Andy, Steve,
Engels *did* first use the term 'dialectical materialism' closely followed
by Dietzgen (1886). Tony Burns gives the textual exposition in a Science and
Society article on Dietzgen (Summer 2002). He doesn't choose between Engels
and Dietzgen but there is evidence in Dietzgen's writing that it was
definitely Engels in 'Ludwig Feuerbach'.
I have been sort of following this thread and have had a lot to say but no
time to write it up. I'd just like to make two points to Andy (wherever you
are!).
Firstly, as Steve pointed out, there is a struggle to be fought against both
idealism (e.g. post-modernism etc) and mechanical materialism (e.g.
Darwinian reductionism) that's going on today. We cannot just fall back on
Lenin of 1908 or Engels precisely because they bend the stick and not
necessarily in very useful directions but I'm not sure that at a
philosophical level the content of what is being argued about has changed
all that much (a depressing thought perhaps!). I do not mean by saying that
to be either uncritical or ahistorical about what they wrote - I also don't
think that the classical 'Apostolic succession' of 'Dialectical materialism'
means we should take those thinkers as beyond critical examination today.
I see Vygotsky, among others, as having something relevant to say that goes
beyond - and perhaps in a different direction from Engels and the Lenin of
1908 - e.g. his statement to the effect that 'every scientific fact is
already incorporated in a pre-existing system of knowledge'.
I'm unclear what you're saying about scientific laws too. Are you a 'social
constructionist', like the majority of the 'sociologists of science' or
saying that nature has been almost totally 'socialised' like Lukacs or that
some of what pass for scientific laws today are not based on experiential
knowledge but are more speculative?
There is a difference between having 'Nature' and 'God' as universal
starting point / background for ontology - at least once you have rejected
the pantheistic idea that 'God' is everywhere in 'Nature'. Both Feuerbach
and Dietzgen manage to be atheists and take nature precisely as their
starting point for a critique of religion. If you reject the need to start
from some sort of universalist category, you also run into problems with
Hegel and arguably Marx.
I hope I haven't misread you here as I have written this in a hurry.
Bruce
----- Original Message -----
From: Steve Gabosch
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 3:57 AM
Subject: Re: timescale question
Hi Andy,
I am enjoying this exchange, but it is quickly spreading across numerous
topics! Soon, we will need to find a resting place. But here are some
thoughts on your very interesting previous post.
Steve had asked:
Returning to the original question, do you include the formulation of
scientific laws as something you *can* say about Nature?
Andy responded:
Yes. But correctly interpreting the meaning of scientific laws turns out to
be not as obvious as it seems at first.
Thank you. I agree. To be sure, any generalization - "natural law" - is
subject to further interpretations and refinements as human knowledge
(hopefully) progresses, and eventually whole systems of generalizations,
once thought to apply universally, become subjected to more and more
exceptions, more and more qualifications and limitations, more and more
critical interpretations - such as Newton's laws of mechanics, now a special
case of the larger and more universal field of quantum mechanics. And so
will be the fate of all scientific laws, including those of quantum
mechanics and even dialectical materialism. The parliament of modern
science is ever-revising its observations and theories, and no law, no
matter how deeply etched it might be in a stone tablet, is absolute. There
will always be better ways to understand things. Whether we understand the
meanings of these understandings and put them into practice in time is the
historic problem.
Andy remarked:
Steve, I will respond to your points one at a time, but you might reflect on
the observation that if you were to re-write your message inserting the word
"God" in lieu of "Nature" and the names of the various Christian saints and
prophets in lieu of the names of Marxist figures, it would read perfectly
well as a defence of Christianity. Are we really disputing over the name of
God?
No, I didn't at all think we were disputing the name of God, or, in general,
discussing the comparison of Marxism and scientific thinking in general to
religious ideology. I must admit, I didn't expect this discussion to head in
this kind of direction. It appears that you are drawing parallels between
dialectical materialism and religion. Is this your intent?
... why not say "Plekhanov, Stalin, Mao" instead of "Engels, Lenin,
Vygotsky", after all it was Plekhanov who invented the term?
If I get your comment, you are pointing out that Plekhanov invented the term
dialectical materialism. Something in the back of my brain wants to say it
was Kautsky who first popularized it - somebody did - (another tidbit for a
dictionary of philosophical etymology) - but the point you make is the same,
Marx and Engels did not originally invent this term.
I would agree that Plekhanov belongs on the list of dialectical
materialists - which includes Engels, Lenin and Vygotsky - that adhere to
the "two great camps" thesis, but I personally draw the line at including
Stalin and Mao. I would not include Marxist philosophy on their list of
historic accomplishments - in my opinion, they did much damage and no good
to dialectical materialism as a mode of scientific thought.
Steve said:
Andy, what do you believe happened in the post-world war two period - or for
that matter, since the latter half of the 19th century - that has
invalidated or rendered obsolete the positions of Engels, Lenin, Vygotsky
and others on the historic struggle between idealism and materialism in
science and philosophy?
Andy responded:
One of the things we have learnt from Hegel is the concept of "Zeitgeist",
and the way the focus of struggle changes in the course of history. Despite
Engels' observation about "two great camps", this conception does not
withstand an actual study of the history of philosophy. A reading of the
history of philosophy (and even more science) shows that the focus of
disputes changes from generation to generation.
As you stress, the precise focus of struggle certainly changes with the
course of history and from generation to generation, but this point does not
necessarily invalidate Engels' thesis that the struggle of the "two great
camps" of idealism and materialism is underlying philosophical debate in
general. What actual study of the history of philosophy in your opinion
provides contrary evidence to this traditional Marxist thesis? What
analysis does it not withstand?
Andy continued:
"Materialism vs. Idealism" was indeed the focus of philosophical struggle in
the wake of the collapse of Hegelianism in 1841, until sometime close to the
beginning of the first world war, i.e., exactly that period when the
classics of Marxism were written.
This sentence points once more to the need to distinguish a "focus" from an
"underlying debate." I would agree that the focus of the struggle did
shift, but in my thinking, while the forms of the discussion moved to new
parameters, the underlying debate between the ideologies of idealism and
materialism has remained the essential point of contention. In your
comments, you agree that this was the case up to a point, but then things
changed. What do you believe happened just before WWI that changed this
situation?
Andy continued:
Now Marx, Engels and Lenin are beyond criticism in taking a clear position
in the forefront of the philosophical dispute of their day, but it gives no
glory to their followers to repeat these arguments in a later period. Need I
explain that this does not mean that failing to join in this ancient battle
means joining the enemy (i.e., idealist) camp; it simply means to fight the
battle of today rather than the battle of the day before yesterday.
Once again, I suspect we are wrestling here with distinctions of form and
content. If the idealist camp is still the "enemy", isn't there still a
battle? I suggest these essentially opposed conceptions of the world are
still at the root and comprise the essential content of contemporary
scientific and philosophical debate. I am with Engels, Vygotsky and their
followers on this. But I am certainly interested in arguments to the
contrary, and I welcome your thoughts on this.
At the same time, and to emphasize the very valid point I believe you are
making, the forms and foci of this debate have indeed shifted since the 19th
century and with the successive generations. So here is my take, see what
you think. As the 20th century rolled on, many forms of what I would call
mechanical and objectivist materialism became dominant in many quarters of
scientific reasoning, replacing the openly idealist tendencies predominant
in the late 19th century, especially in the social sciences. This has
accelerated in recent decades, to the point where it might be valid to argue
that objectivist-mechanical materialism in social science is the new form of
philosophical idealism. A common methodology associated with this trend of
materialism - which I am suggesting is a form of idealism in disguise - is
to promote biological explanations for social activity. Hence, a major
focus in modern social science philosophy today is on the role of biology in
human affairs. Two popular contemporary trends provide examples: one, the
tendency to look at the human genome as a direct cause of human behavior and
ailment; another, the tendency to seek explanations of modern behavior in
speculations about how and why bio-psychological characteristics originally
evolved.
This view attempts to take into account both the general historic truth of
the struggle of "two great camps" thesis as well as the specific changing
forms and foci of their ideological debates. Thoughts?
Andy said:
My point is that in the sense in which the word "Nature" is used in
philosophy (as opposed to meaning "the birds and the bees", etc), it means
exactly the same thing as "God".
As you surmised, I am not religious, and I do not mean God when I say
Nature. Perhaps I create a problem when I capitalize the "n" in nature. In
doing so, I may be guilty of trying to sound pretentiously Philosophical.
But by Nature I really just mean the Birds and the Bees. So, please, let me
restate my original question as: "is nature lawful?". Asking "is Nature
lawful" may have gotten us off Track - I mean, track. :-))
Steve said:
As I understand it, reification is the process of treating thoughts as real
objects and acting accordingly. Surely, I am misreading your statement if I
take it to mean that the process of reification in general is a valid
practical guide to day-to-day action. What am I missing in your statement?
Andy responded:
No you did not misread me. If I treat a policeman with the respect due to
the law, I am being wise. Equally well I don't step in front of the thing I
call "bus" (unless its indicators are blinking).
Andy a few sentences later said:
If I were to act as if socialist society had arrived, and not bother about
earning a wage or paying for what I take from the shop I would have a very
bad life.
The last example demonstrates why the process of reification in general
cannot in my opinion be a reliable guide to day-to-day action. In
reification, thoughts, including false thoughts about what rules a society
expects us to follow, may not serve us well in practical action. From the
materialist point of view, much more practical than treating abstract
thoughts as real, is thinking concretely about reality. As for stepping in
front of a bus with its indicators blinking: the assumption that a blinking
turn signal means that a bus is actually turning is another example of
reification - the substitution of a semiotic sign for a real event. As any
wise pedestrian knows, it is best to observe the real motion of the bus
before proceeding. :-))
Thanks for your posts, Andy.
- Steve
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