Thank you, Paul, for your prompt and thoughtful reply!
However, there are still some things that make me feel uncomfortable.
Paul wrote:
> For example, you continue to talk about "human
>activities" which surreptitiously slips the notion of individual back into
>the idea of activity. This confusion is continuous, I think,
There is no confusion whatsoever. The use of "human activity" (either
individual or collective) was intended just to differentiate it from " the
actions of the individual antelope or zebra
>> >or other such animal "
until one
>begins to see that (in this theoretical framework) activity is a property of
>a social group. Actions are the behavior of individuals within the group.
I believe the opposite is true and activities should be considered as
properties of BOTH individual and collective subjects. That was Leontiev's
position and there seem to be good reasons to believe individuals have
their "personal" or "subjective" (cf. Ricardo's recent message) motives,
which cannot be considered as just goals within supra-individual activity
systems. Moreover, the life of an individual ("zhiznedejatelnost",
according to Leontiev) can be considered as a higher-level entity comparing
to individual activities.
Therefore, I do not think any attempt to "slip the notion of individual
back into
the idea of activity" should be dismissed outright. In my view, both
Leontiev's and Engestrom's should be taken seriously and perhaps rejecting
individuals the right to be subjects of activities (not just actions) needs
much more thorough argumentation then just pointing out the dangers of
thinking otherwise.
Ricardo's idea that we need to keep two meanings of "individual" (as
opposed to "social" and as opposed to "collective") separate seems to be
very relevant. One of the implications of accepting this idea is that
activities can be individual and social at the same time.
Doesn't that mean that questions asked by Charles should be addressed once
again? The answers provided by Paul earlier are based on the logic that
activities are not individual because they are social. However, since it
*is* possible to be individual and social at the same time, these answers
do not seem to be valid any longer...
What do you think?
Best wishes,
Victor
>
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: Victor Kaptelinin <vklinin@informatik.umu.se>
>To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 4:52 AM
>Subject: Re: Individual activity?
>
>
>> Paul,
>>
>> I am a bit puzzled with your answers to Charles. Could you please help me
>> clarify one thing?
>>
>> >Given that the subject is transitional, it still begins as an
>individual,
>> >so at the time of the first individual changing his/her object, isn't
>> >there then an individual activity?
>> >
>> > Answer 1. No because all activity is social which is what
>> >distinguishes it >from the actions of the individual antelope or zebra
>> >or other such animal that, being a member of a herd/community (origin
>> >of Gattungwesen??), does not act through the mediation of tools. All
>> >tool use is learned hence all activity, involving tools, is
>essentially
>> >social
>>
>> It apears you (and Yrjo) claim that human activities are not individual
>> because they are always social. However, human actions and operations are
>> social, too. It surely means they are not individual, either, right?
>>
>> Then where does the distinction between collective activities and
>> individual actions come from? ("We may well speak of the activity of the
>> individual, but never of individual activity; only actions are
>> individual.")
>>
>> Thank you!
>>
>> Best wishes,
>> Victor
>>
>> PS I have just joined the discussion and have not traced it to the
>> beginning yet, so if this issue has already been resolved, well, I am
>> sorry...
>>
>>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue May 01 2001 - 01:01:47 PDT