. However, I'd agree (following Latour) that irrationality is a
>>characterization of incomprehensible others. In other words, "false
>>consciousness" (like irrationality in general) is a relational rather than
>>an essential notion. In this, I may be different from Marx who seemed to
>>coin the notion of "false consciousness" (but may be not!).
>>
>>I think that the phenomenon of "false consciousness" is born out of (at
>>least) two consciousnesses whose practices (and ways of being) do not
>>overlap in some serious ways. When I just came to US as a refugee from the
>>Soviet Union, a guy tried to convince me to join Am-Way
>>(http://www.amway.com). It took me a while to realize how this consumer
>>pyramid works and that it is based on robbing (although lawful robbing)
>>those who are at the bottom of the pyramid. The guy had somewhat cynical
>>attitude and quickly agreed with me. However, he was shocked with my
>>conclusion of rejection to participate in Am-Way. In his view, I probably
>>had "false consciousness" (he did not know this term) because I betrayed my
>>economic interests and my family (he called me "a communist"). I was
>>definitely irrational to him. Indeed, why would a person be more loyal to
>>unknown others rather than to his own family? I knew that from being that
>>this guy came from my reasoning was false, irrational, and stupid. I
>>remember that he said with frustration "You came from a communist country to
>>a capitalist country that is based on people like in Am-Way!" He was
>>right...
>>
>>I wonder what would take this guy to understand me? Would understanding me
>>jeopardize his well-being? Would my understanding of this guy jeopardize my
>>well-being aiming at that time at a social science academician (where I'm
>>now)?
>>
>>In other words, I argue that "false consciousness" is always functional and
>>always relational.
>>
>>What do you think?
>>
>>Eugene
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: Judy [mailto:jdiamondstone@clarku.edu]
>> > Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2003 6:39 PM
>> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > Subject: RE: false consciousness: real and virtual worlds
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Eugene, I agree with you (Ilenkov, apparently) that all consciousness (&
>>all
>> > semiosis) has its virtual basis, so virtuality cannot be the basis of
>>false
>> > consciousness. I don't understand your use of Latour, however; you seem
>>to
>> > be equating irrationality w/ false consciousness, which just seems to
>> > rephrase the claim about virtuality (except that your/Latour's emphasis is
>> > on cultural practices...) Where there is incomprehensibility between
>> > subjects, there is the evidence that the culture is irrational -- can you
>> > please explain your notion of a rational (& thus coherent???) culture?
>> >
>> > I would like a definition of false consciousness that I could use to refer
>> > to a regrettable condition, but every definition I've heard refers to a
>> > condition that could be just the opposite -- a saving grace (like denial
>>in
>> > general) for the subject under certain conditions. Like faith. But I do
>>see
>> > the working class Latino's support for someone like Bush to be
>>regrettable,
>> > in terms of that persons's interests. I suppose what I'm really struggling
>> > with is the notion that there is a consciousness of some kind that ISN'T
>> > false. But maybe that's because I "grew up" with Bateson, not Ilenkov.
>> >
>> > Judy
>> >
>> > Eugene wrote: (snip)
>> > In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
>> > "irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to reconstruct
>> > cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
>> > consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of
>>irrationality
>> > or "false consciousness" is about relationship of incomprehensibility
>> > between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
>> > I-am-now).
>> >
>> > What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for Schwarzenegger
>> > embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for Mike
>> > embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
>> > incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when people
>>do
>> > not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you know
>> > any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so, did you
>> > ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about
>>possible
>> > economic consequences for his family?
Jay Lemke
Professor
University of Michigan
School of Education
610 East University
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
Tel. 734-763-9276
Email. JayLemke@UMich.edu
Website. www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
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