[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)

Sun Jan 10 17:32:32 PST 2016

Exactly, Martin. The article does give a very simple 
explanation, doesn't it! :)
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 11/01/2016 12:20 PM, Martin John Packer wrote:
> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology.  Here is an accessible account of the basics:
>
> <https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/>
>
> Martin
>
> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The differing
>> interpretations have quite different implications.
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step,
>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those
>>> concepts.
>>>
>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments" but
>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they are
>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three moments.
>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general
>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot
>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a general
>>> secretary, can we?
>>>
>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just
>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ...
>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of
>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of Logic
>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>>
>>> Andy
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>
>>>> Huw:
>>>>
>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the word
>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the three
>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself",
>>>> "for
>>>> others", "for myself".
>>>>
>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the
>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three
>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying.
>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture. "Nominating" is
>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has a
>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place
>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult understanding
>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing that
>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named?
>>>>
>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant
>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture, pointing
>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to something
>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a name",
>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it could
>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the
>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name
>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence modes of
>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is
>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of speech
>>>> development.
>>>>
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I thought
>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can not
>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics
>>>>> you
>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>>>>
>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a
>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too.  What is really meant, I believe,
>>>>> is
>>>>> "instants of a process".  These have two rather different meanings from
>>>>> the
>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Huw
>>>>>
>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Если задача не превышает естественных сил ребенка, он справляется с ней
>>>>>> непосредственным или примитивным способом. В этих случаях структура его
>>>>>> поведения совершенно напоминает схему, нарисованную Фолькельтом.
>>>>>>
>>>>> (Russian
>>>>>
>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go beyond
>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an
>>>>>>
>>>>> unmediated
>>>>>
>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior would
>>>>>>
>>>>> be
>>>>>
>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two
>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is referring
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of an
>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively
>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which perception and behavior were
>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a
>>>>>>
>>>>> series
>>>>>
>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like a
>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all
>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the
>>>>>>
>>>>> teat:
>>>>>
>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did. He
>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling of
>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually ignore
>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity,
>>>>>>
>>>>> blueness,
>>>>>
>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was not
>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively
>>>>>> colored
>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>>>>>> schemata".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we never
>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior wholes,
>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of the
>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very careful
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant
>>>>>>
>>>>> behavior:
>>>>>
>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of behavior
>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is referred
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> p.85
>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)?  I don't think a reference is given.
>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>
>> -- 
>>
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>