Abstract dialectics?

From: Paul Dillon (dillonph@northcoast.com)
Date: Sun Feb 06 2000 - 10:02:27 PST


Bruce,

I have been trying to relate what you have written about dialectics and
modeling to the perspective on dialectics that Ilyenkov developed, in
particular, how Ilyenkov's emphasis on the 'concrete universal' fits with
the integration of dialectics and IS modeling
you have proposed. The concrete universal might be considered the telos
that guides the process of abstraction in Ilyenkov.

This emphasis lies behind Ilyenkov's statement that "dialectics points out
the determining aspect, that element in the unity of opposites which is in
the given instance the leading or determining one. That is an axiom of
dialectics."

Without this "axiom" I find it hard to distinguish a dialectical approach
from an expanded systems approach: ie an approach to modeling that expands
the process of model making to include all of the points of view for whom
the modeled reality has practical significance. As Ilyenkov presents the
matter dialectics works with a "universal concept underlying the entire
system of the categories of science". In the case of economics, that
universal concept is value. Some argue that in Vygotskian psychology that
universal concept is "word-meaning" (Bakhurst's discussion of "unit
analysis" is relevant here).

I've been having a really hard time formulating this response and I have
read your paper several times. I think my concern is basically that you are
formulating an abstract theory of the application of dialectics, that is
one that would apply to any modeling whatsoever. This goes against my
understanding that there are no general, non trivial procedures for
determining concrete universals.

As I understand it, the unity of contradictions is always specific to any
real object. The concrete universal, the dialectical concept, reflects the
concrete, real nature of the object because "all the categories of the
science" are expressed in it. (Ilyenkov 1977). But there is no method for
applying dialectics to "any object in general", the abstract universal.

I have to admit functional ignorance of IS. My comments are thus directed
at the question of dialectics in general. I couldn't really identify a
"concrete universal" in your paper . The questions I would be looking to
see answered would be: What are the categories with which IS commonly
works? What specific contradictions do these categories present in their
description of their object (e.g., the contradiction between the source of
profit and the source of wages in Marx's capital, Vygotsky's paper on the
crisis in psychology).

Your fundamental emphasis on the need to situate IS modeling activity within
the totality of social relations is a necessary component of all dialectical
theories. What I'm not finding in your paper is the specific object of IS
constructed dialectically.

In the present xmca climate concerning message tone I feel it necessary to
emphasize that I have spent a lot of time in self-relfection about my
motives, language, and the possible repercussions of this post. These
comments are posted in the belief that Bruce will in fact benefit from a
consideration of the points raised or, if he has already answered them in
his paper, I will benefit from the clarification that I hope he will
provide.

Paul H. Dillon



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