[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion

[Dr. Paul C. Mocombe]

Mike,

The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject.  Derrida is correct to point out that Austin and Searle assume the aforementioned in their theory of speech act.  Although I do not subscribe to derrida ' s decentered subject as the alternative to the rational subject that experiences the world.  For me, as heidegger points out in his critique of husserl, the latter subject is an analytic, present-at-hand, of Dasein among its other analytics (very kantian), ready-to-hand and unready-to-hand.  What psychology and speech act can not account for is the origins of consciousness itself...artifical intelligence is not consciousness!


Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
President
The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
www.mocombeian.com 
www.readingroomcurriculum.com 
www.paulcmocombe.info 

<div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  2:59 PM  (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion </div><div>
</div>Mike,

My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing.  It is simply background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on the argument).  

Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories.  This psychological act of thinking is the element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking.  However, in order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text.    


Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
President
The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
www.mocombeian.com 
www.readingroomcurriculum.com 
www.paulcmocombe.info 

<div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  1:10 PM  (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion </div><div>
</div>Thanks Paul --

Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question:
How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul,
such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them?

And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke?

What are the major implications of the differences??

mike

On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:

> Martin,
>
> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech
> act, but not austin's.
>
>
> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> President
> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> www.mocombeian.com
> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> www.paulcmocombe.info
>
> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <
> mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/10/2014  7:48 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> </div><div>
> </div>Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the
> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i
> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble
> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief
> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character?
> mike
>
> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer <
> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> wrote:
>
> > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that
> > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character?  Acting requires
> > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world.
> > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with
> > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form
> of
> > new signs.
> >
> > ?
> >
> > Martin
> >
> > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring
> > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that
> word
> > > meaning is BEST understood -
> > >
> > > "as MODES  of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as
> operations,
> > > actions, and activities."
> > >
> > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings.
> >
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>
>


-- 
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.