[Xmca-l] Re: Intrinsic motivation?

Huw Lloyd huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
Thu Aug 7 12:18:16 PDT 2014 

Maria,

I've indented my responses below.

On 7 August 2014 10:48, Maria Cristina Migliore <migliore@ires.piemonte.it>
wrote:

> Andy,
>
> I intend objective motive as the motive of the activity. Objective does not
> refer to objectivity, objectiveness and judging objectively here. Objective
> motive refers to the idea that "the object of an activity is its true
> motive."
> This is the terminology proposed by Leontiev in Activity, Consciousness,
> and Personality, section 3.5 The General Structure of Activity, page 62
> However, I tend to not use the locution 'objective motive'. But
> motive/object.
>
> Huw,
> I take the stance of Hyysalo. He noted that in Leontiev’s framework there
> is no “personal motive”, but a personal sense of motive. Hyysalo, S.
> (2005). "Objects and Motives in a Product Design Process." *Mind, Culture
> and Activity* *12*(1): 19-36., note 6.
>

That seems perfectly reasonable and, from my readings and thinkings, chimes
with the Vygotsky self-control paper in the form of discrete motives only
manifesting in selection between different orientations (i.e. of where to
throw oneself next).


>
> My interviews to the employers and managers begun by questions like "What
> does this enterprise do? what are the goods produced? how work is
> organized? assembly line or machine tools?" etc.
> So I interpreted their answers as a description of the business in which
> the enterprise is involved. That gave me information and data to classify
> the enterprise by referring to the typology I had elaborated about the main
> strategies of production. As I wrote in one of my previous emails, the
> strategy of production is what I consider the object of activity of the
> firm.
>
>
Your attributing an object of activity to a company (?) seems a bit awkward
to me in terms of locution.  A strategy is a plan -- a sets of goals etc
-- but it is the (ongoing) stable relation that the plan is designed to
achieve that would consititute something like the object of activity (do
you agree?)  i.e. a specific form of production with the character
demarcated by the manifest plan (the real strategy, which might be
different from the claimed strategy).

With respect to (personal) activities mediating between the individual(s)
and the demands, I would locate the individual's objective imagination as
centrally applied to both.  The acitivity of the individual is maintained
(held steady) through their objective imagination, which is used to
negotiate (and is partially derived from) the demands of the situation
(demands of mass production, lack of sleep etc).

Hence a hierarchy of motives might resolve to a hierarchy of relations of
psychological functions, yielding objective imagination (Vygotsky again),
depending on your meaning of hierarchy of motives...



> My interviews to the older workers started by asking to tell me when they
> begun to work, as a way to prompt a narrative of their life.
> The personal sense of motive - that is the subjective way to relate to the
> motive and oject of the activity of the firm - has emerged through the
> emotions, feelings, thoughts which the older workers were expressing while
> they were talking about their tasks.
>

Yes, although if it is a "classically western" structure (strategy of
production), then the needs of the workers will not actually figure within
it (much)!  The fact that you did research (for them) suggests that they
are a bit more "advanced" than classically western, i.e. that they are
groping for relations between strategy of production and the needs of the
workers to foster effective learning.  Out of interest, did the
organisation have some initial stimulus for the interest, e.g. problems in
effective learning?


>
> Huw, you have reached a conclusion about the importance of affect in
> detecting motive (but it would be better to say: personal sense of motive)
> which was also elaborated by Chaiklin in his book The Theory and Practice
> of Cultural-historical Psychology, in the chapter
> The Category of 'Personality' in Cultural-Historical Psychology.
>

Thanks, Cristina.  I'm aware of some of Seth's methods (I don't recall
whether I've read that paper though).  The germ cell, as I understand he &
Mariane to use and describe, is contradicitory to me.  But I have, I
believe, discovered a resolution to that (hooray).

Best,
Huw



>
> Thank you for your comments and questions.
>
> Cristina
>
>
>
>
> 2014-08-06 22:24 GMT+02:00 Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>:
>
> > Hi Everyone,
> > I have a copy of David Kellogg's new book:
> > *The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in
> > Story-telling with Halliday, Vygotsky, and Shakespeare **Sense
> Publishers,
> > Rotterdam, The Netherlands.*and will mail it to anyone who would like to
> > write a review of it. David did a fabulous job on it and is already using
> > it in his English classes in Korea. By the way,
> > He did not ask me to do this.
> >
> > *Robert Lake*
> >
> > *From the back cover.*
> > Every storyteller soon discovers the difference between putting a story
> > inside children and trying to extract it with comprehension questions and
> > putting children inside a story and having them act it out. Teachers may
> > experience this as a difference in "difficulty", or in the level of
> > motivation and enthusiasm, or even in the engagement of creativity and
> > imagination, and leave it at that. This book explores the divide more
> > critically and analytically, finding symmetrical and even complementary
> > problems and affordances with both approaches.
> >
> > First, we examine what teachers actually say and do in each approach,
> using
> > the systemic-functional grammar of M.A.K. Halliday.
> >
> > Secondly, we explore the differences developmentally, using the
> > cultural-historical psychology of L.S. Vygotsky.
> >
> > Thirdly, we explain the differences we find in texts by considering the
> > history of genres from the fable through the plays of Shakespeare.
> "Inside"
> > and "Outside" the story turn out to be two very different modes of
> > experiencing-the one reflective and narrativizing and the other
> > participatory and dialogic. These two modes of experience prove to be
> > equally valuable, and even mutually necessary, but only in the long
> > run-different approaches are necessary at different moments in the
> lesson,
> > different points in development, and even different times in human
> history.
> > In the final analysis, though, this distinction is meaningless to
> children
> > and to their teachers unless it is of practical use.
> >
> > Each chapter employs only the most advanced technology ever developed for
> > making sense of human experience, namely thinking and talking--though not
> > necessarily in that order. So every story has a specific narrative to
> tell,
> > a concrete set of dialogues to try, and above all a practicable time and
> a
> > practical space for children, their teachers, and even their teachers'
> > teachers, to talk and to think
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 3:46 PM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Thanks Andy for this extension. the
> > >
> > > IF the difficulty is how to conceptualize this *general* community
> > without
> > > abstractions such as *context* or *society* and *project* is a
> preferable
> > > unit of analysis which becomes more complicated when communication is
> > > between multiple projects then we require a DIFFERENT ETHICS [and
> > language
> > > and concepts].
> > >
> > > Rather tan the concept *play* I will translate to *subject matter*
> which
> > > may have some affinity with *project*
> > >
> > > IF projects are *projected* then they may be *made available* AS
> *subject
> > > matter*.
> > >
> > > I would like to also bring into this discussion the concept of
> > > *perspective* as used by Justus Buchler in his book *Toward a General
> > > Theory of Human Development*
> > >
> > >
> > > Robert Corrington in his reflections on Buchler’s book notes that for
> > > Buchler,
> > >
> > > “A perspective is a ‘humanly occupied order’ that has a direction and a
> > > meaning BEYOND given conscious intents. Buchler saw the *community of
> > > interpreters* as the place where perspectives [as humanly occupied
> order]
> > > are shared and communicated]
> > >
> > >
> > > Andy I will pay attention to your developing the notion of *projects*
> and
> > > ETHICS.
> > >
> > > PLAY, as a concept shares with Buchler’s concept of *perspective* a
> > notion
> > > of *subject matter* which HAPPENS to us in our engagements.  *Subject
> > > matter* [die Sache] is the *mediating 3rd* within dialogue.
> > >
> > > I wonder if there is a possibility of a to-and-fro translating between
> > the
> > > concepts *subject matter* and *projects*. Both concepts may be
> > *projected*
> > > as a kind of order beyond mere subjective *will power*
> > >
> > > Thanks Andy for the chat
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Sent from Windows Mail
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Andy Blunden
> > > Sent: ‎Tuesday‎, ‎August‎ ‎5‎, ‎2014 ‎8‎:‎29‎ ‎PM
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I don't know about play, Larry, and I wouldn't want to counterpose
> > > Heller to MacIntyre. Heller is adding a further dimension to what
> > > MacIntyre has pointed out. The importance for me is how she points to
> > > the fact that different ethics (and different forms of cognition and
> > > language) apply within a project as opposed to in "the general
> > > community." The difficulty then is how to conceptualise this "general
> > > community." This is where people often introduce open-ended
> abstractions
> > > like "context" or "society", but I prefer to stick to project as a unit
> > > of analysis, and recognise that communication and interaction between
> > > projects requires a different ethics (and language, concepts, etc.)
> than
> > > that which applies within any one project - you don't talk to your
> > > family the same way your talk to strangers in the street or colleagues
> > > at work.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > >
> > >
> > > Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > Greg
> > > > thank you for posting this section of Andy's book.
> > > > Andy
> > > > I appreciated your highlighting the ethical concerns and linking
> > projects
> > > > to MacIntyre's exploration of *virtue* and *ethics*.
> > > >
> > > > I would like to hear more about Heller refuting MacIntyre's
> > understanding
> > > > of the loss of virtue through the loss of a dense ethos of
> >  institutional
> > > > relations in the tendency or movement towards  the looser ethos of
> > > > modernity.
> > > >
> > > > Is Heller questioning the communitarian orientation of MacIntyre's
> > > ethics??
> > > >
> > > > This *introduction* certainly opens a field for further play
> > > > Larry
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 6:21 PM, Greg Thompson <
> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > >
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> A lovely book indeed!
> > > >>
> > > >> For those playing along at home (and without access to the book), I
> > have
> > > >> pasted the relevant section from Andy's chapter below. Please note
> > that
> > > >> this is from Andy's introductory chapter in the book Collaborative
> > > >> Projects: An Interdisciplinary Study. The book can be found here:
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > >
> >
> http://books.google.com/books?id=Ukv3AwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
> > > >>
> > > >> Cheers,
> > > >> greg
> > > >>
> > > >> "
> > > >>
> > > >> One of the great strengths of Activity Theory with ‘collaborative
> > > project’
> > > >> as the unit of analysis is that collaboration is not only an
> > observable
> > > >> phenomenon which can be a means of scientific description and
> > > explanation,
> > > >> but it is also an *ethic*, and one with powerful normative force in
> > > >> contemporary, secular society. Having a concept which is both a unit
> > of
> > > >> analysis for science and a secular ethical norm gives it a special
> > > place in
> > > >> social science and its practical application, particularly in
> sciences
> > > such
> > > >> as economics, jurisprudence and sociology whose subject matter is
> > > ethical
> > > >> life.
> > > >>
> > > >> For example, economic science assumes that economic agents will act
> > > >> ‘rationally’ within the bounds of the information available to them
> at
> > > the
> > > >> time. But the definition of ‘rational’ assumed by economic science
> is
> > > >> contrary to the ethics of large sections of social life. When
> > > governments
> > > >> make policies and laws based on a conception of what is ethical,
> then
> > > such
> > > >> laws function so as to *propagate *the ethic which is built into the
> > > >> science. This process, which has gone on since governments began to
> > take
> > > >> policy advice from economists in the 18th century, has had
> deleterious
> > > >> effects on human welfare.
> > > >>
> > > >> In 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre published *After Virtue*, which, despite
> > the
> > > >> fact that MacIntyre had converted to Catholicism in 1980, became a
> > > >> reference point for secular ethics. MacIntyre situates ethical norms
> > in
> > > >> ‘practices’ which he understands much as I understand ‘projects’:
> > “Every
> > > >> activity, every enquiry, every practice aims at some good” (1981, p.
> > > 139).
> > > >> MacIntyre distinguished between ‘internal goods’ “realized in the
> > > course of
> > > >> trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
> appropriate
> > > to,
> > > >> and partially definitive of, that form of activity” (1981, p. 175)
> and
> > > >> ‘external goods’ such as prizes, monetary rewards and wages which
> are
> > > used
> > > >> to sustain the practice, and are associated with the transformation
> of
> > > the
> > > >> form of practice into an institution. In this connection, MacIntyre
> > > refers
> > > >> to the “corrupting power of institutions” (1981, p. 181). For
> > MacIntyre
> > > >> also, the concept of ‘project’ extends from the organizations such
> as
> > a
> > > >> school or hospital to entire political communities, “concerned with
> > the
> > > >> whole of life, not with this or that good, but with man’s good as
> > such”
> > > >> (1981, p. 146). The virtue ethics which MacIntyre builds on this
> > > conception
> > > >> of social life is precisely consistent with the ‘project’ approach
> to
> > > >> Activity Theory.
> > > >>
> > > >> One qualification to MacIntyre’s ethical project which is important
> to
> > > the
> > > >> task at hand is Agnes Heller’s (1987) contrast between the sense of
> > > >> equality which prevails within the ‘dense ethos’ uniting
> participants
> > > in a
> > > >> project, and the ‘loose ethos’ which characterizes the marketplace
> of
> > > >> public intercourse. Heller observes that the obligation to treat
> > others
> > > as
> > > >> equals is not universal. While we are obliged to treat equals
> equally,
> > > >> within the practices of an institution ‘equals should be treated
> > equally
> > > >> and unequals unequally’ – the boss gets paid more, managers give
> > orders
> > > to
> > > >> subordinates, parents bear the burdens of care for their children,
> > etc.
> > > >> Utopian dreams notwithstanding, there is no real project within
> which
> > > >> equality is truly the norm. Consequently, Heller points out that the
> > > >> ongoing displacement of the formerly dense ethos of institutional
> life
> > > by
> > > >> the loose ethos of modernity which underlies MacIntyre’s concerns is
> > > *not
> > > >> *a
> > > >> regressive development. However, the critical problem of developing
> a
> > > >> universal ethos which can sustain a genuinely human life still lies
> > > before
> > > >> us. Since human freedom can only be attained through mediated
> > > >> self-determination, *i.e.*, participation in projects, the ethics of
> > > >> *relations
> > > >> between projects *must be central to our concerns.
> > > >>
> > > >> Finally, I will briefly touch on discourse ethics (Habermas, 2001)
> > which
> > > >> requires that “all those affected” be counted as participants in a
> > > >> discourse. This requirement is not only vague and abstract, but
> > > untenable.
> > > >> Who decides who is affected, and how exactly does an individual
> remote
> > > from
> > > >> the discourse participate? But more significantly, what are the
> > > >> discussants *doing
> > > >> together *which gives a purpose to the discourse? Seyla Benhabib
> > (1992)
> > > >> reminds us that “discourse ethics ... is not to be construed
> primarily
> > > >> as a *hypothetical
> > > >> *thought process, carried out singly by the moral agent ... but
> rather
> > > as
> > > >> an *actual *dialogue situation.” Moral maxims based on the
> > hypothetical
> > > >> interests of a generalized other are meaningless. To be meaningful
> at
> > > all
> > > >> such an ethics presupposes state or supra-state institutions, as
> > > >> representatives of the generalized other, to mediate social action,
> > > which
> > > >> is an unwarranted restriction on the moral standpoint. Rather, the
> > real
> > > >> relations between any two individuals is given by the projects in
> > which
> > > >> they collaborate, whether that ‘collaboration’ entails cooperation
> or
> > > >> conflict over the object. Collaboration is a strong ethical norm,
> but
> > > >> encompasses a complex variety of nuances according to the mode of
> > > >> collaboration. The complex ethics entailed in consultation,
> > attribution,
> > > >> privacy, sharing, ownership, division of labor, negotiation of
> norms,
> > > >> consistency, and so on, provide a real basis for the construction of
> > an
> > > >> ethics for the modern, secular world.
> > > >>
> > > >> One of the corollaries of Benhabib’s (2002) approach is that the
> > > concept of
> > > >> nation-state has to be disentangled into the several distinct
> projects
> > > >> which are conflated in the notion which has pertained since the
> Treaty
> > > of
> > > >> Westphalia. This is a task which can only be resolved by a social
> > theory
> > > >> which takes projects and not abstract general categories as its
> basic
> > > >> units.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 6:54 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> Relevant references to MacIntyre's "After Virtue" are on pp. 7-8 of
> > > >>> "Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study," which I know
> > you
> > > >>>
> > > >> have
> > > >>
> > > >>> a copy of, Greg. He uses the expressions "internal reward" and
> > > "external
> > > >>> reward."
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Andy
> > > >>>
> > >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > >>> *Andy Blunden*
> > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Greg Thompson wrote:
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>> And one more thing Andy (I realize given the hour down-under, you
> > are
> > > >>>> probably slumbering - hopefully not dogmatically...), could you
> sell
> > > us
> > > >>>>
> > > >> on
> > > >>
> > > >>>> why we should look at MacIntyre on extrinsic and intrinsic
> > motivation.
> > > >>>> Your suggestion that Cristina read MacIntyre on extrinsic and
> > > intrinsic
> > > >>>> motivation was less than convincing to me if only b.c. I know
> > nothing
> > > >>>>
> > > >> about
> > > >>
> > > >>>> it! -greg
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Greg Thompson <
> > > >>>>
> > > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > >>
> > > >>>> <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>     Andy,
> > > >>>>     I'm a bit baffled by your response to Cristina. It seems fair
> > > >>>>     enough to try to recover Descartes as not necessarily a bad
> guy.
> > > >>>> But I didn't take that to be Cristina's point.
> > > >>>>     It seems to me that she was arguing against Cartesian dualism
> -
> > a
> > > >>>>     particular way in which we Westerners (and we aren't the only
> > ones
> > > >>>>     who do this) divide up the world into various kinds binaries -
> > > >>>>     subject/object, mind/body, nature/culture, emotion/reason, and
> > so
> > > >>>>
> > > >> on.
> > > >>
> > > >>>>     Are you advocating that these should be the governing
> categories
> > > >>>>     of the human sciences?
> > > >>>>     If so, then "real human language" will work just fine.
> > > >>>>     If not, then the "real human language" called English will
> pose
> > > >>>>     some significant problems for imagining things other than they
> > > are.
> > > >>>>     Confused.
> > > >>>>     -greg
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>     On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Andy Blunden <
> ablunden@mira.net
> > > >>>>     <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         Cristina,
> > > >>>>         There is far too much in your message to deal with on an
> > email
> > > >>>>         list. What I usually do in such cases is simply pick a
> bit I
> > > >>>>         think I can respond to and ignore the rest. OK?
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         I think *real human languages* - as opposed to made up
> > > >>>>         languages like Esperanto or the kind of mixture of
> neologs,
> > > >>>>         hyphenated words and other gobbydegook fashionable in some
> > > >>>>         academic circles - can be underestimated. Sure, one must
> use
> > > >>>>         specialised jargon sometimes, to communicate to a
> > specialised
> > > >>>>         collaborator in a shared discipline, but generally that is
> > > >>>>         because the jargon has itself a long track record. Don't
> try
> > > >>>>         and make up words and concepts, at least, take a year or
> two
> > > >>>>         about it if you have to.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         Secondly, Descartes was no fool. He was the person that
> > first
> > > >>>>         treated consciousness as an object of science, and the
> many
> > of
> > > >>>>         those belonging to the dualist tradition he was part of
> > wound
> > > >>>>         up being burnt at the stake for suggesting that the world
> > was
> > > >>>>         not necessarily identical to how it seemed. So I'd say,
> > better
> > > >>>>         to suffer association with Descartes than make up words
> and
> > > >>>>         expressions. The Fascist campaign launched against him in
> > the
> > > >>>>         1930s was not meant to help us. He deserves respect.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         For example, my development is not the same the
> development
> > > >>>>         some project makes. And no amount of playing with words
> can
> > > >>>>         eliminate that without degenerating into nonsense. I must
> > > >>>>         correct something I said which was wrong in my earlier
> post
> > > >>>>         though. I said that the relation between projects was the
> > > >>>>         crucial thing in personality development. Not completely
> > true.
> > > >>>>         As Jean Lave has shown so well, the relation between a
> > person
> > > >>>>         and a project they are committed to is equally important,
> > > >>>>         their role, so to speak. Take these two together.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         Motives instead of motivation is good. More definite. But
> I
> > > >>>>         don't agree at all that Leontyev resolves this problem.
> For
> > a
> > > >>>>         start his dichotomy between 'objective' motives, i.e.,
> those
> > > >>>>         endorsed by the hegemonic power in the given social
> > formation,
> > > >>>>         and 'subjective', usually unacknowledged, motives, is in
> my
> > > >>>>         view a product of the times he lived in, and not useful
> for
> > > >>>>         us. The question is: how does the person form a *concept*
> of
> > > >>>>         the object? It is the object-concept which is the crucial
> > > >>>>         thing in talking abut motives. Over and above the relation
> > > >>>>         between the worker's project of providing for his family
> (or
> > > >>>>         whatever) and the employer's project of expanding the
> > > >>>>         proportion of the social labour subsumed under his/her
> > > >>>>         capital. The relation between these two projects doubtless
> > > >>>>         seems to the boss to be the difference between the
> worker's
> > > >>>>         subjective, secret, self-interest, and his own "objective"
> > > >>>>         motive. But his point of view is not necessarily ours.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         Have a read of Alasdair MacIntyre on extrinsic and
> intrinsic
> > > >>>>         motives, too.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         That's more than enough.
> > > >>>>         Andy
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > >>>> ------------
> > > >>>>         *Andy Blunden*
> > > >>>>         http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > >>>>         <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>         Maria Cristina Migliore wrote:
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>             Greg and Andy,
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>             Thank you for your comments.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>             Greg, I absolutely agree with you about the
> difficulties
> > > >>>>             of overcoming our
> > > >>>>             western language and thoughts, so influenced by the
> > > >>>>             Cartesian dualism.
> > > >>>>             Andy, I hope to be able to show a bit how I connect
> > > >>>>             activities in what
> > > >>>>             follow.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>             About my attempts to overcome a dualistic language: I
> > tend
> > > >>>>             to prefer to
> > > >>>>             talk about a) single development (as suggest by Cole
> and
> > > >>>>             Wertsh) instead of
> > > >>>>             individual and activity (or context or project)
> > > >>>>             development; b) dimensions
> > > >>>>             of a phenomenon instead of levels of a phenomenon
> > > >>>>             (micro-meso-macro); c)
> > > >>>>             motives instead of motivation.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>             However it happens that I need to swing between ‘my’
> new
> > > >>>>             language and the
> > > >>>>             ‘standard’ one, because I am living in a still
> Cartesian
> > > >>>>             world and I need
> > > >>>>             to be understood by people (and even myself!) who are
> > (am)
> > > >>>>             made of this
> > > >>>>             Cartesian world.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>     --     Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > >>>>     Assistant Professor
> > > >>>>     Department of Anthropology
> > > >>>>     882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > >>>>     Brigham Young University
> > > >>>>     Provo, UT 84602
> > > >>>>     http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> --
> > > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > >>>> Assistant Professor
> > > >>>> Department of Anthropology
> > > >>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > >>>> Brigham Young University
> > > >>>> Provo, UT 84602
> > > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> --
> > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > >> Assistant Professor
> > > >> Department of Anthropology
> > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > >> Brigham Young University
> > > >> Provo, UT 84602
> > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> Maria Cristina Migliore, Ph.D.
>
> Senior Researcher
>
>
> IRES Istituto Ricerche Economico Sociali del Piemonte
>
> Via Nizza, 18
>
> 10125 Torino – Italia
>
> Tel. +39 011 6666463
>
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>
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>
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>
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>
> personal web www.mariacristinamigliore.it (Italiano)
>
> personal web www.mariacristinamigliore.it/index_e.htm (English)
>
>
>
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