[Xmca-l] Re: Hegelian sources of CHAT

[HENRY SHONERD]

Andy and Huw,
This is a perfect example of what I was talking about in the discussion of your article on Academia: Two philosophers having a dialog about the same pholosophical object, a dialog manifesting an experience of common understanding. In the same way that two mathematicians might agree on a mathematical proof. I have to believe that you are not bull shitting, that you really have understood each other via your language. So, of course this is of interest to a linguist, even though he/I don’t really get the “proof”. I may not understand the arguments you are making, but I can imagine, based on slogging through thinking as a lingist, what it’s like to get it. 

I think this relates to the problem in the world of a lack of trust in scientific expertise, in expertise in general. Where concpetual thinking reigns. So many climate deniers. So many Brexiters. But can you blame them entirely? Probably it would be better to say that trust isn’t enough. The problem is a lack of connection between trust and the creative imagination. It’s what Beth Fernholt and her pals have sent to the New Yorker. 

Henry


> On Sep 27, 2019, at 6:40 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
> 
> Thanks, Huw. 
> 
> The interconnectedness of the "four concepts," I agree, they imply each other, but nonetheless, they remain distinct insights. Just because you get one, you don't necessarily get the others.
> 
> Hegel uses the expression "true concept" only rarely. Generally, he simply uses the word "concept," and uses a variety of other terms like "mere conception" or "representation" or "category" to indicate something short of a concept, properly so called, but there is no strict categorisation for Hegel. Hegel is not talking about Psychology, let alone child psychology. Like with Vygotsky, all thought-forms (or forms of activity) are just phases (or stages) in the development of a concept. Reading your message, I think I am using the term "true concept" in much the same way you are. 
> 
> (This is not relevant to my article, but I distinguish "true concept" from "actual concept." All the various forms of "complexive thinking" fall short, so to speak, of "true concepts," and further development takes an abstract concept, such as learnt in lecture 101 of a topic, to an "actual concept". But that is not relevant here. Hegel barely touches on these issues.)
> 
> I don't agree with your specific categories, but yes, for Vygotsky, chapters 4, 5 and 6 are all talking about concepts in a developmental sense. There are about 10 distinct stages for Vygotsky. And they are not equivalent to any series of stages identified by Hegel. Vgotsky's "stages" were drawn from a specific experiment with children; Hegel's Logic is cast somewhat differently (the Logic is not a series of stages) and has a domain much larger than Psychology.
> 
> The experienced doctor does not use what I would call "formal concepts" in her work, which are what I would call the concepts they learnt in Diagnostics 101 when they were a student. After 20 years of experience, these formal concepts have accrued practical life experience, and remain true concepts, but are no longer "formal." Of course, the student was not taught pseudoconcepts in Diagnostics 101. But all this is nothing to do with the article in question.
> 
> Hegel and Vygotsky are talking about different things, but even in terms of the subject matter, but especially in terms of the conceptual form, there is more Hegel in "Thinking and Speech" than initially meets the eye.
> 
> Andy
> 
> Andy Blunden
> Hegel for Social Movements <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
> Home Page <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
> On 27/09/2019 4:32 pm, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> The "four concepts", for me, are four aspects of one understanding -- they imply each other.
>> 
>> Quoting this passage:
>> 
>> "The ‘abstract generality’ referred to above by Hegel, Vygotsky aptly called a ‘pseudoconcept’ - a form of abstract generalization, uniting objects by shared common features, which resembles conceptual thinking because, within a limited domain ofexperience, they subsume the same objects and situations as the true concept indicated by the same word.
>> The pseudoconcept is not the exclusive achievement of the child. In our everyday lives, our thinking frequently occurs in pseudoconcepts. From the perspective of dialectical logic, the concepts that we find in our living speech are not concepts in the true sense of the word. They are actually general representations of things. There is no doubt, however, that these representations are a transitional stage between complexes or pseudoconcepts and true concepts. (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 155)"
>> 
>> My impression from your text, Andy, is that you are misreading Vygotsky's "Thinking and Speech". Implicit LSV's whole text of vol. 1 is an appreciation for different kinds of conception (3 levels: pseudo, formal, and dialectical), but the terminology of "concept" is only applied to the formal concept, i.e. where Vygotsky writes "concept" one can read "formal concept".
>> 
>> In vol. 1, the analysis of the trajectory of the thought of the child is towards a growing achievement of employing formal concepts. These formal concepts are only called "true concepts" (not to be confused with Hegel's true concept) in relation to the pseudo (fake or untrue) formal concepts. The pseudo concepts pertain to a form of cognition that is considered by Vygotsky (quite sensibly) to precede the concepts of formal logic.  This is quite obvious to any thorough-going psychological reading of the text.
>> 
>> However, within the frame of analysis of the text there is another form of conception which is Vygotsky's approach towards a dialectical understanding. None of Vygotsky's utterances about dialectics (in this volume) should be conflated with the "true concept" which he is using as a short-hand for the "true formal concept", similarly none of Vygotsky's utterances about "pseudo concepts" should be confused with formal concepts.
>> 
>> I hope that helps,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sat, 21 Sep 2019 at 06:37, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
>> I'd dearly like to get some discussion going on this:
>> 
>> It will be shown that at least four foundational concepts of Cultural Historical Activity Theory were previously formulated by Hegel, viz., (1) the unit of analysis as a key concept for analytic-synthetic cognition, (2) the centrality of artifact-mediated actions, (3) the definitive distinction between goal and motive in activities, and (4) the distinction between a true concept and a pseudoconcept.
>> 
>> https://www.academia.edu/s/7d70db6eb3/the-hegelian-sources-of-cultural-historical-activity-theory <https://www.academia.edu/s/7d70db6eb3/the-hegelian-sources-of-cultural-historical-activity-theory>
>> Andy
>> 
>> -- 
>> Andy Blunden
>> Hegel for Social Movements <https://brill.com/view/title/54574>
>> Home Page <https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
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