[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?

[HENRY SHONERD]

After I sent my email you have graciously answered, I thought precisely of the way representations afford time to dwell on something, rather than responding ballistically, as in controlled vs. automatic processing. Round peg and square hole here?

> On Dec 2, 2014, at 12:18 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> 
> I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry.
> Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an
> appropriate enough word.
> 
> I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to
> talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its
> trendiness).
> 
> I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence
> of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) to
> the polysemic concept of imagination.
> 
> To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way
> back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to
> think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is
> brought to the fore.
> 
> 
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Peeps,
>> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop about
>> David K’s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a
>> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think
>> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and
>> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of
>> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery
>> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but
>> does refraction slow things down in any way?
>> Henry
>> 
>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Martin!
>>> 
>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is
>> coming closer!
>>> 
>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of
>> affordances.
>>> 
>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I
>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important
>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>>> 
>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade
>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you
>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your
>> reply, Martin.
>>> 
>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at
>> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences
>> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
>> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more
>> voluntary phrased that way).
>>> 
>>> Kind regards,
>>> 
>>> Annalisa
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> on behalf of Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>> 
>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me
>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even
>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the
>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the
>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>>> 
>>> Martin
>>> 
>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
>>>> 
>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we
>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything
>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available
>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
>>>> non-image based mental representation.
>>>> 
>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are
>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In
>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener
>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that
>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior
>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have
>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>>>> 
>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading
>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am
>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like
>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read
>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>>>> 
>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>>>> 
>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of
>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any actual
>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience
>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then deliberately
>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>>>> 
>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel fresco
>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she
>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and
>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice
>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it.
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>> 
>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>>>>> 
>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the
>> root of all thinking.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon
>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like
>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the
>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett
>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already
>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to
>> take a look.
>>>>> 
>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial.
>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this
>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation.
>>>>> 
>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that
>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a
>> thought.
>>>>> 
>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity?
>>>>> 
>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>>>>> 
>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> on behalf of Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
>>>>> 
>>>>> David K
>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason
>> for
>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a
>> basic
>>>>> question.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding
>> images
>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
>>>>> 
>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and
>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path
>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this
>> process
>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character
>> of the
>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>>>>> 
>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets
>> -
>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>>>>> 
>>>>> AND
>>>>> 
>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the
>>>>> meaning of its very self.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
>> metaphor can
>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in
>>>>> *objectivity*
>>>>> 
>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself
>> *in* the
>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has
>> been
>>>>> established.
>>>>> 
>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the
>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic
>> may
>>>>> become [again]
>>>>> 
>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic
>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as
>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and
>> is
>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems
>> to
>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's
>> writings
>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Larry
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> <dev.image1.&cit%3Apub=Developmental+Psychology&cit%3Avol=10&cit%3Aiss=5&cit%3Apg=716&cit%3Adate=Sep+1974&ic=true&c>