[Xmca-l] Re: language and music

[James Ma]

Andy, thank you for your message. Just to make a few brief points, linking
with some of your comments:



First, I have a default sense of signs based on Saussurean linguistics
(semiology); however, I don't think I "strangely leap from Peirce's
semiotics to Saussure's semiology".  When I read Peirce and Vygotsky on
signs, I often have a Saussurean imagery present in my mind.  As I see it,
Saussurean semiology is foundational to all language studies, such as the
evolution of language in terms of e.g. semantic drift and narrowing.
Speaking more broadly, in my view, both synchronic and diachronic approach
to language have relevance for CHAT.  Above all, *a priori *hermeneutic
methodology can benefit further development of semiotic methodology within
CHAT, helping us to come to grips with what Max Fisch, the key Peircean
exponent, referred to as "the most essential point", i.e. the tripartite of
thought as semiosis, namely sign-interpretation or sign action.  For
example, how sign action might be implicated in culture and consciousness.



Second, animal utterances, however eloquently produced or approximated like
human ones, are simply communication.  It would be rather absurd for formal
linguists to think of animal utterances as language, given that in a strict
sense no animals are in effect as able to sustain a conversation as humans
do!



Third, on hearing that you are "definitely not an Analytical philosopher,
but not really a Continental philosopher either", it's not surprising that
in my last email the paragraph beginning "More specifically..." doesn't
make much sense to you.  That paragraph reflects a take on consciousness
and language informed by phenomenology and post-structuralism.
Phenomenology gave way to post-structuralism in the 1960s, prior to which
Heidegger and Sartre had taken phenomenology to a direction different to
Husserl.  However, Heidegger's theory as mainly presented in "Being and
Time", albeit provocative and much disputed, has long been a landmark of
modern thought in philosophy and beyond.  Funnily enough, when reading your
comments, my first impulse was recollection of you remarking that
phenomenology was not for you and that Heidegger was a flawed personality!



After all, perhaps we all have a Dasein unique to ourselves. Our different
disciplinary interests lead to different ontological positions that
influence our views on how we should know what we know!  Sometimes
synergistic meaning-making without emotion may be fruitful and illuminating.



James





On Mon, 10 Dec 2018 at 01:50, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:



(1) Analytical Philosophy vs. Continental Philosophy
This is the tribal division which divides philosophy departments across the
Anglosphere into rival, mutually incomprehensible tribes. My lights -
Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky - are certainly not part of Analytical Philosophy
but are not really Continentals either. The Pragmatists - from Dewey, James
and Peirce to Rorty and Brandom - are not quite Analytical Philosophers,
but these are the only Analyticals I find interesting. So I'd say I am
definitely not an Analytical philosopher, but not really a Continental
philosopher either. All the people I like are "in between."

(2) "Reality as a creation of minds or mental states?"
This is the absurd claim of Subjective Idealism. No, as a Hegelian-Marxist,
I am definitively not a Subjective Idealist.

(3) "Consciousness bestows meaning to the objects of the world or that the
experience of a human subject makes these objects meaningful?"
Well, yes, I don't know what "meaning" could mean otherwise, so something
of this kind must be the case.

(4) I can't make much sense of your paragraph beginning "More specifically
..." I go with Vyotsky's view of the mutually interconnected development of
verbal intellect and intelligent speech (whether verbal or signed). I don't
want to add anything to what Vygotsky said in "Thinking and Speech."

(5) Why "consciousness cannot in itself be a sign"?
I think Peirce's view of consciousness as semiosis is a powerful one and
can be utilised consistently with Vygotsky's views on the solution of
relevant problems. But the thing is that consciousness is not something
which in itself has any impact on the external world, only mediately
through the physiology of the thinking body and material objects wielded by
the body. You strangely leap from Peirce's semiotics to Saussure's
Semiology when you say: "consciousness is the signifying and the
signified." How can consciousness signify if it is not empirically given?
Unless you are just referencing an "internal world" here?

(6) How semiotics in the Peircean sense is "not language"?
As I see it, semiotics is an approach (like structuralism or functionalism
or behaviourism), an extremely powerful approach, for the objective
analysis of culture in the sense of a mass of interconnected objects and
behaviours. The context in which I was speaking was the phylogenetic
origins of language. Treating language as a natural process subject to
objective analysis just like geological formations or the structure of
ecosystems, or whatever, ruled out Semiotics as providing the explanation
for why language is essentially not just a system of signs,- that a chimp
screeching in fright and causing another chimp to run away, is essentially
different from a chimp calling out: "There's a wolf coming!" and another
chimp responding by calling out "Stop playing games, Charlie! You scared
the life out of me." Even old Spinoza took the essential issue, not to have
emotions, but to be able to control one's emotions and one's response to
emotions.

Whatever your ontological position, there remains a real puzzle: how did
homo sapiens sapiens evolve? What is it that was the essential driver in
forming our unquestionably unique species. Many answer that it is language,
and it is not unreasonable to re-pose the original question: how did
language-using evolve? If the analytical tools you bring to bear can't make
a fundamental distinction between language-using and any other semiotic
process, then that tool is of no use for the task at hand.

Andy


On Sun, 9 Dec 2018 at 22:15, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com> wrote:

Andy, I'm now back to you after a busy week. You said: "Language is an
> essential part of a specific form of life, namely human life, in which
> consciousness mediates between stimulus and response, and that
> consciousness cannot in itself be a sign". I found this interesting - would
> it encapsulate an idealistic view of reality as a creation of minds or
> mental states? Are you saying that consciousness bestows meaning to the
> objects of the world or that the experience of a human subject makes these
> objects meaningful?
>
> More specifically, linking consciousness with language, do you consider
> both the intentionality of consciousness and the linguistic structures as
> described in analytical philosophy (I guess you're more of an analytical
> philosopher)? I wondered, in your view, what would serve as a foundation
> for knowledge, if human subjects had no recourse to the narratives of
> "transcendent being" or "higher being". I'm interested in Wittgenstein and
> Husserl, both of whom examined language and consciousness. Wittgenstein saw
> limits in what philosophy could do in terms of explaining and
> understanding; Husserl stressed limits in articulating or communicating
> consciousness. Can you comment on this and perhaps how it might be
> implicated in your position?
>
> Can you also explain why "consciousness cannot in itself be a sign"? As I
> see it, consciousness is the signifying and the signified, both of which
> evolve as consciousness evolves. In Peirce's terms, consciousness is a
> semiosis.
>
> In an earlier message, you said semiotics in the Peircean sense is "not
> language". Reading Peirce, I've found it intriguing that a great deal of
> his pragmaticism (as distinguished from William James's pragmatism) can be
> packed into his semiosis. It seems that his semiosis might be studied
> against the backdrop of his pragmaticism (which provides a conceptual basis
> for his tripartite of the sign). As I see it, Peircean pragmatism is also a
> theory of meaning, indicative of the role of language in making clear what
> we mean by what we say (e.g. what it is meant by "going around the tree" in
> William James's "squirrel on the tree").
>
> This discussion is perhaps a most enduring one so far on Xmca-I. I'm busy
> again from tomorrow but will be joyfully watching how it develops in the
> background!
>
> James
>
>
>
>
> *________________________________________________*
>
> *James Ma  Independent Scholar **https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
> <https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa>   *
>
>
>
> On Mon, 3 Dec 2018 at 04:35, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>
>> Greg, those currents of formal analysis which, like Peirce's semiotics,
>> take the subject (in the sense of a moral agent) out of a process have an
>> important place in analysis. The same could be said of Structuralism and
>> even Marx's Capital (though it could be argued that for Marx capital is a
>> subject). One can of course study language from a purely structural
>> standpoint, or purely semiotic standpoint. But my point is that language
>> (languaging?) is not just a system of signs. Language is an essential part
>> of a specific form of life, namely human life, in which consciousness
>> mediates between stimulus and response, and that consciousness cannot in
>> itself be a sign.
>>
>> I think Peirce says that the self is a concentrated group, or something
>> of the kind. Peirce is fine. But subjects do not (generally) create words *de
>> novo*; interactions (with other and self) is mediated by use of an
>> already-objectively-existing culture. Semiotics *can* be used to analyse
>> that objectively-existing culture, but close as it comes to a concept of
>> the Subject, I don't think it can get there.
>>
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden
>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>> On 3/12/2018 1:44 pm, Greg Thompson wrote:
>>
>> Not "behind" Andy - you're playing a different game!
>> (And it happens to be one in which I am terribly "behind"!)
>>
>> And I generally agree with your appraisal, but it makes me wonder what
>> you've concluded with regard to Colapietro's characterization of Peirce's
>> notion of the self? I believe you were the one who shared it with me but
>> from your tone here I assume that you feel that it falls short in
>> theorizing a "subject"/self. Care to expand on that any? Particularly with
>> regard to the shortcomings of the theory?
>>
>> -greg
>> [p.s. And perhaps instead of "playing games" we might turn the metaphor
>> back to the original thread by noting(!) that we are simply "playing
>> different tunes"?
>> Often discordant but occasionally resonant...]
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 6:16 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks Greg. It's good to hear that I am thoroughly behind the game! :)
>>> Thank you.
>>>
>>> I think Peirce's semiotics has the great advantage in that it does *not
>>> *include the category of Subject in its triads (e.g. sign |
>>> interpretant | object). This means that it can be used for the analysis of
>>> *objective* processes. When used in this way it does not imply
>>> "thinking" at all. That virtue of Peirce's semiotics was the basis of my
>>> objection to James's observation. Speech and gesture has a subject.
>>>
>>> The other minor point I would make about your very erudite response is
>>> that I think we should not be too apologetic about using the concept of
>>> "mind." True, mind is not a sensible entity, but in all human interactions
>>> we deduce the state of minds from the observable behaviour, and in fact
>>> (scientific or everyday) human behaviour is incomprehensible without the
>>> presumption that it is mindful to this or that extent. Otherwise, we become
>>> Behaviourists, and Chomsky would murder us! :)
>>>
>>> Andy
>>> ------------------------------
>>> Andy Blunden
>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>> On 3/12/2018 11:53 am, Greg Thompson wrote:
>>>
>>> Andy,
>>>
>>> My short response would depend on whether you'd prefer to be critical or
>>> charitable toward linguistic anthropologists.
>>>
>>> The critical approach would say that with a few exceptions (e.g., Elinor
>>> Ochs, Paul Kockelman, Elizabeth Mertz, John Lucy, among others), you are
>>> right.
>>>
>>> The charitable approach would say that linguistic anthropologists are in
>>> fact dealing with precisely the things that you are talking about. Most of
>>> the ones that I know are anti-Chomskyian, to say the least. Most of them
>>> are grappling with issues of practice, not just studying formal structures
>>> that exist in someplace called "the mind" (where is that exactly?). In
>>> fact, one of the greatest insults to the linguistic anthropologists that I
>>> know is to call them a "butterfly collector" - that is to say, a mere
>>> documenter of language variation across the globe. Most of the ones I know
>>> are in fact very mindful of understanding the practical consequences of
>>> semiotic forms. In his book Talking Heads Benjamin Lee makes precisely the
>>> point that you are making through his deployment of Peirce to Critique
>>> Saussure. Peirce offers a means of grasping semiosis as a lived practice
>>> rather than one that exists only in the "mind" (as Saussure's approach to
>>> semiotics would suggest).
>>>
>>> The critical approach is nice because you can just dispense with
>>> linguistic anthropology and all their gobbly-gook jargon as irrelevant. The
>>> charitable approach might suggest that we should at least acknowledge their
>>> project. That's all I was hoping to do. I figured that there might be a few
>>> who are interested, but most on the listserve will find that it wasn't
>>> worth investing the time - and I don't blame them! (as someone in this
>>> goofy world of academia, I'm very sensitive to the fact that learning the
>>> language of an entirely new system is a major time commitment and only
>>> worth it in rare cases).
>>>
>>> I think things get a bit more complicated when we get to the issue of
>>> the semiosis of non-human agents that you seemed to be poking at (e.g.,
>>> Eduardo Kohn's book How Forests Think). I understand that you are very much
>>> a humanist and don't like this approach for some very fundamental reasons.
>>> I'm not entirely committed to this position (Kohn's) and so I'm not the
>>> best person to make the case for this position - unless you are really
>>> genuinely interested. And besides, I'm already well beyond your one screen
>>> rule!
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> greg
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 5:28 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> So I gather confirmation from your message, Greg: "most of the
>>>> anthropologists I know, linguistic or otherwise, don't have much interest
>>>> in talking about such things as psychological functioning" and therefore,
>>>> it seems to me, little interest in what people do as well as what they
>>>> think. In other words, the turn to seeing language as a system of Peircean
>>>> signs is an entirely *formal* project. Yes, the babbling of a brook or
>>>> the babbling of a band of monkeys can be formally analysed with the same
>>>> set of concepts as the babbling of a group of humans in conversation. But
>>>> this is purely formal, superficial and obscures what is expressed and
>>>> transacted in the human babble.
>>>>
>>>> I can understand the fascination in such formal disciplines, I accept
>>>> that Peircean Semiotics can be a tool of analysis, and often insights come
>>>> out from such formal disciplines relevant to the real world (mathematics
>>>> being the supreme example), but ....! One really has to keep in mind that
>>>> words are not Peircean signs. To answer the question of how it is that
>>>> humans alone have language by saying that everything has language, even
>>>> inanimate processes (and this is how I interpret the equation of language
>>>> with Peircean signs), is somewhat more than missing the point.
>>>>
>>>> As an example of how such formal processes lead to grave errors is the
>>>> Language Acquisition Device "proved" to exist by Chomsky's formal analysis
>>>> of language. And yet to hold that an actual biological, neuronal formation
>>>> as a LAD exists in all human beings in quite inconsistent with the
>>>> foundations of biology, i.e., Darwinian evolution. Either Darwin or
>>>> Chomsky, but not both. Which tells me that there is a problem with this
>>>> formal analysis, even though I gasp in wonder every time Google manages to
>>>> correctly parse an ordinary language question I ask it and deliver very
>>>> relevant answers.
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>> On 2/12/2018 2:51 am, Greg Thompson wrote:
>>>>
>>>> [I hesitate to send a post like this to this group for precisely the
>>>> reasons Helena mentioned previously (the proliferation of technical
>>>> languages in different fields and the time-intensive labor of translating
>>>> terms/meanings of entire systems of thinking from one of these fields to
>>>> the next). Add the fact that there are few who have much interest in one of
>>>> the field of linguistic anthropology (and esp. how ling anthro has taken up
>>>> Peicean semiotics - a tangle of words in its own right), and this means the
>>>> following post will likely remain an orphan (not at all because of anyone's
>>>> ill intentions but simply because this is an impossible situation for
>>>> anyone to commit to learning an entirely new language for talking about
>>>> language!).]
>>>>
>>>> Yes James, as a Peircean, I assume that you would point to (!) the
>>>> indexical and iconic potentials of SPOKEN language while noting that this
>>>> flattens the oft-made distinction between gesture and the spoken word? Our
>>>> dominant ideology of language tends to assume that spoken language is
>>>> (only?) symbolic and gesture is only indexical and iconic. Peirce's notion
>>>> of indexical and iconic functions offers us a way into seeing how spoken
>>>> language is also indexical and iconic (as opposed to Saussure who dismissed
>>>> them out of hand - e.g., in the Course he dismisses onomatopoeia (iconic)
>>>> and "shifters" (indexical) as irrelevant to his project).
>>>>
>>>> Following Peirce's vision, Roman Jakobson was one of the first to point
>>>> to the problem of this dominant ideology of language, and Michael
>>>> Silverstein has made a rather substantial career off of this simple point,
>>>> first elaborated in his famous 1976 paper on "shifters" and since then in
>>>> numerous other works. Many others working in linguistic anthropology have
>>>> spent the last 40 years expanding on this project by exploring the
>>>> indexical and iconic nature of spoken language in the concepts of
>>>> "indexicality" and "iconization". More recently linguistic anthropologists
>>>> have considered the processes by which sign-functions can shift from one
>>>> function to another - e.g., rhematization - from indexical or symbolic to
>>>> iconic (see Susan Gal and Judy Irvine's work), and iconization - from
>>>> symbolic or iconic to indexical (see Webb Keane's and Chris Ball's work).
>>>> And others have looked at more basic features of sign-functioning such as
>>>> the realization of qualia (see Lily Chumley and Nicholas Harkness' special
>>>> issue in Anthro theory).
>>>>
>>>> The relevance of all this for the present list serve is that the
>>>> processes being described by these linguistic anthropologists are
>>>> fundamental to understanding human psychological functioning and yet most
>>>> of the anthropologists I know, linguistic or otherwise, don't have much
>>>> interest in talking about such things as psychological functioning (one
>>>> exception here is Paul Kockelman, e.g., in his book Person, Agent, Subject,
>>>> Self - although beware that his writing is just as dense as Peirce's!).
>>>> Anyway, I suspect that this could be a particularly productive intersection
>>>> for development.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> -greg
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2018 at 8:40 AM HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Right on, James!
>>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 30, 2018, at 12:16 AM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Henry, personally I prefer Xmca-I discussion to be exploratory and
>>>>> free style, allowing for the coexistence of subjectness and subjectless.
>>>>> When it comes to scholarly writing, we know we will switch the code.
>>>>>
>>>>> James
>>>>>
>>>>> HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> 于 2018年11月29日周四 18:58写道：
>>>>>
>>>>>> James,
>>>>>> This conversation has been so satisfying I don’t want to let go of
>>>>>> it, so I hope I am not tiring you or others with all the connections I
>>>>>> find. But, in the spirit of Alfredo’s post, I’ll just keep on talking and
>>>>>> remark on how the duck tail hair cut is a rich gesture, an important
>>>>>> concept in this subject line. Gesture is an aspect of communication present
>>>>>> in many species. Hence, the importance of gesture as a rudimentary form of
>>>>>> language with evolutionary results in human language. Maybe this is a
>>>>>> reach, but I see the business of quotes in the subject line now taking
>>>>>> place (Anna Stetsenko and Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont, contributing right
>>>>>> now) on the last chapter of Vygotsky’s Speech and Language as an issue of
>>>>>> gesture. Language, written language in this case, is limited in its ability
>>>>>> to provide nuance. Writing without quotes “gestured”, pointed to to author
>>>>>> sources familar in the day that Vygotsky wrote, such that quotes were not
>>>>>> necessary. Dan Slobin, psycholinguist at Univ of Calf, wrote that two
>>>>>> charges of language where in “tension”: 1) make yourself clear and 2) get
>>>>>> it said before losing the thread of thinking and talking. Gesture, I would
>>>>>> like to argue, is an aspect of discourse that helps to address this
>>>>>> tension. A turn (in discourse) is a gesture, with temporal constraints that
>>>>>> belie the idea that a single turn can ever be totally clear in and of
>>>>>> itself. Writing, as we are doing now, is always dialogic, even a whole
>>>>>> book, is a turn in discourse. And we keep on posting our turns.
>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Nov 29, 2018, at 8:56 AM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Henry, Elvis Presley is spot on for this subject line!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The ducktail hairstyle is fabulous. Funnily enough, it is what my
>>>>>> brother would always like his 9-year-old son to have because he has much
>>>>>> thicker hair than most boys. Unfortunately last year the boy had
>>>>>> a one-day show off in the classroom and was ticked off by the
>>>>>> school authority (in China). However, my brother has managed to
>>>>>> restore the ducktail twice a year during the boy's long school holiday in
>>>>>> winter and summer!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I suppose the outlines of conversation are predictable due to
>>>>>> participants' intersubjective awareness of the subject. Yet, the nuances of
>>>>>> conversation (just like each individual's ducktail unique to himself) are
>>>>>> unpredictable because of the waywardness of our mind. What's more,
>>>>>> such nuances create the fluidity of conversation which makes it difficult
>>>>>> (or even unnecessary) to predict what comes next - this is perhaps the
>>>>>> whole point that keeps us talking, as Alfredo pointed out earlier.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> James
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, 28 Nov 2018 at 22:19, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Back at you, James. The images of the mandarin drake reminded me of
>>>>>>> a hair style popularin the late 50s when I was in high school (grades
>>>>>>> 9-12): ducktail haircuts images
>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=ducktail+haircuts+images&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8>.
>>>>>>> One of the photos in the link is of Elvis Presley, an alpha male high
>>>>>>> school boys sought to emulate. Note that some of the photos are of women,
>>>>>>> interesting in light of issues of gender fluidity these days. I don’t
>>>>>>> remember when women started taking on the hair style. Since I mentioned
>>>>>>> Elvis Presley, this post counts as relevant to the subject line! Ha!
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Nov 28, 2018, at 7:39 AM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thank you Henry.
>>>>>>> More on mandarin duck, just thought you might like to see:
>>>>>>> https://www.livingwithbirds.com/tweetapedia/21-facts-on-mandarin-duck
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> 于 2018年11月27日周二 19:30写道：
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What a beautiful photo, James, and providing it is a move on this
>>>>>>>> subject line that instantiates nicely Gee’s conception of discourse. Thanks
>>>>>>>> for your thoughtful and helpful response.
>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Nov 27, 2018, at 11:11 AM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Henry, thanks for the info on Derek Bickerton. One of the
>>>>>>>> interesting things is his conception of displacement as the
>>>>>>>> hallmark of language, whether iconic, indexical or symbolic. In
>>>>>>>> the case of Chinese language, the sounds are decontextualised or
>>>>>>>> sublimated over time to become something more integrated into the words
>>>>>>>> themselves as ideographs. Some of Bickerton's ideas are suggestive of the
>>>>>>>> study of protolanguage as an *a priori *process, involving
>>>>>>>> scrupulous deduction. This reminds me of methods used in diachronic
>>>>>>>> linguistics, which I felt are relevant to CHAT just as much as those used
>>>>>>>> in synchronic linguistics.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regarding "intermental" and "intramental", I can see your point. In
>>>>>>>> fact I don't take Vygotsky's "interpsychological" and "intrapsychological"
>>>>>>>> categories to be dichotomies or binary opposites. Whenever it comes to
>>>>>>>> their relationship, I tend to have a post-structuralism imagery present in
>>>>>>>> my mind, particularly related to a Derridean stance for the conception of
>>>>>>>> ideas (i.e. any idea is not entirely distinct from other ideas in
>>>>>>>> terms of the "thing itself"; rather, it entails a supplement of the other
>>>>>>>> idea which is already embedded in the self). Vygotsky's two
>>>>>>>> categories are relational (dialectical); they are somehow like a
>>>>>>>> pair of mandarin ducks (see attached image). I also like to think that each
>>>>>>>> of these categories is both "discourse-in-context" and
>>>>>>>> "context-for-discourse" (here discourse is in tune with James Gee's
>>>>>>>> conception of discourse as a patchwork of actions, interactions, thoughts,
>>>>>>>> feelings etc). I recall Barbara Rogoff talking about there being no
>>>>>>>> boundary between the external and the internal or the boundary being
>>>>>>>> blurred (during her seminar in the Graduate School of Education at Bristol
>>>>>>>> in 2001 while I was doing my PhD).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, 21 Nov 2018 at 23:14, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> James,
>>>>>>>>> I think it was Derek Bickerton (
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derek_Bickerton) who argued that
>>>>>>>>> “formal syntax” developed from stringing together turns in verbal
>>>>>>>>> interaction. The wiki on Bickerton I have linked is short and raises issues
>>>>>>>>> discussed in this subject line and in the subject line on Corballis.
>>>>>>>>> Bickerton brings me back to the circularity of discourse and the
>>>>>>>>> development of discourse competence. Usage-based grammar. Bickerton’s idea
>>>>>>>>> that complex grammar developed out of the pidgins of our ancestors is
>>>>>>>>> interesting. Do I see a chicken/egg problem that for Vygotsky, “…the
>>>>>>>>> intramental forms of semiotic mediation is better understood by examining
>>>>>>>>> the types of intermental processes”? I don’t know. Could one say that inner
>>>>>>>>> speech is the vehicle for turning discourse into grammar? Bickerton claimed
>>>>>>>>> a strong biological component to human language, though I don’t remember if
>>>>>>>>> he was a Chomskian. I hope this is coherent thinking in the context of our
>>>>>>>>> conversation. All that jazz.
>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Nov 21, 2018, at 3:22 PM, James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Alfredo, I'd agree with Greg - intersubjectivity is relevant and
>>>>>>>>> pertinent here.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As I see it, intersubjectivity transcends "outlines" or perhaps
>>>>>>>>> sublimates the "muddledness" and "unpredictability" of a conversation (as
>>>>>>>>> in Bateson's metalogue) into what Rommetveit termed the "draft of a
>>>>>>>>> contract". This is because shared understanding makes explicit and external
>>>>>>>>> what would otherwise remain implicit and internal. Rommetveit argues
>>>>>>>>> that private worlds can only be transcended up to a certain level and
>>>>>>>>> interlocutors need to agree upon the draft of a contract with which the
>>>>>>>>> communication can be initiated. In the spirit of Vygotsky, he uses a
>>>>>>>>> "pluralistic" and "social-cognitive" approach to human communication - and
>>>>>>>>> especially to the problem of linguistic mediation and regulation in
>>>>>>>>> interpsychological functioning, with reference to semantics, syntactics and
>>>>>>>>> pragmatics. For him, the intramental forms of semiotic mediation is better
>>>>>>>>> understood by examining the types of intermental processes.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think these intermental processes (just like intramental ones)
>>>>>>>>> can be boiled down or distilled to signs and symbols with which
>>>>>>>>> interlocutors are in harmony during a conversation or any other joint
>>>>>>>>> activities.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *________________________________________________*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *James Ma  Independent Scholar **https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
>>>>>>>>> <https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa>   *
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 21 Nov 2018 at 08:09, Alfredo Jornet Gil <
>>>>>>>>> a.j.gil@ils.uio.no> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Henry's remarks about no directors and symphonic potential of
>>>>>>>>>> conversation reminded me of G. Bateson's metalogue "why do things have
>>>>>>>>>> outlines" (attached). Implicitly, it raises the question of units and
>>>>>>>>>> elements, of how a song, a dance, a poem, a conversation, to make sense,
>>>>>>>>>> they must have a recognizable outline, even in improvisation; they must be
>>>>>>>>>> wholes, or suggest wholes. That makes them "predictable". And yet, when you
>>>>>>>>>> are immersed in a conversation, the fact that you can never exactly predict
>>>>>>>>>> what comes next is the whole point that keep us talking, dancing, drawing,
>>>>>>>>>> etc!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Alfredo
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> *Sent:* 21 November 2018 06:22
>>>>>>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: language and music
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I’d like to add to the call and response conversation that
>>>>>>>>>> discourse, this conversation itself, is staged. There are performers and
>>>>>>>>>> and an audience made up partly of performers themselves. How many are
>>>>>>>>>> lurkers, as I am usually? This conversation has no director, but there are
>>>>>>>>>> leaders. There is symphonic potential. And even gestural potential, making
>>>>>>>>>> the chat a dance. All on line.:)
>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 20, 2018, at 9:05 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> For many years I used the work of Ellen Dissenyake to teach comm
>>>>>>>>>> classes about language/music/development. She is quite unusual in ways that
>>>>>>>>>> might find interest here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> https://ellendissanayake.com/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 2:16 PM James Ma <jamesma320@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hello Simangele,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In semiotic terms, whatever each of the participants has
>>>>>>>>>>> constructed internally is the signified, i.e. his or her understanding and
>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation. When it is vocalised (spoken out), it becomes the signifier
>>>>>>>>>>> to the listener. What's more, when the participants work together to
>>>>>>>>>>> compose a story impromptu, each of their signifiers turns into a new
>>>>>>>>>>> signified – a shared, newly-established understanding, woven into the
>>>>>>>>>>> fabric of meaning making.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> By the way, in Chinese language, words for singing and dancing
>>>>>>>>>>> have long been used inseparably. As I see it, they are semiotically indexed
>>>>>>>>>>> to, or adjusted to allow for, the feelings, emotions, actions and
>>>>>>>>>>> interactions of a consciousness who is experiencing the singing and
>>>>>>>>>>> dancing. Here are some idioms:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 酣歌醉舞 - singing and dancing rapturously
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 村歌社舞 - dancing village and singing club
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 燕歌赵舞 - citizens of ancient Yan and Zhao good at singing and
>>>>>>>>>>> dancing, hence referring to wonderful songs and dances
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 舞榭歌楼 - a church or building set up for singing and dancing
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> *________________________________________________*
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> *James Ma  Independent Scholar **https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://oxford.academia.edu/JamesMa>   *
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, 17 Nov 2018 at 19:08, Simangele Mayisela <
>>>>>>>>>>> simangele.mayisela@wits.ac.za> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Colleagues,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This conversation is getting even more interesting, not that I
>>>>>>>>>>>> have an informed answer for you Rob, I can only think of the National
>>>>>>>>>>>> Anthems where people stand still when singing, even then this is observed
>>>>>>>>>>>> only in international events.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Other occasions when people are likely not to move when singing
>>>>>>>>>>>> when there is death and the mood is sombre. Otherwise singing and rhythmic
>>>>>>>>>>>> body movement, called dance are a norm.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This then makes me  wonder what this means in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>> cognitive functioning, in the light of Vygotsky’s developmental stages – of
>>>>>>>>>>>> language and thought. Would the body movement constitute the
>>>>>>>>>>>> externalisation of the thoughts contained in the music?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena – the video you are relating about reminds of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> language teaching or group therapy technique- where a group of learners (or
>>>>>>>>>>>> participants in OD settings) are instructed to tell a single coherent and
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical story as a group. They all take turns to say a sentence, a sentence
>>>>>>>>>>>> of not more than 6 words (depending on the instructor ), each time linking
>>>>>>>>>>>> your sentence to the sentence of previous articulator, with the next person
>>>>>>>>>>>> also doing the same, until the story sounds complete with conclusion. More
>>>>>>>>>>>> important is that they compose this story impromptu, It with such stories
>>>>>>>>>>>> that group dynamics are analysed, and in group therapy cases, collective
>>>>>>>>>>>> experiences of trauma are shared.  I suppose this is an example of
>>>>>>>>>>>> cooperative activity, although previously I would have thought of it as
>>>>>>>>>>>> just an “activity”
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Simangele
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *From:* xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] *On Behalf Of *
>>>>>>>>>>>> robsub@ariadne.org.uk
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Sent:* Friday, 16 November 2018 21:01
>>>>>>>>>>>> *To:* eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>;
>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Michael C. Corballis
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I remember being told once that many languages do not have
>>>>>>>>>>>> separate words for singing and dancing, because if you sing you want to
>>>>>>>>>>>> move - until western civilisation beats it out of you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Does anybody know if this is actually true, or is it complete
>>>>>>>>>>>> cod?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If it is true, does it have something to say about the
>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship between the physical body and the development of speech?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Rob
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16/11/2018 17:29, Helena Worthen wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I am very interested in where this conversation is going. I
>>>>>>>>>>>> remember being in a Theories of Literacy class in which Glynda Hull, the
>>>>>>>>>>>> instructor, showed a video of a singing circle somewhere in the Amazon,
>>>>>>>>>>>> where an incredibly complicated pattern of musical phrases wove in and out
>>>>>>>>>>>> among the singers underlaid by drumming that included turn-taking, call and
>>>>>>>>>>>> response, you name it. Maybe 20 people were involved, all pushing full
>>>>>>>>>>>> steam ahead to create something together that they all seemed to know about
>>>>>>>>>>>> but wouldn’t happen until they did it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Certainly someone has studied the relationship of musical
>>>>>>>>>>>> communication (improvised or otherwise), speech and gesture? I have asked
>>>>>>>>>>>> musicians about this and get blank looks. Yet clearly you can tell when you
>>>>>>>>>>>> listen to different kinds of music, not just Amazon drum and chant circles,
>>>>>>>>>>>> that there is some kind of speech - like potential embedded there. The
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sonata form is clearly involves exposition (they even use that word).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> For example: the soundtrack to the Coen Brothers’ film Fargo
>>>>>>>>>>>> opens with a musical theme that says, as clearly as if we were reading
>>>>>>>>>>>> aloud from some children’s book, “I am now going to tell you a very strange
>>>>>>>>>>>> story that sounds impossible but I promise you every word of it is
>>>>>>>>>>>> true…da-de-da-de-da.’ Only it doesn’t take that many words.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (18) Fargo (1996) - 'Fargo, North Dakota' (Opening) scene
>>>>>>>>>>>> [1080] - YouTube
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Berkeley, CA 94707 510-828-2745
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Blog US/ Viet Nam:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen.wordpress.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> skype: helena.worthen1
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 16, 2018, at 8:56 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy and Peter,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I like the turn taking principle a lot. It links language and
>>>>>>>>>>>> music very nicely: call and response. By voice and ear. While gesture is
>>>>>>>>>>>> linked to visual art. In face-to-face conversation there is this
>>>>>>>>>>>> rhythmically entrained interaction. It’s not just cooperative, it’s
>>>>>>>>>>>> verbal/gestural art. Any human work is potentially a work of art. Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>> John-Steiner and Holbrook Mahn have talked about how conversation can be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> co-construction “at the speed of thought”.  Heady stuff taking part, or
>>>>>>>>>>>> just listening to, this call and response between smart people.  And
>>>>>>>>>>>> disheartening and destructive when we give up on dialog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> As I write this, I realize that the prosodic aspects of spoken
>>>>>>>>>>>> language (intonation) are gestural as well. It’s simplistic to restrict
>>>>>>>>>>>> gesture to visual signals. But I would say gesture is prototypically
>>>>>>>>>>>> visual, an accompaniment to the voice. In surfing the web, one can find
>>>>>>>>>>>> some interesting things on paralanguage which complicate the distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>> between language and gesture. I think it speaks to the embodiment of
>>>>>>>>>>>> language in the senses.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 16, 2018, at 7:00 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
>>>>>>>>>>>> pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I couldn't agree more. And thanks for introducing me to the
>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of delayed gratification as a precondition for sharing and
>>>>>>>>>>>> turn-taking.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That's a feature I hadn't considered before in connection with
>>>>>>>>>>>> speech communication. It makes sense that each participant would need
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> to exercise patience in order to wait out someone else's turn.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Much obliged.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Peter
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Nov 16, 2018 at 8:50 AM Andy Blunden <
>>>>>>>>>>>> andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Interesting, Peter.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Corballis, oddly in my view, places a lot of weight in
>>>>>>>>>>>> so-called mirror neurons to explain perception of the intentionality of
>>>>>>>>>>>> others. It seems blindingly obvious to me that cooperative activity,
>>>>>>>>>>>> specifically participating in projects in which individuals share a common
>>>>>>>>>>>> not-present object, is a form of behaviour which begets the necessary
>>>>>>>>>>>> perceptive abilities. I have also long been of the view that delayed
>>>>>>>>>>>> gratification, as a precondition for sharing and turn-taking, as a matter
>>>>>>>>>>>> of fact, is an important aspect of sociality fostering the development of
>>>>>>>>>>>> speech, and the upright gait which frees the hands for carrying food back
>>>>>>>>>>>> to camp where it can be shared is important. None of which presupposes
>>>>>>>>>>>> tools, only cooperation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ethicalpolitics.org_ablunden_index.htm&d=DwMFaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=itd0qPWlE7uAuyEX0ii8ohEoZegfdMAOOLf-YoaEqqs&s=-uwTjZDhHtJM2EFdBS-rXLTptADQdSGAcibaav-mhJw&e=>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 17/11/2018 12:36 am, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If I might chime in to this discussion:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I submit that the key cooperative activity underlying speech
>>>>>>>>>>>> communication is *turn-taking*. I don't know how that activity or rule came
>>>>>>>>>>>> into being,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> but once it did, the activity of *exchanging* utterances became
>>>>>>>>>>>> possible. And with exchange came the complementarity of speaking and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> listening roles, and the activity of alternating conversational
>>>>>>>>>>>> roles and mental perspectives. Turn-taking is a key process in human
>>>>>>>>>>>> development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Peter
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 9:21 PM Andy Blunden <
>>>>>>>>>>>> andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Oddly, Amazon delivered the book to me yesterday and I am
>>>>>>>>>>>> currently on p.5. Fortunately, Corballis provides a synopsis of his book at
>>>>>>>>>>>> the end, which I sneak-previewed last night.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The interesting thing to me is his claim, similar to that of
>>>>>>>>>>>> Merlin Donald, which goes like this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It would be absurd to suggest that proto-humans discovered that
>>>>>>>>>>>> they had this unique and wonderful vocal apparatus and decided to use it
>>>>>>>>>>>> for speech. Clearly* there was rudimentary language before
>>>>>>>>>>>> speech was humanly possible*. In development, a behaviour is
>>>>>>>>>>>> always present before the physiological adaptations which facilitate it
>>>>>>>>>>>> come into being. I.e, proto-humans found themselves in circumstances where
>>>>>>>>>>>> it made sense to develop interpersonal, voluntary communication, and to
>>>>>>>>>>>> begin with they used what they had - the ability to mime and gesture, make
>>>>>>>>>>>> facial expressions and vocalisations (all of which BTW can reference
>>>>>>>>>>>> non-present entities and situations) This is an activity which further
>>>>>>>>>>>> produces the conditions for its own development. Eventually, over millions
>>>>>>>>>>>> of years, the vocal apparatus evolved under strong selection pressure due
>>>>>>>>>>>> to the practice of non-speech communication as an integral part of their
>>>>>>>>>>>> evolutionary niche. In other words, rudimentary wordless speech
>>>>>>>>>>>> gradually became modern speech, along with all the accompanying facial
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions and hand movements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It just seems to me that, as you suggest, collective activity
>>>>>>>>>>>> must have been a part of those conditions fostering communication
>>>>>>>>>>>> (something found in our nearest evolutionary cousins who also have the
>>>>>>>>>>>> elements of rudimentary speech)  - as was increasing tool-using,
>>>>>>>>>>>> tool-making, tool-giving and tool-instructing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ethicalpolitics.org_ablunden_index.htm&d=DwMFaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=VlOXr8x02-mghKHGod2LwGx8_X-LHNRmDI_elI-7rKI&s=A3k5oeQ13zGCPUbWibdOb2KNZT4q__fLyCwugyULUDw&e=>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16/11/2018 12:58 pm, Arturo Escandon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Andy,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michael Tomasello has made similar claims, grounding the surge
>>>>>>>>>>>> of articulated language on innate co-operativism and collective activity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-child-language/90B84B8F3BB2D32E9FA9E2DFAF4D2BEB
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.cambridge.org_core_books_cambridge-2Dhandbook-2Dof-2Dchild-2Dlanguage_90B84B8F3BB2D32E9FA9E2DFAF4D2BEB&d=DwMFaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=VlOXr8x02-mghKHGod2LwGx8_X-LHNRmDI_elI-7rKI&s=vxJZooXRDYwTRrM4dzWBbLfUhF9HhmUvU3ouq6sbwPI&e=>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Arturo
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent from Gmail Mobile
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Director,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.fordham.edu/info/24303/institutional_research>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fordham University
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Director,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Office of Institutional Research
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.fordham.edu/info/24303/institutional_research>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fordham University
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This communication is intended for the addressee only. It is
>>>>>>>>>>>> confidential. If you have received this communication in error, please
>>>>>>>>>>>> notify us immediately and destroy the original message. You may not copy or
>>>>>>>>>>>> disseminate this communication without the permission of the University.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Only authorised signatories are competent to enter into agreements on
>>>>>>>>>>>> behalf of the University and recipients are thus advised that the content
>>>>>>>>>>>> of this message may not be legally binding on the University and may
>>>>>>>>>>>> contain the personal views and opinions of the author, which are not
>>>>>>>>>>>> necessarily the views and opinions of The University of the Witwatersrand,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Johannesburg. All agreements between the University and outsiders are
>>>>>>>>>>>> subject to South African Law unless the University agrees in writing to the
>>>>>>>>>>>> contrary.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> <Mandarin Ducks.jpg>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>> Assistant Professor
>>>> Department of Anthropology
>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>>> Brigham Young University
>>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> Assistant Professor
>>> Department of Anthropology
>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> Brigham Young University
>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> Assistant Professor
>> Department of Anthropology
>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> Brigham Young University
>> Provo, UT 84602
>> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>
>>
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