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Chapter 15
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us speak to the point. The important thing is that
the meaning of a term is accepted in a system of views.
It turns out that even reflexology
conceived of in a certain way
has its raison d’être.
Let people not think that these trifles have no importance, because they are too obviously confused, contradictory, incorrect, etc. Here there is a difference between the scientific and the practical points of view. Mflnsterberg explained that the gardener loves his tulips and hates the weeds, but the botanist who describes and explains loves or ,hates nothing and, from his point of view, cannot love or hate. For the science of man, he says, stupidity is of no less interest than wisdom. It is all indifferent material that merely claims to exist as a link in the chain of phenomena. As a link in the chain of causal phenomena, this fact—that terminology suddenly becomes an urgent question for the eclectic psychologist who does not care about terminology unless it touches his position—is a valuable methodological fact. It is as valuable as the fact that other eclectics
following the same path
come to the same conclusion as Kornilov: neither the conditional nor the correlative reflexes appear sufficiently clear and understandable. Reactions are the basis of the new psychology, and the whole psychology developed by Pavlov, Bekhterev and Watson is called neither reflexology nor behaviorism, but ‘psychologie de reaction,’ i.e., reaetology. Let the eclectics come to opposite conclusions about a specific thing. They are still related by the method, the process by which they arrive at their conclusions.
We find the same regularity in all reflexologists—both investigators and theoreticians. Watson [1914, p. 9] is convinced that we can write a course in psychology without using the words “consciousness,” “content,” “introspectively verified,” “imagery” etc. And for him this is not a terminologieal matter, but one of principle:
just as the chemist cannot use the language of alchemy nor the astronomer that of the horoscope. He explains this brilliantly with the help of one specific case: he regards the difference between a visual reaction and a visual image as extremely important because behind it lies the difference between a consistent monism and a consistent dualism [1914, pp. 16-20]. A word is for him the tentacle by which philosophy comprehends a fact. Whatever is the value of the countless volumes written in the terms of consciousness, it can only be determined and expressed by translating them into objective language. For according to Watson consciousness and so on are no more than undefined expressions. And the new textbook breaks with the popular theories and terminology. Watson condemns “half-hearted psychology of behavior” (which brings harm to the whole current) claiming that when the theses of the new psychology will not preserve their clarity its framework will be distorted, obscured, and it will lose its genuine meaning. Functional psychology perished from such half-heartedness. If behaviorism has a future then it must break completely with the concept of consciousness. However, thus far it has not been decided whether behaviorism will become the dominating
system
of psychology or simply remain a methodological approach. And therefore Watson (1926) too often takes the methodology of common sense as the basis of his investigations. In the attempt to liberate himself from philosophy he slips into the viewpoint of the “common man,” understanding by this latter not the basic feature of human practice but the common sense of the average American businessman. In his opinion the common man must welcome behaviorism. Ordinary life has taught him to act that way. Consequently, when dealing with the science of behavior he will not feel a change of method or some change of the subject (ibid.). This [viewpoint] implies the verdict on all behaviorism. Scientific study absolutely requires a
change
of the subject (i.e., its treatment in concepts) and the
method.
But behavior itself is understood by these psychologists in its everyday sense and in their arguments and
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