[Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Mon Sep 15 08:11:07 PDT 2014
I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have our
specific research interests.
But when we publish, most of us have something to report.
I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of time
arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote:
> Why is it that we came to what David stated as:
>
> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We
> are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions,
> and qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics.
>
>
>
> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational
> Psychology and Counseling
> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey
> Education Complex
> IT Online Program Coordinator University
> of Tennessee
> http://itonline.utk.edu/
> Knoxville, TN 37996
> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone:
> 865-974-7712
>
> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
>
> Andy,
>
> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific project,
> though it might initially have been conceived as such.
> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts."
> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations,
> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely detached from
> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even at the
> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game.
>
> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that claims be
> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the
> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical setting
> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In this case,
> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to separation of
> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement as a
> consequence.
>
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>]
> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM
> To: David H Kirshner
> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse
>
> David,
> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must
> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are
> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they
> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of
> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental
> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We
> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts;
> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts.
> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it
> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to
> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research
> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't
> think that makes any difference.
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> David H Kirshner wrote:
> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems
> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts
> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to
> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is
> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical
> discourse.
> >
> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT
> would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in
> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make
> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that
> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might
> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of
> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into
> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological
> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical
> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could
> look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical
> problematics.
> >
> > David
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM
> > To: Huw Lloyd
> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
> >
> > Ah! I see!
> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in
> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain
> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone
> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is
> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky,
> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially
> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in
> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with
> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost.
> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were
> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation."
> >
> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do
> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or
> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my
> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever -
> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are
> products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can
> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce
> them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as
> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects,
> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So
> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through
> everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I
> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too
> mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So
> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis
> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh?
> >
> > Andy
> >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > --
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >
> >
> > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >
> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the
> >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances,
> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions
> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through
> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem
> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action.
> >>
> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant
> >> way to demonstrate this.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Huw
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
> >>
> >> he, he, Huw!
> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very
> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I
> really
> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being
> used to
> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to
> >> separation.
> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and
> >> history. Perhaps you could explain?
> >> Andy
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >>
> >>
> >> Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >>
> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity".
> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the
> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails
> typologies or
> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and
> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as
> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements
> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally
> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one
> needs to
> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too.
> >>
> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which
> leads me to
> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate
> >> the act from its production and history?
> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple
> clarity from
> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Huw
> >>
> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT
> >> tradition
> >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in
> general,
> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of
> course, every
> >> action
> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive
> >> contexts,
> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite
> >> legitimately,
> >> but with no special significant for the use of
> CHAT. In social
> >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other
> >> activities
> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of
> actions by
> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if
> the topic is
> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so
> central, that I
> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term
> >> "artefact-mediated" rather
> >> than the vague term "mediated".
> >>
> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by
> such-and-such a
> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to
> >> mean what
> >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the
> context of
> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of
> >> "mediation" in
> >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the
> fact that a
> >> concept is not immediately present in any act of
> >> communication or
> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*.
> >> Artefacts,
> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a
> concept, can of
> >> course mediate an act of communication. But the
> point is
> >> that a
> >> word is not universally and unproblematically a
> sign for
> >> any one
> >> concept. It means different things to different people.
> >> Concepts
> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their
> >> materiality,
> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a
> concept
> >> in mind
> >> when we use a word in communication, the
> communication is
> >> mediated
> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake
> not to be
> >> aware
> >> of that.
> >>
> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in
> >> qualified
> >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his
> comment, too.
> >>
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Greg Thompson wrote:
> >>
> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and
> culture?
> >>
> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we
> >> would need
> >> to include
> >> reflexes)
> >>
> >> And does it include our socio-contextual
> surround as in
> >> Bateson's man with
> >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include
> >> newborns).
> >>
> >> Just wonderin'.
> >>
> >> -greg
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner
> >> <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
> >> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks for replies.
> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno
> decided
> >> to stop
> >> talking about
> >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of
> >> adjectival
> >> use implies there
> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated
> cognition. He now
> >> speaks of
> >> situativity theory. It seems, with the
> exception of
> >> physical reflexes (and
> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all
> human
> >> action
> >> is mediated (and
> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as
> well). So, it's
> >> worth noting that
> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of
> >> action, but
> >> rather a
> >> theoretical assumption about all human
> action; though
> >> there seems to be
> >> some variation in interpretation of what that
> >> assumption
> >> entails.
> >> David
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
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