[Xmca-l] Re: Acquisition of word meaning

[Larry Purss]

David,
I read your comment:

discussing the concept *word* what is meant is not a noun but something
much more like an attribute, which would be expressed as a nominal group in
English but a
verbal group in Korean. And elsewhere it's clear that the word 'word'
actually means "wording"--.

I went away and that night heard myself asking if the distinctions between
*word* and *wording* and the way they are different can also be explored as
how *word* and *wording* are*related* [form conjunctions].
Then the question becomes what is *mediating* this conjunction? If I use
the term *between* to refer to the relation as *word* AND *wording* it
seems to imply a certain type of conjunction. However, if the relation is
considered as a *trans* relation [transformation, translation] it seems to
indicate a more fluid flowing or being *carried* from one *aspect* of the
relation towards the *other* aspect and also in the reciprocal direction
without clear distinct boundaries of *word* and *wording*

This also could apply to *event* and *eventing* OR
could apply to *worded* and *wording*

In 1977 Raymond Williams wrote the book *Marxism and Literature* and in
Chapter two Raymond explores what he refers to as a wrong turn in our
understanding when studying the concept *language* and the notion of *sign*.
 Raymond's perspective is the notion of *sign* is a medieval concept which
has been readopted in modern linguistic thought.
*Sign*, from Latin, *signum* meant a mark or token which is intrinsically a
concept based on a distinction between *language* and *reality*.
Raymond states: sign "is an INTERPOSITION between *word* and *thing* which
repeats the Platonic interposition of *form*, *essence*, or *idea* but now
in inaccessible linguistic terms." (page 25)

In contrast to this notion of *sign* Raymond articulates a notion of
*sign*as a PRODUCT [but not merely a past reified product of an
*always-given* language SYSTEM.]  Real communicative *products* [which are
usable signs] are living evidence of a continuing social process within
which individuals are carried but within which they also actively
contribute. This understanding of *sign* is AT ONCE BOTH socialization and
individuation [connected aspects of a single process] which the alternative
notions of *sign* as *system* or *expression* dissociate as reified
*language* and reified *society*.
Raymond also emphasizes his notion of language  rejects the metaphor of
language as *reflection* of *material reality*  We grasp THIS reality
THROUGH language, which as practical social consciousness is saturated by
and saturates all social activity [including productive activity]
Raymond says this grasping is continuous languaging [wording] which is THIS
LOST MIDDLE term between the abstract entities *subject* and *object* on
which BOTH idealism AND orthodox materialism flounder. Language IS this
articulated social PRESENCE in the world.

Raymond is playing with *word* and *wording* [*event* and *eventing*] and
it is the conjunction OF *word* and *wording* which he is articulating



On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 1:16 AM, Bella Kotik-Friedgut <bella.kotik@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Without theorizing I want to share my recent observation of development of
> word meaning in my grandson 3.10. Everyday there is something reminding me
> of LSV. Here are examples of words that still are not full concepts.
> Driving home at narrow crowded street he proclaims "The street is sad"
> (atsuv in Hebrew)
> We ask him what exactly is sad, may be people, but he insists that "The
> street is sad";
> Other day I use word single (boded in Hebrew) and he asks what does it mean
> and with a lot of questions try to develop a concept: A child can be
> single? An adult? When I will be adult? and so on. Sometimes he hears an
> expression and try to use it in order to test appropriateness: "You cause
> me a bunch of problems!" (Zarot zrurot) and after our reaction and
> questions about specific problems he escapes and seemingly gets the idea.
> So the vocabulary expands very intensively, but the meaning of each word is
> still to be mastered.
>
> Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 10:52 AM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk) <
> james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi David, for your info, the below article contains an overview of
> > perspectives on semiotic mediation within sociolinguistics and
> > sociocultural theory:
> > http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10749039.2014.913294
> > Best wishes
> > James
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > on behalf of David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > Sent: 19 July 2014 23:12
> > To: Mike Cole; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Acquisition of word meaning
> >
> > Halliday is Vygotskyan. Explicitly so in places: he says that his concept
> > of consciousness as a social being derives from Vygotsky. Ruqaiya Hasan,
> > who sometimes lurks on this list, has written extensively on the
> > "exotropic" links between Halliday and Vygotsky. At first I didn't quite
> > believe this, because for Vygotsky what develops is a meta-system made up
> > of functions (psychological abilities), while for Halliday what develops
> is
> > a metafunction made up of systems (linguistic choices). But Gordon Wells
> > persuaded me: he points out that Halliday's "ideational metafunction"
> (this
> > is the function that allows us to represent the world as figures of
> > experience linked by logic, and is realized in nouns, verbs, and other
> > open-class words) is essentially equivalent to "thinking" and the
> > "interpersonal metafunction (this is the function that allows us to
> > exchange commodities such as goods and services or information and is
> > realized in commands, statements and questions) is essentially equivalent
> > to "speech".
> >
> > I think the reason that I didn't get the profound and very
> > thorough connection between Halliday and Vygotsky (which seems more
> > endotropic than exotropic to me now) was that I kept assuming that when
> > Vygotsky says "word" he means something like a noun, as in the block
> > experiments of Chapter Five Thinking and Speech. But of course even in
> the
> > block experiments, what is meant is not a noun but something much more
> like
> > an attribute, which would be expressed as a nominal group in English but
> a
> > verbal group in Korean. And elsewhere it's clear that the word 'word'
> > actually means "wording"--what is a single word in the mouth of a very
> > young child is going to be a whole clause in an older child and
> eventually
> > an entire text.
> >
> > So Mike's example is quite a propos. When I first read this example from
> > Shweder back in 2007, it seemed to me that Vygotsky would say that this
> > particular "wording" has nothing to do with morality, and of course it's
> > not really a concept. Now I am not so sure: I'm convinced that a lot of
> > ethical concepts develop out of almost purely esthetic ones, which is
> > actually a good example of how "perizhivanie" starts by meaning feeling
> and
> > only in the course of development comes to mean thinking.
> >
> > In China, what girls tell their classmates in high school is that their
> > "Grandma is visiting" or else that they are "dao mei le" ("doomed"). This
> > was a highly prized condition when my wife was in high school, because it
> > meant that you didn't have to go out for physical education and you could
> > stay in and do math homework instead. So one day the boys told the
> physical
> > education teacher that they were all "doomed" and could not go either,
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >
> >
> > On 20 July 2014 03:02, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > While puzzling over all the interesting notes on
> > > language/thought/emotion/development in recent days I happend upon the
> > > following. It seems a potential object of interpretation that would
> help
> > to
> > > hightlight for us (for me at least) the stakes in the pattern of
> > agreements
> > > and disageements and silences in the conversation. Does Halliday inform
> > our
> > > understanding differently from Vygotsky might be a helpful question. Is
> > > convergence of meaning and generalization manifest?  Anyway, perhaps it
> > > will be of interest:
> > >  (From an essay on culture's involvement in moral development by
> Shweder
> > > and colleagues. Data from Orrisa).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > *"Mara heici. Chhu na! Chhu na!*" is what a menstruating Oriya mother
> > > explains when her young child approaches her lap. It means, "I am
> > polluted.
> > > Don't touch me! Don't touch me!" If the child continues to approach,
> the
> > > woman will stand up and walk away from her child. Of course, young
> Oriya
> > > children have no concept of menstruation or menstrual blood; the first
> > > menstruation arrives as a total surprise to adolescent girls. Mother's
> > > typically "explain" their own monthly "pollution" to their children by
> > > telling then that they stepped in dog excrement or touched garbage, or
> > they
> > > evade the issue. Nevertheless, Oriya children quickly learn that there
> is
> > > something called "*Mara"* (the term *cchuan* (check spelling) may also
> be
> > > used) and when "*Mara*" is there, as it regularly is, their mother
> avoids
> > > them, sleeps alone on a mat on the floor, is prohibited from entering
> the
> > > kitchen... eats alone, does not groom herself and is, for several days,
> > > kept at a distance from anything of value. Children notice that
> > everything
> > > their mother touches is washed. (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987, p.
> > 74)
> > >
> >
> >
>