[Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects
David Kellogg
dkellogg60@gmail.com
Sat Jul 25 22:56:29 PDT 2015
I think that the word Vygotsky uses here is not so much "image" as
"imagination" or perhaps "construal". Or rather, it is "image" but it isn't
image in the sense of a photographic image but more in the sense of a
Russian icon. That's why you can have an image of a game, and it's also why
it is really only half true to say that the concept is built through
actions. Painting isn't reducible to actions, and in a very important sense
the ideal image of the painting exists long before any action at all is
taken.
David Kellogg
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> Wow! Nice quote Larry! I must add that to my collection of Hegel citations
> (though actually I think it is an Engels quote)! I am not the only one who
> insists that a concept is a unity of individual, universal and particular!
>
> The thing is, Larry, if we think of the concept of "game", how does the
> child come to use "game" in a way that adults will understand and in turn
> be able to react when adults use it? This is of course a protracted process
> but it is through actions. In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky explains
> concept formation only in terms of actions, not any kind of hypothetical
> mental images or dictionaries or mental filing systems or whatever. It is
> all actions which are in one way or another organised around some artefact,
> and in particular a word. At the most elementary level when an adult points
> and says "That is a game!" that point-and-name is an action. But it is in
> the whole bundle of actions around the word "game" that a child or an adult
> learns to use the word correctly, to utter the word meaningfully and
> coordinate their own actions with respect to the word. The words on their
> own are nothing. They acquire meaning only through their use in
> collaborative activity in which the learner participates in some way. The
> problem is, of course, that not everyone in the world uses the word in a
> uniform, consistent way.
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 25/07/2015 1:13 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
>
>> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of course nothing
>> other than activity. That is how signs and situations acquire psychological
>> meanings.
>>
>> In my continuing struggle that is definitely confusing I will share
>> Vygotsky's own words on what a concept is:
>>
>> "A real concept is an IMAGE of an objective thing in all its complexity.
>> Only when we recognize the thing in all its connections and relations, only
>> when this diversity is synthesized in a word in an INTEGRAL IMAGE through a
>> multitude of determinations, do we develop a concept. According to the
>> teaching of dialectical logic, a concept INCLUDES not only the general but
>> also the individual and particular.
>> In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a
>> concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the RESULT of
>> rational processing of our existence AND it is mediated knowledge of the
>> object. To think of some object with the help of a concept MEANS TO
>> INCLUDE the GIVEN object in a complex SYSTEM of mediating connection and
>> relations DISCLOSED in determinations of the concept"
>> [Vygotsky, The Collected Works, Volume 5, Child Psychology, page 53]
>>
>> I felt my struggle I am going through may be relevant to others. In
>> particular "when we recognize the thing in all its connections and
>> relations .... THROUGH a multitude of DETERMINATIONS".
>> THIS [thing] is synthesized "in a word" IN AN INTEGRAL IMAGE".
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 5:00 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks Manfred. I think we are on the same page.
>> This "confusing struggle of different meanings" is of
>> course nothing other than activity. That is how signs
>> and situations acquire psychological meanings, and
>> children learn not only by observing but by
>> participating in those activities.
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> On 25/07/2015 5:50 AM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
>>
>> Hi Andy,
>> thanks for your clarification. I now think I have
>> understood your message. You are "travelling" in
>> the social world and discussing Leontyev's
>> understanding of the concept of objective meaning.
>> I can now understand your critique that he might
>> believe that something like an objective meaning
>> may exist or can be extracted from an analysis of
>> social interactions. Ok, if one is going to
>> analyze what the essence of an "objective meaning"
>> e.g. of the word "dog" is (and all the more of
>> abstract terms such as feminism, social justice),
>> then one will find oneself in a confusing struggle
>> of different meanings that are also changing with
>> time. So, the objective meaning of a word or
>> concept is fuzzy and of many voices. Nevertheless,
>> people are sometimes (:-) ) able to communicate
>> their personal sense by using words and concepts.
>> This is not a hopeless endeavor although it
>> sometimes and for some people fails miserably.
>> Your construction of a theory of collaborative
>> projects is indeed a noteworthy proposal to deal
>> with the societal emergence and change of the
>> objective meanings of concepts that maintain the
>> link between the social and psychological plane.
>> Best Manfred
>>
>>
>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>> Fliednerstr. 21
>> D-48149 Münster
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311 <tel:%2B49-%280%29-251-83-34311>
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310
>> <tel:%2B49-%280%29-251-83-34310> (Sekretariat)
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314
>> <tel:%2B49-%280%29-251-83-34314> (Fax)
>>
>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>> <mailto:manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de>
>>
>>
>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>> Von:
>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=
>> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces%2Bmanfred.holodynski>=
>> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu>] Im
>> Auftrag von Andy Blunden
>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 16:26
>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary
>> Objects
>>
>> Er: "macro-unit of activity", not "macro-unity".
>> :( Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> On 24/07/2015 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>
>> Hi Manfred, I am delighted to hear your voice
>> again on this list.
>> I understand what you are saying. I will try
>> to better explain how I
>> stand with A N Leontyev.
>>
>> I am a social theorist, that is I am
>> interested in changing societal
>> arrangements (to put it very politely), and I
>> am one of few social
>> theorists, properly so-called, who base
>> themselves on Vygotsky's
>> theories, and use Activity Theory as well. My
>> position is a
>> contradictory one because Vygotsky and
>> Leontyev were psychologists
>> (like
>> you) and not social theorists. Social
>> Theorists and Psychologists
>> generally live in different buildings on the
>> university campus, in
>> different departments, publish in different
>> journals, refer to
>> different founding theorists, and altogether
>> inhabit different
>> universes. Social theorists have ideas about
>> psychology, but generally
>> not scientific ones, and vice versa.
>> In my opinion, Vygotsky's ideas provide an
>> excellent foundation for
>> social theory because he introduced into human
>> development and every
>> interaction between two individuals a
>> culturally produced sign. But he
>> only went so far. He showed how people acted
>> and developed within
>> their social situation, but he did not tackle
>> the problem of how that
>> situation arose. Leontyev, by his discovery of
>> the Activity as a
>> macro-unity of activity, made an epoch-making
>> development which opened
>> CHAT to become a fully developed
>> social-and-psychological theory. But
>> what he said himself on questions of social
>> theory was of very poor
>> quality, as I said, "Neanderthal." Not the
>> sort of ideas that would
>> win any following among social theorists
>> today. But he was after all a
>> Psychologist and not a Social Theorist, so he
>> is forgiven.
>>
>> Now, to your point. If I am not mistaken
>> "objective meaning" is not a
>> psychological category at all for Leontyev.
>> Yes? And personal sense
>> is, as you eloquently explain, a fundamental
>> Psychological category.
>> So if what I said were to be interpreted to
>> say that personal sense is
>> a subset of objective meaning, that would be
>> quite wrong. While I
>> accept (as I must) a categorical difference
>> between material
>> objects/processes and their reflection in my
>> mind, I do not at all
>> understand societal processes as
>> nonpsychological processes. I try to
>> conceive of them together in one unit, and I
>> think I am on my own
>> there (some Freudian/Phenomenologists aside).
>> There remains of course the distinction
>> between the individual
>> (Einzeln) and the universal (Allgemein),
>> mediated by the particular
>> (Besonder). A human individual is something
>> radically different from a
>> number of individuals. For the human
>> individual and how they erleben a
>> social situation, I rely on my friends and
>> collaborator-psychologists.
>> I am interested in how the Activities go. In
>> small part to avoid
>> having arguments with followers of Leontyev I
>> call activities
>> "projects."
>> So I reserve the right to say things about
>> projects without a follower
>> of Leontyev correcting me. "Project" is not a
>> mysterious or esoteric
>> concept; every English-speaker knows what a
>> project is, and if there
>> is any confusion with projects as defined by
>> Existentialists, I call
>> them "collaborative projects." (i.e., people
>> usually join them, not
>> create them). These include capitalist firms,
>> political parties,
>> sporting clubs or indeed whole sports, a
>> family, a professional career
>> - all those things which gives our lives
>> mening while we build the
>> world we and our children must live in, what
>> Fedor Vasilyuk called an
>> отношение . A project is not a collection of
>> people, it is an
>> aggregate of actions (like an Activity) and
>> the "logic" of projects is
>> something different from Psychology, but it is
>> inclusive of Psychology
>> as well. A project is a kind of psychological
>> phenomenon, but it is
>> also much more than psychology, because, as
>> you remind us, people
>> regulate their own behaviour using signs
>> created in the world beyond
>> their ken. Projects are the material substance
>> of Concepts, and I rely
>> on Vygotsky for a Psychology of concepts. OK?
>>
>> Everything you said (except how you
>> characterised my
>> ideas) I agree with. Complex business isn't it?!
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> On 23/07/2015 10:37 PM, Holodynski, Manfred wrote:
>>
>> Hi Andy,
>> with great interest, I follow the
>> discussion and your interpretation
>> of A N Leontyev's contradiction between
>> subjective sense and
>> objective meaning. As far as I interpret
>> ANL he presented a very
>> elegant solution of the relation between
>> sense and meaning: For ANL,
>> subjective sense is not a part or subset
>> of objective meaning (as you
>> seem to insinuate him), but a
>> psychological quality that emerges when
>> a person uses societal signs and their
>> objective meanings in order to
>> regulate his or her socially embedded
>> activity.
>> What happens is a transformation of
>> societal meanings into the
>> personal sense of those involved. The
>> personal sense that an
>> individual assigns to interactions, facts,
>> and experiences through
>> the use of signs can be conceptualized not
>> as a subset of societal
>> meanings but as a particular sphere of
>> mind that is constituted by
>> two psychological factors in particular
>> (a) the relation to the
>> motives of the person, and (b) the
>> relation to the situated and
>> sensorially mediated experiences of the
>> individual within the process
>> of internalization.
>> a) People do not appropriate the use of
>> signs and their meanings
>> during social interactions in an impartial
>> way.
>> They interpret and use them in the light
>> of their actually elicited
>> motives along with the motives they assign
>> to the interaction
>> partner. The societal meaning of the used
>> signs does not have to
>> match the individually assigned personal
>> sense. For example, an
>> outsider may well interpret a public fit
>> of rage by a low-ranking
>> bank employee toward his superior as an
>> inexcusable violation of
>> social etiquette. However, for the menial
>> employee, it may well be a
>> reassertion of self-esteem in response to
>> a humiliating directive.
>> b) The personal sense of sign-use is also
>> determined by the
>> situatedness and sensory mediation of the
>> previous encounters in
>> which the use of signs is (or was)
>> embedded. Societal meanings are
>> coded primarily not by propositional
>> phrases (e.g., “a dog is a
>> mammal” or “wide-open eyes signal fear”)
>> but through their ties to
>> sensorially mediated and situated
>> perceptions—as complex as these
>> interrelations may be (Leont’ev, 1978).
>> For example, two persons can
>> use propositional phrases to agree on the
>> same definition of the term
>> “dog” or “fear.”
>> These terms, however, will be situated
>> very differently and enriched
>> with other sensory perceptions when one
>> person grew up with a very
>> likeable family dog and the other person
>> experienced a highly
>> dramatic episode with an overpoweringly
>> large and aggressive dog.
>> Thus, conventionalized signs and the
>> meanings assigned to them are
>> subject to an interpersonal process of
>> interpretation and
>> coordination that more or less
>> successfully supports the embodiment
>> and expression of personal sense. People
>> do not have a private
>> “speech” at their disposal that they can
>> construct and use on their
>> own (Wittgenstein). Therefore, they depend
>> on the appropriation and
>> use of conventionalized signs when they
>> want to communicate
>> successfully and satisfy their motives in
>> social interactions.
>> By an act of reflection, the person can
>> try to realize and to become
>> aware of his personal relation and sense
>> of the situation and the
>> used signs, but also this reflection has
>> to fall back on societal
>> signs in order to express this personal
>> relations. So, this is the
>> overall tension between objective meaning
>> of an event or an object
>> and its personal sense for a specific person.
>> Best
>> Manfred
>>
>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und
>> Erziehung Westfälische
>> Wilhelms-Universität Münster Fliednerstr. 21
>> D-48149 Münster
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
>> <tel:%2B49-%280%29-251-83-34311>
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310
>> <tel:%2B49-%280%29-251-83-34310> (Sekretariat)
>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314
>> <tel:%2B49-%280%29-251-83-34314> (Fax)
>>
>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.ht
>> ml
>>
>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>> <mailto:manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de>
>>
>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>> Von:
>> xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski=
>> uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+manfred.holodynski
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces%2Bmanfred.holodynski
>> >=uni-muenster.de@mailman.ucs
>> d.edu <http://d.edu>]
>>
>> Im Auftrag von Andy Blunden
>> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 23. Juli 2015 06:32
>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker
>> Betreff: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of
>> Boundary Objects
>>
>> I was waiting to see what Lubomir would
>> say in response to my post to
>> take it from there, Mike, but I will try
>> to respond as best I can to
>> the question about subjectivism and
>> objectivism.
>> When I first remarked in my 2009 paper
>> that I thought that A N
>> Leontyev was too much of an objectivist,
>> Morten Nissen remarked that
>> that was odd, because in Europe ATists
>> thought he was too subjective.
>> So there you are!
>> Activity Theory as propounded by ANL is a
>> theory of Psychology, and
>> yet I want to use AT as a foundation for
>> social theory, so my claim
>> does seem anomalous.
>>
>> What it comes down to is the insistence of
>> ANL in interpreting
>> contradictions between the "subjective sense"
>> and the "objective meaning" of an activity
>> in terms of the social vs.
>> the individual. This reduces subjectivity
>> to a matter of the
>> capriciousness of the individual mind or
>> the underdevelopment of the
>> child mind. This is hardly objectionable
>> in the domain of child
>> development, but in the domain of social
>> theory it is a Neanderthal
>> position.
>> Social life is made up of a multiplicity
>> of standpoints among which
>> none have the right to claim unproblematic
>> "objective truth"
>> for themselves. This is the basis on which
>> I describe ANL as giving
>> too much to the Object. Engestrom on the
>> other hand, is different,
>> but people's intentions are relegated to
>> "phenomenological
>> investigation" which are preliminary to
>> the investigation itself. I
>> see Engestrom's approach as a kind of
>> social behaviourist approach in
>> which change occurs only thanks to
>> "contradictions" at different
>> levels in the "system." My aim in
>> proposing to see the "system" as a
>> "project" at one or another phase in its
>> life cycle aims to restore
>> the purposiveness of human action to
>> Activity Theory. The
>> interpretation of purposes and intentions
>> in social science is a
>> challenge, but I believe that with the aid
>> of Hegel it can be met.
>>
>> I am happy to join Rubinshtein and declare
>> "All the the Subject!"
>> though I know nothing at all of his work.
>>
>> The problem with your question about
>> Boundary Objects, Mike, is that
>> though I knew nothing of them a little
>> while ago, I can now see 3
>> different meanings of the term. So perhaps
>> Geoffrey is in the best
>> position to answer this question, and I
>> look forward to his answer.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> On 23/07/2015 2:13 PM, mike cole wrote:
>>
>> Andy/Lubomir--
>>
>> I am overwhelmed by this thread so
>> this's query may be badly timed.
>> But .... I recall Lubomir writing
>> that AT was centered on the
>> subject. And now Andy is gesturing to
>> Strands of AT theory that give
>> everything to the object.
>>
>> Question-- isn't this a version of
>> Rubenshtein/Leontiev schools'
>> conflict? Or LSV "vs" AN L on the
>> problem of the environment?
>>
>> Or?
>>
>> What is at stake here theoretically
>> and practically?
>> Mike
>> PS. I am still trying to absorb the
>> multifaceted discussion of
>> boundary object. I almost want to ask
>> -- what forms of joint
>> mediated activity do not involve
>> boundary objects? But I am pretty
>> sure that not knowing the answer to
>> this question is a result of the
>> richness of the discussion.
>>
>> It's fair to say that XMCA is a
>> boundary object??
>> Mike
>>
>> On Wednesday, July 22, 2015, Andy
>> Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>
>> That is exactly right, Larry, I
>> am advocating a
>> humanism, in opposition to
>> poststructuralism,
>> structuralism Marxism, and
>> strands of Activity Theory
>> which give everything to the Object.
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> On 23/07/2015 2:24 AM, Lplarry
>> wrote:
>>
>> Here is a quote from the
>> introduction of "The
>> Cambridge Handbook of
>> Merleau-Ponty on the topic
>> of the subject.
>>
>> "Foucault's archaeological
>> studies of the early
>> 1970's, most notably "The
>> Order of Things" and
>> "The Archaeology of
>> Knowledge", did perhaps more
>> than any other work of the
>> period to LEGITIMIZE
>> conceiving of processes
>> without subjects."
>>
>> This is an "antihumanist"
>> program as Foucault saw
>> the failure of phenomenology
>> and the residual
>> links between subjectivism
>> and anthropology.
>>
>> The force of Foucault's
>> argument was tying the
>> philosophy of the subject to
>> what he saw as an
>> outmoded humanism.
>>
>> It may be what Andy is
>> highlighting is a new humanism.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> From: Lubomir Savov Popov
>> <mailto:lspopov@bgsu.edu
>> <mailto:lspopov@bgsu.edu>>
>> Sent: 2015-07-22 8:55 AM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture,
>> Activity
>> <mailto:
>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>;
>> Andy Blunden
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The
>> Emergence of Boundary
>> Objects
>>
>> Hi Alfredo,
>>
>> The object doesn't carry in
>> itself the motive and
>> the purpose of activity.
>> Actually, depending on
>> the motive and purpose of
>> activity, the object can
>> be approached in many
>> different ways.
>>
>> It is true that the
>> relationship between the
>> object and the subject
>> caries the
>>
>> purpose/goal/objective/motive of
>> activity. This
>> type of relationship might
>> has several aspects and
>> the teleological aspect is
>> one of them. Actually,
>> in AT, the teleological
>> aspect is central one
>> among all aspects of
>> Subject-Object relationships.
>>
>> The teleological aspect in
>> AT is envisaged at
>> several levels with
>> distinctive teleological
>> phenomena: motivation, goal,
>> etc.
>>
>> It is difficult to find
>> diagrams of the structure
>> of activity with its three
>> levels. I just tried to
>> do that and in most cases I
>> got the famous
>> "triangle." The internet is
>> dominated by English
>> language texts where the
>> authors evidently use
>> that version of activity
>> theory. The three
>> structural levels of
>> activity might be found in t
>>
>> Lubomir
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From:
>> xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=
>> bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces%2Blspopov>=
>> bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu>]
>> On Behalf Of Alfredo Jornet Gil
>> Sent: Wednesday, July 22,
>> 2015 11:25 AM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture,
>> Activity; Andy Blunden
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The
>> Emergence of Boundary
>> Objects
>>
>> That was a very helpful
>> entry, Andy. Thanks!
>> I see that our treatment of
>> object in the paper is
>> very much in line with the
>> notion of
>> Arbeitsgegenstand as you
>> describe it.
>>
>> I have many questions, most
>> of which I should find
>> in the literature rather
>> than bother here. But I
>> would like to ask one here.
>> It concerns the quote
>> that the object "carries in
>> itself the purpose and
>> motive of the activity."
>> What does "in itself"
>> mean here?
>> Thanks again for a very
>> informative post,
>> Alfredo
>>
>> ________________________________________
>> From:
>> xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=
>> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> <xmca-l-bounces+a.g.jornet=
>> iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:iped.uio.no@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>> on behalf of Andy Blunden
>> <ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>
>> Sent: 22 July 2015 08:31
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture,
>> Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The
>> Emergence of Boundary
>> Objects
>>
>> If I could try to do my
>> thing and draw attention
>> to some
>> distinctions in this field
>> ... we have at least three
>> different versions of
>> Activity Theory involved
>> here plus
>> Leigh Star's theory and in
>> addition the theories
>> that have
>> spun off from Leigh Star's
>> initial idea. Each is
>> using the
>> word "object" in a different
>> way, all of them
>> legitimate
>> uses of the English word,
>> but all indexing different
>> concepts. So for the sake of
>> this discussion I
>> will invent
>> some different terms.
>>
>> The German word
>> Arbeitsgegenstand means the object of
>> labour, the material which
>> is to be worked upon, the
>> blacksmith's iron. It is
>> objective, in that if may
>> be a nail
>> to a man with a hammer and
>> waste material for a
>> man with a
>> broom, but it is all the
>> same Arbeitsgegenstand.
>> Engestrom
>> use the word "Object" in the
>> middle of the left
>> side of the
>> triangle to mean
>> Arbeitsgegenstand, and when it
>> has been
>> worked upon it becomes
>> "Outcome." The hammer that the
>> blacksmith uses is called
>> "Instruments" or now
>> "instrumentality," and the
>> Rules, whether implicit or
>> explicit, these are
>> respectively the base and apex
>> of the
>> triangle.
>>
>> Engestrom says " The object
>> carries in itself the
>> purpose
>> and motive of the activity."
>> So this "purpose or
>> motive" is
>> not shown on the triangle,
>> but I will call it the
>> OBJECT.
>> This is what Leontyev meant
>> by "object" when he
>> talks about
>> "object-oriented activity."
>> The OBJECT is a
>> complex notion,
>> because it is only
>> *implicit* in the actions of the
>> subject(s); it is not a
>> material thing or process
>> as such.
>> Behaviourists would exclude
>> it altogether. But
>> this is what
>> is motivating all the
>> members of the design team
>> when they
>> sit down to collaborate with
>> one another. Bone one
>> of the
>> team thinks the OBJECT is to
>> drive the nail into
>> the wood
>> and another thinks the
>> OBJECT is to sweep the
>> Arbeitsgegenstand into the
>> wastebin. These OBJECTs
>> change in
>> the course of collaboration
>> and in the End an
>> OBJECT Is
>> *realised* which is the
>> "truth" of the
>> collaboration, to use
>> Hegel's apt terminology here.
>>
>> Surely it is important to
>> recognise that while
>> everyone
>> shares the same
>> Arbeitsgegenstand, and ends up
>> with Outcome
>> as the same OBJECT, along
>> the road they construe
>> the object
>> differently. This is what
>> Vygotsky showed so
>> clearly in
>> Thinking and Speech. It is
>> not the
>> Arbeitsgegenstand or some
>> problem carried within it
>> alone which motivates
>> action, but
>> *the concept the subject
>> makes of the
>> Arbeitsgegenstand*!
>>
>> Then Leigh Star comes along
>> and applies (as
>> Lubomir astutely
>> notices) postmodern ideology
>> critique to the
>> collaboration
>> within an ostensibly neutral
>> infrastructure - that
>> is, in
>> Engestrom's terms Rules and
>> Instruments, which are
>> naively
>> supposed to be there just to
>> aid collaboration.
>> And Leigh
>> Star shows that this is an
>> illusion; the Rules and
>> Instruments are in fact
>> residues of past
>> collaborations
>> which carry within them the
>> Outcomes, i.e.,
>> realised OBJECTs
>> of past collaborations. It
>> is these one-time OBJECTs,
>> now-Instruments+Rules which
>> are the Boundary Objects.
>>
>> But it seems that other have
>> grasped the
>> postmodern critique
>> elements of this idea, that
>> apparently
>> ideologically neutral
>> obJects (in the expanded
>> sense of socially constructed
>> entities, usually far more
>> than OBJects - as
>> things, or
>> artefacts, including
>> institutions - fossilised
>> "systems of
>> activity") and recognised
>> the shared OBJECT as a
>> Boundary
>> Object, reflecting the fact
>> not everyone has the same
>> concept of the OBJECT, as
>> Vygotsky proved.
>>
>> But what Engestrom has done,
>> by placing the
>> Boundary Object
>> in the place of Object on
>> his triangle, joining
>> two "systems
>> of activity," for the
>> purpose of looking not at
>> cooperation
>> but rather the conflict
>> within the broader
>> collaboration.
>> The reconstrual of the
>> Arbeitsgegenstand is
>> deliberate and
>> aimed to change the relation
>> between Subject and
>> obJECT
>> (here referring to the
>> Hegelian "Object" usually
>> rendered as
>> "the Other.") thereby
>> introducing yet a different
>> strand of
>> postmodern critique into the
>> equation, namely
>> Foucault's
>> Poststructuralism, to mind
>> mind, with great effect.
>>
>> OK, so we have
>> Arbeitsgegenstand. OBJECT, Boundary
>> Object,
>> OBject, obJECT and obJect.
>> And I might say, the
>> situation is
>> almost as bad in Russian and
>> German,
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> On 22/07/2015 5:46 AM,
>> Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>> > Thanks a lot for your
>> appreciation, Lubomir.
>> >
>> > To clarify my question in
>> the previous e-mail, I
>> wish to add that I am a bit
>> familiar with the
>> distinction between object
>> and tool in activity
>> theory, though not enough
>> yet. I can see, and we
>> were aware through the
>> process, that what we
>> describe in the paper has to
>> do with how the
>> object of design emerged and
>> developed for the
>> team in and as they were
>> dealing with, developing,
>> and resorting to particular
>> means or tools. But I
>> guess we could say that in
>> our analyses there is a
>> lack of a historical account
>> of the object that
>> goes over and above the
>> particular instances
>> analyzed. Although we
>> provide with some
>> ethnographic
>> contextualization of the team's
>> developmental trajectories,
>> all of our discussion
>> is grounded on concrete
>> events and their
>> transactional unfolding. We
>> did not resort to the
>> distinction between object
>> and means because it
>> seemed to be the same thing
>> in the there and then
>> of the episodes analyzed, at
>> least in what
>> participants' orientations
>> concerned. If they ori
>> > ented towards anything
>> beyond what was there
>> in the meetings, it was in
>> and through the
>> meetings' means. How would
>> then the distinction
>> between means and object
>> have added to our
>> understanding of the events?
>> (And this is not to
>> doubt of the contribution
>> from such a distinction,
>> I really mean to ask this
>> question for the purpose
>> of growing and expanding;
>> and as said before, part
>> of the answer may be found
>> in Engestrom et al.
>> contribution).
>> >
>> > As to how we would
>> position our contribution
>> with regard to activity
>> theory, I would reiterate
>> what we said when
>> introducing the paper for
>> discussion: we begun with
>> the purpose of working
>> outside any particular
>> framework and think, as we
>> think Star did, broadly,
>> drawing from several
>> sources. These included
>> cultural historical
>> psychology,
>> ethnomethodology, and discourse
>> analysis. But also the ideas
>> about Experience (in
>> the Deweyan/Vygotskyan
>> sense) that have been the
>> topic in this discussion
>> were in the background
>> all the time, but we did not
>> operationalize them
>> in terms of any particular
>> theory. This is not to
>> say that we went for the
>> "anything goes;" we tried
>> our best to keep internal
>> coherence between what
>> we said about the data, and
>> what the data was
>> exhibiting for us. Perhaps
>> Rolf would like to add
>> to this.
>> >
>> > I think the questions you
>> are rising about
>> activity theory are very
>> much in the spirit of
>> what I am after, and I am
>> not the best to answer
>> them; but this xmca list may
>> be one of the best
>> places to be asking those
>> questions.
>> >
>> > Alfredo
>
>
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