[Xmca-l] Re: thoughts on Mathematics of Mathematics by Wolff-Michael Roth

Wed Apr 11 08:31:00 PDT 2018

the idea of "construction" has the advantage that it is a
lot better than any of the other ideas you offered as
alternatives.

When a series of actions add up to a more remote outcome,
and each of the composite actions is goal-oriented in a
relevant way, I think there is a fair basis for calling the
remote outcome a "construction." I mean, this is in a
context where *none* of the protagonists believe that human
evolution was the motivation of hominids. It is, I grant
you, if one ignores this context, possible to put this
absurd spin on "construction."you have made that point. I am
not particularly wedded to this word or the concept it
indicates. If you have a better one, I'd go for it. But to
make your point, you had to have a human life in which there
was no culture. You make what seems to be a chicken-and-egg
argument to deny the existence of pre-human culture:

"before there was culture, before we used tools, where
were those tools for constructing anything of the likes that
constructivists say that we use to construct?"

As Vygotsky pointed out, the crucial activity which is the essence of the human being must be found in rudimentary form in pre-human hominids. He is surely right. Rudimentary culture existed in hominids and this culture (social use of tools and speech) is the conditions which produced human beings.

I don't think the goal of that hominid activity was to produce human beings (of course) but it was purposive activity, and the molding of the human form to suit that kind of activity is a *predictable* outcome of that activity.

But all this is to the side isn't it? Why are we arguing over these things? What is the motivation?

Andy 

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
On 12/04/2018 1:06 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> Andy, to construct is a transitive verb, we construct something. It is not
> well suited to describe the emergence (morphogenesis) of something new.
> This is why Richard Rorty (1989) rejects it, using the craftsperson as a
> counter example to the poet in the larger sense, the maker of new things.
> He writes that poets know what they have done only afterward, when,
> together with the new thing they have found themselves speaking a new
> language that also provides a reason for this language.
>
> I also direct you to the critique that E. Livingston articulates concerning
> social constructionism, which takes the social in a WEAK sense; and the
> social in the strong sense is not a construction.
>
> Also interesting in this is the question of origins, and there the French
> philosophers (Derrida and others) have had a lot of discussion. Mead's
> fundamental point is that "before the emergent has occurred, and at the
> moment of its occurrence, it does not follow from the past" (1932, xvii).
>
> And concerning relations, Marx/Engels write (German Ideology) that the
> animal does not relate at all, for it, the relationship does not exist as
> relationship
>
> m
>
> Rorty, R 1989, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, CUP
>
> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>
>> Well, I can see that as an argument, Michael. My response:
>>
>> The thing is, to interpret "construction" in an intellectual
>> way, leads to the conclusion that to give construction a
>> fundamental place in human evolution is "intellectualism,"
>> and actually, interpreted that way, would be utterly absurd.
>> But the fact is that all human actions are teleological,
>> that is, oriented to a goal. Of course!! no hominid ever
>> said to herself: "I think I will now take another step to
>> evolving homo sapiens." AN Leontyev does exactly the same
>> move in his criticism of Vygotsky.
>>
>> Actually, I don't know just how the formation of social
>> customs, speech and tool-making interacted in the earliest
>> stages of phylogenesis, ... and nor do you. We do know that
>> all three are intimately interconnected from the earliest
>> times we have any real knowledge of, though.
>>
>> As to "emergence," in my opinion "emergence" is the modern
>> word for God. I don't know how this happens, so it must be
>> Emergence.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden
>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>> On 12/04/2018 12:18 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>> Andy, there is nothing of construction. Construction may be an effect of
>>> mind, but mind did not emerge as a construction. It is a manifestation
>> of a
>>> relationship.
>>>
>>> Emergence means that what comes after cannot be predicted on the basis of
>>> what comes before. The construction metaphor implies that (e.g., the
>>> craftsman in the Marx/Engels case who is superior to the bee, an  example
>>> that Vygotsky takes up).
>>>
>>> Construction smacks of intellectualism, precisely the intellectualism
>> that
>>> Vygotsky made some moves to overcome at the end of his life
>>>
>>> m
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>> wrote:
>>>> All of those quotes make my point, Michael, in ever so
>>>> slightly different words.
>>>>
>>>> a
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>> On 12/04/2018 12:02 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>> I do not think mind is a construction,
>>>>>
>>>>> Vygotsky (1989) writes: "Any higher psychological function ... was the
>>>>> social relation between two people" (p.56)
>>>>>
>>>>> And Mikhailov (2001) suggests: "the very existence of the
>>>>> mind is possible only at the borderline where there is a continual
>>>>> coming and going of one into the other, at their dynamic interface,
>>>>> as it were—an interface that is defined ... by the single process of
>>>> their
>>>>> [self and other] mutual generation and mutual determination" (pp.20-21)
>>>>>
>>>>> Bateson (1979): Mind is an effect of relations, an aggregate effect,
>> like
>>>>> stereo (spatial) vision
>>>>> is the emergent effect of two eyes with planar images.
>>>>>
>>>>> Mead (1932): "the appearance of mind is only the culmination of that
>>>>> sociality which is found throughout the universe" (p.86).
>>>>>
>>>>> Nobody says anything about construction. The to eyes don't construct
>>>>> stereovision and space. It is an emergent phenomenon,
>>>>> an ensemble effect deriving from relations.
>>>>>
>>>>> m
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 6:47 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> I always thought that the mind was a construction of human
>>>>>> culture. But of course, that was not what Spinoza thought.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>> On 11/04/2018 11:44 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>> No, I am not saying that there were human beings. Anthropogenesis and
>>>>>>> generalized (societal) action *come* together. But we have to explain
>>>>>>> culture and cognition as emergent phenomena not as *constructions* of
>>>> the
>>>>>>> mind. m
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 6:15 AM, Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> So, Michael, you are saying that there were human beings
>>>>>>>> before there was culture. And I gather you do not count
>>>>>>>> tools as units of culture.
>>>>>>>> Do we have to await a Psychologist to invent the word
>>>>>>>> "meaning" before we can poke a stick into an ant-hill?
>>>>>>>> Creationism makes more sense, Michael, at least it offers
>>>>>>>> /some/ explanation for the existence of human life.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>>> ttp://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2018 9:57 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Hi Bill,
>>>>>>>>> it is not so much "socially constructed." My key point in the book
>> is
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> it is social BEFORE there can be any construction. It is social,
>> and
>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>> is where I refer to a Vygotsky that has not been taken up, because
>>>>>> "every
>>>>>>>>> higher psychological function ... was a social relation between two
>>>>>>>>> people." That is, in this specific case, mathematics is social, was
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> relation between two people before you see it in individuals...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think the construction metaphor breaks down when you look at our
>>>>>>>> species
>>>>>>>>> becoming human. So before there was culture, before we used tools,
>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>> were those tools for constructing anything of the likes that
>>>>>>>>> constructivists say that we use to construct? How can a hominid
>>>>>> construct
>>>>>>>>> "meaning" of the branch as tool to start digging for roots or
>> fishing
>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> termites? And how do they construct meaning of the first
>> sound-words
>>>>>> when
>>>>>>>>> they do not have a system that would serve as material and tool for
>>>>>>>>> building anything like "meaning?"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So yes, a learning theory has to be able to explain learning from
>>>>>> before
>>>>>>>>> culture (phylogenesis), before language and meaning (ontogenesis).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And about eclecticism---I think we would be a step further if we
>>>>>> listened
>>>>>>>>> to and pondered A.N. Leont'ev's complaint about the "eclectic soup
>>>>>>>>> [eklekticheskoj pokhlebke] ... each to his own recipe" that
>>>>>> psychologists
>>>>>>>>> are trying to cook (in his foreword to *Activity. Consciousness.
>>>>>>>>> Personality*).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> One interpretation of Vygotsky (Wolff-Michael Roth) argues that
>> all
>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is socially constructed and that ethnomethodology,
>> paying
>>>>>>>>>> detailed attention in the now, is the best or only way of
>> detecting
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> evaluating what is going on . Human activity can’t be reduced to
>>>>>>>> individual
>>>>>>>>>> actions. Anything individual originates in the social, be it
>> words,
>>>>>>>>>> mathematics or by implication computer science (mentioned not in
>> the
>>>>>>>>>> original but because it is a current interest of mine). Moreover
>>>>>>>> internal
>>>>>>>>>> representations or schemas seem to be denied because that would
>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> capitulation to dualism, emphasising brain / mind activity whereas
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> real
>>>>>>>>>> deal is an integrated thinking body.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This world view is critical of other learning theories be they
>>>>>>>>>> behaviourist, cognitivist, enactivist or constructivist.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The question that I want to explore here is the pragmatic one of
>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>>>> and how learning theory (an abstraction) makes a difference in
>>>>>> practice,
>>>>>>>>>> for busy, hard working (usually overworked) teachers. An
>> alternative
>>>>>>>>>> epistemology/ies which might appeal more in practice to real
>>>> teachers
>>>>>>>> under
>>>>>>>>>> pressure is an eclectic one centred around the issue of “what
>>>> works”.
>>>>>>>>>> I believe I am better read on learning theory than most teachers.
>>>> See
>>>>>>>>>> http://learningevolves.wikispaces.com/learning%20theories
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Up until now I've developed an eclectic / pragmatic approach to
>>>>>> putting
>>>>>>>>>> learning theory into practice. Take something from Seymour
>> Papert's
>>>>>>>>>> constructionism, something from Dan Willingham's cognitivism,
>>>>>> something
>>>>>>>>>> from Dan Dennett's behaviourism, something from Andy Clarke’s
>>>>>> enactivism
>>>>>>>>>> and roll them altogether in an eclectic mix. The authors in this
>>>> list
>>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>>>>> be multiplied. My underlying belief was that it was not possible
>> to
>>>>>>>> develop
>>>>>>>>>> a unified learning theory, that human learning was too complex for
>>>>>>>> that. As
>>>>>>>>>> Marvin Minsky once said in 'Society of Mind', "the trick is there
>> is
>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>>> trick", I think meaning no overarching way in which human's learn.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One big surprise in reading Wolff-Michael Roth is his serious
>>>> attempt
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> put an end to such eclectism and develop what appears to be a
>> unfied
>>>>>>>>>> learning theory.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>