[Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
HENRY SHONERD
hshonerd@gmail.com
Fri Dec 5 16:41:39 PST 2014
Larry,
I’m late to this: Cognitive Pluralism is a term Vera uses in her work in creativity. Does that resonate?
Henry
> On Dec 5, 2014, at 1:47 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Helena,
> Thank you for this ebook. A wonderful resource which can be offered to
> others working in learning environments. [in my case public school systems]
>
> On the notion of using complex words. I find I have introduced simple
> metaphors such as "shared brains" which can be imagined easily and can be
> understood. when I lend my brain to the child we do *it* together and when
> they are ready they can do *it* all by their self.
>
> Bella, also thank you for introducing the new Cambridge book on Cultural
> Historical Psychology. A wonderful resource on the complexity of this
> theoretical approach or path.
>
> Mike, the paper Natalia sent on the Luria-Vygotsky approach to
> *neuro-psychology* also is a wonderful foundation for extending the Western
> understanding of Vygotsky to a deeper understanding [and extension in the
> West] of the *principle "of dynamic organization and localization of the
> Higher Mental Functions" I do wonder if this paper should be on the
> archive list.
>
> Martin's paper on Barsalou and Mike's paper on Kosslyn making the case for
> *mental imagery* also are resources that are gesturing to a rich *cascade*
> of understandings.
>
> I am like a kid in the candy store deciding which delight to try first as
> they all seem to be sharing a *similar* perspective.
>
> CHAT is a marvelous *interpretive community* David K's caution that as we
> generalize we can also loose focus is a struggle I encounter when
> responding. Do I try to stay within the *cultural-historical* approach
> [path] or take a more general *sociocultural approach*??
>
> It all seems to lead back to *shared brain* which is what I bring to public
> school settings.
>
> The format of CHAT is unique.
>
> Larry
>
> On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Helena,
>>
>> I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those
>> words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were
>> are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading
>> Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the
>> idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be
>> self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any
>> conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and
>> the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in
>> small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run).
>>
>> Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity
>> often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become
>> difficult to relate.
>>
>> A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education
>> should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme
>> cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many
>> educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while
>> and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read
>> it) would just pass it right over.
>>
>> So what do we do? Hard to know.
>>
>> A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed
>> cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson
>> every some up?
>>
>> Michael
>> ________________________________________
>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>> on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
>>
>> A voice from the margins, here:
>>
>> I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go
>> quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out
>> there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas
>> intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years
>> of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms
>> that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a
>> face as if they'd tasted something bad.
>>
>> Examples of terms like this are:
>>
>> affordance
>> mediate
>> activity
>> CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory)
>>
>> and:
>>
>> development
>>
>> For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term
>> "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can
>> use that.
>>
>> Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning
>> theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same
>> reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very
>> different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists.
>>
>> theoristshttp://
>> www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf
>>
>>
>> Helena Worthen
>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
>>
>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>>
>>> Haydi,
>>> Thank you so much! Here’s how it is for me:
>>> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in
>> the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But
>> I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher
>> educator where research and publication wasn’t necessary for tenure and
>> promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years
>> back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in
>> thrashing about I came to read Andy’s articles on "collaborative project"
>> as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him
>> one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering
>> my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time
>> for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe
>> up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one
>> of the papers for the book. I love them both. That’s how it is for me.
>>>
>>> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike
>> has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking
>> him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest
>> thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I
>> have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where
>> the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where
>> human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have
>> to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, “I’m still willin’” Let’s
>> make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We
>> can’t afford it. In my humble opinion.
>>>
>>> In gratitude and hope,
>>> Henry
>>>
>>>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Haydi--
>>>>
>>>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to
>>>> implement your demands may be more
>>>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as
>>>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing,
>>>> so who knows.
>>>>
>>>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in
>> the
>>>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me.
>>>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas,
>>>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian.
>>>>
>>>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various
>> comments
>>>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads.
>> For
>>>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment
>> vis
>>>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc.,
>> might
>>>> be be placed in that thread.
>>>>
>>>> etc.
>>>>
>>>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments!
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei <
>> haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi
>>>>>
>>>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to
>>>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this
>> Forum .
>>>>>
>>>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms ,
>>>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as
>>>>> native speakers , etc.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether
>> put
>>>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the
>>>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view .
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the
>> "History of
>>>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries .
>> Andy
>>>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all .
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools
>>>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He
>>>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just
>> within the
>>>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect
>> much of
>>>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and
>>>>> Engels so as to prove his claims .
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture
>>>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to
>>>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets
>>>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device
>> gets to
>>>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and
>>>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself
>>>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ??
>> At
>>>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No
>> more
>>>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some
>> is to
>>>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that
>>>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at
>>>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present
>> man of
>>>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work
>> activity
>>>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the
>>>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12
>>>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically ,
>> that
>>>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and
>>>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through
>>>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups
>> and
>>>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed !
>> collective
>>>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can
>> distinguish
>>>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of
>>>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not
>> ontogenetically
>>>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to
>>>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with
>>>>> whichone .
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the
>> four
>>>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point
>>>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction
>>>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and
>> the
>>>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could
>> be
>>>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use
>> artifacts and
>>>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the
>> domain
>>>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal
>> activity'
>>>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one
>> more
>>>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V
>> , if
>>>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' .
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool
>>>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine
>>>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole
>> activity
>>>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign
>> activity
>>>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize
>> its
>>>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech ,
>> dialogue
>>>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal
>>>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral
>> change
>>>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold
>> of the
>>>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley
>> rich
>>>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a
>>>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic
>> 'motive'
>>>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing)
>> ,
>>>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete
>> action
>>>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the
>> ground
>>>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material
>> (object ,
>>>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole
>> thing
>>>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the
>>>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no
>>>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why
>> taking
>>>>> affordance for a tool .
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Soooooooooo much for one post .
>>>>>
>>>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works .
>>>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying !
>>>>>
>>>>> Best
>>>>>
>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
>>>>>
>>>>> My view?
>>>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On
>> what
>>>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise?
>>>>> What's gained, what's lost?
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael <
>> glassman.13@osu.edu>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than
>>>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to
>> get
>>>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for
>> you
>>>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it
>>>>> you
>>>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection
>> of
>>>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the
>>>>> activity
>>>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes
>> in
>>>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither
>> subjective
>>>>> or
>>>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the
>>>>> correct
>>>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass
>> the
>>>>>> plank by.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the
>>>>> perceived
>>>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are
>>>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the
>>>>> design
>>>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of
>>>>> designing
>>>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch
>> on a
>>>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank,
>>>>> where
>>>>>> there is no prior design.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that
>> gibson
>>>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret
>> him)
>>>>> and
>>>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they
>> share
>>>>> the
>>>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a
>> located
>>>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the
>> phylgenetically
>>>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove
>>>>> cognitive
>>>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then
>>>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means.
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances,
>>>>> which
>>>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is
>> a
>>>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with
>>>>> regard
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> understanding what they are.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting
>>>>>> outside
>>>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> some fashion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what
>> Norman
>>>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I
>> could
>>>>>>> find:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal,
>>>>> what
>>>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to
>>>>>> afford"
>>>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made
>>>>> it
>>>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and
>> the
>>>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the
>>>>>> complementarity
>>>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? …Subject to revision, I suggest
>> that
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of
>>>>> its
>>>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The
>>>>>> reference
>>>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson,
>>>>>> 1977/1986).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they
>> are
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings,
>>>>> which
>>>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But
>>>>>> actually,
>>>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective
>>>>> property;
>>>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of
>>>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is
>>>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both
>>>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways,
>> to
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very
>> carefully
>>>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this
>>>>> list
>>>>>>> value history, learning, and development.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'd take a look.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of
>>>>>> your
>>>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically
>>>>>>> manifest.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> ]
>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Interloper, Michael?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and
>>>>>> cognitive
>>>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by
>> Engestrom
>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
>>>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be
>>>>>> gathered
>>>>>>>> up.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <
>>>>> glassman.13@osu.edu
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).
>>>>> He
>>>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish
>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which
>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.
>>>>>> Meaning
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to
>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong
>>>>> word,
>>>>>> if
>>>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a
>>>>>>>> complex
>>>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes
>>>>> based
>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one
>>>>>> context
>>>>>>>> may
>>>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that
>>>>>> he
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
>>>>>>>> constraints.
>>>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances
>>>>> or
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
>>>>>>> mention
>>>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of
>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>> interloper.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> ]
>>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Annalisa-
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation
>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
>>>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set
>>>>> against
>>>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> d-cog
>>>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the
>>>>>>>> notion
>>>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of
>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> distributed*
>>>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition:
>>>>>> Psychological
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> wish!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important
>>>>> connections.
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I
>>>>> learned
>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science
>>>>>> (1985).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity:
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
>>>>>>>> cognitive
>>>>>>>>>> artifacts?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in
>>>>>> play,
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> even joy!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however
>>>>>> until
>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
>>>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
>>>>>>>> artifacts
>>>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a
>>>>>> source
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it
>>>>>> might
>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of
>>>>>>> intro
>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
>>>>>>>> newcomer's
>>>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is
>>>>> seeking
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> sort
>>>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
>>>>>>>>> insuficiently
>>>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many
>>>>>>> rocks,
>>>>>>>> so
>>>>>>>>>> little time"!
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Martin!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental
>>>>>>> representation"
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>> coming closer!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's
>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>> affordances.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed
>>>>>> article.
>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
>>>>>>>>> important
>>>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a
>>>>>>>> grenade
>>>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the
>>>>>> list.
>>>>>>>> If
>>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look
>>>>>> forward
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that
>>>>> being
>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>>> UCSD
>>>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that
>>>>>>> influences
>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
>>>>>>>>> community
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more
>>>>> voluntary
>>>>>>>>> phrased
>>>>>>>>>>> that way).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>> John
>>>>>>>>>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is
>>>>>> interesting,
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> me
>>>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not
>>>>> used,
>>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read"
>>>>> images
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to
>>>>>> define
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <
>>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight"
>>>>>> when
>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
>>>>>>>>> anything
>>>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe
>>>>>>> available
>>>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even
>>>>> remember
>>>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental
>>>>> representations
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth
>>>>> century.
>>>>>>> In
>>>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
>>>>>>>>> Titchener
>>>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>>>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically
>>>>>>>> anterior
>>>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would
>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that
>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more
>>>>>>>> reading
>>>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read
>>>>> than
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels
>>>>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do
>>>>>> NOT
>>>>>>>> read
>>>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color
>>>>> structure
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any
>>>>>>> actual
>>>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
>>>>>>>>> experience
>>>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then
>>>>>>> deliberately
>>>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>>>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine
>>>>> Chapel
>>>>>>>> fresco
>>>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation.
>>>>> He
>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> she
>>>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the
>>>>> painting
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not
>>>>>>> notice
>>>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <
>>>>>> annalisa@unm.edu
>>>>>>>>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are
>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently,
>>>>>> based
>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers,
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a
>>>>>>> phrase
>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on
>>>>> it
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know
>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think
>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>> Hackett
>>>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have
>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be
>>>>>>> willing
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>> take a look.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
>>>>>>>>> controversial.
>>>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone
>>>>>>> says
>>>>>>>>>> "this
>>>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
>>>>>>>>> observation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and
>>>>> whatever
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at
>>>>>>> hand?
>>>>>>>>>> Just a
>>>>>>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model,
>>>>>> metaphoricity?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>> Purss <
>>>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> David K
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce.
>>>>>> My
>>>>>>>>> reason
>>>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path
>>>>>>> pursuing a
>>>>>>>>>> basic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> question.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic
>>>>>>>> guiding
>>>>>>>>>>> images
>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring
>>>>>>> appearances
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new
>>>>>>> phenomenological
>>>>>>>>>> path
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible
>>>>>>>> image-character
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which
>>>>> he
>>>>>>>>>> brackets -
>>>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> AND
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject*
>>>>>> finds
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> metaphor
>>>>>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is
>>>>> implicated
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of
>>>>>>> itself
>>>>>>>>>> *in*
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding
>>>>>>> images
>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>>>>>>> established.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the
>>>>>> path
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is
>>>>> derived
>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial
>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>> topic
>>>>>>>>>>> may
>>>>>>>>>>>>> become [again]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by
>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> basic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these
>>>>>>> images
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images
>>>>>> emerge
>>>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is
>>>>>>> transcendental]
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical].
>>>>>> It
>>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in
>>>>>>> Vygotsky's
>>>>>>>>>>> writings
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of
>>>>>>> XMCA. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>>>> with
>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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