[Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)

Sun Aug 16 02:10:59 PDT 2020

A couple of things, especially about the Uzbekistan experiments. As I have alluded to in some earlier posts I have been doing some reading on theater during the time Vygotsky was writing. One thing I have come across multiple times is the issue of socialist realism. The idea (and this is probably not a very good definition) is that we have to understand people as they really are and think, but we also have to accept that humans can become better actors (broadly defined) and thinkers under a socialist system. It seems the people pushing this was somewhat akin to cadres in the cultural revolution. In other words you better do it. Even Stanislavski, who both Lenin and Stalin loved, was forced to do a number of productions that promoted socialist realism. If you did not toe the line you were sent to Siberia (or worse). I am sure this is discussed somewhere in relationship to Vygotsky but I wonder if we she take that into account when thinking about things like the Uzbekistan experiment.

A second thing. I wonder if sometimes we have a tendency to over think and over philosophize Vygotsky. In some ways he was just trying to get things done and a concept like conscious awareness in Thinking and Speech is mostly a means to solving a problem, not any philosophical statement. The problem it seems to me is that we do not have consistent conceptual systems based solely on our experience. A five year old can have five different best friends on five days on the playground depending on what people brought for lunch or who got to the swings first. Still, it is these affective based concepts that drive our activity. But we don’t offer use these concepts with any conscious use of attention or memory or any of our other intellectual functions. “Hmmm, Jerry brought salami today, maybe I should think about making him my best friend.” On the other hand social concepts are developed separately from our experiences and our emotions. They are developed specifically to organize and bring consistency to our feelings. But they are meaningless from an affective, everyday  perspective. Why would we even want to think about them. In order to bring them into our lives we have to consciously engage in volitional activities using them. So we have to have conscious awareness. How then do you bring the two together, for which he takes the remainder of chapter six.

Dewey also was really, really inconsistent in the way he used words. I would argue he used words as tools not as philosophical statements. You have to read the texts and figure it out.

Michael

From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> On Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: Saturday, August 15, 2020 8:15 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)

Hi Mike,

Well you and I may differ on this. My interpretation is that in the passage that Anthony gave us, LSV is talking about the growing consciousness *of their own thinking* on the part of school-age children. (In Thought & Language he shifts a bit on whether this happens in middle childhood or adolescence, but that needn't concern us.) That is to say, he is writing about what he calls “introspection."

As evidence for this interpretation let me cite a couple of other passages (these are from the excellent Kellogg translation) where I think the point is made more clearly:

100 "I make a knot. I do it consciously. I cannot, however, tell you exactly how I did it. My conscious act is unconscious, because my attention is focused on the act of the tying, but not on how I do it. Consciousness is always some piece of reality. The object of my consciousness is tying the knot, a knot, and what was happening to it but not those actions that I make when tying, not how I do it. But the object of consciousness can be just that - then it will be awareness. Awareness is an act of consciousness, the object of which is itself the very same activity of consciousness”

102 "Even Piaget's research showed that introspection does not begin to develop in any significant degree until school age. Further investigations have shown that the development of introspection in the school age contains something similar to what occurs in the development of the external perception and observation in the transition from infancy to early childhood. As is well known, the most important change in external perception of this period [i.e. infancy to early childhood] is that a child from a wordless and, consequently, meaningless perception, to a semantic, verbal and objective perception. The same can be said of introspection on the threshold of school age. The child is moving from mute introspection to speech and words. He develops an internal semantic perception of his own mental processes…. I realize that I can recall, i.e. I do recall the subjectivity of my own consciousness."

104 "By their very nature, spontaneous concepts include the fact that they are unconscious. Children know how they operate spontaneously but are not aware of them. This is what we saw in the children's concept of "because." Obviously, by themselves, spontaneous concepts need to be unconscious, because consideration is always directed to their objects, rather than to the act of thought which is grasping it.”

106  "only in a system [of concepts] can the concept become the object of awareness and only in a system can the child acquire volitional control [of concepts]."

In his Lectures on Child Psychology LSV is very clear, in my view, that at each stage the child has consciousness of different aspects of the world and of their own psychological processes. For example:

"In an infant, there is no intellectual perception: he perceives a room but does not separately perceive chairs, a table, etc.; he will perceive everything as an undivided whole in contrast to the adult, who sees figures against a background. How does a child perceive his own movements in early childhood? He is happy, unhappy, but does not know that he is happy, just as an infant when he is hungry does not know that he is hungry. There is a great difference between feeling hunger and knowing that I am hungry. In early childhood, the child does not know his own experiences…. Precisely as a three-year-old child discovers his relation to other people, a seven-year-old discovers the fact of his own experiences.” (p. 291)

Of course, one might find it objectionable that LSV might suggest that non-literate peoples might be unaware of their own thinking. But I agree with Andy, in such cultures there may well be systematic instruction in systems of concepts — legal, religious… — that would have the same effect as LSV says that school instruction does in the west.

Stay safe,

Martin

On Aug 15, 2020, at 6:06 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu<mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>> wrote:

I was not being ironic, David
If scientific concepts are required for conscious awareness (as specified in the quotation I was asked to respond to) and people who
have not been to school do not acquire Piagetian concepts related to formal operations (for example) or other measure of "thinking in
scientific concepts) if seems to follow that they have not achieved conscious awareness.

LSV writes about non-literate, indigenous, peoples that they are capable of complexes, but not true concepts (I think the use of the term.
"scientific" is not helpful here). Luria interprets his data on self-consciousness that are a part of the same monograph as his work on syllogisms,
classification, etc among Uzbekis who had experienced various degrees of involvement in modern (e.g. Russian) forms of life as evidence for
what might be termed "lack of conscious awareness I am not sure."

mike

On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 3:31 PM David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu<mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
Maybe I missed an ironic intention, Michael, but on August 11 Anthony asked about the meaning of a couple of paragraphs from Thinking and Speech.

Here is the passage in question, from Thinking and Speech, Ch. 6, pp. 190-1:
"To perceive something in a different way means to acquire new potentials for acting with respect to it. At the chess board, to see differently is to play differently. By generalizing the process of activity itself, I acquire the potential for new relationships with it. To speak crudely, it is as if this process has been isolated from the general activity of consciousness. I am conscious of the fact that I remember. I make my own remembering the object of consciousness. An isolation arises here. In a certain sense, any generalization or abstraction isolates its object. This is why conscious awareness – understood as generalization – leads directly to mastery.

Thus, the foundation of conscious awareness is the generalization or abstraction of the mental processes, which leads to their mastery. Instruction has a decisive role in this process. Scientific concepts have a unique relationship to the object. This relationship is mediated through other concepts that themselves have an internal hierarchical system of interrelationships. It is apparently in this domain of the scientific concept that conscious awareness of concepts or the generalization and mastery of concepts emerges for the first time. And once a new structure of generalization has arisen in one sphere of thought, it can – like any structure – be transferred without training to all remaining domains of concepts and thought. Thus, conscious awareness enters through the gate opened up by the scientific concept."

Mike’s reply, in total was:

I understand that to mean that humans who have not achieved scientific/real concepts do not have conscious awareness.

What am I missing?
Mike

David

From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> On Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: Saturday, August 15, 2020 4:36 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)

David,

Are you saying that either Mike Cole or Lev Vygotsky, or both, are claiming that 5-year old children (for example) lack conscious awareness of the world they live in?

Puzzled...

Martin

On Aug 14, 2020, at 9:16 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu<mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:

Andy,

That “any ‘actual’ concept is the intersection or merging of both the scientific and spontaneous path,” speaks to their complementarity, making them akin to Type 1 and Type 2 processing I referred to in my post.
But they’re also hierarchically related, since according to Mike’s interpretation of a Vygotsky’s passage cited by Anthony a few days ago, “humans who have not achieved scientific/real concepts do not have conscious awareness.”

I do not question Vygotsky’s genius. What I do question is the coherence of the interpretive frames that have evolved from his work. As Michael observed in a recent post, “like the writer he wanted to be he [Vygotsky] used phrases and ideas less as truths and more to move his narrative forward.” What I always wonder in eavesdropping on XMCA is whether the issues we discuss are resolvable, or is the theoretical backdrop to our conversation so heterogeneous as to make the possibility of resolution illusory.

David

From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Friday, August 14, 2020 10:32 AM
To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)

No David, as I said, the term "scientific concept" as it is understood nowadays, tends to mislead. The distinction for Vygotsky is entirely, as you say, developmental, and it is not a categorisation either (as in putting things into boxes), and nothing to do with "sophistication." "Scientific concept" refers to the path of development that begins with an abstract (decontextualised) concept acquired through instruction in some more or less formal institution. "Spontaneous concept" refers to the path of development which begins with everyday experience, closely connected with immediate sensori-motor interaction and perception, i.e., it begins from the concrete, whereas the "scientific" is beginning from the abstract.
Any "actual" concept is the intersection or merging of both the scientific and spontaneous path. For example (1) everyday life is full of ideas which have their source in institutions, but have made their way out of the institutional context into everyday life. On the other hand, for example (2) any scientific concept worth its salt has made its way out of the classroom and become connected with practice, like the book-learning of the medical graduate who's spent 6 months in A&E.
I admit, this is not clear from Vygotsky's prose. But here's the thing: when you're reading a great thinker and what they're saying seems silly, trying reading it more generously, because there's probably a reason this writer has gained the reputation of being a great thinker.
Andy
________________________________
Andy Blunden
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On 15/08/2020 1:14 am, David H Kirshner wrote:
Thanks for your accessible example, Michael.

Vygotsky’s scientific / spontaneous distinction between types of concepts has always struck me as such an unfortunate solution to the problem of differential sophistication in modes of reasoning. I’m sure this problem must have deep roots in classical and contemporary philosophy, even as it is reflected in cognitive psychology’s Dual Process Theory that at its “theoretical core amounts to a dichotomous view of two types of processes…: type 1—intuitive, fast, automatic, nonconscious, effortless, contextualized, error-prone, and type 2—reflective, slow, deliberate, cogitative, effortful, decontextualized, normatively correct” (Varga & Hamburger, 2014). What externalizing this distinction as different kinds of cognitive products (this or that kind of concept) seems to do is distract/detract from the sociogenetic character of development. Surely, a sociogenetic approach seeks to interpret these different forms of reasoning as differential discursive practices, embedded in different cultural contexts (Scribner, Cole, etc.). But talking about different kinds of concepts seems like the wrong departure point for that journey.

David

From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael
Sent: Friday, August 14, 2020 7:03 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu><mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)

Hi Andy, Henry, Anna Lisa,

Let me start by saying that this is completely restricted to the way conscious awareness is used in Thinking and Speech. If it is use differently in other places this perspective may be wrong. To my mind (with the proviso that my mind if often wrong) Vygotsky is using the idea of conscious awareness for a specific purpose. To differentiate the role of spontaneous concepts with non-spontaneous concepts. Spontaneous concepts are based initially in affective memory and they give energy and motivation to many of our activities. However we are not consciously aware of them. To go back to chess, I am at the pool and my friend comes up to me and says “Chess?” I say yes. I have no conscious awareness of the concept of chess in my life, why I say yes so easily why it may be a way to make a social connection between me and my friend. It is residue of my affective memory (I don’t know how much Vygotsky was using Ribot when making this argument). We are playing chess and I remember that my brother showed me the non-spontaneous/scientific concept of the bishop’s gambit. As this point in my life I have to think about it and whether I want to use it. I must summon the intellectual functions of memory and attention as I think about the use of the bishop’s gambit. This then is conscious awareness of the scientific concept. I used the bishop’s gambit and win the game and I applaud myself. I got home and tell my brother, the bishop’s gambit was great, thanks. I am mediating the scientific concept of the bishop’s gambit with my everyday concept of playing chess. Voila, development!!!!

I don’t know if Vygotsky uses conscious awareness differently elsewhere.

Michael

From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2020 11:51 PM
To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu<mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "conscious awareness enters through the gate" (a Participation Question)

Henry, my aim was just to introduce Annalisa and whoever to the scientific way that the terms "conscious awareness" and "consciousness" are used in CHAT. I say "scientific" in the sense that in CHAT we have a system of concepts and associated word meanings which have, if you like, conventional meanings. There is nothing wrong with "automatic and controlled processing" and "ballistic processing" but so far as I am aware these terms were not in Vygotsky's vocabulary. I could be wrong of course and I am sure I will be rapidly corrected if this is the case.

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